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Union Calendar No. 294 
98TH CONGRESS j HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ( REIH>IC 
1st Session J ( No. 98-51 
DEFICIENCIES IN FDA'S REGULATION OF THE NEW DRUG 
"ORAFLEX" 
NOVEMBER 9, 1983.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the Stut< 
of the Union and ordered to be printed 
Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on Government Operations, 
submitted the following 
FOURTEENTH REPORT 
together with 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS 
On October 25, 1983, the Committee on Government Operation 
approved and adopted a report entitled "Deficiencies in FDA's Re* 
ulation of the New Drug 'Oraflex'." The chairman was directed t 
transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the rules of the House of Representatives, the Committe 
on Government Operations has responsibility for studying the ope 
ation of Government activities at all levels from the standpoint < 
economy and efficiency. The committee has assigned this respons 
bility as it relates to the Department of Health and Human Ser 
ices (HHS) to the Intergovernmental Relations and Human R< 
sources Subcommittee. 
Since 1964 the subcommittee has periodically examined the pe 
formance of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in protectin 
the public from unsafe and ineffective drugs. 
FDA's central responsibility, in the drug area, is to regulate th 
investigational use of new drugs and to evaluate applications fc 
marketing new drug products. In discharging this responsibilit; 
FDA is expected to obtain and review all available information re 
evant to the safety and efficacy of new drug products before a 
proving them for marketing. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Inasmuch as HHS had recently announced plans to speed the ap-
proval and marketing of new drugs, the subcommittee believed it 
was timely, as well as important, to assess the soundness of FDA's 
'current policies and procedures for insuring the availability and 
thorough review of all important information concerning new 
drugs. As part of this assessment, the subcommittee's inquiry fo-
cused on FDA's review of Oraflex (generic name benoxaprofen), a 
newly approved anti-arthritis drug manufactured by Eli Lilly and 
Company (Lilly). 
The subcommittee's ongoing investigation of FDA's review of 
Oraflex has included two days of public hearings on August 3 and 
4, 1982.1 
Witnesses included the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, the Director of FDA's National Center for Drugs and 
Biologies, and the Acting Director of FDA's Office of New Drug 
Evaluation. 
The subcommittee investigation of FDA's evaluation and approv-
al of Oraflex included careful examination of the relevant medical 
literature and of FDA documents, including correspondence, inter-
nal memoranda, establishment inspection reports, and information 
contained in the Oraflex new drug application (NDA) and investi-
gational new drug (IND) files. In addition, the subcommittee ob-
tained information on Oraflex from both public and private sources 
outside the United States. The comprehensive nature of this docu-
mentation enabled the subcommittee to evaluate the adequacy of 
FDA's policies and procedures for insuring the safety and effective-
ness of new drugs in general and Oraflex in particular. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The FDA approved Oraflex on April 19, 1982, for relief from the 
pain and inflammation of rheumatoid and osteoarthritis. Oraflex 
was one of several nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAID's) 
approved for this purpose by the FDA. Because of its exceptionally 
long half-life or retention period in the body, Oraflex offered the 
advantage (shared by only one other approved NSAID 2) of once-a-
day dosage. 
Oraflex was first synthesized in 1966 by its manufacturer, Eli 
Lilly and Company, at its research center in the United Kingdom. 
In the United States, Lilly submitted an investigational new drug 
application (IND) for Oraflex on June 10, 1974, and a new drug ap-
plication (NDA) on January 17, 1980. Approximately 3,000 users 
and 105 clinical investigators participated in the Oraflex clinical 
trials in the United States. 
The question of whether Oraflex should be approved was re-
ferred by FDA to its Arthritis Advisory Committee. In a January 
21, 1982, meeting, the committee unanimously voted to recommend 
approval of the drug. However, it expressed concern about the 
drug's side effects, especially phototoxicity. For Oraflex patients 
1
 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Mouse of 
Representatives. "The Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The New 
Drug Review Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, hereinafter referred to as Hearings. 
a
 On April 6, 1982, FDA hnd opproved Feldene, which is manufactured by Finer Pharmaceuti-
3 
this involved burning, itching, redness and sometimes wheals after 
brief exposure to sun or ultraviolet light. Concern also was shown 
for Oraflex patients who developed onycholysis, the loosening or 
separation of the fingernail from its bed. The Advisory Committee 
decided that Oraflex-induced phototoxicity and onycholysis were 
generally minor problems that could be handled by appropriate 
warnings in the drug's labeling. 
On April 19, 1982, approximately three months after the Arthri-
tis Advisory Committee meeting, Oraflex was approved by FDA for 
marketing in the United States. By this time, the drug had already 
been marketed in the United Kingdom for approximately 18 
months.3 
Five days after FDA approved Oraflex, an article appeared in 
The Lancet, a British medical journal, linking Oraflex to three 
cases of jaundice in the United Kingdom.4 On May 8, 1982, 19 days 
after FDA approved Oraflex, the British Medical Journal published 
an article on the benoxaprofen-associated deaths of five elderly 
women in Northern Ireland who developed jaundice and, in all but 
one case, kidney disease. The article also mentioned a sixth patient 
who died of kidney failure.5 
On May 27, 1982, FDA received a letter dated May 20, 1982, from 
a senior government medical official in the United Kingdom who 
enclosed a February 1982 adverse reaction register associating the 
drug with 27 deaths in the United Kingdom, including 15 deaths 
from gastrointestinal disorders, two deaths from liver failure, and 
three deaths from kidney disease.6 
In the wake of British reports linking Oraflex with fatal liver 
disease, the Arthritis Advisory Committee devoted its June 3-4, 
1982, meeting to a consideration of the liver toxicity of the nonster-
oidal anti-inflammatory drugs, including Oraflex. Following the 
meeting, FDA advised Lilly to modify the Oraflex labeling. On July 
12, 1982, FDA approved revised labeling which acknowledged re-
ports of Oraflex-associated deaths from liver and, in many cases, 
kidney disease. Noting reports of deaths among elderly users of the 
drug, the labeling also recommended one-half to two-thirds of the 
usual dose for older patients. 
On July 22, 1982, Lilly advised FDA that the Danish drug regula 
tory authority had decided to restrict use of benoxaprofen to hospi 
tals, beginning August 2, 1982.7 The Danes based this action on re 
ports in the British medical literature and the high incidence ol 
drug-related skin reactions. The Danish regulatory authority hac 
also received three reports of drug-associated deaths, two of which 
involved liver dysfunction.8 
At the time of the subcommittee hearing on August 3, 1982, 1( 
benoxaprofen-associated deaths had been reported in the Britisl 
3
 It was approved in the United Kingdom for hospital use only in May 1980, and for generi 
commercial marketing in October 1980. 
• This April 24, 1982, article U reprinted at page 105 of the Hearings. 
• Hearings, page 104. 
• The letter and register are on file in the subcommittee office. 
1
 See memorandum of July 28, 1982, meeting between FDA staff and Lilly representatives 
subcommittee file*. 
•Ibid 
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medical literature,9 including 14 from liver and/or kidney failure, 
one from gastro-intestinal disease, and one from a serious skin dis-
order. In addition, FDA had received from the British Govern-
ment's Committee on Safety of Medicines a June 1982 adverse reac-
* tion printout showing 33 benoxaprofen-associated deaths in the 
United Kingdom, including 19 from gastro-intestinal disorders, 3 
, from liver diseases, 3 from kidney failure, and 3 from skin dis-
' eases.10 Just minutes before the subcommittee hearing commenced 
on August 4, the Committee on Safety of Medicines notified FDA 
that it had suspended the product's license in the United Kingdom 
for 90 days.11 By this time, British health officials had received 
more than 3,500 reports of benoxaprofen-associated adverse effects, 
including 61 reports of deaths.12 
In announcing the British decision at the subcommittee hearing 
that morning, FDA Commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr., stated 
that FDA was "in the process now of finding out from [the British] 
what data they have, the basis for this, so that we can act appro-
priately." 13 Immediately following the subcommittee's hearings, 
FDA officials met with representatives from Lilly to discuss the 
British Government's action. Later that same day, Lilly announced 
that distribution of benoxaprofen would be suspended worldwide. 
The drug had been marketed in West Germany, South Africa, Den-
mark, Spain, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, as 
well as in the United States and the United Kingdom. At the time 
Lilly removed Oraflex from the market, it had been associated with 
11 reported deaths in the United States. Oraflex has more recently 
been associated with 36 deaths from liver and/or kidney disease and 7 
deaths, from gastrointestinal disorders in the United States.14 
III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. FDA FAILED TO REVIEW ALL S IGNIFICANT ORAFLEX SAFETY 
I N F O R M A T I O N IN ITS POSSESSION PRIOR TO APPROVING THE DRUG 
1. FDA did not insure that its reviewers examined all files contain-
ing reports of Oraflex-associated adverse effects 
To meet the FDA requirement for reporting all significant ad-
verse reactions associated with drugs under investigation, drug 
sponsors may elect to make such reports to the IND (investigation-
al new drug) file rather than to the NDA (new drug application) 
file. In fact, FDA has not expected adverse reaction reports would 
be made to the NDA file after the sponsor of an NDA has declared 
a "data lock point"—the point at which the sponsor determines 
that it has reported to the NDA file all safety and efficacy data 
• All of these deaths appeared in the British Medical Journal. One was reported in the Janu-
ary 16, 1982, issue; 6 in the May 8, 1982, issue; 3 in the Mav 29, 1982, issue; 3 in the June 12, 
1982, issue; 2 in the July 3, 1982, issue; and 1 in the July 31, 1982, issue. 
10
 This printout, which is in the subcommittee files, may have included some of the 16 drug-
associated deaths reported in the British medical literature. 
1
' Memorandum by Jerome Halperin, Acting Director, Office of Drugs, of an August 4, 1982, 
telephone conversation with Dr. Gerald Jones, Medicines Division, U.K. Department of Health 
and Social Security. On file in subcommittee office. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Hearings, page 368. 
14
 October 7, 1983. triweekly FDA submission from Lilly of adverse experience repo'rts, which 
is in subcommittee files. 
5 
needed to support the new drug application. Since, as FDA officials 
testified, the NDA is the primary file for drugs under NDA review, 
the committee believes it imperative that FDA require full and 
prompt reports to that file up to the date of NDA approval. 
FDA acknowledged during subcommittee hearings that it has not 
routinely required its staff charged with evaluating new drug ap-
plications to examine the IND file for reports of adverse reactions 
before they approve new drugs for marketing. This policy resulted 
in the agency s failure, prior to approving Oraflex, to detect several 
important reports of Oraflex-associated liver and kidney reactions 
that had occurred during clinical trials. FDA approved labeling for 
Oraflex which made no mention of drug-associated liver reaction 
reports and even erroneously denied the existence of kidney dis-
ease in the clinical trials. 
FDA's lack of awareness, when it approved Oraflex, of the clini-
cal trial reports it had already received of liver and kidney disease 
proved particularly unfortunate in the light of the numerous re-
ports received of fatal as well as nonfatal drug-associated liver and 
kidney injury after the drug's approval. 
2. FDA approved Oraflex without knowing whether it had received 
all reports associating the drug with deaths and other serious 
adverse reactions 
After receiving information that Lilly did not report to FDA sev 
eral benoxaprofen-associated deaths known to its United Kingdom 
division prior to the approval of Oraflex in the United States, the 
subcommittee asked FDA whether the firm had reported any ben 
oxaprofen-associated deaths occurring outside the United State* 
before FDA approval. FDA initially responded that it did not know 
more than five months after approving Oraflex, whether Lilly hac 
made such reports. It is evident from FDA's response that it hac 
not thoroughly examined the sponsor's IND and NDA submission! 
before approving the drug for marketing. 
Moreover, because of a filing backlog in the documents room o 
the division charged with reviewing the Oraflex NDA, FDA wai 
unable to determine whether the sponsor had reported any signifi 
cant adverse reactions in the several months immediately preced 
ing the drug's approval on April 19, 1982. FDA was unable t< 
review several reports of significant liver and kidney disease whicl 
had been reported during that period. 
On June 23, 1982, more than two months after Oraflex was ap 
proved, Lilly informed FDA that five cases of jaundice had oc 
curred during the clinical trials, three of which had not been re 
ported. The drug's labeling did not mention jaundice and, in fact 
two company vice-presidents had stated earlier that no cases o 
jaundice had occurred in the clinical trials. On July 2, 1982, Lill^ 
informed FDA that it had reported all of the clinical trial cases in 
volving jaundice prior to the drug's approval, and that all of then 
had also involved serious kidney disease. Despite Lilly's discrepan 
versions of what it had reported, FDA, as late as the August \ 
hearing, had still not confirmed and, in fact, was unable to con 
firm, whether the firm had reported cases of Oraflex-associate< 
liver and kidney reactions prior to the Oraflex approval. 
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B. PRIOR TO APPROVING ORAFLEX, FDA MADE NO EFFORT TO OBTAIN IN-
FORMATION ON ITS SAFETY FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN WHICH IT 
WAS ALREADY MARKETED 
Despite its responsibility to consider all available information 
relevant to a new drug's safety, FDA has instituted no procedures 
for seeking adverse reaction data for drugs under investigation in 
the United States which have already been marketed in other 
countries. As a result, FDA was not aware of several deaths and 
other serious adverse reactions associated with Oraflex which had 
been reported to British health authorities prior to the drug's ap-
proval on April 19, 1982. For example, a February 1982 adverse re-
action register for Oraflex which FDA received from British medi-
cal officials more than a month after it approved the drug showed 
27 deaths and 25 reports of nonfatal liver and nine reports of non-
fatal kidney disease among the drug's users in the United King-
dom. 
Report data from other countries also might have been available 
to FDA prior to its approval of Oraflex. The Danish regulatory au-
thority, for example, received reports of 143 adverse reactions and 
three deaths associated with use of the drug in a 10-month period 
prior to this date. 
The committee believes FDA should make full use of the market-
ing experience of other nations with drugs that are under NDA 
review, particularly since premarketing studies frequently do not 
include a sufficient number of patients to detect unanticipated and 
relatively infrequent adverse reactions. Foreign marketing data 
can provide FDA with an indispensable source of information on 
the types and frequency of serious side effects reported for drugs 
under investigation in the United States. 
C. LILLY DID NOT REPORT SERIOUS ADVERSE REACTIONS ASSOCIATED 
WITH USE OF ORAFLEX PRIOR TO APPROVAL OF THE DRUG 
FDA regulations require sponsors to supply the agency with 
prompt and full reports of "any finding" associated with a drug 
under investigation that may prove pertinent to its safety. The sub-
committee's investigation has revealed that Eli Lilly and Company 
did not report to FDA at least 32 benoxaprofen-associated deaths 
outside the United States known to its foreign affiliates prior to 
FDA approval of the drug. In addition, several officials in Lilly's 
Indianapolis headquarters were advised of a number of unreported 
Oraflex-associated deaths outside the United States before the drug 
was approved. 
Despite FDA's requirement that it receive prompt and full re-
ports of "any finding" associated with an investigational new drug 
which may significantly relate to that drug's safety, FDA officials 
have expressed the belief that sponsors are not always reporting to 
FDA deaths and other significant adverse experiences associated 
with the foreign marketing of drugs under investigation in the 
United States and that Lilly's failure to make such reports ap-
peared consistent with current industry practice. The committee 
believes that FDA cannot carry out its statutory responsibility for 
protecting the public from unsafe drugs unless it promptly receives 
7 
complete reports of all known deaths and serious adverse effects as 
sociated with new drugs, wherever they occur. 
More than a year before the FDA initiated an inspection o 
Lilly's Oraflex records on October 18, 1982, an agency official ha< 
recommended the prosecution of those Lilly officials responsible fo 
allegedly failing to report "important adverse findings" about Ore 
flex and several other drugs. FDA had been investigating Lilly's re 
porting practices since the fall of 1979. At the subcommittee1 
August 3, 1982, hearing, FDA officials characterized this investig* 
tion as "full-fledged" and "ongoing." Despite this, the agency di 
not undertake its inspection of Lilly's report files concerning On 
flex-associated deaths outside the United States until advised b 
the subcommittee of the company's failure to report 13 such deatl 
prior to the drug's approval on April 19, 1982. Based solely on tr 
findings of this inspection, which uncovered additional unreport* 
Oraflex-associated deaths, FDA requested the Justice Departmei 
to initiate a grand jury investigation. 
D. FDA ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS WAS INADEQUATE 
Shortly after FDA discovered unreported Oraflex deaths by i 
specting Lilly records in late 1982, the supervisory medical offic 
in FDA's Oraflex review found that Pfizer Pharmaceuticals al 
failed to report to FDA several serious adverse reactions, includii 
one death, associated with use of its arthritis drug, Feldene, outsi 
the United States prior to FDA approval of that drug. This bears 
strong resemblance to the Oraflex situation. Pfizer did not infoi 
FDA of serious adverse reactions which apparently were report 
to its foreign divisions prior to FDA's approval of Feldene. How< 
er, no referral of the Pfizer matter was made to any investigati 
arm of the FDA. 
The committee questions FDA's commitment to enforcing its r< 
ulations requiring sponsors promptly to report all significant safc 
information relating to drugs under investigation. In this conn 
tion, the committee notes that FDA did not investigate the exU 
of Lilly's failure to report Oraflex-associated deaths outside t 
United States until after it had been advised by the subcommitl 
of 13 such unreported deaths. 
The FDA is charged with executing the Food, Drug, and Cosm 
ic Act and its implementing regulations. The committee belies 
FDA places the public's health at risk when it does not vigorou 
enforce the legal requirement that a sponsor report all adverse 
actions to a new drug under clinical investigation, since this inf 
mation is needed to weigh the risks of the drug against its pot 
tial benefits. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The committee recommends that the Secretary of Health i 
Human Services take prompt action to assure the correction of 
deficiencies identified in this report. The committee specifically 
ommends that: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1. FDA require sponsors to report all adverse drug reactions si-
multaneously to both the investigational new drug (IND) and new 
drug application (NDA) files for drugs under investigation, 
i 2. FDA evaluate all reports it receives of adverse reactions asso-
ciated with new drugs before approving such drugs for marketing. 
Steps should be taken to: 
a. Assure a thorough examination of all documents and files 
which might contain such reports; 
b. Establish for drug sponsors standardized formats for re-
cording and alerting FDA reviewers to serious adverse reac-
tions; and 
c. Assure that all incoming adverse reaction reports for 
drugs under investigation are promptly and systematically en-
tered into appropriate files and are immediately retrievable for 
review. 
3. FDA establish procedures for obtaining information concern-
ing the safety and effectiveness of drugs under investigation from 
foreign countries in which such drugs have already been approved, 
or disapproved, for marketing. 
4. Institute policies and procedures for insuring that the agency's 
adverse reaction reporting requirements are strictly enforced. 
V. DEFICIENCIES IN THE FDA REVIEW OF ORAFLEX 
A. FDA FAILED TO REVIEW ALL SIGNIFICANT ORAFLEX SAFETY 
INFORMATION IN ITS POSSESSION PRIOR TO APPROVING THE DRUG 
During a 1981 inspection, FDA investigators learned that Lilly 
had reported significant adverse reactions to the Oraflex NDA 
which it had not reported to the Oraflex IND, and vice versa.15 
FDA, however, has not required firms to submit reports of serious 
or alarming adverse effects to both the active IND and NDA files 
for drugs under investigation. While acknowledging during the sub-
committee's hearings that once a new drug application is filed, 
"the primary attention of the reviewers is on the NDA and not the 
IND," 16 FDA informed the subcommittee on October 22, 1982, that 
it "has not ordinarily expected most additional adverse reaction 
data to be submitted to'the NDA" l 7 following the establishment of 
a data lock point—the point at which the sponsor decides no longer 
to provide full reports and analysis of efficacy and safety informa-
tion to the NDA file. Lilly set its data lock point for Oraflex in No-
vember 1978, almost 3V2 years before FDA approved the drug. 
During this interval, FDA neither required nor expected Lilly to 
submit significant Oraflex-associated adverse effects to the Oraflex 
NDA. 
FDA has acknowleged that it has established "no policy, written 
or unwritten, freeing sponsors from reporting any significant ad-
verse reactions that our regulations otherwise require them to 
report." l 8 FDA regulations, in fact, require full reports to FDA of 
16
 Hearings, page 7f>. 
*• Hearings, page 120 
17
 Hearings, page 559 
' • Hearings, page 559. 
9 
significant information pertinent to the safety of a new drug under 
investigation.19 Since the NDA is the primary file for a drug under 
NDA review, the committee believes it imperative that FDA re-
quire full and prompt reports of significant adverse effects to that 
file up to the date of NDA approval. 
Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, FDA's Office of New Drug 
Evaluation, acknowledged during the subcommittee hearings, that 
the agency did not routinely require the staff charged with review-
ing new drug applications to examine, before approving a new 
drug, the IND file for legally required reports of drug-associated 
adverse effects which may not have been submitted to its compan-
ion NDA file.20 Despite Dr. Temple's statement that "it would be 
very unusual * * * to find a major adverse reaction in [the IND 
file] once an NDA had been submitted," 21 the subcommittee inves-
tigation revealed that several important Oraflex-associated liver re-
actions which the sponsor had reported only to the IND had es-
caped the notice of agency reviewers prior to FDA's approval of the 
Oraflex NDA. Had such reports been noted, it is unlikely that FDA 
would have originally approved labeling for the drug which made 
no mention of liver disease and which confined Oraflex-associated 
liver reactions to "liver function test abnormalities" which were 
"usually transient." 2 2 
The subcommittee's investigation revealed that before FDA ap-
proved this labeling on April 19, 1982, Lilly had reported four cases 
of serious liver disease to the Oraflex IND, all of which involved 
clinical trial patients who had also developed kidney disease. The 
first such case was reported more than 15 months before Lilly sub-
mitted its new drug application for Oraflex on January 17, 1980. 
Lilly included in an October 5, 1978, IND submission, a drug expe-
rience report for a 60-year-old patient who developed jaundice. This 
patient also eventually developed kidnev disease. In fact, she was 
admitted to the hospital on August 28, 1978, in hepato-renal failure 
and required renal dialysis.23 
A 70-year-old female patient featured in a February 23, 1982, 
IND submission, showed a similar course. This patient developed 
hepatitis, jaundice, and, according to a preliminary report, acute 
renal failure secondary to nephritis while taking Oraflex.24 
A March 22, 1982, IND submission described a case of drug-in-
duced liver and kidney disease involving a 60-year-old female clini-
cal trial patient on 1,000 mg/day of Oraflex who suffered hepato-
renal failure in December 1981. When Oraflex was resumed at a 
lower dose of 800 mg/day on February 2, 1982, the patient again 
experienced hepato-renal failure.25 
' •See 21 C.F.R. 312(aXlX6). 
, 0
 Hearings, pages 86-87. 
11
 Ibid., page 87. 
" Hearings, page 63. Oraflex's chemical similarity to Flexin, a drug approved for the relief ol 
skeletal muscle spasm, should have alerted FDA to its potential liver toxicity. FDA removed 
Flexin from the market on October 13, 1961, because of a number of reports of serious and some 
times fatal liver disorders associated with its use. Both Oraflex and Flexin contained a benzoxa 
role nucleus. The committee is aware of only one other drug approved by FDA with this chemi 
cal feature. FDA's review of Flexin is recounted in subcommittee hearings held in 1964. Se< 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Reprc 
sentatives, "Drug Safety (Part 2)," April 28. 1964, pages 665-676. 
, s
 Hearings, pages 676-578. 
" Hearings, pages 633-636. ' 
" Hearings, pages 638-640. 
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Another case of combined liver and kidney disease occurred 
during the Oraflex clinical trails, although Lilly did not completely 
report it to FDA until a July 2, 1982, weekly adverse experience 
treport to the Oraflex NDA, more than ten weeks after FDA ap-
proved the drug. According to that report, a 65-year-old female 
Oraflex clinical trial patient was hospitalized on December 21, 
1981, with hepatitis and renal failure.26 However, a January 6, 
1982, initial report to the IND, the only Lilly submission on this 
patient prior to the drug's approval, discussed only renal failure 
with an unknown relationship to Oraflex and made no mention of 
hepatitis or any liver disorders.27 Yet according to its July 2, 1982, 
NDA submission, the company had received all paperwork concern-
ing this patient on February 23, 1982,28 almost two months before 
Oraflex was approved. 
FDA's failure prior to approving Oraflex to note the association 
in clinical trials between the drug and serious liver disease proved 
particularly unfortunate in light of numerous reports of fatal and 
non-fatal cases of Oraflex-associated liver failure which surfaced 
after FDA approval.29 Had FDA made a thorough review of all 
submissions to the Oraflex IND, it would have detected the drug's 
association with liver disease before, rather than after, it permitted 
marketing of the drug. 
Many of the post-market reports of serious Oraflex-associated 
injury and death involved patients who experienced both kidney 
and liver failure.30 Clearly, information on Oraflex's association 
with kidney disease, as well as its link to liver disease, was availa-
ble in FDA files before the agency approved the drug. Despite this, 
Lilly proposed and FDA approved labeling which denied altogether 
the existence of "evidence * * * of renal [kidney] toxicity in [the 
Oraflex] clinical studies." 31 
Lilly had prominently reported to the Oraflex IND a total of six 
cases of drug-associated kidney disease prior to the drug's approval. 
In addition to the four reports of combined kidney and liver disease 
already discussed, two other reports were submitted to the Oraflex 
IND of drug-associated kidney disorders which had occurred during 
the clinical trials. 
An adverse drug experience report contained in a September 17, 
1981, IND submission discussed a 60-year-old male with no history 
of renal problems who was diagnosed as suffering from nephrotic 
syndrome, a kidney ailment.32 A November 18, 1981, submission 
contained a follow-up report on this patient which diagnosed the 
case as "probable nephrotic syndrome. ' 3 3 According to a consulta-
tion notation included in this submission, "renal disease in this 
man is probably secondary to benoxaprofen." 34 
An August 21, 1980, IND submission described a 58-year-old 
woman who developed kidney complications in the form of intersti-
26
 Hearings, page 651. 
21
 Hearings, pages 630-G32. 
*• Hearings, page 648. 
29
 See Section VI below. 
3 0
 Ibid 
31
 Hearings, page 110. 
31
 Hearings, pages 617-619. 
S3
 Hearings, pages 620-622 
34
 Hearings, page 626 
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tial nephritis and membranous glomerulopathy 35 while taking 
Oraflex. Essentially the same information was reported to the IND 
in a December 1, 1980,36 follow-up submission. The case reports 
submitted by the clinical investigator for this patient described her 
condition as "drug-induced interstitial nephritis." 37 This finding 
was later highlighted in an FDA report of a special inspection of this 
investigator's records which was conducted in May 1981 at the re-
quest of FDA's Division of Scientific Investigations. According to 
that report, a kidney biopsy revealed the patient had "developed 
interstitial nephritis which was felt by the clinical investigator to 
be drug induced." 3 8 
Despite all the agency attention focused on this case of "drug-in-
duced ' kidney disease, FDA allowed Lilly to label "interstitial ne-
phritis" as an experienced side effect whose "causal relationship" 
with the drug was "unknown." 3 9 
This case brings to six the number of prominently reported cases 
of drug-associated kidney disease which had occurred during the 
Oraflex clinical trials. The Oraflex labeling which denied evidence 
of such disease was not only inconsistent "with the facts as known 
to Lilly," 4 0 but also contradicted information submitted to the 
Oraflex IND. FDA was no more justified in approving such labeling 
than Lilly was in proposing it. 
As discussed below,41 the subcommittee learned that Lilly did 
not inform FDA of several benoxaprofen-associated deaths in the 
United Kingdom which one of Lilly's foreign divisions knew about 
months before April 19, 1982, the day FDA approved the drug. 
In view of this information, the subcommittee wrote FDA Com 
missioner Hayes on September 20, 1982, inquiring whether th« 
sponsor reported to FDA any other benoxaprofen-associated death* 
outside the United States prior to April 19, 1982.42 In a Septembei 
28, 1982, reply, Robert C. Wetherell, Jr., Associate Commissionei 
for Legislation and Information, advised the subcommittee thai 
FDA was still reviewing its records to determine whether the com 
pany might have reported additional Oraflex-associated death* 
prior to the drug's approval: "Our National Center for Drugs anc 
Biologies informs me that additional deaths may have been report 
ed and we are now in the process of reviewing our records, includ 
ing reprints of the literature which may have been submitted b) 
Eli Lilly and Company." 4 3 
That FDA did not know more than five months after approva 
whether the sponsor had reported Oraflex-associated deaths before 
approval indicates that the agency had not thoroughly examinee 
the sponsor's IND and NDA submissions before approving the dru* 
3
* Hearings, pages 590-591. 
a e
 Hearings, pages 594-595. 
31
 Hearings, page 593. 
" Hearings, page 596. 
*• Hearings, page 110. FDA's acknowledgement of the possibility that a case of interstitial n< 
thritis occurring in the Oraflex clinical trials might have been drug-related is itself, as Dr. Ala isook of FDA's Division of Scientific Investigations observed, inconsistent with iU original a| 
proval of labeling disclaiming existence of "evidence * * • of renal [kidney] toxicity in clinici 
studies." See Heurings, pages 614-615. 
4 0
 Hearings, pages 614-615. 
41
 See Section VI below. 
4a
 Hearings, pnpe 544. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for marketing. FDA's lack of information on reports of Oraflex-as-
sociated deaths is all the more surprising because FDA Commis-
sioner Hayes testified in his August 3 appearance before the sub-
committee that the agency was conducting an intensive investiga-
tion of alleged adverse reaction reporting violations by Lilly in con-
nection with Oraflex and several other investigational and market-
ed drugs.44 
Due to a filing backlog in the documents room of the division 
charged with reviewing the Oraflex NDA, FDA was unable to de-
termine whether the sponsor had reported all significant adverse 
reactions in the several months immediately preceding the drug's 
approval on April 19, 1982. As of July 2, 1982, more than two 
months after the drug was approved, only those reactions reported 
by Lilly prior to December 2, 1981, had been entered into that divi-
sion's filing system and were thus reviewable.45 Those adverse re-
actions which Lilly reported after that date completely escaped the 
notice of FDA's reviewers. Included among these adverse reactions 
were three of the four cases of combined liver and kidney diseases 
whicji were reported before approval. 
As of the subcommittee's August 3 hearing—three and one half 
months after Oraflex was approved—FDA still was unable to verify 
the company's claim that it had reported serious drug-associated 
adverse effects to the agency prior to the drug's approval. Initially, 
the company disclaimed the existence of jaundice—a serious liver 
disorder—in the Oraflex clinical trials. Two Lilly vice-presidents-
one in a letter in the May 29, 1982, British Medical Journal 4 6 and 
the other in a May 14, 1982, phone conversation with Dr. Robert 
Temple of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation 47— stated that no 
Oraflex clinical trial patients had developed jaundice. Then, at a 
June 23, 1982, meeting, Lilly officials told FDA that they had dis-
covered five cases of jaundice in the clinical trials, two of which 
had been submitted to the NDA and three of which were part of 
the firm's "unprocessed" and unreported IND data.48 According to 
a memorandum of that meeting, FDA officials "expressed surprise 
that cases of jaundice had not been submitted prominently to the 
NDA prior to its approval." 4 9 Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, 
FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, testified before the subcom-
mittee, however, that the memorandum of the June 23, 1982, meet-
ing was "not accurate." 5 0 Lilly later informed FDA that only four 
cases of hepatic disease occurred prior to approval,61 all of which, 
Dr. Temple told the subcommittee, he thought "were reported in 
one way or another to something." 52 As late as the subcommittee's 
44
 Hearings, page 234. 
4 5
 Hearings, page 119. 
4 S
 Hearings, page 105. 
41
 Hearings, page 107. 
*• Hearings, page 111. 
4 9
 Ibid. At this meeting, Lilly neglected to mention that many of the patients who developed 
jaundice, as previously discussed, also experienced kidney failure. Since the "meeting was sched-
uled as a result of the liver and renal toxicity problems reported since the approval of Oraflex 
on April 19, 1982," (hearings, page 112) such a disclosure would have been appropriate. 
•° Hearings, page 114. 
•* Ibid. Actually, a fifth case of hepatic disease occurred prior to approval but was reported to 
FDA by the clinical investigator on April 28, 1982, after the drug was approved. Hearings, page 
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August 3 hearing, FDA had still not confirmed Lilly's discrepant 
versions of what adverse reactions had been reported. In fact, FDA 
was unable to confirm whether Lilly had reported several Oraflex-
associated liver reactions prior to the drug's approval.63 
B. PRIOR TO APPROVING ORAFLEX, FDA MADE NO EFFORT TO OBTAIN I N -
FORMATION ON ITS 8AFETY FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES I N WHICH IT 
WAS ALREADY MARKETED 
The law prohibits FDA from approving a new drug for marketing 
unless it has sufficient information that it is safe for its intended 
use. In this connection, FDA has the responsibility to inform itself 
of all known adverse effects associated with such a drug, and to 
make full use of such information in weighing the drug's risks 
against its purported benefits. FDA approved Oraflex withoul 
meeting that standard. 
A February 1982 adverse reaction register on Oraflex preparec 
by the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) in the Unitec 
Kingdom showed 27 benoxaprofen (OraflexVassociated deaths ii 
the U.K., including 15 deaths from gastrointestinal disorders, thre< 
deaths from kidney and two deaths from liver disease. In addition 
the register showed 25 reports of non-fatal liver and nine reports o 
non-fatal kidney disease among the drug's users in the Unites 
Kingdom. Dr. John P. Griffin, Professional Head of the Medicine 
Division of the CSM, sent the register unsolicited to FDA on Ma 
20, 1982, approximately one month after the FDA approved Or* 
flex.64 Some or all of this information might have been available t 
FDA prior to its April 19, 1982, approval of Oraflex had the agenc 
taken the initiative to inform itself of the British experience wit 
the drug. 
In the 10 months prior to March 1982, Danish health authority 
had received 101 benoxaprofen-associated adverse effect report 
covering 143 reactions, three of which were fatal.65 Two of tl 
three Danish deaths involved liver disease. This information, to 
might have been available to FDA prior to its approval of the dru 
FDA has no established procedures for obtaining foreign adver 
reaction data for drugs under investigation in the United Stat 
which are already marketed in other countries. The committee \ 
lieves FDA should make full use of the marketing experience 
other nations with drugs that are under NDA review, particulai 
since pre-marketing studies often do not include a sufficie 
number of patients to detect unanticipated and relatively infi 
quent adverse reactions. In short, the limitations of clinical testi: 
for predicting the full range and severity of a new drug's adver 
effects under normal conditions of medical practice intensifies t 
need for seeking adverse reaction data from all possible sourc 
The commercial marketing of new drugs in foreign countries ob 
ously is an important source of this information. 
FDA Commissioner Hayes maintained in testimony before 1 
subcommittee that FDA's "files would literally explode" were i 
•* Hearings, page 127. 
*
4
 Hearings, page 120. Letter and register on file in subcommittee office. 
•• Asgar Pedersen, Vgeskr Laeger, June 7, 1982, pages 1704-1705. Available in subcomm 
files. 
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agency "to solicit all adverse reactions on all drugs from all coun-
tries that have such information." 5 6 The committee does not be-
lieve the evidence supports this conclusion. For example, the two 
' adverse reaction registries which the United Kingdom Committee 
on Safety of Medicines sent to FDA for benoxaprofen consisted only 
of a total of six pages of tabular data.57 Moreover, it is essential 
that FDA have all available adverse reaction data for a new drug if 
it is to make a balanced and reliable risks-to-benefit judgment. 
Even tabular data, which do not include detailed reports on pa-
tients experiencing adverse effects, might prove valuable to FDA. 
The June 1982 benoxaprofen registry, which the Committee on 
Safety of Medicines sent to FDA, disclosed 256 reports of gastroin-
testinal disorders, 19 of which involved fatalities. In a memoran-
dum of a July 7, 1982, telephone conversation, Dr. Robert Temple, 
Acting Director of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, discussed 
the significance of this information: 
What is most impressive in that printout is the number 
and severity of gastrointestinal disease with what appear 
to be a surprisingly large number of cases of G.I. hemor-
rhage and perforation resulting in death. • * • There are 
about 20 reports of death related to gastrointestinal hem-
orrhage, perforation, etc. for a frequency of about 1 in 
25,000 users. If we assume some reasonable level of under-
reporting such as a 20 percent reporting rate, we would 
calculate a fatality rate of about 1 in 5,000, a figure that, 
offhand, seems quite high, even for non-steroidal anti-in-
flammatory drugs, which are known to cause gastrointesti-
nal bleeding, and hemorrhage, some episodes of which nat-
urally will be fatal.58 
Prior to studying these data, FDA was unaware of the drug's as-
sociation with an exceptionally large number of deaths from gas-
trointestinal disorders. Foreign marketing data, even in tabular 
form, can provide FDA with an indispensable source of information 
on the types and frequency of serious side effects reported for new 
drugs under investigation in the United States. 
VI. LILLY DID NOT REPORT SERIOUS ORAFLEX-ASSOCIATED ADVERSE 
REACTIONS AND THEREBY PREVENTED FDA FROM FULLY ASSESSING 
THE DRUG'S RISKS PRIOR TO ITS APPROVAL 
FDA regulations require sponsors to supply the agency with 
prompt and full reports of "any finding" associated with a new 
drug under investigation "that may suggest significant hazards, 
contraindications, side effects, and precautions pertinent to the 
safety of the drug." 5 9 
An October 5, 1982, internal Lilly memorandum reveals that, 
prior to the drug's approval on April 19, 1982, the firm failed to 
report to FDA 32 benoxaprofen-associated deaths outside the 
United States known to the company, including its foreign affili-
*• Hearings, page 121. 
i 1
 One registry consisted of two pages; the other of four pages. 
•• On file in subcommittee office. 
• • 91 PFR 8 Ml? KnVfil 
15 
ates.60 Eleven (34.4 percent) of these deaths involved liver and ten 
(31.3 percent) kidney disease. Six (18.8 percent) of these deaths, in 
fact, showed both liver and kidney involvement.61 In addition, ten 
(31.3 percent) were associated with gastrointestinal disorders.62 
Aplastic anemia was also implicated in three (9.4 percent) of the 
unreported deaths.63 The list of drug-associated adverse reactions 
in the original Oraflex package insert did not include aplastic 
anemia. 
The committee believes that Eli Lilly and Co. was responsible 
under the law, for making prompt, complete, and accurate reports 
to FDA of all significant Oraflex-related adverse reactions knowr 
to the firm's foreign affiliates. In this connection, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act "imposei 
not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations but also 
and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure tha 
violations will not occur. The requirements of foresight and vigi 
lance imposed on responsible corporate agents are . . . no mor 
stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who volur 
tarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whos 
services and products affect the health and well-being of the publi 
that supports them." 6 4 
An internal Lilly memorandum shows that one official in th 
firm's Indianapolis headquarters was aware of seven of thes 
deaths before the FDA approval date. Four of those deaths involve 
kidney and five gastrointestinal disease. One of the four kidne 
cases also involved liver failure.65 
The company memorandum lists two colleagues of this Lilly of! 
cial as knowing of five of the seven unreported deaths prior to tl 
drug's approval.66 One of these colleagues, in fact, has admitU 
pre-approval knowledge of 29 Oraflex-associated deaths outside tl 
United States.67 One of these deaths was reported to FDA befo 
•° Memorandum in subcommittee files. An FDA inspection begun on October 18, 1982, wh 
was designed to determine when Lilly reported Oraflex-associated deaths outside the Uni 
States to the FDA, did not turn up this memorandum. FDA inspectors were only able to do 
ment 25 unreported deaths known by "Eli Lilly and Company and/or its divisions, subsidiai 
or affiliates prior to the NDA approval date." Establishment Inspection Report, November 
1982, page 28. In subcommittee files. 
61
 Calculations based on information in Exhibit A, Establishment Inspection Report, Nov< 
ber 29, 1982. In subcommittee files. Adverse reaction information on one of the 32 deaths co 
not be located. 
•
3
 Ibid. 
6 3
 Ibid. 
•* United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1974). 
•* The October 5, 1982, memorandum is in subcommittee files. The calculations are based 
information in Exhibit A, Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, which ia als< 
subcommittee files. This official learned of two of these deaths, including one associated v» 
hepa to-renal failure, as early as October 1981, one-half year before Oraflex was approved. 
Because they did not obtain the October 6, 1982, memorandum, FDA personnel who inspe< 
Lilly's Oraflex records from October 18 to November 19, 1982, could only document a tota 
five unreported deaths known to Lilly's Indianapolis officials prior to the drug's approval. ' 
total was based on a report from Europe for the last quarter of 1981 which was sent to tl 
such officials. One copy of the report showed its receipt by Lilly's Indianapolis headquarter 
January 27, 1982, almost three months before Oraflex was approved. Other reactions liste 
the fourth quurter 1981 report—among them obstructive airways disease, deterioration of fil 
ing alveotitis, and vasculitis—were not previously known to FDA. See Exhibit T-3, Estab 
ment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, pages 4-6. 
•• See the October 5, 1982, Lilly memorandum in subcommittee files. 
• ' Deposition of Dr. W. I H. Shedden in Borom v. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil A< 
Number 83-38-COL. (M.D. Ga ), June 21, 1983. In subcommittee files. 
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the drug's approval.68 Twenty-five of these deaths were listed in a 
January 1982 benoxaprofen adverse reaction registry provided by 
the British Committee on Safety of Medicines.69 Eighteen of these 
• British deaths involved gastrointestinal disorders, two liver disease, 
and two kidney aliments.70 Three additional unreported deaths 
, were discussed in a pre-publication copy of an article 7 1 reporting 
1
 drug-associated adverse reactions occurring in Denmark, two in-
volving liver dysfunction and one Stevens Johnson syndrome, a se-
rious skin disease.72 
Other Lilly officials in Indianapolis were reportedly advised, 
prior to Oraflex's approval, of these unreported deaths, including 
the president of Lilly Research Laboratories, the head of Lilly's 
Regulatory Affairs Division, and the monitor for the Oraflex clini-
cal trials in the United States.73 
Documented receipt of some of this information by Lilly's U.S. 
personnel, FDA personnel have noted, contrasted with a Lilly vice 
president's statement during a November 19, 1982, conference with 
agency representatives that U.S. officials of Lilly "had not been 
aware of liver or kidney problems" until well after the drug had 
been approved.74 
Despite FDA's requirement that it receive prompt and full re-
ports of "any finding" associated with an investigational new drug 
which may significantly relate to that drug's safety,76 one senior 
FDA official has expressed the belief that sponsors are not routine-
ly reporting to FDA deaths and other significant adverse experi-
ences associated with the foreign marketing of drugs under investi-
gation in the United States and that Lilly's failure to make such 
reports was probably consistent with current industry practice.76 
In a similar vein, the Group Leader for the Oraflex review has 
stated that "I do not see anything outside the range of normal in 
Lilly's behavior as compared with the other companies whose 
•• Lilly reported a West German death, which involved a patient who developed toxic epider-
mal necrolysis (Lyell's syndrome), a serious dermatological condition. Such a death was reported 
to the Oraflex IND on June 29, 1981. Hearings, page 548. This case was forwarded to Lilly's 
Indianapolis headquarters by it* affiliate in the United Kingdom, which in turn received it from 
Lilly's West German affiliate. See Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, page 15. 
A section of the originally approved Oraflex labeling which acknowledges reports "from market-
ing outside the United States' includes toxic epidermal necrolysis as a reaction which has been 
associated with use of the drug. See Hearings, page 110. 
6 8
 The Committee on Safety of Medicines periodically makes available to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in the UK. registries of reported adverse effects associated with drugs they are 
licensed to sell. See "Data in Printouts from the Adverse Reactions Register" published by the 
Committee on Sufety of Medicines in Murch 1982. This document is available in subcommittee 
files. Lilly's British affiliate had obtained from the Committee on Safety of Medicines bcnoxu-
profen adverse reaction printouts in February 1981, April 1981, May 1981, and January 1982. 
Exhibit J., page 1, Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982. Available in subcom-
mittee files. The April 1981 registry snowed one death (from a perforated gastric ulcer), and the 
May 1981 registry a deaths (all from gastrointestinal disorders). Ibid., pages 13 and 19. 
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NDAs I reviewed . . . or as compared with the broader spectrum < 
NDAs I have seen but have not formally surveyed." 77 
The committee finds this view of law enforcement wholly ind 
fensible. As discussed subsequently in this report, FDA has a clei 
responsibility for instituting effective policies and procedures 
insure that it is promptly informed of all known deaths and serioi 
adverse effects associated with investigational new drugs, wherev 
they may occur. FDA's regulations require that "any" signifies 
finding relevant to the safety of an investigational drug be promj 
ly reported to the agency. The committee believes it essential th 
FDA receive all such information if it is to carry out its statuto 
responsibility for protecting the public from unsafe drugs. In tl 
connection, it should be remembered that the thalidomide disasl 
was averted in the United States largely because of reports of bii 
defects associated with the use of thalidomide in other countri 
which, unlike the United States, had approved it for marketing. 
When FDA initiated an inspection of Lilly's Oraflex records 
October 18, 1982, FDA had before it a year-old recommendation 
the prosecution of those Lilly officials responsible for failing 
report "important adverse findings" about Oraflex and seve 
other marketed or investigational drugs. In a September 29, 1£ 
memorandum, Dr. Michael J. Hensley, a medical officer v% 
FDA's Division of Scientific Investigations, made this recommer 
tion after alleging, based on a previous inspection of the compai 
records, that Lilly had failed to report 81 of the 173 Oraflex-ass 
ated adverse effects which were submitted to the company's rr 
agement by five clincial investigators. Sixty-five of these 81 advi 
effects were eventually confirmed as Oraflex-related.78 
FDA's inspection of Lilly's Oraflex records in October and 
vember of 1982 actually represented the seventh establishment 
spection it had conducted of the firm over the previous three yc 
After receiving allegations from a former Lilly employee that 
firm had withheld significant information from FDA,79 the ag< 
undertook a major investigation in the fall of 1979 which evenl 
ly uncovered evidence of serious omissions and deficiencie 
Lilly's reporting to FDA of important findings in connection 
several investigational80 and marketed81 drugs. In view of 
evidence, Dr. Marion J. Finkel, then the Associate Directoi 
New Drug Evaluation, advised Lilly in a March 12, 1982, letti 
77
 "Additional Views," Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Eli Lilly am 
panv Task Force, March 1983, page 64. 
1
 "Hearings, page 90. Despite testimony before the subcommittee bv Dr. Robert 1 
Acting Director o f FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, that Lilly's failure to report tt 
actions did not violate agency regulations (Hearings, page 92), FDA recently acknowledg 
such non re porting "may have been an attempt to bias the safety profile of the drug." (Fi 
Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Eh Lilly and Company Task Force, March 198 
7
* Hearings, page 128. 
•° FDA personnel found serious irregularities in Lilly's reporting for several investif 
new drugs besides Oraflex, including two anti-arrhythmic drugs—aprindine (pages 128-
660-673 of the Hearings) and drobuhne (pages 169-192 and 674-681 of Hearings) and pen 
drug for breast cancer (pages 285-287 of Hearings). 
•
r
 FDA investigators nave concluded that Lilly failed to make required reports of adi 
actions associated with monenein, an approved animal feed supplement (pages 192-219 
ings). They also found that Lilly did not report cardiotoxicity findings from dog experih 
volving Darvon, an approved analgesic (pages 249-280). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FDA's concerns about the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness 
of the firm's submissions.82 
At the subcommittee's August 3, 1982, hearing, FDA officials 
•characterized the investigation of Lilly's reporting practices as 
"full-fledged" 8 3 and "ongoing." 8 4 Despite this, the agency did not 
undertake an inspection of Lilly's report files concerning Oraflex-
1
 associated deaths outside the United States until after it had been 
informed by the subcommittee that the company had failed to 
report 13 such deaths to FDA prior to the agency's approval of the 
drug on April 19, 1982. Based solely on the findings of this inspec-
tion, which uncovered additional unreported Oraflex-associated 
deaths,85 FDA requested on April 20, 1983, that the Justice Depart-
ment initiate a grand jury investigation.86 
The United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines in-
formed the subcommittee in an August 24, 1982, response to the 
subcommittee's letter of August 11, 1982,87 that Dista Products 
Ltd., a wholly-owned Lilly company, had reported at least eight 
deaths associated with use of benoxaprofen in the United Kingdom 
prior to April 19, 1982, the day FDA approved the drug.88 The last 
of these deaths was reported to the British Committee on January 
15, 1982, more than three months before FDA's approval for mar-
keting in the United States. The subcommittee advised FDA of its 
findings concerning the eight benoxaprofen-associated deaths on 
September 7, 1982.89 In a subsequent response to a subcommittee 
inquiry, FDA Commissioner Hayes wrote that these deaths were 
not reported to FDA prior to NDA approval, a fact which Lilly had 
confirmed during a recent phone call.90 
A further exchange of correspondence between the subcommittee 
and the British Committee on Safety of Medicines elicited the in-
formation that three of the eight deaths involved gastrointestinal 
disorders (1 gastric ulcer hemorrhage, 1 perforated gastric ulcer 
and 1 case of melena), two involved kidney disease (1 case of 
uremia and 1 case of nephritis) and one primarily involved liver 
disease (1 case of hepatic failure accompanied by renal failure).91 
These are the same fatal side effects which apparently led to Lilly's 
decision on August 4, 1982, to suspend further sale of Oraflex 
worldwide. 
In view of the company's failure to report eight deaths, the sub-
committee asked FDA on September 20, 1982, whether the compa-
•
2
 Hearings, pages 230-233. 
•
3
 Hearings, page 230. 
9 4
 Hearings, page 228. 
•• FDA inspectors documented a total of 25 unreported deaths prior to approval of the drug. 
Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, page 28. In subcommittee files. 
•• Letter from Thomas Scarlett, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, 
Food and Drug Division, Department of Health and Human Services, to J. Patrick Glynn, Direc-
tor, Office of Consumer Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice. FDA confined this re-
quest to Lilly's reporting of Oraflex-associated adverse reactions and did not ask the Justice De-
partment to investigate Lilly's alleged failure to report adverse effects for other drugs. 
FDA believed that a grand jury investigation was necessary to determine whether Lilly offi-
cials had violated criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. } 1001 by Intentionally scheming to conceal 
important information from the agency, or the provisions of $ 303(b) of the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act by intending to defraud or mislead the agency. 
•
7
 Hearings, page 528. 
•• Hearings, page 529. 
•• Hearings, pages 530-531. 
•° Hearings, page 532. 
•* Hearings, pape 533. 
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ny had reported to FDA any other benoxaprofen-associated death 
outside the United States prior to April 19, 1982.92 FDA's Octobe 
12, 1982, response based on information furnished by Lilly in i 
recent phone conversation,93 omitted mention of five other benoxe 
profen-associated deaths which the subcommittee learned had beei 
reported before April 19, 1982, to Dista Products Ltd., Lilly's Bril 
ish subsidiary. All of these were reported to Dista by Dr. Hug 
McA Taggart of the Department of Geriatric Medicine, Belfast Cit 
Hospital, Belfast, Northern Ireland. Dr. Taggart had submitted r< 
ports to Dista on February 9, 1982, of the deaths of two elder 1 
women taking the drug from jaundice and renal failure.94 O 
April 7, 1982, Dr. Taggart submitted reports on three addition! 
deaths of elderly women taking benoxaprofen. Two of these cas< 
involved jaundice in conjunction with renal failure and one jau 
dice alone.95 
In addition, Dr. Taggart, in a September 10, 1982, letter to tl 
subcommittee, stated that at a March 16, 1982, benoxaprofen pr 
motional meeting in Belfast, he "had a detailed conversation wi1 
a member of the medical staff of Dista in the presence of a c< 
league in which I gave general details of the five cases and indict 
ed my intention to submit these for publication." 9 6 In a cohvers 
tion with the subcommittee staff, Dr. Taggart identified this Dis 
employee as Dista's medical director.97 Lilly records in Indianaj 
lis list this Dista official as a Lilly employee—Medical Direct* 
Pharmaceutical Marketing, Eli Lilly and Company Ltd. in Basil 
stoke, Hampshire.98 
Lilly did not officially notify FDA of these deaths until a May 
1982, submission to the Oraflex NDA,99 several weeks after O 
flex was approved and only after the five cases were reported 
Dr. Taggart and Dr. Joan M. Alderdice in an article entitl 
"Fatal Cholestatic Jaundice in Elderly Patients Taking Benoxap 
fen" in the May 8, 1982, issue of the British Medical Journal. T 
was the first article in the medical literature linking the drug w 
fatal liver and kidney disease. Lilly's May 17, 1982, NDA subn 
sion enclosed this and two other articles on adverse effects associ 
ed with use of the drug.100 
FDA eventually became extremely concerned, as Dr. Rob 
Temple testified before the subcommittee, with the "peculiar" h 
combination of drug-associated liver and kidney disease descril 
in this and similar published reports from Great Britain.101 
fact, according to FDA, such reports contributed to the eventual 
cision to remove the drug from the market. In a form letter 
B2
 Hearings, page 544. 
•
3
 Memorandum of this October 1, 1982, conversation is in the subcommittee files. 
•
4
 Hearings, page 538-540. 
•• Hearings, page 641-543. 
•• Hearings, page 538. 
*
T
 Hearings, page 536. 
•• Establishment Inspection Report, November 29, 1982, Exhibit D, page 2. 
•• Hearings, pages 552 and 554. Lilly informally notified Dr. John Crotti of FDA of 
deaths on May 7, 1982. Dr. Crotti's May 10, 1982, memorandum of this contact is In the sul 
mittee files. Lilly also told Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, Office of New Drug Evalu 
of these deaths in a May 14, 1982, telephone conversation. Hearings, page 108. 
1 0 0
 Hearings, page 654. 
1 0 1
 Hearings, page 95. 
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sponding to Congressional requests for an explanation for that 
withdrawal, FDA wrote: 
Shortly after Oraflex's approval in the United States on 
April 19, 1982, there appeared in the British medical lit-
erature a number of reports of deaths in elderly patients 
from liver and kidney failure * * * [I]t appears likely the 
drug was responsible for at least some of the British 
deaths and may have an unusual ability to cause simulta-
neous liver and kidney damage.102 
"Of particular concern" to FDA, wrote Dr. John Harter, Group 
Leader in FDA's Oraflex review, immediately following the drug's 
removal from the U.S. market were the "hepatic + / — renal reac-
tions resulting in death." l 0 3 
According to an October 7, 1983, submission by Lilly to the Ora-
flex NDA, 215 hepatic and/or renal events, including 36 deaths, 
have been associated with Oraflex in the United States from the 
time it was approved until October 5, 1983.104 
Prior to Lilly's suspension of Oraflex sales, the publication of Dr. 
Taggart's findings was instrumental in forcing post-market modifi-
cations in the Oraflex labeling. The vice president of Lilly Research 
Laboratories has stated that Lilly proposed in May 1982 to reflect 
Dr. Taggart's experience in revised labeling which mentioned re-
ports of death from drug-associated liver disease.105 
Following a June 3-4, 1982, Arthritis Advisory Committee meet-
ing on the liver toxicity of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, in 
which those findings were discussed at length, FDA required Lilly 
to revise the Oraflex labeling to include the following new lan-
guage: 
Severe hepatic reactions, including cholestatic jaundice 
and cases of fatal hepatitis associated with renal failure, 
have been reported with benoxaprofen. * * * In elderly pa-
tients, renal function as assessed by creatinine clearance is 
normally decreased and serum creatinine levels alone may 
not accurately reflect a decrease in renal function. If data 
from a creatinine clearance test are not available, therapy 
in the elderly should generally be initiated using one-half 
to two-thirds of the usual dose (i.e., 300-400 mg daily).106 
"[R]eported fatalities in the elderly women in England," Dr. 
Harry Meyer, Director, National Center for Drugs and Bilogics, tes-
tified before the subcommittee, led FDA to conclude that "it would 
be safer to call for reduced dosages of the drugs. That, in fact, has 
been incorporated in the labeling." 107 
Lilly issued a June 29, 1982, Dear Doctor letter which, in explain-
ing the new Oraflex dosage schedule, stated: "Recent reports in 
British medical publications have linked Oraflex to cases of hepatic 
10
* Document in subcommittee files. 
1 0 3
 His August 5, 1982, Bureau of Drugs Hazard Evaluation Criterion for Human Drug Re-
calls is in subcommittee files. 
104
 Document in subcommittee files. 
1 0 6
 Deposition of W.l.H. Shedden in Domiano v. Eli Lilly and Company, Civil Action No. 82-
0982 (M.D.Pa), June 29, 1982, page 70. In subcommittee files. 
, o e
 Revised Oraflex labeling dated June 24, 1982. 
107
 Hearings, pages 118-119 
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dysfunction, frequently associated with acute renal failure. * * 
Data in these reports are incomplete, but the information availabl 
suggests that the adverse effects may be drug related. * * * The* 
events occurred primarily in elderly female patients who receive 
full 600 mg daily doses of the drug. 1 0 8 Lilly did not, as one of i 
vice presidents claimed at a November 19, 1982, meeting with FD 
officials, first learn of the drug's association with fatal liver ar 
kidney disease when Dr. Taggart's article was published appro) 
mately two and one-half weeks after FDA approved the drug.1 
Dr. Taggart, in fact, had informed the company of such an asso< 
ation more than two months before FDA approved Oraflex. Lillj 
failure to report Dr. Taggart's findings promptly to FDA depriv 
the agency of information that was important for a responsible i 
sessment of the risks of Oraflex before the drug was allowed on t 
American market. 
VII. FDA ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS WAS INADEQUATE 
Shortly after FDA discovered unreported Oraflex deaths by 
specting Lilly records in late 1982, the Oraflex Group Leader fou 
that Pfizer Pharmaceuticals had also failed to report to FDA 
least 26 "serious adverse reactions associated with use of its artr 
tis drug Feldene outside the United States" prior to the drug's i 
proval on April 6, 1982.110 The reactions involved several sevi 
episodes of gastrointestinal bleeding, including one death.111 
The subcommittee devoted most of its hearing on August 4, IS 
to FDA's approval of Feldene.112 
In a December 9, 1982, letter to Pfizer, the Director of the D 
sion of Oncology and Radiopharmaceutical Drug Products wr< 
"We feel such reports should have been available as a minimun 
Pfizer's U.S. physicians and optimally to FDA reviewers as v 
during the deliberations about Feldene safety and adverse react 
labeling." 1 1 3 
The subcommittee brought this matter to the attention of sei 
FDA managers at an April 27, 1983, hearing, more than 
months after an agency medical officer uncovered the unrepoi 
Feldene reactions.114 Three months after this hearing, FDA < 
, 0 - L e t t e r in subcommittee files. 
1 0 9
 See page 4 of the memorandum of that meeting which appears in the November 29, 
Establishment Inspection Report, us Attachment A. lX>cumont in subcommittee files. 
M O
 Hearings before u subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Hot 
Representatives, "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," April 27, 1983, page 440. 
1
' * Case summaries of the unreported adverse reactions are in subcommittee files. 
1
»
a
 Hearings, pages 367 to 450. 
1 1 3
 "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," page 440. In a February 7, 1983, letter to Dr. Willii 
Gyarfas, Director, Division of Oncology and Radiopharmaceutical Drug Products, Pfizer a 
that none of the unreported reactions were "unexpected as defined in 21 CFR 5 310.300(bXi 
that thev further confirm that the side effect profile of Feldene is consistent with that ci' 
the product labeling." The committee notes that the relevant reporting requirement in tl 
stance is 21 CFR 5 312 l(aX6), which applies to drugs under investigation and not, as Pfize 
gests, 21 CFR $310.300(bX2), which applies to approved drugs. Under 21 CFR $3l2.1(aX6 
significant findings pertinent to the safety of an investigational drug, whether or not "une 
ed," must be promptly reported to FDA. 
In addition, FDA has concluded that under 21 CFR § 312.1(aX6) "an (adverse drug react 
required to be reported to FDA regardless of whether it is * * * already reflected in the la 
of the product." Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Eh Lilly and Compan; 
Force. March 1983, page 3. 
1 1 4
 The medical officer wrote about his discovery of the unreported reactions on Noveml 
1982. See "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," page 441. 
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cials concluded that, had Pfizer promptly reported the reactions, 
the original Feldene labeling might "have been stronger." l l 5 The 
labeling might have reported the drug's association with gastric 
perforation l *6 and, according to agency reviewers, might have re-
sembled the September 1982 revisions made in the warning section 
of the Feldene package insert which discussed reports of "severe" 
and sometimes "fatal" drug-associated adverse effects.117 
This bears a strong resemblance to the Oraflex situation. Pfizer 
did not inform FDA of serious adverse reactions which apparently 
were reported to its foreign divisions prior to FDA's approval of 
Feldene. However, no referral of the Pfizer matter was made to 
any investigative arm of the FDA.118 
The committee questions FDA's commitment to enforcing its re-
quirement that it promptly receive reports of "any" significant 
finding associated with the safety of a new drug under investiga-
tion. In this connection, the committee notes that FDA did not in-
vestigate the extent of Lilly's failure to report Oraflex-associated 
deaths outside the United States until after it had been advised by 
the subcommittee of 13 such unreported deaths.119 
The FDA is charged with executing the Food, Drug, and Cosmet-
ic Act and its implementing regulations. The committee believes 
FDA places the public's health at risk when it does not vigorously 
enforce the legal requirement that a sponsor report all significant 
adverse reactions to a new drug under clinical investigation, since 
this information is needed to weigh the risks of the drug against its 
potential benefits. 
, l
* August 4, 1983, memorandum from Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, Office of New 
Drug Evaluation and Dr. John Harter, Medical Officer, Division of Oncology and Radiopharma-
ceutical Drug Products, to Mr. Joseph P. Hile, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, 
page 3. In subcommittee files. 
116
 Gastric perforation was included among the unreported adverse effects. Ibid., page 1. At 
FDA's request in October 1983, perforation was added to the list of adverse reactions in the Fel-
dene labeling, the change being made in December 1982. 
117
 Ibid., pages 2-3. 
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 "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," page 443. 
" • F D A advised the subcommittee of its decision to undertake such an investigation after 
learning from the subcommittee of 8 unreported deaths. Hearings, pages 530-531 and 548-549. 
By the time FDA began its final inspection of Lilly's records, it had been advised by the subcom-
mittee of five additional Oraflex-associated deaths which I.illv failed to renort to FDA prior to 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. ROBERT S. WALKER, HON 
FRANK HORTON, HON. LYLE WILLIAMS, HON. WILLIA1 
F. CLINGER, JR., HON. RAYMOND J. McGRATH, HON 
DAN BURTON, HON. TOM LEWIS, HON. ALFRED A. (AI 
McCANDLESS, AND HON. LARRY E. CRAIG 
While we can support the Committee's report, several conceri 
should be expressed to complete the record. 
The Subcommittee hearings on which the report is based we: 
held 15 months ago. The findings and recommendations are val 
but lose considerable impact as the report was not made promptl 
Passage of considerable time between hearings and the issuan 
of this report has created another concern. No Members of tl 
present Subcommittee responsible for the report were Subcomm 
tee Members in 1982 when the hearings were convened. Tl 
makes it difficult for Members to contribute constructively regai 
ing more detailed issues in the report. 
We note that since the August 1982 hearings the Food and Dr 
Administration (FDA) has taken constructive action to answer cc 
cerns about the agency's Investigational New Drug/New Drug / 
plication (IND/NDA) adverse drug experience reporting syste 
Several responses should be mentioned. 
First, prior to the August 1982 hearings, FDA attempted admin 
trativelv to ensure that agency reviewers were made aware of 
new safety information obtained by NDA applicants before appr 
al decisions became final. In a July 30, 1982, memorandum fr 
the Acting Director, Office of New Drug Evaluation, appropri 
FDA staff were directed: (1) to check the corresponding IND file 
any adverse drug experience reports, submitted since the "dt 
lock" point of the NDA, that might alter the approval decision 
cause major changes in labeling; (2) for pending NDAs to be 8 
that IND annual reports were not unduly delayed, and that a d 
copy is supplied to the NDA reviewer; and (3) at pre-NDA meeti 
or for NDAs early in the review process, to reach explicit ag 
ments with NDA applicants on a safety data update plan, with 
filing going directly to the NDA. 
Second, in the agency's proposed revisions to the new drug ap 
cation regulations (NDA Rewrite) published on October 19, 1! 
FDA proposed an explicit requirement for NDA applicants 
submit ''safety update reports" periodically to the agency while 
NDA is pending with FDA for review, including a final report 
lowing receipt of an approvable letter. 
Finally, both the NDA Rewrite proposal and the proposed i 
sions to the investigational new drug application regulations ( 
Rewrite) published on June 9, 1983, reinforce current regulator 
quirements for applicants to report to FDA adverse drug ex 
ence information, received or obtained by the applicants from 
source, throughout the entire IND/NDA process. Final reguldl 
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for both the NDA and IND Rewrites are under review within the 
agency. 
ROBERT S. WALKER, 
FRANK HORTON, 
LYLE WILLIAMS, 
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., 
RAYMOND J. MCGRATH, 
DAN BURTON, 
TOM LEWIS, 
ALFRED A. (AL) MCCANDLESS, 
LARRY E. CRAIG. 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. RAYMOND J. McGRATH 
I am in general agreement with the comments contained in t 
Subcommittee's report, and in addition, I have cosigned the vie 
of the Subcommittee's ranking member, Mr. Walker. However, 
the only sitting member of Congress who was on the subcommit 
and participated in the hearings on Oraflex in a substantive wa] 
feel constrained to make some further comments. 
At the outset, I must point out that the hearings which w< 
held on August 3 and 4, 1982, were entitled "The Regulation 
New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The New Di 
Review Process." The only witnesses to appear at those hearii 
were representatives of the Food and Drug Administration. How 
er, approximately one third of the report in question deals not w 
the regulatory practices of the FDA but with the research and m 
keting practices of the manufacturer of Oraflex, Eli Lilly and C< 
pany. To this end, it may have been helpful for the subcommit 
to have heard testimony from representatives of the compi 
itself. 
I have other concerns with the timing of the report and with 
information on which many of its conclusions are based. 
First, the hearings were held fourteen months ago. Neither 
previous chairman of the subcommittee nor its previous rank 
member are still in Congress. Indeed, there are no current m 
bers of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations ; 
Human Resources who were members of that subcommittee in 1 
when the hearings were held. While I have little substantive 
agreement with the report itself, it should be noted that this ii 
essence a staff report, and that no members of the subcommi 
which issued the report actually participated in the hearings. 
Second, the report contains references to numerous documc 
which came into the subcommittee possession after the complel 
of the hearing on which the report is based. Unfortunately, 
hearings were held subsequent to the 1982 hearings to exan 
new, and apparently important, documents which had come i 
the subcommittee's possession. 
Finally, I am concerned that the report presents an incomp 
picture of Eli Lilly and Company's actions, and of the regulal 
efforts of the FDA. There are two specific charges which have b 
made which are not necessarily borne out by the facts presentei 
the report. 
For example, the report cites a 1981 FDA internal memoranc 
which recommends criminal prosecution of Lilly officials for in 
tionally failing to report certain critical adverse reaction data to 
FDA. Information presented at the hearing and otherwise avail 
to the subcommittee shows that the FDA accepted Lilly's dep 
stration that parts of the memorandum in question were in ei 
hence casting doubt on the validity of its conclusions. 
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Specifically, statements by senior FDA officials at the hearing in-
dicated that many of the reactions in question were relatively 
minor and had been encountered with sufficient frequency in clini-
cal trails (p. 93 of the hearing record); a memorandum prepared by 
FDA enforcement officials stated that the adverse reactions identi-
fied by the investigator had "no effect on the labeling approvabil-
ity" of the NDA (p. 240); and the March 3, 1983, report of the FDA 
Eli Lilly and Company Task Force repeated the FDA's view that 
the adverse reactions in question had no effect on review of the 
Oraflex NDA. I would add, too, that the company itself prepared a 
point-by-point rebuttal to the investigator's findings, which it sub-
mitted to the FDA on September 16, 1982. The hearing record 
makes no note of this document, and if it is not in the subcommit-
tee's files, it should be, in the interests of fairness. 
The second charge involves the alleged failure to report certain 
fatalities which occured overseas prior to the marketing of Oraflex 
in this country. The report refers to 21 CFR 312.1(a)(6), which re-
quires sponsors to supply the agency with prompt and full reports of 
and adverse finding associated with a new drug under investigation, 
including foreign data. In actuality, this particular regulation has 
generally been interpreted by the industry and the FDA to apply 
only to data collected in clinical studies. 
There may be reason to question Lilly's actions in regard to the 
reporting of foreign data, whether the regulations required it or 
not. But if the subcommittee's hearings revealed anything at all, it 
was .that the agency's rules did not require full foreign data disclo-
sure. If the subcommittee believes the FDA's pre-existing regula-
tions were so clear and unambiguous, why does it also recommend 
that the FDA establish procedures for obtaining information con-
cerning the safety and effectiveness of drugs under investigation 
from foreign countries in which the drugs have already been ap-
proved? 
In point of fact, the FDA is to be commended for taking positive 
action in the matter of foreign data since the Oraflex issue arose. 
Proposed revisions of the NDA regulations, issued on October 19, 
1982, would require "safety updates" for pending NDAs and pro-
posed amendments to the IND regulations on June 9, 1983, would 
require reports of reactions associated with foreign commercial 
marketing. 
It is not the role of the subcommittee to substitute its judgment 
for the FDA as to whether or not Oraflex should have been ap-
proved for marketing in the first place or if it should remain on 
the market. However, the subcommittee's report has added to the 
public record a generally reasonable discussion of some of the defi-
ciencies of the drug approval process. It is apparent that the FDA 
has reconsidered its past practices, and has begun to clarify its re-
porting guidelines. 
RAYMOND J. MCGRATH. 
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FDA'S REGULATION OF THE NEW DRUG MERITAL 
JULY 8, 1987.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
Union and ordered to be printed 
Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on Government Operations, 
submitted the following 
FIFTEENTH REPORT 
BASED ON A STUDY BY THE HUMAN RESOURCES AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 
On June 16, 1987, the Committee on Government Operations 
proved and adopted a report entitled "FDA's Regulation of 
New Drug Merital." The chairman was directed to transmit a c< 
to the Speaker of the House. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the rules of the House of Representatives, the Commit 
on Government Operations has responsibility for studying the oi 
ation of Government activities at all levels. The committee has 
signed this responsibility as it relates to the Department of He* 
and Human Services (HHS) to the Human Resources and Inters 
ernmental Relations Subcommittee. 
The manner in which the Food and Drug Administration (Fl 
regulates the use and reviews the safety and efficacy of new dr 
has long been a major priority of the subcommittee. In the th 
years since the subcommittee last held hearings on FDA's poli< 
and procedures for approving new drugs, there had been sevt 
developments affecting the new drug review process. On Febru 
22, 1985, FDA issued new regulations designed to speed the appi 
al of new drugs.1 In July 1985, FDA initiated a new managem 
Action Plan with the stated goal of expediting new drug approv 
At the same time, in recent years FDA has approved record m 
1
 See 50 Fed Reg 7<1M. 
74-1M 
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bers of new drugs, culminating in the approval of 30 new chemical 
entities in 1985. 
In view of these developments, the subcommittee reexamined 
PDA's policies and procedures in this area. This reexamination ini-
tially focused on FDA's regulation of the new drug Merital (generic 
name nomifensine maleate), an anti-depressant manufactured by 
lloechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a subsidiary of Hoechst AG 
in Frankfurt, West Germany.2 Merital was approved for marketing 
on December 31, 1984, six years after its new drug application 
(NDA) was submitted to FDA. On January 21, 1986, the sponsor an-
nounced that it was withdrawing the drug from the market be-
cause of a large number of hypersensitivity or allergic reactions as-
sociated with its use. 
The subcommittee's investigation included a public hearing on 
May 22, 198G.3 Witnesses included a noted medical expert in drug-
induced allergic reactions and the Director and other representa-
tives from the Office of Drug Research and Review, FDA's Center 
for Drugs and Biologies. 
The subcommittee's investigation included careful examination 
of the relevant medical literature and of FDA documents, including 
correspondence, internal memoranda and information contained in 
the Merital NDA and investigational new drug (IND) files. In addi-
tion, the subcommittee obtained information on Merital from both 
public and private sources outside the United States. The compre-
hensive nature of this documentation enabled the subcommittee to 
evaluate the adequacy of PDA's policies and procedures for ensur-
ing the safety and effectiveness of new drugs in general and Meri-
tal in particular. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In October 1976, Hoechst AG began marketing Merital in West 
Germany. The following year, the drug was introduced in several 
other countries, including France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, South Africa, and Switzerland.4 The drug was being mar-
keted in 31 nations5 by the time Hoechst submitted its NDA for 
Merital on December 2(1, 1978.n 
On Feb ruary 27, 197!), FDA advised Hoechst that it was consider-
ing the possibility of not filing the Merital NDA because of major 
organizational deficiencies in the application.7 
On March 1H, 1979, Hoechst submitted four reports to FDA of 
immune hemolytic anemia, the destruction of red blood cells, asso-
ciated with use of Merital in Europe. Three of these cases were 
known to Hoechst officials in Europe prior to the submission of the 
'•' Hoechst Rousscl Pharmaceuticals. Inc. is also a subsidiary of Koussel Uclaf of Prance 
' Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. House of Rep-
resentatives. 'Oversight of the New Drug Review Process and FDA's Regulation of Merital." 
May 22. 19Xf>. herealter relerred to as Hearing. 
4
 See Table S 1. List of Countries Where Nomifensine is Sold.'' in Hoechst s May 7. 19K4. 
submission to FDA. which is in subcommittee files 
• Ibid 
"Hoechst was originally granted an investigational new drug lINDi exemption for Merital in 
7
 The memorandum ol FDA's February 27. VM\), meeting with the sponsor is in subcommittee 
l ibs 
o 
Merital NDA. The reports were of sufficient concern that Hoechst 
was: 
. . . notifying all [U.S.] investigators currently treating pa-
tients of the European reports. All existing protocols will be 
amended to require a direct and indirect Coombs Test [a test 
for hemolytic anemia] for newly enrolled patients at baseline 
and termination.8 
Hoechst AG had advised U.S. Hoechst of three of these four cases 
approximately two months earlier, when it suggested that they be 
reported to FDA since the agency was likely to learn of them 
anyway.9 
After reviewing eleven protocols submitted by the sponsor, FDA's 
statistician wrote on July 16, 1979, that the sponsor had not pre-
sented ' 'substantial evidence of the superiority of Merital as com-
pared to placebo" in the t reatment of the symptoms of depres-
sion.10 On September 14, 1979, FDA's clinical reviewer similarly 
concluded that the sponsor had not submitted two "adequate and 
well-controlled trials which demonstrate substantial evidence of ef-
ficacy, the criterion for approval." 1 1 
Despite these conclusions, and serious deficiencies in the organi-
zation of the original Merital NDA submission, FDA brought Meri 
tal before its Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee 
which on October 15, 1979, voted tha t it was "not able to identify 
sufficient studies supporting [the drug's] safety and efficacy." 1 2 
On December 28, 1979, FDA advised the sponsor that Merita 
was not approvable, largely because "the NDA does not contaii 
'substantial evidence [of efficacy] consisting of adequate and well 
controlled investigations,' a criterion for approval." 13 Thirteei 
months later, on January 28, 1981, FDA informed the sponsor tha 
the NDA remained not approvable because of problems in assess 
ing the evidence submitted in support of the drug's efficacy.14 
Merital was again brought before the Psychopharmacologi 
Drugs Advisory Committee on December 3, 1981, which reviewe 
the efficacy evidence submitted for the drug and decided tha t th 
data were sufficient to support safety and efficacy.15 
8
 Hoechst's March 13, 1979, submission is in subcommittee files. 
9
 On January 10, 1979, an official in Hoechst's international headquarters in Frankfurt, We 
Germany, sent a "personal" and "confidential" letter to the residence of Dr. A. John Nelson 
US . Hoechst, advising of three reports of Merital-associated hemolytic anemia, one in Fran 
and two in the United Kingdom. 
The author of the letter which is in subcommittee files, stated that he was "pretty sure tr 
these cases will be published in a widely distributed Journal whilst our NDA is still in the 1 
days processing." Consequently, he believed that "it is better to notify the FDA now, rati 
than being asked later by them 'Why did not you inform us earlier?' " 
Dr Nelson received this letter on January 17, 1979 On January 18, 1979, he wrote Dr. Pola 
Hoechst AG, officially requesting materials concerning these three cases. This letter is in s 
committee files. 
•° Lucille P Pogue's July 16, 1979, review is in subcommittee files. 
1
 * In subcommittee files. 
12
 Four members voted in favor of this motion, while three abstained. See page 229 of 
verbatim transcript of this meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
13
 Hearing, page 371. 
14
 In subcommittee files. 
15
 The verbatim transcript of the advisory committee meeting is in subcommittee files. At 
meeting, the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee voted to recommend approve 
Merital partly on the basis of a pooling of several studies purporting to show efficacy, notw 
standing that FDA's biostatisticians had objected to the method by which these studies had 1 
Contiri 
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Dr. Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Office of Drug Research and 
Review, testified before the subcommittee that concerns about the 
evidence offered in support of Mental's "effectiveness remained the 
central focus of review and discussion for about the first four years 
of review" ! 6 of the Merital NDA. 
However, after reviewing important safety information received 
over the previous IV2 years, most notably a July 22, 1981, Hoechst 
submission to the Merital IND concerning liver abnormalities asso-
ciated with worldwide use of the drug that included four fatali-
ties,17 Dr. J. Hillary Lee, FDA's clinical reviewer for Merital, 
wrote in a February 23, 1982, memorandum: 
It is my impression that there are a number of serious 
adverse effects with this drug and I feel that perhaps the 
benefit risk ratio of nomifensine should be reconsidered 
based on these new data. 1 should say that we have been 
aware of the hemolytic and hepatic effects of this drug al-
though perhaps the new reports suggest the effects are of 
a more serious degree than we previously thought.18 
Two weeks later, at a March 8, 1982, internal meeting, Dr. Paul 
Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacological Drug 
Products, concurred with Dr. Lee that: 
. . . recently obtained data from Europe suggests a 
closer consideration of the drug's safety profile is needed. 
Rather than merely a question of efficacy, the drug's ap-
provability may rest on a possible weak benefit/high risk 
ratio.19 
Nonetheless, questions of the drug's efficacy continued to domi-
nate FDA's review of the drug. Plagued by continuing doubts about 
the adequacy of the efficacy data submitted for Merital, FDA offi-
cials met with Hoechst on January 12, 1983, and suggested that the 
firm either "do additional studies" or that the "matter again go 
before an Advisory Committee." 2 0 
On February 25, 1983, FDA's Psychopharmacologic Drugs Adviso-
ry Committee met again and voted to reaffirm its previous determi-
nation that Merital had been shown to be a safe and effective anti-
depressant. The advisory committee, however, was not apprised of 
FDA's concerns that a "number of serious adverse effects ' recently 
reported for Merital suggested that the "drug's approvability may 
rest on a possible weak benefit/high risk ratio." 
FDA met again with the sponsor on May 23, 1983,21 and Dr. 
Temple reminded the firm that the Merital NDA had been rather 
pooled. Following the meeting, FDA's Division of Biometrics maintained that the advisory com-
mittee did not consider major statistical problems with the data presented it. See Hearing, page 
16
 Hearing, page 10. 
17
 This submission is in subcommitee files. 
18
 In subcommittee files. 
19
 In subcommittee files. 
2 0
 The memorandum of this meeting appears at Hearing, page 421. 
21
 In requesting such a meeting, Hubert E. Huckel, Chairman of the Board of Hoechst's U.S. 
affiliate, wrote FDA on March 11, 1983: 
Another aspect important to our relatively small U.S. company is that our Board of 
Directors has refused to allow an increase in sales force personnel and the number of 
Continued 
difficult because the drug's "effectiveness . . . had been a mattei 
of some debate." 2 2 
Finally, however, on April 10, 1984, FDA notified Hoechst thai 
Merital was approvable.23 A month later, Hoechst submitted t< 
FDA an international safety update concerning Merital.24 During 
his review of this safety update, Dr. Thomas Hayes, the supervisory 
medical officer for Merital, apparently realized for the first timi 
that some Merital-associated fevers reached temperatures as higl 
as 40 °C (104 °F) or above. Based on this and what was alread; 
known about the toxicity of the drug, he recommended on July S 
1984, that FDA rescind its determination that Merital was appro\ 
able: 
In view of the reactions reported in this submission, it 
appears necessary to reopen the question of the approva-
bility of NOM [nomifensine] for depression. It should be re-
called that at the time of initial submission, the NDA was 
judged to have failed to present sufficient evidence of effi-
cacy to merit approval. It was later agreed after extended 
discussions that additional analyses provided a modicum of 
evidence of effectiveness applicable to the population for 
which it was intended, and there did not appear to be any 
prohibitive safety risks . . . Do these reports tip the bal-
ance away from approval? Certainly . . . The new disclo-
sure of the problem of high fevers casts this in a different 
light, as far as I am concerned, and makes me feel that the 
risks outweigh the benefits for this drug. A careful ap-
praisal of the data fails to disclose any benefit or contribu-
tion that the drug might offer to any identified or selected 
patient group which would justify exposing them to a 
treatment that causes adverse effects such as hemolytic 
anemia or high fever when the others don't. . . . I doubt 
that there is sufficient evidence of safety and efficacy to 
justify a recommendation of approval.25 
Two weeks later, however, Dr. Hayes' superior, Dr. Leber, wr< 
that Merital-induced hyperpyrexia, or extremely elevated fev 
should not prevent the drug's approval. Instead, Dr. Leber reco 
mended, Merital should be approved on the condition that it 
limited to second-line use. It should be marketed with labeling tl 
" restricts its use to patients who have failed to respond to standi 
treatments." 2 6 
scientists working in our research laboratories until new product approvals are re 
ceived With receipt of the NDA approvals we would create immediately 50 new posi 
tions in the sales force, would add about 20 employees in production, and would alsc 
bring an expansion of our research department Surely at a time when unemployment 
is so high, and national attention is directed towards improving the situation, ever 
these small additions of jobs for the workforce should not be overlooked. 
This letter is in subcommittee files. 
22
 This memorandum is in subcommittee files. 
2 3
 Dr. Temples April 10, 1984, approvable letter is in subcommittee files. 
24
 This May 7, 1984, update is in subcommittee files. 
2 5
 Hearing, pages 187-8. 
2B
 Dr. Leber's July 17, 1984, memorandum appears in Hearing, pages 385-9. 
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Dr. Temple concurred with Dr. Leber's second-line use recom-
mendation,27 and on August 1, 1984, FDA sent Hoechst a second 
approvable letter for Merital, this time restricting the drug to 
second-line use. The letter concluded: 
Your safety update has provided new information about 
a previously unappreciated risk of nomifensine, hyperpyr-
exia. In our judgment, hyperpyrexia—although reported 
infrequently to date—has more serious implications that 
the low grade temperature elevations of which we were 
aware. . . . This newly discovered serious reaction, cou-
pled with the known unusual profile of risks of nomifen-
sine requiring careful monitoring for hemolytic anemia 
and liver abnormalities, causes us not to consider nomifen-
sine a first choice drug in depression. . . . [A]t present we 
consider nomifensine to be approvable only for a popula-
tion of depressed patients unresponsive to, or intolerant of, 
other agents.28 
A Hoechst official swiftly moved to overturn FDA's decision on 
second-line use, in a conversation recorded in a memorandum by 
Dr. Thomas Hayes: 
Mr. Bucceri [Vice-President Regulatory Affairs of 
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate] said they were surprised at the 
stringency of the labeling requirements. . . . He wondered 
if we might agree not to require the paragraph on [second-
line use] if they presented new information. I said . . . I 
did not think we would be receptive to approving the drug 
without the paragraph in question.29 
This was followed by an October 31, 1984, letter from Hoechst to 
Dr. Temple complaining that the labeling of Merital as a second-
line anti-depressant "virtually precludes the marketing of this 
drug." 3 0 
On December 21, 1984, FDA officials were reportedly "able to re-
solve" all "outstanding issues" regarding final approval of the Mer-
ital NDA during a teleconference with the sponsor,31 including the 
approval of the Merital NDA without the second-line limitation.32 
Accordingly, on the final day of 1984, FDA approved Merital for 
marketing without the second-line use restriction.33 
27
 Dr Temple's July 27, 1984, memorandum appears in Hearing, pages 427-8. Dr. Temple ac-
knowledged, however, that "We . . . do not have a precisely defined subset of patients in whom 
|Merital) is known to be a useful second line agent" but only "a strong expectation, given clini-
cal variability, that it will sometimes prove useful in people who failed on other agents." 
2 8
 In subcommittee files. 
2 9
 Dr Hayes' memorandum of this August 7, 1984, telephone conversation is in subcommittee 
files 
3 0
 This letter from Victor J. Bauer, Executive Vice President, and A John Nelson, Senior 
Vice President and Medical Director, both of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate, appears in Hearing, pages 
:ir>o-2. 
3 1
 The sponsor, according to a December 20, 1984, letter to FDA, was "able to resolve" all 
"outstanding issues" with FDA regarding final approval of the Merital NDA during this telecon-
ference No FDA memorandum was written of this important contact See FDA's November 5, 
198<>, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 487. 
3 2
 One week after this teleconference, Dr. I^ber recommended that Merital be approved with-
out this limitation His December 28, 1984, memorandum appears at Hearing, pages M9-349. 
33
 Hearing, page 12. 
7 
Although the sponsor had complained about FDA's delays in aj 
proving the drug, it did not launch its marketing campaign fo 
Merital until late July 1985. In the meantime, the safety of MeriU 
became the subject of considerable concern in Europe. 
In February 1985, a German medical publication published 
warning on Merital which stated: 
The antidepressant nomifensine can induce an immune-
allergic reaction, which usually manifests itself within 
three weeks after the beginning of treatment in fever, 
serum sickness-like complaints with muscle aches, joint 
pain and flu symptoms and can proceed with blood damage 
(thrombocytopenia) and pathological liver function includ-
ing granulomatous hepatitis. A north German group of 
physicians now also describe symptoms of lung involve-
ment with the clinical picture of bronchopneumo-
nia. . . .34 [Emphasis supplied.] 
In addition, on February 1, 1985, the Adverse Drug Reactic 
Committee of the Drug Commission of the German Medical Profc 
sion met and decided to issue a warning about possible "allergi 
reactions involving several organ systems that had been observ 
among Merital patients.35 It appeared in the March 27, 1985, Dei 
sches Arzteblatt. 3 6 
In early 1985, Hoechst also received several reports of Merit 
associated deaths involving immune hemolytic anemia. These 
eluded a report of a 37-year-old British woman who had restart 
Merital, having previously discontinued it after 6 or 7 days becai 
of dizzy spells. Within one hour of restarting, she collapsed ai 
upon admission to the hospital, was diagnosed with severe int 
vascular hemolysis. Acute renal failure also occurred, and dial} 
was considered. Shock lung syndrome ensued and she died on F 
ruary 10, 1985. A report of this death, including a manuscript s< 
by two consulting hematologists to the British Medical Joun 
concerning the case,37 was submitted to FDA on April 15, 198f 
On May 9, 1985, Dr. Hayes, the supervisory medical officer 
Merital, recommended that "warning statements" in that label 
"be revised and strengthened to convey the seriousness of hemo 
ic reactions to this drug." 3 9 
On May 21, 1985, Hoechst submitted a report to FDA concern 
two additional Merital-associated hemolytic anemia deaths fi 
3 4
 Translated from the German. See "The Alveolitis-Influenza-Like Syndrome with NOIT 
sine," appearing in the February 1985 issue of the Arznei-telegramm, which is in subcomir 
files. 
3 5
 The memorandum of this meeting is in subcommittee files. 
3 6
 This warning is in subcommittee files. 
37
 The British Medical Journal published the case on August 3, 1985. See Sokol. H< 
Booker, Stamples, and Taylor, "Fatal immune haemolysis associated with nomifensine," B 
Medical Journal, vol. 291, pages 311-2. 
3 8
 The records referred to in this case were all included in the April 15, 1985, submissi 
FDA, which is also in subcommittee files. The sponsor submitted a follow-up report to F l 
the case on September 11, 1985, which is also in subcommittee files. 
On March 19, 1985, Dr. Suzanne M. Streichenwein of Hoechst AG, accompanied by tw< 
cials of Hoechst UK, visited the hospital to obtain more information on the case. Obvi 
Floechst officials were notified of the case some time before this, although none of the rt 
submitted to FDA by the sponsor indicates this notification date On March 28, 1985, H< 
AG officials forwarded records on the case to Dr. A. John Nelson of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate 
3 9
 His May 9, 1985, memorandum is in subcommittee files. f 
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the United Kingdom, involving a 43-year-old and 27-year-old 
woman.40 Hoechst did not report, at this time, at least one addi-
tional Merital-associated death possibly involving hemolytic 
anemia that had been brought to its attention. This case, involving 
a German woman, was received by Hoechst AG on April 23, 1985,41 
but it was not reported to FDA until September 16, 1985.42 
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate learned of the case by June 10, 1985.43 
In anticipation of a June 25-26, 1985, Tripartite Meeting with 
the British and Canadians, Dr. Robert Temple, noting that "the 
British expressed concern regarding hematological toxicity of nomi-
fensine and wanted to know about any knowledge or experience we 
might have had," requested information on this subject.44 
Responding to this request, Dr. Thomas Hayes wrote on June 11, 
1985, that FDA had received one report of a fatal hemolytic 
anemia case associated with use of the drug outside the United 
States,45 even though by that time Hoechst had in fact reported 
three such cases to FDA. 
Two days later, FDA asked Hoechst to revise the warnings sec-
tion to "convey the seriousness of hemolytic reactions to this 
drug." 4 6 On June 25, 1985, Hoechst strengthened the hemolytic 
anemia warning, although not completely to FDA's satisfaction.47 
In June 1985, Hoechst received a report of an August 8, 1983, 
death of a 62-year-old Canadian man who also appeared to have ex-
perienced a hypersensitivity or allergic reaction to Merital.48 A pa-
thologist diagnosed the patient as having suffered "drug induced 
hypersensitivity vasculitis [inflammation of the peripheral blood 
vessels] and myocarditis [inflammation of the muscular walls of the 
40
 Hoechst's May 21, 1985, submission is in subcommittee files. A follow-up report on these 
cases was submitted to FDA on September 11, 1985 In subcommittee files. 
41
 According to a September 10, 1985, letter to Hoechst Canada, which is in subcommittee 
files, Hoechst AG officials stated: "(W)e received the first notification ever about this case from 
the patient's physician on April 23, 1985." Merital-specific antibodies had been detected in the 
serum of a hemolytic anemia patient who died several years earlier. The serum of a German 
woman was found in 1981 to exhibit "warm auto-immune haemolysis." While testing a new 
antibody detection method in 1985, a German researcher reportedly found Merital-specific anti-
bodies in her serum Hoechst AG made an on-site visit in connection with this case on May 6, 
1985. 
42
 This report is in subcommittee files. 
4:
* See the inspectorial observations issued by FDA field investigators to Hoechst's U.S. affili-
ate (FDA form 483) in March 1987, in subcommittee files. 
44
 His memorandum is in subcommittee files 
4 5
 His memorandum is in subcommittee files. 
4,i
 FDA's June 13, 1985, letter is in subcommittee files. 
47
 In a June 25, 1985, letter, Hoechst submitted to FDA revised labeling that was to be effec-
tive immediately in accordance with 21 CFR § 314.70<cK2) The new hemolytic warning read as 
follows: "Hare occurrences of severe hemolytic anemia which could lead to potentially fatal com-
plications have been re|>orted after treatment with Merital (nomifensine maleate) from two 
weeks up to fourteen months " In subcommittee files. 
However, FDA's clinical reviewer, Dr. J Hillary l>ee, recommended in a July 3, 1985, memo-
randum that the labeling specifically state that: 
Gases of severe, life threatening, hemolytic anemia have been reported following 
treatment with Merital As of mid-1985, three deaths from this cause have been report-
ed from world wide sources 
In subcommittee files. 
*
H
 The patient's psychiatrist completed a Hoechst adverse reaction report on the case on June 
5, 1985 On June 17, 1985, he also advised an official of Hoechst Ganada of the case. In a June 
25, 1985, letter to him, Dr \i. LaCombe, Medical Director, Hoechst Canada, wrote: "Also, from a 
telephone conversation you had with Dr. R. Laliberte jof Hoechst Canada) on June 17, 1985, we 
note that you have agreed to provide us with information regarding the other case—a (>2 year 
old male patient." 
V 
heart]." The sponsor did not submit the case to FDA as a "15-day 
alert" report, however, until September 16, 1985.49 
In July 1985, the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety oi 
Medicines reported that it had received 33 reports of Merital-asso 
ciated hemolytic anemia, including 3 deaths, and noted that the 
drug "has also been associated with an influenza-like syndrome 
characterized by malaise, pyrexia, myalgia, and arthralgia or ar 
thritis." 5 0 
On July 27, 1985, The Lancet reported two fatal cases of necrotis 
ing vasculitis associated with use of nomifensine in Germany 
Noting that the drug "can cause immune-allergic adverse reac 
tions," the report concluded that "clinicians need to realize tha 
nomifensine may cause these symptoms, since otherwise they ma; 
be misinterpreted as signs of an acute bacterial or viral diseas< 
(septic shock)." 5 I Although one of the authors advised the subcom 
mittee staff that he reported these cases to Hoechst shortly befor 
they were published,52 the company did not report this article t 
FDA as a "15-day alert" report until September 5, 1985. 
By mid-August 1985, Hoechst learned of a July 14, 1985, deatl 
possibly resulting from an allergic reaction to Merital, this one ir 
volving a 79-year-old Dutch woman who experienced hepatitis, a 
veolitis, and a secondary "hepatorenal syndrome.53 No mention c 
the case was made to FDA until October 31, 1985.54 Many detail 
regarding the case were not forwarded to the agency until Januar 
3, 1986.55 
By August 1985, the German medical publication which, in Fe 
ruary 1985, had warned physicians about severe immune-toxic r 
actions to Merital, was recommending that physicians use altern 
tive drugs since, in its judgment, Mental 's risks outweighed i 
benefits.56 
At the direction of the German Federal Health Office, Hoech 
sent a warning letter on September 24, 1985, to all doctors ar 
pharmacists in Germany, which reviewed several reports of "h 
persensitivity" reactions associated with use of the drug, includii 
three fatal cases of immune hemolytic anemia, two fatal cases 
immune vasculitis, one fatal case of acute liver dystrophy,5 7 and 
case of lupus erythematosis.58 
4 9
 Report is in subcommittee Tiles. Hoechst also submitted a February 7, 1985, manuscrip 
had received on the case that the patient's psychiatrist had submitted for publication. 
5 0
 See the July 1985 issue of Current Problems, which is in subcommittee files. 
51
 See Schoenhoefer, Goeticke, "Fatal Necrotising Vasculitis Associated with Nomifensir 
July 27, 1985, The Ixincet, page 221. 
52
 The memorandum of a May 7, 1986, conversation is in subcommittee files. 
s n See a memorandum or an August 1(>, 198t», telephone conversation with Dr. Sumaj 
Hoechst Holland, by Dr Suzanne M. Streichenwein of Hoechst AG. On August 29, 1985, 
Streichenwein was informed that "three physicians intend to publish this case." In view of w 
Hoechst AG regarded as "the importance of this case for pharmaceutical policy," (see Dr Si 
chenwein's memorandum of her August H>, 1985, conversation with Dr. Sumajow) Drs. Si 
chenwein and Mohr of Hoechst AG visited Holland to discuss the case on September 19, 1 
r>4
 Hoechst's October 31, 1985, report of this case is in subcommittee files. 
•
%s
 Most of the details that appear here concerning the case are from the sponsors Januar 
198f>, submission, in subcommittee files 
r,r>
 See article entitled, "On the Immune Toxicity of the Antidepressant Nomifensine," that 
peared in the August 1985 issue of the Arznei-telegramm. in subcommittee files. 
S 7This obviously referred to the Dutch case, which also involved alveolitis and secom 
renal failure. This case was not even reported to FDA until October 31, 1985, approximately 
weeks following the issuance of this warning letter 
r ,HThe letter is in subcommittee files. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Hoechst sent a similar letter to physicians in the United King-
dom on September 30, 1985.59 This letter advised that, "in the light 
of recent reports of adverse reactions in association with nomifen-
sine (Merital)," revised labeling was under discussion with U.K. 
regulatory authorities in which "more emphasis will be given to 
hypersensitivity reactions." r>0 At that time, Hoechst also suspend-
ed all written and oral promotion of the drug to doctors and phar-
macists.61 
On October 31, 1985, Hoechst reported eight deaths to FDA, in-
cluding the Dutch case involving alveolitis, acute liver dystrophy, 
and secondary renal failure; a 1984 British case involving cardiac 
arrthymia and shock in the face of anemia; and a 1982 French case 
involving "allergic" exfoliative dermatitis and pneumonitis.62 
On November 1, 1985, Hoechst submitted a report of large num-
bers of adverse reactions—including hemolytic anemia, liver 
injury, alveolitis/Jung disorder/dyspnea/pneumonitis, and f eve r -
associated with worldwide use of the drug that reportedly came to 
the U.S. affiliate's attention since the international safety update it 
submitted to FDA on May 7, 1984.63 On November 8, 1985, the 
sponsor met with FDA to discuss "immunologic ADRs [adverse 
drug reactions]." 64 At the meeting, the firm agreed to Dr. Leber's 
recommendation that it restructure the Merital labeling to empha-
size the immunological basis that FDA thought might underlie sev-
eral of the adverse effects associated with use of the drug.6 5 
Thus, the labeling that went into U.S. distribution channels in 
December 1985 warned for the first time of a presumed immunologi-
cal basis for many of the reactions, including some that had proven 
life-threatening, that had been reported for Merital. 
A December 7, 1985, update from the United Kingdom's Commit-
tee on Safety of Medicines that appeared in the British Medical 
Journal concluded that Merital carried higher risks than all other 
new antidepressants being marketed.66 The drug was associated 
with substantially more reports of hemolytic 67 and hepatic 6H reac-
tions than other second generation antidepressants. The drug had 
also been associated with more reports of death than any anti-
depressant—old or new—then on the British market.6 9 
On December 9, 1985, Hoechst AG received yet another report of 
a Merital-associated hemolytic anemia fatality, this one involving a 
(jf)-year-old German woman that had occurred on June 17, 1985. 
FDA did not receive a report of this case, however, until February 
5, 198(>, almost two months later.70 
r,!t
 In subcommittee files. The letter reviewed the same cases summarized in the September 21, 
l9K.r>, CJerman warning letter 
BOIbid 
fil
 See The Lancet, February 1. 1986, page 281. 
, i2See the subcommittee's .June i:i, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, pages i.VA and l.'l6-7 
, ;1
 Hearing, pages 190 208. 
'"* See the memorandum of this meeting by Tony DeCicco, consumer safety officer Hearing 
page 147 ' H' 
r >
 See the November VA, 198f>, letter from Mr Dennis Bucceri, of Hoechsfs U.S. affiliate, to 
l)r U'ber, in subcommittee files, Hearing, page 44(i 
';" See "CSM Update." Vol 291, page UY.iH. 
1,7
 Merital had attracted 28 hemolytic anemia re|>orts per million prescriptions, compared to 1 
for maprotiline and less than 1 for mianserin 
fiH
 Merital attracted f>:t reports of hepatic injury per million prescriptions, compared to 9 such 
reports for mianserin and 2 for maprotiline 
'•" Seven fatal adverse reactions had been reported to the CSM per million prescriptions 
'" Hoechsfs February r», l'.)H6. submission is in subcommittee files 
11 
On December 16, 1985, the British Drug and Therapeutics Bulle-
tin mentioned another drug-associated hemolytic anemia fatality 
that had been reported to the British authorities but not to 
Hoechst.71 The article concluded that "in most patients, the risks, 
and the vigilance required to minimise them, overshadow the 
therapeutic advantages previously claimed for it over the tricyclic 
antidepressives." It also criticized Hoechsfs September 30, 1985, 
U.K. "Dear Doctor" letter, not only for its failure to "accept in any 
of the six cases [of hypersensitivity reactions it mentioned] the 
causal relationship with nomifensine," but also its promotional 
tone, which was "likely to undermine the authority of the CSM's 
warning about the dangers of using nomifensine" and "which may 
be thought to amount to contempt of the CSM [the United King 
dom's Committee on Safety of Medicines]." 7 2 
Two days following publication of this article, Hoechst U.K. dis 
tributed to U.K. physicians another "Dear Doctor" letter which 
called attention to Merital-associated "hypersensitivity reactions' 
and expressed particular concern about "reports of hepatic reac 
tions, an influenza-like syndrome and blood disorders, notably hae 
molytic anaemia." 7 3 Accompanying the letter was revised U.K. la 
beling which stated that "Merital should be discontinued immedi 
ately after the onset of the first signs of a [hypersensitivity] reac 
tion and not used again under any circumstances." 7 4 
On January 8, 1986, the British trade publication, SCRIP, "sug 
gested that the CSM might be on the verge of taking some sort o 
action against nomifensine." 7 5 At the request of FDA's Di 
Temple, a copy of this article was provided to Dr. Leber on Janu 
ary 13, 1986,76 and on that same day, Dr. Leber contacted Hoechs 
to request a copy of the recent U.K. "Dear Doctor" letter, as wel 
as all information about the drug currently being published in th 
U.K. by regulatory authorities. He also asked that they keep hiri 
fully informed of any pending action by British regulators.77 
Dr. Leber also contacted British authorities directly and learne 
that they were concerned about Mental 's risk-to-benefit ratk 
planned to discuss the matter before a subcommittee of the CS1V 
and that reports of Merital-associated hemolytic anemia had ii 
creased dramatically, without clear explanation, during 1984 an 
1985.78 
On January 16, 1986, Dr. Michael Murphy, Director of Psyche 
pharmacology of Hoechst U.S., called Dr. Leber to inform him th£ 
the South Africans were modifying Merital's labeling to advise thr 
it be used cautiously, and then only for seriously ill patients.7 9 D 
71
 In a January 21. 1986, letter to FDA, Dr. Michael F Murphy, Director of Psychopharmac 
ogy of Hoechsfs U.S. affiliate, wrote: "A death noted in the Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin w 
reported directly to CSM. Hoechst U.K. has no further information on this case." In subcomm 
72
 See "Trouble with Nomifensine," Vol. 23, No. 2.r>4, pages 98-100. 
7 3
 In subcommittee files. 
74
 In subcommittee files. ™^A» »>• 
7 5
 See a January 27. 1986, memorandum, from Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA s Division 
Neuropharmacological Drug Products, which is in subcommittee files. 
7 8
 Ibid 
77
 Ibid 
7 8
 Ibid . , . . . 
79
 Ibid Dr Murphy also implied that the CSM would meet to consider a similar insert r« 
sion for the U.K. labeling. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Leber could not have known at this time that, on November 6, 
1985, Hoechst AG had received a report of the October 30, 1985, 
death of a 23-year-old South African woman involving hemolytic 
anemia in conjunction with jaundice and acute kidney failure.80 
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate was notified of the case by December 23, 
1985.81 That death was not reported to FDA until February 5, 
1986, four months after Hoechst AG was notified of it and almost 
three weeks after Dr. Leber's conversation with Dr. Murphy of 
Hoechst.82 
A January 16, 1986, quarterly report to FDA covering U.S. mar-
keting of the drug during the final quarter of 1985 included 547 re-
ports of adverse reactions, 49 of which involved reactions Hoechst 
classified as serious, and 7 of which involved hemolytic anemia re-
actions.83 In addition, the submission reported the hemolytic 
anemia-related death of a 76-year-old woman who also had "preex-
isting severe liver disease" that was reported to the sponsor on De-
cember 2, 1985.84 
On January 20, 1986, a Federal holiday, a Hoechst official called 
Dr. Leber at home to state that the company was withdrawing 
Merital from the market.8 5 The following day, Dr. Leber called 
Hoechst and learned that a worldwide withdrawal was being an-
nounced.86 
Hoechst stated in a draft withdrawal letter sent to FDA on Janu-
ary 21, 1986, that it was removing the drug from the market be-
cause of "an increase in the number of reports of serious hypersen-
sitivity reactions, notably hemolytic anemia, occurring in nomifen-
sine-treated patients in the United Kingdom." 8 7 In an accompany-
ing letter, the firm advised FDA that it did "not consider a with-
drawal to the patient level as necessary because current labeling 
adequately addressed these issues and the size of prescriptions is 
small and, thus, self-limiting." 8 8 On January 22, 1986, the firm 
further advised FDA that it would issue a press release on its 
withdrawal "[o]nly if the volume of questions becomes over-
whelming . . ." 8 9 
Based on two submissions to FDA, one in January 1986 and one 
in April 1986, Hoechst listed at least 353 U.S. reactions that it clas-
sified as hypersensitivity reactions to Merital that were reported 
during the drug's brief and relatively limited marketing in the 
United States.90 Additional such reactions occurring in the U.S. 
have been reported by the sponsor in subsequent submissions. 
8 0
 The reaction onset date was October 18. 1985. From the information available in FDA's 
files, it cannot l>e ascertained when the death first came to the attention of Hoechst's South 
African affiliate. However, that affiliate's medical director visited and discussed this case on No-
vember 4 and f>, 198f>, with the registrar of the Medicines Control Council, Pretoria. 
8 1
 See the inspections! observations issued by FDA field investigators to Hoechst's U.S. affili-
ate (FDA Form AH'A) in March 1987, in subcommittee files 
8 2
 Hoechst's February 5, 1986, submission to FDA is in subcommittee files 
8 3
 In subcommittee files 
8 4
 Ibid. The sponsor was informed of the case in late October 1985, but did not receive a report 
of the patient's death until December 2, 1985. 
"
s
 See Dr. Leber's January 27, 1986, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files. 
8fl
 Ibid. 
87
 In subcommittee files. 
8 8
 In subcommittee files. 
8 9
 Hoechst's January 22, 198f>, letter is in subcommittee files 
90
 Hearing, page 20 
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Deaths have continued to be reported following Mental 's market 
withdrawal. For example, on October 21, 1986, Hoechst reported to 
FDA another Merital-associated fatality in the United States possi-
bly involving hemolytic anemia.91 On February 3, 1987, Hoechst 
reported the Merital-associated death of an Arkansas woman that 
also involved hemolytic anemia as well as jaundice and other disor 
ders.92 Another hemolytic anemia fatality on January 21, 1986, in 
volving a 64-year-old female German Merital patient was reported 
to FDA on March 25, 1986,93 as was a death from malignant neuro 
leptic hyperthermia syndrome involving a 60-year-old Irisl 
woman.94 On July 30, 1986, Hoechst reported additional deaths, in 
eluding a French case of extrapyramidal syndrome 9 5 and a U.K 
case of disseminated intravascular coagulation.96 On August 19 
1986, Hoechst reported the death of a 36-year-old French womai 
associated with hemolytic anemia in combination with thrombocy 
topenia and disseminated intravascular coagulation.97 
While FDA was advised that "Hoechst AG decided voluntarily t 
withdraw Merital from worldwide distribution,"9 8 the Uni te 
Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines, in an update put 
lished in the July 5, 1986, British Medical Journal, stated that re 
ports received of Merital-associated adverse reactions "suggested 
hazard which was unacceptable when effective alternative reme 
dies were available." 9 9 
On June 17, 1986, FDA removed Merital from the list of a] 
proved drugs because it had been withdrawn from the market f( 
safety reasons.1 0 0 
On January 9, 1987, one year after Merital was removed froi 
the world market, Hoechst requested that FDA withdraw approvi 
of the Merital NDA.1 0 1 
9 1
 The report of this case is in subcommittee files. In a December 4, 1986, submission, how 
er, Hoechst included a consultant's report that argued against "a nomifensine induced hemol 
ic anemia or any type of hemolytic anemia" as being responsible for the death of the 54-year 
patient. In subcommittee files. 
9 2
 The February 'A, 1987, report of this March 4, 1986, death is in subcommittee files. The 
tient had previously been diagnosed with Hodgkins lymphoma. See the January 22, 1987, let 
to the subcommittee from the lawyer for the patient's estate, in subcommittee files. 
9 3
 The patient died 12 hours after being admitted to the hospital. The records on this case 
in subcommittee files. 
9 4
 On February 24, 1986, Hoechst Ireland Ltd related this death to Hoechst AG Records 
the case are in subcommittee files. In an October 29, 1984, submission, Hoechst listed "neurol 
tic malignant syndrome'' as one of many "signs commonly observed in extreme pyrexia [ 
fever]." In subcommittee files. 
9 5
 Records on this case are in subcommittee files. In an October 29, 1984, submission to Fl 
Hoechst had listed "extrapyramidal symptoms" as among "signs commonly observed in extrc 
pyrexia (fever)" that "have not been reported" for Merital. In subcommittee files. However 
an April 24, 1986, quarterly report for Merital, the sponsor reported a French case of extrap^ 
midal syndrome known to it since 1982. In subcommittee files. A Merital associated case of at 
extrapyramidal reaction to nomifensine in a 77-year-old woman was also reported in the Nov 
ber 10. 1984, British Medical Journal, see vol. 289, page 1272. 
9fi
 Records on the death of this ^7-year-old female are in subcommittee files. 
97
 On February 28, 1986, reportedly some time after she discontinued use of Merital in Dec 
ber 198f), the patient developed acute hemolysis, thrombocytopenia, disseminated intravasci 
coagulation, hypertension, renal failure and pulmonary edema and subsequently died on Mi 
3, 1986. Records on the case are in subcommittee files. 
9 8
 See Hoechst's January 22, 1986, letter to FDA, in subcommittee files. 
9 9
 "Withdrawal of nomifensine," July f>, 1986, British Medical Journal, Vol 29H, page 41. 
»
nnr>l Fed Reg 21981. 
101
 Hoechst's January 9, 1987, letter to FDA is in subcommittee files. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. PRIOR TO APPROVING MERITAL, FDA OVERLOOKED EVIDENCE OF THE 
DRUG'S ALLERGY-INDUCING POTENTIAL 
Prior to its approval by FDA in 1984, Merital was associated 
with various combinations of signs and symptoms, including eosino-
philia (an abnormally high count of a certain kind of white blood 
cells); fever; joint and muscle pain; skin rashes; abnormal liver 
functioning; hemolytic anemia (destruction of red blood cells), 
sometimes accompanied by kidney failure; thrombocytopenia (de-
pressed blood platelet counts); and lung infiltrates. 
Dr. N. Franklin Adkinson, Jr., an Associate Professor of Medi-
cine with a joint appointment in the Subdepartment of Immunolo-
gy of the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, testified 
before the subcommittee that such pre-approval reports suggested 
that Merital was associated with immunological or allergic side ef-
fects. His assessment was reiterated by a number of noted experts 
in drug-induced immune reactions consulted by the subcommittee. 
Shortly before the drug was approved, Mental 's sponsor acknowl-
edged that many signs and symptoms reported for the drug that oc-
curred in various combinations suggested that Merital was associ-
ated with an immune syndrome or group of syndromes. Despite 
this, the labeling originally approved by FDA did not acknowledge 
a common immunological basis for many of the adverse reactions 
that had been reported for the drug and did not warn that serious 
reactions such as hemolytic anemia probably constituted part of a 
Merital-induced immune syndrome. 
Dr.' Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Office of Drug Research and 
Review, conceded that many of the signs and symptoms reported 
for the drug "can be and perhaps should earlier have been recog-
nized as all related to immune complex formation." He main-
tained, however, that such recognition was not relevant to the 
agency's consideration of whether and how Merital could be safely 
used. What mattered to FDA, he testified, was the incidence and 
severity of Merital-associated adverse reactions—i.e, the actual 
damage to patients—not whether an immunological mechanism 
was responsible for them. 
Since allergic drug reactions, by definition, are those that involve 
an immunological mechanism, the implication of Dr. Temple's tes-
timony is that it was not important in evaluating Merital's safety 
to recognize that potentially serious Merital-associated side effects 
represented allergic reactions to the drug. 
The central deficiency in FDA's pre-market regulation of Meri-
tal's safety was the agency's failure to recognize the drug's signifi-
cant allergenic potential. A review of the extensive medical litera-
ture devoted to the clinical diagnosis and management of drug-in-
duced allergic reactions contradicts FDA's position that recognition 
of Merital's capacity to cause immunologically mediated or allergic 
reactions was unimportant. Allergic drug reactions, unlike other 
toxic drug effects, can be precipitated by minute amounts of a 
drug, far below therapeutic doses. Thus the literature repeatedly 
states that allergenic drugs should be discontinued in patients 
15 
known to be sensitive to them, and especially where therapeutic a 
ternatives are available. 
Allergic reactions generally occur upon re-exposure to a dru 
after a previous period of use and sensitization. Since depressed p; 
tients are likely to use an anti-depressant episodically, any potei 
tially serious, dose-independent toxicity attendant upon re-exposui 
to an allergenic drug is germain to whether or how it can be safe 
used as an antidepressant. 
Serious Merital-associated allergic reactions were often precede 
by more benign allergic responses occurring upon one or mo 
prior exposures. Assuming that Merital was approvable, awarene 
that benign allergic manifestations such as fever or flu-like sym 
toms could lead, upon continued exposure, to severe, even lif 
threatening allergic reactions such as hemolytic anemia was esse 
tial to early detection and clinical management of potentially se 
ous Merital-induced allergic disorders. Merital's labeling did n 
warn physicians to be alert to mild allergic reactions that their p 
tients might experience. It, thus, did not bear "adequate directio 
for use" and was misbranded within the meaning of the law. 
FDA testified that the agency did not believe it important 
alert physicians to Merital's apparent immune or allergic toxicil 
But once the agency concluded that many Merital-associated E 
verse effects might have a common immunological origin, t 
agency asked Hoechst to re-label the drug to warn about this as 
means of alerting physicians to the drug's allergic potential. So 
thereafter, Hoechst removed Merital from the market. 
2 . THE DETECTION OF DRUG-SPECIFIC ANTIBODIES IN A N EXTRAORDIN/ 
ILY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF MERITAL PATIENTS FURTHER EVIDENC 
THE DRUG'S ALLERGENIC POTENTIAL 
Antibodies are proteins produced by the body in response tc 
foreign substance, such as a drug they can recognize. In some cas 
they react with that substance to induce an allergic reaction. Lai 
ratory investigations have confirmed that antibodies were respor 
ble for many of the allergic reactions reported for Merital. 
A person developing antibodies against a drug and/or its meta 
lites (i.e., its breakdown products in the body) is said to exhibit 
immune response to it. Allergic drug reactions, by definition, i 
adverse effects that can be attributed directly to such a respon 
Thus, tests for immunological drug reactions are often directed 
detecting the presence of drug-specific antibodies in a patier 
blood. 
Merital was reported to be highly immunogenic—that is, it v 
found to be associated with a high degree of drug-specific antibc 
formation. A Swiss paper in December 1983 reported that Merii 
specific antibodies were detected in the blood of 51 of 51 patie 
who took the drug. Subsequent work by the authors revealed t 
approximately 88 percent of a total of 105 persons given Men 
developed drug-specific antibodies. This degree of drug-specific ai 
body formation was highly unusual, if not unique. 
It was not until the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing t 
FDA learned that Merital had been reported to be highly immu 
genie. Dr. Robert Temple testified that the antibody findings 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Merital would have been of little significance to FDA unless they 
could be correlated with clinically observable adverse reactions. 
However, such findings would have signaled the drug's potential to 
induce allergic reactions. Drugs that engender a drug-specific 
immune response (i.e., antibodies) are more likely to induce allergic 
reactions than drugs that do not stimulate the immune system. 
Had FDA been aware, prior to approving Merital, that the drug 
was exceptionally immunogenic, it might not have overlooked the 
abundant clinical evidence it received of Mental 's capacity to 
induce a wide range of allergic reactions. Moreover, it was concern 
over reports of adverse reactions to Merital, most notably hemolyt-
ic anemia, that had earlier prompted Hoechst to embark on an ex-
tensive program throughout Europe to look for specific antibodies 
in the blood samples of Merital patients. Similarly, the authors of 
the December 1983 Swiss paper decided to do antibody studies on 
Merital blood samples because they believed the drug induced ad-
verse reactions that appeared to be of immunological origin. 
Prior to the approval of Merital, the sponsor failed to report to 
FDA several serious and sometimes fatal reactions to the drug of a 
possibly allergic nature. The significance of data on Mental 's im-
munogenicity would have been enhanced had these reactions been 
reported. 
3. FDA DID NOT E N S U R E RECEIPT A N D REVIEW OF IMPORTANT INFORMA-
TION PERTINENT TO ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY OF MERITAL 
A. FDA's Regulation of Merital Did Not Include Review of Impor-
tant Publications in the World Literature Relevant to the 
Drug s Safety 
Numerous publications appeared in the world literature from 
1979 through 1984 documenting the clinically diverse manifesta-
tions of Merital's apparent immune toxicity. FDA's regulation of 
the safety of Merital did not include consideration of these publica-
tions. 
It is essential that FDA make every effort to obtain and review 
all publications in the world literature necessary for a responsible 
assessment of the safety and efficacy of a new chemical entity. 
The titles and very frequently the abstracts of articles published 
in tens of thousands of publications in the world literature are en-
tered into Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System 
(MEDLARS), which is maintained by the National Library of Medi-
cine. The computer printouts generated from MEDLARS enable 
virtually the entire world literature concerning a new drug under 
review to be scanned in a very condensed form. The MEDLARS 
printout for "nomifensine" contained English titles and/or English 
abstracts for most of the publications, including foreign language 
publications, concerning Mental 's potential to induce allergic reac-
tions. Although FDA's library has computer access to this system, 
the agency does not require its reviewers to obtain and examine 
titles and, where available, English abstracts accessed from this 
system for relevant publications concerning new drugs under their 
review. 
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B. FDA Does Not Require the Submission of Labeling, "Dear 
Doctor" Letters, and Other Important Regulatory Information 
Related to the Foreign Marketing of New Drugs Under Review 
in the United States 
Well before FDA approved Merital, the drug's German labeling 
warned physicians about several "immunologically caused hyper-
sensitivity reactions" associated with the drug's use, the occurrence 
of any one of which necessitated immediate discontinuation of the 
drug. No such warning appeared in the labeling originally ap-
proved by FDA. 
FDA did not receive a copy of this labeling. The agency does not 
require sponsors to submit to it all labeling, or changes in labeling, 
for a new drug approved in other nations that is either under in-
vestigation or has been approved for marketing in the United 
States. Such a requirement could provide valuable additional infor-
mation on the manner in which foreign regulatory authorities as 
well as sponsors view a new drug under FDA review. 
In February 1985, several months before Merital's market launch 
in the United States, Hoechst sent a "Dear Doctor" letter to 
German physicians emphasizing information concerning the "influ-
enza-like syndrome" and other hypersensitivity reactions associat-
ed with Merital's use. FDA did not receive a copy of this letter. Nor 
did the agency receive "Dear Doctor" letters sent to German and 
U.K. physicians in September 1985 warning of several serious and 
sometimes fatal reports received of Merital-associated "hypersensi 
tivity" reactions. 
FDA does not require sponsors to submit "Dear Doctor" letter* 
distributed to practitioners in other nations concerning new drug! 
under review in the United States. Had it done so, it might have 
learned that the sponsor was emphasizing to foreign physicians as 
pects of Merital's toxicity that were not featured in the package in 
serts then available to American physicians. 
FDA did not learn until January 1986 that as of September 198! 
Hoechst had stopped promoting Merital in the United Kingdom. Ii 
addition, it was not aware that the U.K.'s Committee on Safety o 
Medicines (CSM) was raising questions about the continued approv 
ability of the drug. Were FDA to require sponsors to inform it o 
important regulatory developments concerning new drugs market 
ed outside the United States that are under investigation or hav 
been approved for marketing here, it could keep abreast of event 
that might provide it with valuable additional insights into thes 
drugs. 
A May 1981 evaluation from Australia's Department of Healt 
noted that Merital may induce allergic reactions consisting of or 
or more signs and symptoms that may comprise part of a syi 
drome. Hoechst obtained this evaluation in August 1983, but nev< 
forwarded it to FDA. Similarly, FDA was not informed th; 
Hoechst withdrew its marketing application for Merital in Swede 
following a report from the Swedish regulatory authority that tl 
incidence of certain immune reactions to the drug was unaccep 
ably high. If the agency required sponsors to submit such evalu 
tive material obtained from foreign regulatory bodies, it could be Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark L w School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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efit from learning how other regulators perceive and handle poten-
tially important aspects of a new drug under review. 
4. ffOECHST DID NOT REPORT TO FDA IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
PERTINENT TO THE SAFETY OF MERITAL 
Prior to Mental 's approval, Hoechst failed to disclose to FDA in-
formation concerning the nature, extent, and severity of the drug's 
toxicity to the human immune system and, in the process, rendered 
the drug, especially as originally labeled, misbranded within the 
meaning of the law. 
A. Hoechst Did Not Report Serious Merital-Associated Adverse Re-
actions Prior to the Drug's Approval 
At the time of the subcommittee's hearing, FDA regulations re-
quired sponsors to supply the agency with prompt reports of "any 
finding" associated with a new drug under investigation "that may 
suggest significant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and pre-
cautions pertinent to the safety of the drug." The subcommittee's 
investigation revealed that Hoechst failed to report to FDA at least 
30 Merital-associated deaths known to it prior to the drug's approv-
al, four of which involved hemolytic anemia. 
FDA testified that it had received no reports of Merital-associat-
ed hemolytic anemia fatalities until April 1985, several months fol-
lowing the drug's approval. Initial reports of such deaths prompted 
a major labeling revision in mid-1985 that emphasized the drug's 
capacity to induce life-threatening hemolytic anemia reactions. At 
the very least, Hoechst's failure to reflect Mental 's potential to 
induce hemolytic anemia fatalities in the drug's originally ap-
proved labeling rendered the drug misbranded within the meaning 
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
On June 13, 1986, the subcommittee informed FDA of five other 
Merital-associated deaths that may have involved allergic reactions 
to the drug that were known to Hoechst prior to the drug's approv-
al but were not reported to FDA until after approval. Hoechst also 
failed to report prior to Merital's approval at least three deaths in-
volving cardiac complications and ten cases of drug-associated sui-
cide and/or fatal overdose. 
Hoechst also neglected to report to FDA, prior to the drug's ap-
proval, large numbers of serious, nonfatal hemolytic anemia reac-
tions. Hoechst cited the marked increase from 1984 to 1985 in num-
bers of reports of hemolytic anemia cases from abroad as the prin-
cipal reason for withdrawing the drug from worldwide distribution. 
Had Hoechst reported all such cases known to it prior to approval, 
a similarly marked increase from worldwide marketing experience 
with the drug would have been observable for 1984 as compared to 
1983. 
Some of the reports of Merital-associated adverse effects that the 
sponsor did make to FDA before the drug was approved were de-
layed for several years. 
Some of Hoechst's adverse reaction reports to FDA did not in-
clude important records in the firm's possession. In addition, 
Hoechst sometimes reported adverse effects to FDA in a manner 
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that plainly indicated that it was not sharing all relevant informa-
tion in its custody with the agency. 
B. Hoechst Did Not Comply With the Adverse Reaction Reporting 
Requirements for Approved New Drugs 
FDA regulations require that serious and unexpected (i.e., not 
listed in a drug's current labeling) adverse reactions associated 
with use of approved new drugs be reported to FDA within 15 
working days of their initial receipt. Fifteen-day alert reports of se-
rious and unexpected adverse experiences associated with use of 
Merital outside the United States rarely arrived at FDA on time. 
The agency, however, took no regulatory action in connection with 
Hoechst's failure to meet 15-day reporting requirements. 
FDA does not require 15-day alert reports for drug-associated 
deaths if they are not "unexpected"; that is, if the drug's labeling 
acknowledges the drug's potential to induce such deaths. Thus, the 
sponsor did not make FDA aware of a hemolytic anemia-related 
death that occurred during the drug's brief and limited marketing 
in the United States until after Merital was withdrawn from the 
market. In view of its oft-stated concern with Merital's capacity to 
induce fatal hemolytic reactions, FDA would obviously have bene-
fited from being promptly alerted to this death. 
FDA regulations require that all domestic reports of serious ad-
verse drug reactions for a recently approved new drug tha t are not 
subject to the 15-day alert requirement (i.e., serious but expected 
reactions) be included in quarterly reports submitted to the agency. 
At least 100 reports of Merital-associated adverse effects known to 
the sponsor during the third quarter of 1985 were not provided to 
FDA until the sponsor submitted its report for the fourth quarter 
of 1985. 
FDA's regulations unwisely exempt sponsors from reporting seri-
ous but expected adverse reactions associated with the foreign mar-
keting of a new drug. Once fatal hemolytic anemia became an ex-
pected (i.e., labeled) side effect of Merital therapy, the sponsor was 
no longer required to inform FDA of any such cases occurring 
during foreign marketing of the drug. Thus, Hoechst did not violate 
agency regulations in failing to inform FDA prior to withdrawing 
Merital from the market on January 21, 1986, of three drug-associ-
ated hemolytic anemia deaths occurring outside the United States 
that came to its attention in late 1985. 
C. Hoechst Did Not Report to FDA Laboratory Study Results Re 
vealing That Merital Was Highly Immunogenic 
When Hoechst was advised in 1982 that several Swiss scientists 
had frequently detected drug-specific antibodies in the blood o 
Merital patients, the firm did not bring this matter to FDA's atten 
tion. On December 3, 1983, these Swiss scientists reported some o 
their antibody findings in a Swiss medical journal. Neither a trans 
lation of that German language paper, nor even a copy of it, wa 
ever submitted to FDA. Instead, the title of the paper was merel 
listed without emphasis as the 94th of 97 literature references ir 
eluded in a December 11, 1984, annual report to the Merital INI 
days before the Merital NDA was approved. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On August 22, 1985, two German authors published a paper in 
the New England Journal of Medicine which reported the detection 
of antibodies against Merital and/or its metabolites in the blood of 
19 Merital patients who developed hemolytic anemia. Although 
Hoechst was informed of their findings several months before they 
were published, it waited until the appearance of the New England 
Journal of Medicine paper to discuss them with FDA. Yet, based on 
the publication of this paper, Hoechst made revisions in Merital's 
labeling. 
Throughout most of the review of the Merital NDA, Hoechst re-
ported the various clinical manifestations of the drug's allergeni-
city as separate and discrete aspects of the drug's toxicity without 
any reference to the probability that they shared a common im-
munological origin. In fact, Hoechst repeatedly implied that no 
such immunological link among various drug-associated adverse ef-
fects existed. 
5. FDA'S ENFORCEMENT OF THE ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS WAS INADEQUATE 
FDA administrative files contain abundant support for the com-
mittee's conclusion that Hoechst did not comply with a wide array 
of agency reporting requirements. Although several Hoechst sub-
missions plainly revealed evidence of the firm's noncompliance 
with these requirements, FDA testified before the subcommittee 
that it did not recognize the sponsor "as being out of compliance." 
FDA reviewers, prior to approving Merital, suspected that the 
sporisor had not supplied important safety information in a suffi-
ciently timely manner. Yet, no agency investigation was ever un-
dertaken of the sponsor's reporting practices. 
In an earlier report on FDA's regulation of the arthritis drug, 
Oraflex, the committee concluded that the agency "places the pub-
lic's health at risk when it does not vigorously enforce" require-
ments designed to ensure that it receives all information "needed 
to weigh the risks of [a new] drug against it purported benefits." 
FDA's continuing evasion of its law enforcement responsibilities 
undermines public confidence that the agency is ensuring receipt of 
all the information it needs to make responsible assessments of the 
risks of new drugs* 
In its appearance before the subcommittee, FDA equivocated as 
to whether Hoechst was legally obligated to report to it large num-
bers of adverse reactions it is now known to have withheld from 
FDA prior to Merital's approval. This view of law enforcement is 
unacceptable. The legal requirement that a sponsor report all sig-
nificant adverse reactions to a new drug under clinical investiga-
tion is designed to ensure that FDA receives all the information it 
needs to assess a new drug's risks prior to determining whether it 
may be approved for marketing. By publicly minimizing, after ap-
proval, the significance of large numbers of reports of potentially 
serious adverse drug reactions that it was not permitted to review 
before approval, FDA signals to sponsors tha t they need not ensure 
that FDA's decisions reflect all potentially relevant safety data in 
their possession. 
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For some reason, FDA was also reluctant to acknowledge tha 
agency reporting requirements had been violated in connectio 
with the sponsor's failure to inform it that Merital had been foun 
to be highly immunogenic. FDA testified that such information wa 
"pertinent" and "should [have been] submitted," but that it wa 
"not sure [such information] would have made any difference t 
[its] conclusions about the drug." Accordingly, FDA maintaine 
that such information may not have been required to be reporter 
The committee finds it disturbing that FDA would take a publ 
position that possibly excuses a drug sponsor from informing it < 
data that suggested the drug's potential to induce allergic rea 
tions. 
Section 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires "/i/ 
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether ( 
not such drug is safe for use . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The la 
clearly did not contemplate public speculation by FDA officia 
after approval on the significance of test data they never had tl 
opportunity to review before approval. 
The committee believes that FDA's policies and public stat 
ments should make clear that the "full reports" requirement of tl 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act places the legal burden on sponso 
to ensure that the agency has an opportunity to conduct an inc 
pendent review of all investigations that could possibly bear on tl 
safety and efficacy of a new drug under review. 
6. THE EFFICACY OF MERITAL WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTI 
EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM ADEQUATE AND WELL-CONTROLLED STUDI1 
AS REQUIRED BY LAW 
In enacting the Drug Amendments of 1962, Congress effective 
declared that FDA should not permit public exposure to the ris 
of any new drug, until, at the very least, its sponsor has provid 
"substantial evidence . . . consisting of adequate and well-controll 
investigations . . . that the drug will have the effect it purports 
is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, r< 
ommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thei 
of." The committee's review indicates that FDA permitted t 
public to be exposed to an unusual panoply of risks presented 
Merital without assurance that the drug's efficacy was support 
by "substantial evidence." In this regard, FDA failed to perform 
responsibilities under the law. 
FDA has consistently interpreted the law to require, as a p 
condition for NDA approval, that efficacy be demonstrated by 
least two adequate and well-controlled studies. FDA cited thi 
clinical trials—known as the Georgia, Meredith, and Varga sti 
ies—as the basis for its conclusion that Merital was an effective ; 
tidepressant. 
FDA's statistician, however, testified that two of these studie 
Varga and Georgia—did not provide substantial evidence of Mi 
tal's efficacy. Thus, in his estimation, the drug's efficacy was 
supported by at least two adequate and well-controlled studies, 
required by law and established agency policy. 
Only 26 patients received Merital in the Varga and Georgia st 
ies, 7 and 19, respectively. Early in the review of the Merital ftl Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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FDA cited these small numbers in concluding that these trials 
could not serve as "pivotal" evidence of the drug's efficacy. 
Later FDA defended its subsequent reliance on these trials by 
emphasizing that they yielded statistically significant results in 
favor of Merital. This argument evades what had been the agency's 
principal concern with their small numbers; namely, that such 
small patient samples may not be representative of the universe of 
depressed patients for whom the drug was indicated. 
Further limiting the representativeness of the Varga and Geor-
gia studies was the restricted nature of their patient populations. 
The Varga study included only geriatric patients and the Georgia 
study consisted almost entirely of male patients. FDA reviewers 
stated on several occasions that the types of patients participating 
in these studies were insufficiently representative of the universe 
of depressed patients for whom the drug was indicated. 
FDA stated in the Summary Basis of Approval for Merital that 
"analyses" of the NDA indicated that gender and age were not re-
lated to the outcome of the Varga and Georgia studies. FDA, how-
ever, never performed any such "analyses." Nor did any agency 
medical review detail the agency's rationale for concluding that 
Varga and Georgia study results were applicable to the non-elderly 
and women, respectively. 
FDA's clinical reviewer ultimately decided that Merital had "a 
mild antidepressant effect" and wrote that "a more effective anti-
depressant should produce less equivocal results." FDA's statisti-
cian testified that if Merital has only a mild antidepressant effect, 
larger studies should have been done to document that effective-
ness. None of the larger Merital studies demonstrated the drug to 
be significantly better than placebo. 
Approximately 80 percent of the placebo-controlled studies involv-
ing Merital did not demonstrate the drug's superiority to placebo. 
In some studies, placebo outperformed Merital, with one study 
showing the statistically significant superiority of placebo to Meri-
tal. A "substantial evidence" test cannot be met where the over-
whelming majority of studies either demonstrate no statistically 
significant superiority to placebo or inferiority to placebo. In fact, 
Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacological 
Drug Products, had advised the sponsor in January 1983 that "the 
studies yielded so many divergent results we do not have convinc-
ing evidence of efficacy before us which would allow us to approve 
the drug." 
FDA argued that in five of six three-way studies comparing imi-
pramine—a standard, approved antidepressant—as well as Merital 
with a placebo treatment, neither imipramine nor Merital outper-
formed placebo. FDA testified that negative studies in which imi-
pramine—presumably an effective antidepressant—also did not 
outperform placebo represent "failed studies" rather than evidence 
against Mental's effectiveness. 
The law requires proof of effectiveness. It is not FDA's responsi-
bility to assume effectiveness, even of an approved drug such as imi-
pramine, where a particular study does not support effectiveness. 
That imipramine did not fare better than placebo does not prove 
that Merital has been shown to be effective. 
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The only three-way study that FDA did not regard as "faile< 
was the Varga study, a trial whose small sample size and exclush 
ly geriatric make-up rendered it, in the judgment of several agen 
reviewers, inadequate as representative evidence of Merital's an 
depressant efficacy. 
In addition, at least six negative placebo-controlled studies we 
two-way, not three-way trials. In arguing that negative studies rt 
resent "failed" studies and not evidence against the effectiveness 
Merital, FDA assumed that the results of five three-way stud 
were applicable to these other negative placebo-controlled trials. 
The legal burden for demonstrating efficacy is on the sponsor. 
is inappropriate for FDA to make assumptions that explain aw 
several negative studies performed for the drug. 
Subsequent to the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing, FI 
approved another drug, despite several negative efficacy stud 
submitted for it, including three-way studies in which an alrea 
approved drug outperformed placebo. This drug was approved ev 
though it failed the test presented by FDA as the one reason tl 
negative results in the Merital clinical trials program could be c 
regarded. 
In approving Merital, FDA concluded that the evidence of its 
fectiveness was "modest." No reasonable construction of "subst; 
tial evidence" could embrace evidence that the agency concedes 
"modest." Moreover, the record of the agency's review of the effi 
cy data is replete with statements that the sponsor had not si 
plied "substantial evidence" of Merital's antidepressant effica 
Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacologi 
Drug Products told the sponsor in 1982 and 1983 that he 1 
"severe doubts of whether the drug is an effective antidepressai 
and that "[w]e would be troubled if this drug were approved wr 
effective drugs are available." 
In January 1983, Dr. Leber advised the sponsor that "[w]e cam 
conclude the drug is effective based on studies presented to dat 
Nonetheless, the agency's decision to declare Merital effective > 
based on studies included in the original NDA submission of 
cember 1978. In view of the agency's persistent reservations ab 
whether "substantial evidence" of efficacy had been demonstrat 
the committee sees no basis for FDA's failure to condition appro 
on the sponsor's submission of new efficacy studies clearly dem 
strating the drug's efficacy in depressed patients. 
Dr. Leber testified that at one point during its review of the N 
ital NDA, FDA tried "to figure out how to approve this drug." 1 
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of FDA's function. C 
gress did not authorize FDA, in its review of new drug applicatk 
to engage in any function other than assuring that sponsors h 
demonstrated new drugs safe and effective within the meaning 
the law. The agency has not been delegated the responsibility 
try to figure out how to approve" new drugs whose efficacy is s 
ported by evidence of very dubious value. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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7. FDA'S APPROVAL OF MERITAL WAS DRIVEN BY ITS DETERMINATION TO 
MEET INAPPROPRIATE END-OF-THE-YEAR DEADLINES 
Record numbers of new drug approvals in recent years, which 
FDA cites as evidence of progress in improving new drug review 
procedures, have been made possible by large numbers of approvals 
in the month of December. FDA maintains that the flurry of activi-
ty in December reflects companies* desire to meet end-of-the-year 
deadlines rather than an FDA program to improve yearly score-
cards. 
The record in the Merital case, however, suggests otherwise. 
FDA abruptly dropped its previous insistence that Men' e mar-
keted only as/'second-line" therapy in late December 1 *nd in-
formed Hoechst that it was determined to approve the drug by 
year's end. Hoechst saw this as a "concession" that satisfied its 
minimal needs for a marketable drug." 
FDA is prohibited by law from approving new drugs unless they 
have been shown to be safe and effective and their labeling bears 
adequate directions for use. It is imperative that the agency ensure 
that its approval actions are not influenced by arbitrary, self-im-
posed, end-of-the-year deadlines. 
IV. DISCUSSIONS 
1. PRIOR TO APPROVING MERITAL, FDA OVERLOOKED EVIDENCE OF THE 
D R U G ' S ALLERGY-INDUCING POTENTIAL 
Prior to its approval, Merital was associated with reports of vari-
ous combinations of signs and symptoms, including eosinophilia (an 
abnormally high count of a certain kind of white blood cells); fever 
including hyperpyrexia (or extremely elevated fever); arthralgia 
(joint pain); myalgia (muscle pain); skin rashes, including urticaria 
(hives); abnormal liver functioning, including granulomatous hepa-
titis and jaundice; hemolytic anemia (destruction of red blood cells), 
sometimes accompanied by kidney failure; thrombocytopenia (de^ 
pressed blood platelet counts); and pulmonary or lung infiltrates. 
N. Franklin Adkinson, M.D., an Associate Professor of Medicine 
with a joint appointment in the Subdepartment of Immunology of 
I he Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, testified at the 
subcommittee hearing that reports of such reactions indicated that 
Merital clearly produced immune reactions; that is, it was an aller-
gy-inducing or allergenic drug: 
There is no question but that Merital was reported to 
have induced a wide variety of adverse effects which are 
generally considered to be potentially of immunologic 
origin. . . There were cases of hyperpyrexia, or high 
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fever,102 a granulomatous form of hepatit is ,1 0 3 immune 
cytolysis [destruction] of both red cells [i.e., hemolytic 
anemia] and platelets [i.e., thrombocytopenia!], vasculitis 
[inflammation of the peripheral blood vessels], alveolitis 
[inflammation of the small airsacs of the lung] , 1 0 4 renal 
failure in some cases secondary to intravascular hemolysis 
and eosinophilia 1 0 5 and more rarely, rash. 1 0 6 
Drug allergy is generally diagnosed on the basis of drug-assoc 
ed signs and symptoms that are presumed to be allergic or imm 
ologic in nature.1 0 7 Reports to FDA before Mental 's approval 
eluded most of the limited number of manifestations frequently 
sociated with drug allergy, including skin rashes, serum sickn< 
unexpected fever, eosinophilic pulmonary infiltrates, anen 
thrombocytopenia, and liver damage.1 0 8 
Noted experts in drug-induced immune reactions who were c 
suited by the subcommittee concurred with Dr. Adkinson's assc 
ment that, prior to Mental 's approval, a number of adverse effe 
reported for the drug were presumably allergic in na ture . 1 0 9 
In Dr. Adkinson's judgment, a "common immunologic orig 
linked various combinations of signs and symptoms such as hei 
lytic anemia, fever, eosinophilia, and liver function abnormalil 
that were reported for Merital .1 1 0 Shortly before Merital was 
proved, the sponsor acknowledged Merital's probable associat 
with such an immune syndrome or group of syndromes. In an O 
ber 29, 1984, submission to FDA, the sponsor stated that, collect 
1 0 2
 Dr. Adkinson testified that the most common mechanism of drug fever is probably imi 
ologic, "particularly in drug fevers that arise late in the course of therapy." Hearing, paj 
Fever, in Dr. Adkinson's estimation, was "one of the most frequently reported side effec 
the drug." Hearing, page (>. In fact, the reported incidence of Merital-associated fever oftei 
peared greater than the 1 percent incidence claimed by the sponsor. For example, a Har 
Medical School physician reported, in an April 9, 1985, letter to Hoechst, a 17-percent fever 
dence among the patients whom he treated with Merital. In subcommittee files. 
1 0 3
 Dr. Adkinson testified that growths called granulomatous lesions found in the livers c 
tients, particularly in those "who have no history of alcohol abuse," could indicate a hypers 
tivity reaction. Hearing, page (>. He testified that he reviewed a 1977 report of such lesions 
the U.S. clinical trials. A case of Merital-associated granulomatous hepatitis was also rep< 
in a 1980 Swiss article he reviewed. He observed additional reports of granulomatous liv< 
sions in a July 22, 11)81, report to the Merital INI) Hearing, pages 6-7. 
104
 Dr. Adkinson noted, for example, a case of fever and allergic alveolitis reported in a 
paper in the Swiss literature Hearing, page (>. 
1 0 5
 Dr. Adkinson testified that "in most cases elevated eosinophil in the blood indicate ai 
going inflammatory or allergic or immunologic reaction of some type of another." Hearing, 
(i. Dr Adkinson testified that abnormally high eosinophil counts were frequently reporter 
Merital; the sponsor's U.S. clinical trial data showed an eosinophilia incidence of approxim; 
If) percent. Hearing, page f>. 
i or. Hearing, page 5. 
, ( , 7 In a July 14, li>8f>, letter to the subcommittee, Dr Richard D. deShazo, Professor of P 
cine and Pediatrics and a member of the Section of Clinical Immunology and Allergy, Ti 
University Medical C-enter, wrote: "(F|or the present one must discuss drug hypersensit 
more on the basis of the common sense and deductive reasoning rather than on the has 
science If a given drug repeatedly gives reactions which have the clinical characteristics ai 
ated with hypersensitivity reactions, one must assume that (1) the drug is causing the read 
and (2) the reactions are immunologically mediated." In subcommittee files. 
, ( , HThese side effects are included among the "clinical features of drug hypersensith 
which according to the l.'Uh edition of the Merck Manual < 11)77), "are restricted in their i 
festations." See pages 2.T7-8. 
1
 °'' These included Dr Richard D deShazo, Professor of Medicine and Pediatrics, and me 
of the Section on Clinical Immunology and Allergy, Tulane University Medical Center; Dr 
dell F. Rosse, a Professor of Medicine and immuno hematologist at the Duke University Mc 
Center; and Dr Paul P VanArsdel, Jr., Professor of Medicine and Head, Sectfon of Allergy 
School of Medicine, University of Washington. Their letters to the subcommittee are in sul 
nut tee files 
1
 '" Hearing, page 7 
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ly, Merital-associated hemolytic anemia, fever, eosinophilia, and 
liver function abnormalities, "probably reflect different target 
organ sensitivities to a single immunological event." , 1 ! (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
In a May 1985 submission, Hoechst stated that physicians 
"should be aware" of such "hypersensitivity reactions] to Men-
tal," l , 2 but the labeling originally approved by FDA a few months 
earlier did not warn physicians that several signs and symptoms 
reported for Merital probably reflected various manifestations of a 
"single immunological event," or immune syndrome or group of 
syndromes. In this connection, Dr. Adkinson testified that while 
"the various adverse reactions attributed to Merital were certainly 
contained in the package insert, . . . there was no effort to put 
these various immune disorders together and to suggest what I 
think was apparent at that time, that there was a common immun-
ologic basis for these based upon the drug's significant immuno-
genic potential."1 1 3 In short, Dr. Adkinson testified, the original 
Merital labeling contained no warning that serious reactions such 
as hemolytic anemia probably constituted part of a Merital-induced 
immune syndrome or group of syndromes. l14 
Despite Dr. Paul Leber's statement before the subcommittee that 
FDA was fully aware of the possibility that several reactions in-
duced by the drug had a common immunological basis,115 Dr. 
Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Office of Drug Research and 
Review, testified to the contrary: 
I don't think that I disagree with [Dr. Adkinson] as far 
as his factual statements about the reactions that were 
seen or the immunological findings. . . . It may well be, es-
pecially after the fact, completely obvious that all of the 
adverse reactions to nomifensine, such as eosinophilia 
(which isn't really an adverse reaction but rather a labora-
tory observation), the febrile syndrome, and so on, can be, 
and perhaps should earlier have been, recognized as all re-
lated to immune complex formation.116 (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
Although conceding that FDA failed to recognize the immunolo-
gical origin of several Merital-associated adverse reactions, Dr. 
Temple maintained that such recognition was not relevant to the 
agency's consideration whether and how Merital could be safely 
used: 
Such recognition . . . doesn't tell you what to do 
about the reactions. It merely helps explain them. What is 
of interest is how commonly they occur, how severe they 
' " Hearing, page 7 
" ' S<><» I low-list's (half Product Monograph that was submitted to FDA on May 20, 19X5, in 
subcommittee files. 
1
 '
: l
 Hearing, page 7. 
114
 Ibid 
'
 ir
' I)r. Leber testified 
The question, in 1981 when we made the approval was whether or not we had enough 
information to reach a conclusion about a linkage between a variety of syndromes and 
then stress this hypothesis in nomifensine's labeling It's not that we were un-
aware; it's that we wore not convinced Hearing, page 17 
1
 ' ' ' Hearing, page 16. 
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are when they do occur, how the frequency and severity 
compare to alternative therapies, and the extent to which 
they provoke concern. . . . The mechanism is really not rel-
evant except to the extent it predicts how common or 
severe the damage will be. . . . [WJhat's really important is 
what the damage is to patients, not the mechanism. . . . It 
doesn't matter what the mechanism is. It matters what it 
does. *! 7 
By definition allergic drug reactions "involve an immunologic 
mechanism/ ' 1 1 8 In minimizing the significance of the "immuno 
gical mechanisms responsible for many reported drug-associat 
signs and symptoms, Dr. Temple's testimony confirms a central < 
ficiency in FDA's pre-market regulation of Mental ' s safei 
namely, the agency's failure to recognize the drug's significant { 
tential to induce allergic reactions. 
A review of the relevant and extensive medical l i terature on t 
clinical diagnosis and management of drug-induced allergic dis< 
ders directly contradicts FDA's position that recognition of Me 
tal's capacity to induce immunologically mediated or allergic res 
tions was unimportant. For example, one commentator has writte 
"Although most patients with a history of reacting to a drug con 
safely receive that drug again, the outcome could be serious if t 
individual is truly allergic."119 Allergic drug reactions, unli 
other toxic drug effects, can be precipitated by minute amounts 
a drug, far below therapeutic doses.120 Thus, another expert h 
written: 
As a rule, there is a risk that even small doses will 
produce the reaction again. Hence, the modest dose reduc-
tion that might be used to prevent toxic reactions would be 
ineffective and even dangerous for preventing an allergic 
reaction.121 
Accordingly, allergy experts agree that allergenic drugs shou 
be discontinued in patients known to be sensitive to them if thei 
peutic alternatives are available 1 2 2 to avoid the possibility 
injury upon re-exposure. As Dr. Adkinson has written: 
Discontinuation of the sensitizing drug, and indefinite 
suspension of its use, is indicated in almost all immunolo-
gic drug reactions.123 
1 . 7
 Hearing, pages 16 and 24. 
1 . 8
 See Adkinson and Lichtenstein, "Techniques of Assessing the Immune Response 
Drugs," Drug Design and Adverse Reactions, ed. Bundgaard, et al., Musksgaard, Copenhag< 
page 123. 
" • R i c h a r d D. DeSwarte. "Drug Allergy,'' in Allergic Diseases Diagnosis and Manageme 
ed. Roy Patterson, 3d ed , J B Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1985, p 507. 
1 2 0
 See Kenneth W. Witte and Dennis P. West, "Immunology of Adverse Drug Reaction 
The Journal of Human Pharmacology and Drug Therapy, vol. 2, No. 1, January /February 19 
Also see VanArsdel, "Adverse Drug Reactions,' in Allergy: Principles and Practices, supra, pt 
1390. 
121
 See Paul P. VanArsdel, Jr., "Diagnosing Drug Allergy, " Journal of the American Medn 
Association, vol. 247, No. 18, page 2576. 
122
 "Ordinarily, a history of allergy to any drug indicates that the drug should not be used 
an alternative drug of different chemical structure is likely to be as effective." See Paul P V< 
Arsdel, Jr., M.D., "Adverse Drug Reactions," in Allergy: I>rinciples and Practices, supra, pj! 
1408. 
1 2 1
 N. Franklin Adkinson, "Adverse Drug Reactions," Current Therapy, ed by Howard 
Conn, page 599. 
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Allergic drug reactions usually occur upon re-exposure to a drug 
after a previous period of use and sensitization. Dr. Adkinson testi-
fied that "[tjhere must be an initial exposure to sensitize the pa-
tient and after which either continued exposure or re-administra-
tion at some later time is capable of initiating an adverse immuno-
logic event.124 Many allergic reactions to Merital followed this 
course.125 To the extent that depressed patients are often likely to 
use an antidepressant episodically, any serious reaction that can 
occur upon re-exposure to an allergenic drug is certainly germain 
to assessing whether or how it can be safely used. 
In this connection, a letter to the British Medical Journal dis-
cussed a patient who, re-experiencing depression after several 
months off Merital, took two tablets of the drug from those remain-
ing from her original prescription, after which she experienced in-
travascular hemolysis and renal failure. The authors concluded: 
This case highlights the dangers of immune mediated 
drug reactions, particularly with psychotropic agents, 
where patient compliance may be unpredictable and subse-
quent re-exposure may occur after hoarding.126 
Recognition that Merital induced an immune syndrome or syn-
dromes was also important because serious reactions were often 
preceded by more benign allergic responses occurring upon one or 
more prior exposures.127 
Awareness that an initial, relatively benign allergic reaction, 
such as fever, may eventually lead to more severe allergic reactions 
is essential to early detection and clinical management of poten-
tial, drug-induced allergic disorders. In the words of one expert: 
Because drug fever commonly precedes the development 
of more serious manifestations (for example, drug-induced 
hepatitis, vasculitis, hematologic reactions, and exfolitative 
dermatitis), its recognition is imperative.128 
The European medical literature in early 1985 warned of the 
need to heed such early reactions. For example, in February 1985, 
1 2
* Hearing, page 4. 
1 2 5
 For example, of 11 patients who developed hemolytic anemia whose cases were analyzed 
by Hoechst, 9 had a history of terminated prior exposure to Merital. Usually, one to two cap-
sules upon retreatment would precipitate the hemolytic episodes. See the memorandum by 
Aleta Sindelar of FDA of a June 5, 1984, telephone conversation with Mr. Dennis Bucceri and 
Dr Charles Thayer of lloechst's U.S. affiliate, which is in subcommittee files. 
Additional examples of this phenomenon abound. Severe hemolysis accompanied by renal fail-
ure occurred in two cases following resumption of medication with one capsule of Merital after a 
period off the drug See Eckstein, et al , "Immune Hemolytic Anemia and Renal Failure After 
Nomifensine," Klimsche W<xhensvhrift, vol. 59, 1981, pages 5(i7-9. Similarly, on June 13, 1986, 
Hoechst reported to FDA a case involving a 32-year-old Ohio woman who had previously used 
Merital in August 1985 Three or four hours after taking one dose of the drug on May 10, 1986, 
she presented at an emergency room with hemolytic anemia, coagulation disorder, and acute 
renal failure She subsequently had to undergo dialysis. In subcommittee files. 
1 2 6
 A R Morton, et al. British Medical Journal, August 16, 1986, Vol. 293. 
111
 For example, the July 14, 1979, Ixincet reported on a patient who had experienced seven 
previous, identical episodes of fever accompanied by malaise, chills, and abdominal pain before 
developing hemolytic anemia. F. Bournerias, B. Habibi, "Nomifensine-Induced Immune Haemo-
lytic Anemia and Impaired Renal Function," pages 95-6. Similarly, a French patient developed 
high fever on her 16th day on Merital, accompanied by chills, cutaneous eruptions, agitations, 
and delirium The drug was discontinued and the fever resolved promptly. Fever recurred when 
the drug was restarted and, four days later, she was found to have developed acute hemolytic 
anemia. The report of this 1982 case was included in an October 29, 1984, submission to FDA, 
which is in subcommittee files. 
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a German medical publication, the Arznei-telegramm, after notin 
that "nomifensine can induce an immune-allergic reaction, whic 
usually manifests itself . . . in fever, serum sickness-like con 
plaints with muscle aches, joint pain and flu symptoms [that] ca 
proceed [to] blood damage (thrombocytopenia) and pathologic* 
liver function including granulomatous hepatitis, [and] bronch 
pneumonia," concluded that "the threatening clinical picture < 
the immune allergic reaction requires the immediate discontini 
ation of treatment with the occurrence of symptoms such as fev( 
or flu."129 
In a similar vein, the Drug Commission of the German Medic 
Profession issued the following warning on March 27, 1985: 
The Drug Commission, therefore, advises all physicians, 
even as early as the occurrence of fever, to discontinue no-
mifensine immediately. . . . 1 3° 
Since FDA apparently did not appreciate the significance of tl 
clinical manifestations of Mental 's allergenicity prior to approvii 
the drug, nothing in the drug's original labeling, or, in the labeli 
for the drug when it was launched in the U.S. in July 1985, alert 
physicians to the "threatening clinical picture of the immune al l 
gic reaction" necessitating "immediate discontinuation of t re 
ment with the occurrence of symptoms such as fever or flu." ] 
The committee concludes that FDA, in failing to ensure that t 
original labeling for Merital bore "adequate directions for use" 
including such a warning, did not prevent the drug from being rr 
branded within the meaning of §502(0 of the Food, Drug, and C 
metic Act. 
FDA's attempts to minimize the significance of Mental 's all 
genie potential was inconsistent with the manner in which it 1 
regulated new drugs in the past. In its regulation of the nonstei 
dal anti-inflammatory drug, Zomax (zomepirac sodium), for exs 
pie, FDA believed that physicians should be warned of the possib 
ty of mild immunological reactions that could foreshadow m 
severe allergic reactions upon re-exposure to Zomax.132 
129
 In subcommittee files Translated from the German. The Drug and Therapeutics Bui 
similarly noted on December 10, 1985: 
Since the reactions cannot be predicted or prevented in patients on nomifensine, the} 
must be detected early and the drug stopped at the first suspicion. Patients shouU 
therefore be told to stop the drug and see the doctor if they feel physically unwell, o 
develop fever or aches and pains. Patients who have stopped taking the drug should b 
warned against starting it again since this could lead to an immediate reaction 
Any doctor looking after a patient on nomifensine will need to keep careful watch fo 
the serious reactions this drug may cause, and should withdraw the drug at the firs 
sign of trouble. 
"Trouble with nomifensine," Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin. Vol 28, No. 25, pages 98-100. 
, 3
° Translated from the German. The March 27, 1985, issue of the Deutches Arzteblatt 
subcommittee files. . . » . . , • 
, : n
 It was not until November 13, 1985, that Hoechst advised FDA that Merital shou 
discontinued in patients developing any degree of fever" and that it was modifying the < 
labeling to state this. See the November 13, 1985, letter from Mr. Dennis Bucceri, Vice Pre! 
Regulatory Affairs of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate, to Dr Paul Leber, in subcommittee files. 
1 , 2
 In hearings before the subcommittee on the regulation of Zomax on April 26, 1983, 
testified that, because individuals who had a mild allergic reaction to Zomax on previous 
sure to the drug were at higher risk for a severe allergic reaction, the sponsor of Zoma 
correct to warn physicians that "|w)hen represcribing Zomax, you should be particularly a! 
mild |allergicl reactions that the patient may have experienced while taking the drug pre 
ly " Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. Ho 
Representatives. FDA's Regulation of Zomax," April 2<i and 27. 1983, pages 110-111 
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Notwithstanding FDA's testimony before the subcommittee mini-
mizing the significance of the immunological basis for much of 
Mental 's toxicity, FDA did eventually conclude, shortly before the 
drug was removed from the market, that an immunological link ex-
isted for many Merital-associated adverse effects, and that Hoechst 
should relabel the drug to emphasize this. So, nearly one year after 
FDA approved Merital for marketing, it recommended at a Novem-
ber 8, 1985, meeting with Hoechst that the company restructure 
the warning section of Mental's labeling.133 Dr. Temple testified 
that, as a consequence of that meeting: 
. . . the labeling was revised to convey our altered im-
pression of the . . . type of risk associated with Merital's 
use as well as the underlying mechanism we thought 
might link them. . . . Essentially, the immune mediated 
nature of the several reactions was highlighted in an intro-
ductory paragraph of the Warnings Section, and hemolytic 
anemia was placed at the top of the list of those disorders 
of presumed immune pathogenesis.134 
In addition to acknowledging that such a change was "essential 
to maintaining] [the] accuracy" of Mental 's labeling, Dr. Paul 
Leber wrote in an August 5, 1986, memorandum that "[identifying 
a more generalized immunopathogenetic risk factor was seen as a 
means of sensitizing prescribers to the potential for a type of risk 
that might easily be unappreciated or overlooked!' 1 3 5 (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Detection of Drug-Specific Antibodies in an Extraordinarily 
High Percentage of Merital Patients Further Evidenced the 
Drugs Allergenic Potential 
Antibodies are proteins produced by the body in response to a 
foreign substance such as a drug that can recognize and, in some 
cases, react with that substance to induce an allergic reaction.136 
Dr. Adkinson testified that the development of antibodies to Mer-
ital or its metabolites—that is, its breakdown products in the 
body—could lead to life-threatening adverse reactions in some in-
stances.137 He stated, for example, that the "likely mechanism" of 
Merital-induced immune hemolytic anemia was "one of union of 
antibody with the drug, in this case Merital which it recognized, 
resulting in an immune complex which was toxic to nearby red 
blood cells and resulted in their lysis or prompt removal from the 
circulation." 13R 
1 3 3
 According to a November \'.\, 1985, letter to FDA from Hoechst, this change was made at 
the recommendation of Dr. Paul Leber. See the subcommittee's July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, 
Hearing, page 446. 
134
 Hearing, pages l.'l-M. Thus the warning section opened as follows: 
Immune mediated injury 
Illnesses that may be caused by immune mediated injury have been reported in asso-
ciation with the use of Merital (nomifensine maleate). These include hemolytic anemia, 
a syndrome of fever and alveolitis (which has been linked causally to nomifensine by 
positive rechallenge) eosinophilia, necrotizing vasculitis and a lupus like syndrome. 
These illnesses can produce significant morbidity and fatal cases have been reported. 
1 3 5
 In subcommittee Tiles 
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 Hearing, page 4. 
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A person developing antibodies against a drug exhibits sensitivi 
ty, or a specific "immune response," to it. Dr. Adkinson has writ 
ten that allergic reactions are adverse effects that can be attributec 
directly to such an immune response.139 Thus, tests for allergi 
drug reactions are often directed at detecting the presence of drug 
specific antibodies in a patient's blood.140 
The December 3, 1983, issue of Schweizerische Medizinische Wt 
chenschrift (hereafter referred to as the Swiss Medical Weekly) rt 
ported an antibody study of 51 patients who received Merital, 41c 
whom had exhibited adverse reactions to the drug 1 4 1 and ten c 
whom were asymptomatic. Merital was reported to be highly in 
munogenic; that is, it was found to be associated with a high degre 
of drug-specific antibody formation. Antibodies to Merital and/c 
its metabolites were detected in all 51 Merital patients whose bloo 
was tested.142 By contrast, all eight control patients who did nc 
receive the drug did not develop Merital-specific antibodies. Subse 
quent work by the authors revealed that approximately 88 percer 
of a total of 105 persons given Merital developed drug-specific ant 
bodies.14 3 
Dr. Adkinson testified that the degree of drug-specific antibod 
formation associated with Merital may have been unique: "I'm n< 
aware of any currently marketed drug that induces antibody i 
such a high percentage of patients." 1 4 4 
In an October 29, 1984, submission to FDA, Hoechst included a 
August 23, 1984, letter from a hematological consultant, Dr. S 
Sherry, Dean of the School of Medicine at Temple Universit 
Based on materials provided him by Hoechst, Dr. Sherry noted i 
his letter that "[a]ll patients on prolonged therapy develop . . 
antibodies to the drug." 1 4 5 Despite receipt of this letter, it was n< 
until the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing that FDA learne 
that Merital had been reported to be highly immunogenic. 
As earlier discussed, Dr. Robert Temple, Director, FDA's Offit 
of Drug Research and Review, testified before the subcommitt< 
that, in the absence of data relating antibody formation to adver; 
reactions, antibody formation was of little clinical significance 
that it provided information only on the "mechanism" for partic 
lar reactions, which "is really not relevant except to the extent 
predicts how common or severe the damage will be." 1 4 6 Thus, tl 
antibody findings for a drug like Merital, Dr. Temple conclude 
"wouldn't particularly have a major implication for me unless 
knew what the consequence of that was." 14T 
1 3 9
 N. Franklin Adkinson, "Adverse Drug Reactions," Current Therapy, ed. Howard F. Co 
1977, page 599. 
1 4 0
 N. Franklin Adkinson, "Tests for Immunological Drug Reactions," Manual of Clinical 
munologv, 2d edition, American Society for Microbiology, Washington, D C , 1980, page 822. 
141
 These included seven cases of hemolytic anemia, two cases of allergic alveolitis, ten eg 
of hepatitis with fever, and twenty two cases of fever alone Hearing, page 4. 
1 4 2
 Hearing, page 4. 
1 4 3
 See "Radioimmunologische Erfassung von IgE- und IgG-Antikorpern gegen Medikamer 
published in the Schweizerische Medizinische Wochenschrift, 116, 303-5 (1986) The only d 
class that approached this percentage was the bioflavonoids; drug specific IgG antibodies w 
found in 79 percent of the patients receiving bioflavonoids whose sera were assayed. 
144
 Hearing, page 5. 
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Dr. Temple's statements contradict accepted principles of immu-
nology. As Dr. Adkinson has acknowledged, a basic problem for im-
munology has been the frequently observed discrepancy between 
the capacity of a substance to induce antibodies (immunogenicity) 
and its capacity to induce clinically observable adverse reactions 
(allergenicity).148 Knowledge that Merital was highly immunogenic 
would not, by itself, enable one to predict who would be at risk for 
an allergic reaction, or how frequent or severe allergic reactions to 
the drug might be. Thus, Dr. Adkinson wrote that the "fact that a 
drug can elicit a drug-specific immune response . . . does not mean 
that allergic reactions will be so prevalent as to preclude its 
use." 1 4 9 
However, awareness of Mental's immunogenicity would have in-
dicated that a large percentage of those exposed to the drug did ex-
hibit sensitivity—that is, an ilimmune response" to it and/or its me-
tabolites—the significance of which would have required further in-
vestigation. By itself, the drug-specific immune response, Dr. Ad-
kinson has observed, "indicates a potential adverse reactivity" 1 5° 
of an allergic nature: 
There is virtually no disagreement among scientists and 
physicians interested in drug allergy that drugs and 
chemicals which readily engender a drug-specific immune 
response have a greater potential for allergic drug reac-
tions than drugs which do not stimulate the immune 
system.151 
At the very least, the presence of drug-specific antibody signals a 
greater potential for allergic reaction than does its absence. Dr. 
Temple acknowledged that "[ojbviously, you don't want to form 
antibodies if you can help it." 1 5 2 
Dr. Adkinson testified that "[i]n a drug that has very high im-
munogenicity with 80 to 100 percent immune response rate, 1 be-
lieve with widespread administration and use of the drug, allergic 
drug reactions of some form can be anticipated to occur." 1 5 3 As 
Dr. Adki nson testified, frequent antibody formation could signal 
the potential for very severe allergic reactions, such as "anaphylac-
tic shock, severe intravascular hemolysis, sometimes leading to 
kidney failure, damage to the lungs, and hepatitis. All of these 
latter, more severe reactions can, and have been, fatal." 1 5 4 
In the case of Merital, Dr. Adkinson observed, the creation of 
antibmiies could lead to very serious, even life-threatening adverse 
reactions if drug therapy were continued.*55 
Dr. Adkinson has concluded that "the documented record of Mer-
ital provides an excellent case study of the expected consequences 
of widespread use of a highly immunogenic drug," 1 5 6 (emphasis 
148
 Adkinson, "Drug Hypersensitivity- Prevention, Diagnosis, and Management," Delaware 
Medical Journal. Vol 47, No. 11, page (>47. 
149
 Hearing, page r>28. 
1 5 0
 See his September 29, 19HG, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page f>28. 
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1 5 2
 Hearing, page 2.r> 
1 5 3
 Hearing, page 8 
l s 4
 Hearing, page 5. 
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* See his September 29, 1986, letter, Hearing, page 527 
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supplied) and that it is "distressing] . . . that the FDA still consid-
ers the information regarding the immunogenicity of Merital and 
other drugs to be of incidental value." 1 5 7 
Nonetheless, Dr. Temple attempted to minimize the significance 
of the antibody findings for Merital by characterizing them as an 
isolated laboratory phenomenon: 
[I]f it is now seemingly true that this particular [immu-
nological] mechanism carries a particular implication, 
maybe that is something to learn. But I don't see how one 
could have known that or thought that before the events 
happened. There are a great many drugs that form anti-
bodies. . . . The question always is, what does [antibody 
formation] mean? Just forming antibodies doesn't mean 
anything by itself.158 
Any suggestion that the antibody findings would have existed ir 
a vacuum removed from reports of clinically manifest adverse ex 
periences is belied by the record. In fact, had FDA been aware 
prior to approving Merital, that virtually everyone exposed to Mer 
ital experienced a drug-specific immune response, it may not hav< 
overlooked the abundant clinical evidence it received of Merital' 
capacity to induce a wide range of allergic reactions. As earlie 
noted, Dr. Temple acknowledged that "it may well be . . . complete 
ly obvious" that several signs and symptoms reported for Merita 
"can be and perhaps should earlier have been recognized as all n 
lated to immune complex formation." 1 5 9 Moreover, it was concer 
over reports in 1978 and 1979 of adverse reactions to Merital, mos 
notably hemolytic anemia, that prompted Hoechst to sponsor ant 
body studies "to determine the seriousness of the problem." 1 6° 1 
a January 1980 report, Hoechst described its recently initiated Ei 
ropean Surveillance Program, under which immunologists in Ge 
many, 1 6 1 France,1 6 2 and the United Kingdom 1 6 3 were to invest 
gate blood samples of Merital patients for the presence of drug-sp 
cific antibodies. 
Antibody detection studies followed rather than preceded repor 
of adverse effects that had the clinical appearance of allergic rea 
tions. Thus, Dr. K. Neftel, a Swiss scientist who co-authored tl 
December 3, 1983, Swiss Medical Weekly article on Merital 's ii 
munogenicity, approached Hoechst in the spring of 1982 and pi 
posed that the company supply him several blood samples frc 
Merital patients so that he could test his theory tha t Merital w 
associated with immunological reactions. Prior to this time, I 
Neftel had noted that Merital resembled Catergen (generic nai 
cyanidanol), a drug marketed for the treatment of liver disease 
Europe at the time, in that both drugs had been associated w 
'
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 Ibid 
i5« Hearing, page 24. 
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 Hearing, page 16. 
1 6 0
 See Hoechst s July 7, 1980, amendment to the Merital NDA, in subcommittee tiles. 
1 6 1
 These immunologists were affiliated with the Behring Institute in Marburg, Germany. 
162
 I)r B Habibi of the Centre National de Transfusion Sanguine Annexe in Paris, one o 
authors of the July 14. 1979, report in The Ixinvet on a French case of Merital-induced imn 
hemolytic anemia and secondary renal failure. 
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presumably allergic reactions such as hemolytic anemia 164 and 
fever.165 Dr. Neftel had developed a method for detecting drug-spe-
cific antibodies in patients receiving Catergen,166 and, because the 
side effects profile for that drug resembled Mental 's, he proposed 
using the same method to investigate Merital blood samples for the 
presence of drug-specific antibodies.167 
Dr. Neftel's search for Merital-specific antibodies was conducted 
against the background of large numbers of possibly allergic reac-
tions that had already been reported for the drug. As Professor A. 
L. de Week, a co-author of the December 3, 1983, Swiss report on 
Mental 's immunogenicity and the Director, Institute for Clinical 
Immunology, Inselspital, Bern, Switzerland, advised the subcom-
mittee on September 30, 1986: 
In the presence of . . . signs and symptoms [suggesting al-
lergen icity] serological investigations for the presence of 
drug specific antibodies should certainly be taken into con-
sideration. This is also the reason why we have undertak-
en them [for Merital].168 
It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the report of some of the 
findings of Dr. Neftel and his colleagues in the December 3, 1983, 
Swiss Medical Weekly states: 
Side effects such as immunohemolysis with renal failure, 
fever and/or hepatitis, and interstitial pneumonopathy 
have repeatedly been described or observed following long-
term therapy with nomifensine. An immune etiology has 
been proven for hemolysis, and one is suspected for other 
• side effects.169 
The record simply does not support Dr. Temple's suggestion that 
the antibody findings would have been assessed in a context di-
vorced from evidence of Merital's allergy-inducing potential. Thus, 
Dr. Richard D. deShazo, M.D., Professor of Medicine and Pediatrics 
and a member of the Section of Clinical Immunology and Allergy, 
Tulane University Medical Center, stated in an August 8, 1986, 
letter to the subcommittee. 
164
 See Neftel, et al., "Durch Cyanidanol-3 (Catergen) induzierte immunhamolytische 
Anamie " Schueiz.med Wschr, vol. 110, no. 10 (1980). See also, Neftel, et al., "( + >-Cyanidanol-3 
Induced Immune Haemolytic Anaemia" in the International Workshop on ( \ I ('yanidanol-J in 
Diseases of the Liver, ed Conn, 11)81, The Royal Society of Medicine, Ixnidon. 
In September l!)8f>, Catergen, like Merital a few months later, was withdrawn from the world-
wide market because of reports of fatal hemolytic anemia associated with its use. The Italian 
Health Office removed Catergen from the market after receiving three such reports from the 
Naples area. This action led other regulatory agencies to follow suit, resulting in a worldwide 
market withdrawal by the drug's sponsor. See the September (>, l<)8.r), letter to German physi-
cians from the drug's sponsor, in subcommittee files 
,r,r>
 See Brattig, et al.. "< t >-Cyanidanol-'t Induced Fever and Its Pathogenesis," in Internation 
al W<trkshop on ( | f-Cyanuianol-.l in Diseases of the Liver, supra, pp. 228 -2'X\. 
,r>r>
 See Neftel. et al "( t ) Cyanidanol :* Induced Immune Haemolytic Anaemia," in Interna 
tional Workshop on ( \ ) (\anulanol .t in Diseases of the Liver, ed Conn, 1981, the Royal Society 
of Medicine, 1/ondon 
167
 Dr. Neftel advised the subcommittee in an August 12, 198(5, letter that a "particular 
reason to include nomifensin in the ongoing studies (for drug-specific antibodies) was the obser-
vation that the side effect pattern of nomifensin is in part similar to that of ( \ >-Cyanidanol-3 
(Catergen) " In subcommittee files 
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It is my opinion that it was important that the regula-
tory agencies reviewing Merital know that the drug was 
highly immunogenic. . . . This is especially the case in view 
of the fact that the drug was . . . associated with hypersen-
sitivity reactions.170 
The antibody findings for Merital strongly suggested allergy r 
the likely basis for many already observed adverse reactions th; 
appeared to be of immunological origin. In fact, FDA's recommei 
dation in late 1985 to relabel Merital to highlight the immur 
pathogenesis thought to underlie the various adverse reactions a 
sociated with the drug's use was based, in part, on data that eve 
tually came to its attention showing antibodies forming again 
Merital and/or its metabolites. In a November 5, 1986, letter to tl 
subcommittee, FDA cited an article by Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt ai 
Salama in the August 22, 1985, New England Journal of Medicir 
which reported the detection of such antibodies in the blood 
Merital patients who developed hemolytic anemia as providi 
"support for the conclusion that an immunopathogenetic meel 
nism might explain other adverse events linked to nomifensi 
(i.e., lupus, nephritis, etc.)."171 FDA cited this article as amo 
those few that "were important to the division's conclusion tha t 
'immune mediated risk' was deserving of emphasis in Merital 's 
beling."1 7 2 
As will be described later in this report, the sponsor failed 
report to FDA several serious and sometimes fatal reactions 
Merital of a possibly allergic nature. The significance of data 
Merital's immunogenicity would have been enhanced had these 
actions been reported.1 7 3 
Dr. Adkinson testified that the very high rate of antibody fom 
tion reported to be induced by Merital administration constitute< 
"very strong clue" that an immunological mechanism or mecl 
nisms linked many of the combinations of adverse reactions tl 
were reported for Merital and were listed in the drug's original 
beling.174 Dr. Adkinson found that Merital's "significant immu 
genie potential" suggested a "common immunologic origin" 
many of the disorders associated with the drug's use. 1 7 5 
The record reveals that only once in the six years FDA spent 
viewing the Merital NDA did any agency reviewer recognize t 
an unusual syndrome may have been associated with the use 
1 7 0
 His August 8, 198C), letter to the subcommittee is in subcommittee files. 
171
 Hearing, page 480. 
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 Ibid. 
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 In this connection, the following exchange between the subcommittee chairman an 
Adkinson occurred. "Mr Weiss: Our investigation has revealed that prior to the appro> 
Merital, substantially more serious Merital associated immune reactions occurred than 
known at that time to FDA. In your judgment, would not a large number of serious im 
reactions raise significant safety concerns for a drug known to have a very high rate of ant 
formation? Dr Adkinson: Yes In my judgment, it should have at least indicated a serious 
for concern." Hearing, page r>. 
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Merital. In a memorandum of a November 9, 1983, telephone con-
versation with Dr. John Griffin of the United Kingdom's Commit-
tee on Safety of Medicines, Dr. Paul Leber wrote: 
I inquired on an informal basis whether or not a syn-
drome characterized by fever and/or hemolytic anemia 
and/or liver injury had been identified in England. . . . [Dr. 
Griffin] thought this syndrome of abnormal fevers was as-
sociated with liver changes and said the English interest 
in the syndrome had been piqued by the possibility that it 
was linked to the recognized syndrome of neurological 
damage and systemic injury seen with Zimelidine [an anti-
depressant never approved for use in the United States 
that was withdrawn from the worldwide market in 1983 
because of large numbers of hypersensitivity reactions as-
sociated with its use].1 7 6 
In his testimony, Dr. Leber conceded that pre-approval knowl-
edge of Mental 's immunogenicity "would have forced us to consid-
er new issues." 177 Had FDA known that Merital induced drug-spe-
cific antibodies in a large percentage of persons exposed to it, the 
agency might have pursued the question of whether a syndrome of 
"fever and/or hemolytic anemia and/or liver injury" was associat-
ed with its use. As it was, Dr. Thomas Hayes, FDA's supervisory 
medical officer for Merital, in a June 26-July 2, 1984, review re-
garding Merital, noted for reasons unrelated to the drug's potential 
immune toxicity, that zimelidine was associated with a "hypersen-
sitivity" syndrome involving "fever, myalgia and/or arthralgia, 
headache, [and] liver dysfunction, . . . often combined with nausea, 
later-called a flu syndrome." 1 7 8 At no time in this or any other 
review, however, did he make any connection between this syn-
drome and the similar pattern of reactions that had been frequent-
ly reported, in varying combinations, for Merital. 
During his appearance before the subcommittee, Dr. Leber testi-
fied that the 
. . . question in 1984 when we made the approval was 
whether or not we had enough information to reach a con-
clusion about a linkage between a variety of syndromes 
and then stress this hypothesis in nomifensine's labeling. 
Dr. Adkinson, who obviously thinks that we did, has the 
advantage of retrospect.179 
Dr. Adkinson's "advantage of retrospect" in part reflects his 
awareness of data on Merital's extraordinary antibody-inducing ca-
pacity that were available well before FDA approved Merital in 
1984. One of the "heralds" of Merital's "predisposition" to induce 
allergic reactions, Dr. Adkinson has noted, was "the fact that Meri-
tal stimulated drug-specific antibody in almost everyone who re-
ceived it." 1 8 0 Had FDA been aware of Merital's immunogenicity 
176 1 
' Hearing, page 498. 
177
 Hearing, page 18. 
178
 Hearing, page 187 
179
 Hearing, page 17. 
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" See Dr Adkinson's September 29, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 528-
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before it approved the drug, it would have been far better situated 
to appreciate that several types of adverse reactions reported for 
Merital merely represented various manifestations of the drug'e 
toxicity to the immune system. As Dr. Adkinson, reflecting on tht 
Merital experience, concluded: 
In this case drug developers and regulators remain skep-
tical that "knowing that antibodies are formed doesn't tell 
you what happens (to people)." This attitude results in an 
increased monitoring threshold such that it requires 
dozens of cases of hemolytic anemia, hyperpyrexia and 
vasculitis syndromes to bring the seriousness of the prob-
lem to the attention of those concerned. Because immuno-
logic drug reactions manifest themselves in a variety of 
different ways and inflict damage on many different organ 
systems, it is especially important to know that the drug 
has allergic potential so that adverse experiences with the 
drug can be interpreted appropriately.181 
2. FDA DID NOT ENSURE RECEIPT AND REVIEW OF IMPORTANT INFOR-
MATION PERTINENT TO ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY OF MERITAL 
A. FDA s Regulation of Merital Did Not Reflect Review of Impoi 
tant Articles in the World Literature Relevant to the Drug 
Safety 
Dr. Paul Leber, Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacolog 
cal Drug Products, testified that, had he known that Merital w* 
associated with a very high degree of antibody formation, "I thin 
I would have explored the issue." 1 8 2 As stated earlier, FDA WJ 
not aware of a December 1983 paper in the Swiss literature repor 
ing Merital to be highly immunogenic until the subcommittee 
May 22, 1986, hearing. 
In a November 5, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, FDA cite 
two letters and one paper published in the world literature in 19i 
as "important to the division's conclusion that an ' immune mediE 
ed risk was deserving of emphasis in Merital's labeling" in Nover 
ber 1985.183 A review of relevant publications in the world liter 
ture suggested the drugs toxicity to the immune system well befo 
1985. 
Dr. Adkinson testified that as early as July 1979, an antibod 
drug reaction was postulated as the cause of serious adverse res 
tions to Merital in the medical li terature.1 8 4 From this point o 
numerous publications appeared in the world literature documei 
ing the clinically diverse manifestations of Merital's apparent tc 
icity to the human immune system. FDA's regulation of the dr 
does not reflect consideration of these publications. 
One publication cited by FDA as important to its decision in la 
1985 to recommend that Merital be re-labeled to emphasize its E 
parent immune toxicity was a paper appearing in the August ' 
1985, New England Journal of Medicine on Merital-associated 1 
•"» Ibid 
IH2
 Hearing, page 19. 
inn Hearing, page 4H0. 
IH4
 Hearing, page 5. He referred to F Bournerias, B Habibi, "Nomifensine Induced Imm 
Haemolytic Anemia and Impaired Renal Function," The Ixincet. July 14, 1979, pages 95-6.. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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molytic anemia that reported the detection of antibodies against 
the drug and/or its metabolites.185 However, the frequency and 
heterogeneity of Merital-associated antibody response, as earlier 
discussed, was documented almost two years earlier in the Decem-
ber 3, 1983, Swiss Medical Weekly. 
Another publication cited by FDA as important to its decision in 
late 1985 to recommend that Mental 's labeling highlight its wide-
ranging allergic potential was a letter published on June 8, 1985, in 
The Lancet concerning five cases of "allegedly allergic fever and al-
veolitis." 186 Dr. Adkinson testified, however, that an allergic basis 
for Merital-associated fever and alveolitis (inflammation of the 
small airsacs of the lung) was posited as early as 1980 in the Swiss 
literature.1 8 7 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the authors of the 
1985 Lancet letter cited nine references in the medical literature 
from 1979-1983 in support of the observation that 
[rjeported side-effects [for nomifensine] include drug fever, 
hepatic reactions, haemolytic anaemia, and a lupus-like 
syndrome. These side-effects have usually been assumed to 
be allergic rather than toxic in nature.1 8 8 
Other publications in the world literature, reporting on addition-
al cases of Merital-associated fever, postulated that they represent-
ed allergic responses to the drug. For example, a 1980 paper in the 
Dutch literature, describing two such cases, concluded: 
The eosinophilia, . . . and the quick appearance of the 
changes after repeated administration of nomifensine, 
speaks more for an allergic than for a direct hepatotoxic 
reaction. . . . ,8y(Emphasis supplied.) 
In addition, three papers published by Scandinavian authors in 
1981 called attention to the probable allergic basis for Merital-asso-
ciated fever. One of these, which reported on two fever cases, one of 
which also involved liver injury, concluded: "The mechanism is 
most likely based on an allergic basis, because the reaction took 
place after a time span, was dose independent and immediate after 
the provocation dose of nomifensine/' 1 9 0 In stating that this "hy-
pothesis is supported by the observation of a case of nomifensine-
induced immune hemolytic anemia [Bournerias et al., 1979]," the 
authors emphasized the potentially common immunological basis 
for drug-associated fever and hemolytic anemia. The authors also 
contributed to a second paper, this one featuring one fever case, 
which similarly concluded: 
1 8 5
 Hearing, page 480. 
i«« See FDA's November f>, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 479. 
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pages 1328-9. 
1 8 9
 Dankbaar, Mudde, Ned. Tijdschr.Geneesk. 124, No 51, 2184-86. 
I9 , )
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It is possible that allergy disposes to the development of 
this complication to the treatment. . . . The occurrence of 
immune haemolytic anemia by 1 patient points in the 
same direction.191 
The third article, reporting two cases of fever that recurred upc 
rechallenge, emphasized the probability that they represented "r 
immunological reaction against [the] preparation." 1 9 2 Both p 
tients had slightly abnormal liver parameters and eosinophil 
which resolved upon discontinuation of the drug. 
Dr. Adkinson testified that a 1980 paper on Merital-associat* 
fever included a case in which fever was accompanied by granul 
matous hepatitis,1 9 3 a toxic manifestation of a possible allergic < 
hypersensitivity reaction to the drug. Two other papers publish* 
in 1981 reported similar liver findings. One in the Scandinavian li 
erature reported on the drug's association with hepatic epithelio 
cell granulomas that resolved after the drug was discontinued. l • 
The other, published in the Swiss literature, described three Mei 
tal patients found with eosinophilic granulocytes in their livei 
Lymphocyte transformation tests, used to ascertain whether a dri 
has immune toxic potential, were positive for two of the patienl 
and one patient also experienced a spiked temperature short 
after taking the drug. The paper concluded that the clinical coun 
the presence of eosinophilic granulocytes, and the results of lyi 
phocyte transformation tests all "speak for a drug-induced allerg 
event.195 
Another paper published in 1980 postulated that a case of Me 
tal-associated liver injury (i.e., jaundice) represented a "hypersen 
tivity" reaction to the drug.1 9 6 Similarly, in reporting a severe ca 
of Merital-associated hepatitis, a 1984 paper in the British litei 
ture concluded: 
The four week interval between the start of treatment 
and the appearance of jaundice, blood and tissue eosinophi-
lia,197 and hepatitis similar to viral hepatitis but with no 
demonstrable viral infection or autoimmune disease sug-
gested a drug induced hypersensitivity reaction.198 
A Merital patient who developed thrombocytopenia or a c 
pressed blood platelet count was featured in another 1984 report 
the British literature. The authors offered a "drug indue 
immune mechanism" as the probable explanation for this advei 
reaction.199 
191
 Nielsen, Lund, Ebert Petersen, and Liisberg, "Drug Fever During Nomifensine Tr 
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The third publication FDA cited in its November 5, 198G, letter 
to the subcommittee as important to its decision in late 1985 to rec-
ommend that Merital be relabeled to emphasize the "immune me-
diated risk" associated with its use was a paper published in the 
July 27, 1985, issue of The Lancet on Merital-associated immune 
vasculitis.200 Citing several literature publications predating 
FDA's approval of Merital on December 31, 1984, this paper opened 
with the following statement. 
Immune-toxic reactions to nomifensine often occur 
within 4 weeks of the start of therapy, presenting as high 
fever and an influenza-like syndrome (myalgia, arthralgia, 
malaise), sometimes followed by various organ manifesta-
tions such as hepatotoxicity (including granulomatous hep-
atitis), haemolytic anaemia, thrombocytopenia, alveolitis, 
or interstitial pneumonia.201 
A Merital-associated lupus-like syndrome, which is essentially a 
generalized vasculitis,202 was reported in a letter published in 
1983.203 In reporting two cases of immune vasculitis, the authors 
of the July 27, 1985, Lancet paper cited this article in stating that 
"[nomifensine can cause immune-allergic adverse reactions, includ-
ing a lupus-like syndrome." 2 0 4 
Thus, prior to 1985, the medical literature reveals ample evi-
dence of various ways in which Merital had proven toxic to the 
immune system. FDA's pre-market regulation of the safety of Meri-
tal did not include consideration of this evidence. 
The committee believes it is essential that FDA, in weighing the 
risks'of a new drug against its purported benefits, make every effort 
to obtain and review all publications in the world literature rele-
vant to an intelligent and responsible assessment of the safety and 
efficacy of such a drug, particularly a new chemical entity that the 
agency is considering for general release for the first time to physi-
cians and the consuming public. 
Dr. Paul Leber testified that, because the "world literature . . . 
is voluminous," FDA could not be expected to have been aware of 
the December 3, 1983, Swiss paper on Mental 's antibody-inducing 
properties.205 However, an English abstract of that article was in-
cluded in an annotated bibliography for "nomifensine" obtained by 
the subcommittee staff from the Medical Literature Analysis and 
Retrieval System (MEDLARS) maintained by the National Library 
of Medicine. 
The titles and very frequently the abstracts of articles published 
in tens of thousands of journals in the world literature are entered 
into MEDLARS. Articles appearing in foreign language publica-
tions are generally listed with English titles and, in many cases, 
are accompanied by English abstracts. 
2 0 0
 Hearing, page 479 
2 0 1
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Of the several publications concerning Merital's allergic pote 
tial that were discussed above, five appear in the MEDLARS bit 
ography on nomifensine with English abstracts and six others i 
peared with their titles, including English titles for articles writt 
in foreign language publications. 
FDA's library has computer access to MEDLARS. The agen 
however, does not require its reviewers to obtain and exami 
titles and, where available, English abstracts accessed from t 
system for potentially relevant articles in the world l i terature c< 
cerning new drugs under their review.206 
Defending the absence of such a requirement, FDA has advh 
the subcommittee that "neither the reviewers nor the library 1 
sufficient time or resources for routine searches not directed at s 
cific questions . . ." 20T The committee notes that the subcomn 
tee staff reviewed all the MEDLARS listings for "nomifensine" 
less than two hours. The committee believes that only minimal 
sources are required to scan virtually the entire world literati 
for articles that may be relevant to the safety and efficacy of a n 
drug under review. The computer printouts generated from MI 
LARS enumerating the pertinent world literature in very c 
densed form supply valuable information on a drug that multii 
periodic submissions by sponsors over the long period of an I 
and NDA review do not provide. FDA should institute procedu 
to ensure that its reviewers avail themselves of the agency's ace 
to this important computer technology. 
In 1985, FDA revoked Section 310.9 of its regulations, which 
empted sponsors from submitting to FDA copies of relevant pu 
cations in the literature if they appeared in journals received 
the agency that were included on the FDA's "designated jourr 
list.208 This section apparently relieved Hoechst of the legal obi 
tion to submit to FDA reprints of several publications in the wc 
literature, including foreign language publications, concerning 
safety of Merital. The committee believes that FDA should i 
take steps to ensure that sponsors submit to it in a timely 
prominent manner copies of all publications in the literature t 
may be pertinent to its evaluation of the safety and efficacy < 
new drug under review, including translations of all such publ 
tions appearing in foreign languages. 
FDA's decisions can only be as good as the information u 
which they are based. The Merital experience dramatizes FE 
unfortunate lack of awareness of years of published world exf 
ence with the drug. FDA must remedy this unacceptable situat 
2 0 6
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2 0 7
 Ibid 
2<)H
 Hearing, page 171 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
IL FDA Does Not Require the Submission of Labeling, "Dear 
Doctor'' Letters, and Other Important Regulatory Information 
Related to the Foreign Marketing of New Drugs Under Review 
in the United States 
Foreign Labeling 
In November 1985, almost one year after approval, FDA recom-
mended that Hoechst relabel Merital to emphasize the immune 
toxicity that the agency thought might link several reported drug-
associated adverse effects. Well before approval, however, the 
drug's West German labeling warned physicians about "immunolo-
gically caused" side effects associated with the drug's use. In Febru-
ary 1984 the German labeling for the drug stated: 
In rare cases, the following hypersensitivity reactions 
have been observed: Skin reactions, changes in liver func-
tion tests, drug fever (occasionally over 40°C), symptoms as 
with a cold (pulmonary infiltration), yellow discoloration of 
the skin and darkening of the urine (hemolytic anemia). In 
these cases [Merital] is to be discontinued immediately and 
the treating physician is to be informed that, because 
these immunologically caused reactions do, of course, dis-
appear, nevertheless they do make medical countermeas-
ures necessary (Letter translated from the German and 
emphasis supplied.) 2 0 9 
By contrast, Hoechst made no attempt to highlight the immunolo-
gical basis of these reactions in the labeling proposed to and ap-
proved by FDA. Nor did the original U.S. labeling warn of the need 
immediately to discontinue the drug even at the first sign of a rela-
tively benign immunological reaction such as fever.210 Further-
more, reactions such as fever and liver alterations that were char-
acterized as "hypersensitivity reactions" in the drug's February 
1984 German labeling were not listed among those presumably re-
garded as manifestations of "immune mediated injury" listed in 
the drug's U.S. labeling that was revised in November 1985. 
Dr. Peter S. Schoenhoefer, formerly head of the drug safety de-
partment of the West German Federal Health Office, advised the 
subcommittee that the German label warning concerning Mental 's 
immune toxicity was made when Hoechst's application for a license 
for the drug was approved in 1983.211 "At that point in time," Dr. 
Schoenhoefer explained, "there was published evidence in the 
German medical literature showing the immunogenic properties of 
the drug." 2 1 2 This evidence, Dr. Schoenhoefer wrote, "led the Fed-
eral Health Office to demand from Hoechst the inclusion of these 
adverse reactions in the data sheet." 2 1 3 
2 0 9
 See the subcommittees July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 444. 
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degree of fever ' See the November IS, 1985, letter from Mr. Dennis Bucceri, Vice President, 
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As earlier discussed, FDA's discovery in mid-1934 that Merital 
was associated with fevers in excess of 40°C or 104°F led the agency 
to reconsider whether and under what conditions Merital could be 
approved as a safe antidepressant. Yet, according to a chronology 
published by the West German Ministry of Health, the drug's 
German labeling was revised on October 16, 1980, to warn that 
fevers above 40°C had occasionally been observed.214 
FDA did not receive a copy of any German labeling for Merital 
prior to approving the drug.2 1 5 The agency has advised the sub-
committee that it does not require sponsors to submit to it all la-
beling for a new drug approved in other nations that is either 
under investigation or has been approved for marketing in the 
United States.2 1 6 The committee believes that such a requirement 
could provide valuable additional information on the manner in 
which foreign regulatory authorities as well as sponsors view a new 
drug under review in the United States. As FDA acknowledged, 
"such documents could provide clues to the existence of unrecog 
nized hazards or might, when a sophisticated regulatory agency de 
mands significant changes in labeling or marketing status, alert us 
to the need for more information.217 Now, as a result of the sub 
committee's investigation, FDA has stated that it will considei 
"whether we should modify regulations and/or guidelines to re 
quest certain information of this sort." 2 1 8 
Foreign "Dear Doctor" Letters 
In February 1985, several months before Mental 's market launcl 
in the United States, the Arznei-telegramm, a German medica 
journal, published a warning concerning various clinical manifests 
tions of an immune-allergic reaction associated with the use c 
Merital, including fever; serum sickness-like complaints wit] 
muscle aches; joint pain and flu symptoms; thrombocytopenia; live 
injury including granulomatous hepatitis; and bronchopneumonia 
Although no similar warning appeared in the labeling accomp* 
nying the drug when it was launched in July 1985, Hoechst n 
sponded to alleged charges from the Arznei-telegramm that it ha 
suppressed information concerning the "influenza-like syndrome 
and other hypersensitivity reactions associated with use of the dru 
in a "Dear Doctor" letter sent to German physicians in Februar 
1985. According to Hoechst's letter, the Arznei-telegramm ha 
maintained: 
. . . that as the manufacturer . . . of nomifensine 
Hoechst itself had not informed physicians about the prop-
erties of its own products. The Arznei-telegramm is refer-
ring to an influenza like syndrome and other such under-
sirable side effects which after our experiences with zimeli-
dine make this kind of instruction necessary.219 This as-
2 , 4
 Dated Novermber 18, 1986, that chronology is in subcommittee files. 
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sertion—that we had not informed physicians sufficiently 
concerning the properties—namely, the side effects—of no-
mifensine is false. All of our documentation—that is, the 
instructions for patients and professionals, the Remedia 
Hoechst, scientific monographs and also our advertising— 
have contained indications since the beginning of 1984 of 
just these rare side effects that the Arznei-telegramm has 
accused us of suppressing. In the instructions for use we 
described the hypersensitivity reactions following ingestion 
of nomifensine. . . , 2 2 0 (Emphasis supplied.) 
FDA did not receive a copy of this "Dear Doctor'' letter,2 2 1 nor, for 
that matter, is there any evidence that it received a copy of the 
Arznei-telegramm, that was published that same month. The sub-
committee's investigation revealed, in fact, that FDA does not re-
quire sponsors to submit to it "Dear Doctor" letters distributed to 
practitioners in other nations concerning new drugs under investi-
gation or approved for marketing the United States.2 2 2 Had it 
done so, FDA might have learned that the sponsor was emphasiz-
ing to German physicians' aspects of Merital's toxicity that were 
not described in the package inserts made available to American 
physicians when the drug was approved by FDA, or when the 
drug's market campaign was launched in the United States. 
There is also no indication in the record that, prior to the with-
drawal of Merital from the market in January 1986, FDA received 
"Dear Doctor" letters sent to German and U.K. physicians on Sep-
tember 24 and 30, 1985, respectively. The letters warned of serious 
Merital-associated hypersensitivity reactions, including three fatal 
cases of immune hemolytic anemia, two fatal cases of immune vas-
culitis, a fatal case of acute liver dystrophy, and a case of lupus.2 2 3 
The U.K. letter stated that revised labeling was under discussion 
with U.K. regulatory authorities in which "more emphasis will be 
given to hypersensitivity reactions." 2 2 4 
had more information on the immune-allergic nature of the side-affects of nomifensine and the 
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sensitivity reactions associated with its use, Dr. Schoenhoefer stated that it "never clearly de-
scribed" the "pathogenic links between the initial influenza-like syndrome and hepatitis, inster-
stitial pneumonia or hemolytic anemia." Ibid, of nomifensine and the range of diseases caused 
by the drug . . . I published my warnings in the Arznei-telegramm, indicating that Hoechst had 
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Foreign Regulatory Developments 
FDA did not learn until January 1986 that as of September 198! 
Hoechst had stopped promoting the drug in the United Kingdom 
In a January 27, 1986, memorandum, Dr. Leber wrote that on J a r 
uary 13, 1986, he was given the January 8, 1986, issue of SCRIP, 
British trade publication, that: 
. . . suggested that the CSM (i.e., the English drug regu-
latory authority) might be on the verge of taking some sort 
of action against the product. Furthermore, it indicated 
that Hoechst UK had issued a Dear Doctor letter about 
Merital and had allegedly ceased promotion of the product 
in the U.K.2 2 5 
Dr. Temple testified that u[w]e had not known of these develo 
ments, but we did know that Merital was still being actively pr 
moted in the United States." 2 2 6 
Until it received the SCRIP article in January 1986, FDA had i 
inkling of the serious questions being raised by U.K. regulatory a 
thorities concerning the continued approvability of Merital. Ct 
tainly, no such questions were being entertained by FDA. Once tl 
trade publication came to Dr. Leber's attention, however, he cc 
tacted the sponsor and the Committee on Safety of Medicines f 
information on the status of the drug in the U.K. One week lat< 
Hoechst notified FDA that the drug was being withdrawn from t 
market worldwide. The sponsor emphasized safety problems i 
countered in the U.K. as critical to its decision.227 
In a January 27, 1986, memorandum, Dr. Leber wrote: 
Certainly, it seems clear that we would all have been 
better off knowing sooner, and in full detail, what other 
national regulatory agencies were doing and why. Perhaps 
the whys and wherefores of their actions are most impor-
tant . 2 2 8 
As FDA stated in its November 5, 1986, letter to the subcomn 
tee: 
Notice of the pending British action and associated Dear 
Doctor letters, provided more than a year after our ap-
proval action, and changes in promotion, on the other 
hand, are very much the sort of information we would like 
as soon as possible and, in the present case, were based on 
new information that we would also have liked to see 
promptly.2 2 9 
FDA does not require sponsors to inform it of important regi 
tory developments concerning new drugs marketed outside 
United States that are under investigation or have been apprc 
2 2 s
 In subcommittee files. 
22r
' Hearing, page M. 
221
 Hoechst s J t nua ry 2X, 198(>, product withdrawal letter states: "We have been inforn 
an increase in the number of reports of serious hypersensitivity reactions, notably hem 
anemia, occurring in nomifensine-treated patients in the United Kingdom." In subcornr 
files. 
22H
 In subcommittee files 
-
2
" Hearing, page 477 
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for marketing in this country.230 The committee believes that such 
a requirement would enable FDA to keep abreast of events that 
can provide vital insights into the recent track record of new drugs 
being marketed abroad. 
Evaluations Obtained from Foreign Regulatory Authorities 
A May 1981 evaluation by Australia's Department of Health con-
cluded: 
Nomifensine can cause an allergic or idiosyncratic reac-
tion consisting of one or more of the following: 
(a) drug fever, 
(b) functional and morphological disturbance of liver 
function, 
(c) eosinophilia, 
(d) on occasions a picture suggestive of interstitial 
pneumonitis.231 
By this early date, Australia's Department of Health was 
already speculating whether some of these possibly im-
munologic signs and symptoms comprised a syndrome as-
sociated with use of the drug. The evaluation further 
stated: "Whether fever, eosinophilia and liver damage 
form part of a syndrome and how frequently such a syn-
drome can occur in a complete or incomplete form are at 
present matters for speculation but of some concern." 2 3 2 
Hoechst Australia received this evaluation in August 
1983, and forwarded it that same month to Dr. A. John 
Nelson of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate. However, FDA did not 
Jearn of this evaluation until the subcommittee brought it 
to the agency's attention on July 14, 1986.233 
Similarly, there is no evidence that FDA learned that 
Hoechst withdrew its marketing application for Merital in 
Sweden on May 14, 1984, following a report from the 
Swedish regulatory authority indicating that "the thera-
peutic value of nomifensine was inferior to that of already 
existing drugs of the same category" and that the "inci-
dence of fever and liver reactions was unacceptably 
high." 2 3 4 Swedish regulators had also concluded that "he-
molytic anemia . . . belong[ed] to the same kind of adverse 
effects as fever and liver reactions." 2 3 5 All three were 
considered part of a drug-induced immune syndrome.2 3 6 
FDA does not currently require sponsors to submit eval-
uative material obtained from foreign regulatory bodies re-
garding new drugs under review in the United States.2 3 7 
2:m See FDA's November 5, 198(>, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 47f»-7. 
2 : n
 See (be subcommittee's .July 14, 198f>, letter to FDA. Hearing, page 11r> 
2 , :
' Ibid 
2:,:
' See FDA's November .r>, l!>8f>, response to the subcommittee's July 14, 19K<;, letter. Hear-
ing, pages 472 and 47a. 
2:14
 See the December 4. 19K(>, letter to the subcommittee from the Department of Drugs, Na-
tional Board of Health and Welfare, Sweden, in subcommittee files 
^
r ; Ibid 
2 1 0
 Ibid Also see the subcommittee's October 10, 198{>, letter to the Swedish regulatory au-
thority, in subcommittee files 
2 , 7
 See FDA s November .r>, 198(1, response to the subcommittee's July 14, 198(1, Jetter. Hear-
ing, pages 47(1 7 
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The committee believes such a requirement could prove in-
valuable in enabling FDA to review how potentially impor-
tant aspects of a new drug under its review are perceived 
and handled by other regulators. 
3 . HOECHST DID NOT MAKE TIMELY A N D COMPLETE REPORTS TO FDA < 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SAFETY OF MERITAI 
A. Hoechst Did Not Report Serious Adverse Reactions Associa 
With the Use of Merital Prior to the Drug's Approval 
At the time of the subcommittee's hearing, FDA regulations 
quired sponsors to "promptly" report to the agency "any findii 
associated with a new drug under investigation "that may sugg 
significant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precauti 
pertinent to the safety of the drug." 2 3 8 Based on an examinat 
of submissions made to FDA by Hoechst after approval of Meri 
the subcommittee s investigation has revealed that the compi 
failed to report to FDA at least SO drug-associated deaths knowr 
it prior to that approval. Many of these deaths were suggestive 
possible allergic reactions to the drug. In addition, Hoechst w 
held from FDA important information in its possession regard 
some reports of Merital-associated deaths it did make to FDA pi 
to approval. 
By 1979, for example, Hoechst was notified of a July 14, \\ 
Merital-associated death from hemolytic anemia of a 76-year 
Swiss woman suffering from chronic lympathic leukemia.2 3 9 
senior physician in her case was Dr. K. Laemmel. When Hoec 
was notified of the case cannot be determined from the records ( 
rently available to the subcommittee. However, at a February 
1979, meeting at Hoechst AG, Dr. Zapf, a Hoechst AG official, 
ported, that in light of the Laemmel case in Luzern and the le 
which Hoechst Roussel (HRPI), U.S.A., will submit to the FDA 
other reported cases of drug-associated hemolytic anemia], he n 
contact the BGA [the West German Federal Health Office]." 2 4 ( 
least one official of Hoechst s U.S. affiliate appears to have km 
of this fatal case at that time. In attendance at the February 
1979, meeting was a "Dr. Nelson." 2 4 1 Dr. A. John Nelson, forr 
2 3 8
 21 CFR §312.1(aXf>). On March 19, 1987, FDA replaced this subsection with §312.32 
IND regulations, that requires sponsors to report to FDA within 10 working days any 
pected" adverse experience that is "serious"; that is, that suggests a "significant hazard C( 
indication, side effect or precaution." Wl Fed.Reg. 8797, 8837. 
2 3 9
 The patient received 2.r> mg of Merital twice daily beginning on May 8, 1978. On M« 
1978, she was hospitalized for fatigue, vertigo, and suspected "bleeding anemia." Direct and 
rect Coombs tests were positive at this time. Her anemia was assessed as autoimmune her 
ic. She later attempted suicide at home by taking 12 tablets of an unknown medication. On 
2(>, 1978, she re-started Merital at 300 mg/day. On July 12, 1978, she experienced nausea, N 
ing, vertigo, and developed jaundice. She was transferred to the medical clinic due to reel 
fainting and jaundice and died on July 14, 1978. The clinic physician assessed the cause of 
as follows: 
This is obviously a hemolytic attack in the case of a known chronic lymphatic leuk 
mia In our ward Mb was 4.5, whereas it had been 11.6 g two days earlier. Also clinica 
ly there were signs of an acute severe anemia; in addition to this, the jaundice appear* 
to be increasing The patient probably died of hypoxia (oxygen deficiency] due 
anemia. 
That she had developed leukemia obviously complicated the assessment of Mental 's role 
death. 
2 4 0
 The memorandum of this meeting by Dr S M Streichenwein of Hoechst AG is in su 
mittee files. 
2 4 1
 Ibid 
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ly Senior Vice President and Medical Director of Hoechst-Roussel 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., also worked for the company's U.S. affiliate 
at that time. This case was not reported to FDA until August 19, 
1986, more than seven years after Hoechst learned of it and seven 
months after the drug was withdrawn from the market world-
wide.242 In its August 19, 1986, submission to FDA, Hoechst main-
tained that the case was reported as a "death" in one of the tables 
included in an international safety update sent to the agency on 
January 9, 1984. Nothing in the simple designation of a "death" 
captures the detailed information available to Hoechst concerning 
the case that had originally led the company to number it among 
those it suspected as involving Merital-induced hemolytic anemia. 
Another death reported to the company in 1980 involved Coombs-
positive hemolytic anemia (the destruction of red blood cells), symp-
toms of anaphylactic shock, and icterus (i.e., jaundice).243 On June 
19, 1986, Hoechst submitted a "15-day alert" report to FDA that de-
scribed the death in mid-1980 of a female Merital patient in Flor-
ence, Italy. Included in the submission was a memorandum by Ap. 
E. Woelfel of Hoechst AG of a February 19, 1981, conference with a 
Dr. Sesso of Hoechst's Italian affiliate. The memorandum stated 
that the patient discontinued use of Merital after seven months on 
the drug. Several months later, she took one 25 mg. capsule and 
developed general malaise, after which she discontinued the drug 
for two days. On the third day, she took another 25 mg. capsule 
and eventually collapsed 
. . . with symptoms of anaphylactic shock; hemolysis 
and icterus were also diagnosed. The Coombs test was posi-
tive. Then the patient was treated in various departments 
of a large hospital, where, despite all therapeutic efforts, 
she died.244 (Emphasis supplied). 
Ms. Woelfel's February 1981 memorandum was circulated to at 
least two other Hoechst AG officials.245 
Hoechst AG, as well as the company's Italian affiliate, actually 
learned of this case in 1980. According to a January 28, 1981, letter 
from Hoechst's Italian subsidiary, Dr. Pola of Hoechst AG wrote a 
Dr. Carandente about the case on December 15, 1980, and at some 
unspecified time, discussed the case in Frankfurt with a Dr. Inver-
nizzi. Dr. Pola's December 15, 1980, letter was not included in 
Hoechst's June 19, 1986, submission to FDA.246 
That the 1980 Italian death also may have involved anaphylaxis 
constitutes additional evidence that the patient experienced an al-
lergic or hypersensitivity reaction to Merital.247 Interestingly, Dr. 
Temple testified on May 22, 1986, that "we don't think we had" 
any reports of Merital-associated anaphylaxis.248 
2 4 2
 Hoechst's August 1<>, 1986, submission to FDA is in subcommittee files 
2 4 3
 See the subcommittee's July 7, 1980, letter to FDA, Hearing, pages 439-412 Hoechst's 
June 1!*, 1986, submission to FDA described this case as involving "|s|ymptoms of anaphylactic 
shock; hemolysis; icterus.'' Ibid. 
244
 In subcommittee files 
2 4 5
 Ibid These two officials were Drs. Zapf and Taeuber. 
2 4 0
 Ibid The precise data on which Hoechst AG or its Italian affiliate initially learned of the 
case was not supplied to FDA 
2 4 7
 In fact, Dr Robert Temple cited "anaphylaxis" as among the "kinds of [drug) reactions | that | are more commonly perceived as hypersensitivity reactions." Hearing, page 20 
*
1H
 Hearing, page lid. 
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Hoechst advised FDA on June 19, 1986, that this case was one 
several classified in a table included in a January 9, 1984, subm 
sion to FDA as either an "unspecified reaction" or an "ill defir 
experience." 2 4 9 Until June 19, 1986, however, no mention v 
made of the nature of the adverse experience or, for that matt 
that it resulted in death. 
It is difficult to imagine that cases of fatal hemolytic anemia 
not receive close attention by Hoechst officials in 1979 and V. 
since, by that time, the company was sufficiently concerned ab 
the few reports it had received in 1978 and 1979 of non-fatal hei 
lytic anemia that it had initiated the European Surveillance I 
gram—an ambitious program featuring immunological investi 
tions in three European countries—"in order to determine the s 
ousness of the problem." 2 5 ° 
Notwithstanding reports received by Hoechst of fatal, drug-a: 
ciated hemolytic anemia, Dr. A. John Nelson of Hoechst's U.S. 
filiate, who may have learned of at least one such case by Febru 
1979,251 stated at the December 3, 1981, meeting of the Psyc 
pharmacology Drugs Advisory Committee (PDAC) that "[t]he sal 
of the drug is not in doubt. 2 5 2 Thus, the focus of this meet 
like that of the two subsequent PDAC meetings on Merital, was 
the drug's efficacy, not its safety. 
By early 1984, Hoechst was informed of another Merital-assoc 
ed death involving hemolytic anemia—this time of a 57-year 
French woman. The patient, who had recovered from an episod 
Merital-induced hemolytic anemia and renal failure in 1982, to< 
capsules, or 125 mg., of the drug in February 1984.253 Within 
half hour she developed hemolysis and Quincke's edema and 
hospitalized with chills and jaundice. She died on February 
1984, thirteen hours after she was admitted to the hosp 
Hoechst knew about this death at least by February 1984, 
denced by the date of a letter to the company's French affiliate 
cussing it .2 5 4 Although Hoechst apprised FDA of this deatl 
July 28, 1986, it did not submit details on the case until Augus 
1986.255 The case had previously been reported to FDA on No^ 
2 4 9
 According to Hoechst's June 19, 1986, submission to FDA, a September 19, 1983, 
from Hoechst AG simply referred to this case as a "zwischenfall* (incident). In subcom 
files. 
2 5 0
 See the January 1980 report of Dr. Suzanne Streichenwein of Hoechst AG on the E 
an Surveillance Program that was included in the sponsors July 7, 1980, amendment 
Merital NDA 
2 5 1
 As earlier stated, Dr Nelson may have attended a February 22, 1979, meeting at H 
AG at which the 1978 death from hemolytic anemia of a Merital patient in Luzerne, S 
land, was discussed 
2f>2
 See pages 61-2 of the verbatim transcript of this meeting, which is in subcommitte 
2 5 3
 Hoechst reported that she attempted suicide when she took this dose. Interestingly, 
er, 125 mg. is not significantly greater than the 100 mg. daily dosage recommended in tl 
labeling for Merital. Furthermore, patients who took substantially more of the drug su 
For example, the report of hemolytic anemia and renal failure reported in the Novem 
1980, British Medical Journal involved a patient who took 2 grams or 80 capsules of tl 
and recovered See Prescott, et al., "Acute haemolysis and renal failure after nomifensir 
dosage," British Medical Journal, Vol. 281, pages 1392-3. This case was among the origir 
reports of hemolvtic anemia that HRPI submitted to FDA on March 13, 1979 That an c 
age was involved* in this case obviously did not deter the sponsor from reporting it as | 
relevant to Mental 's capacity to induce immune hemolytic anemia. 
2 5 4
 This letter was dated February 23, 1984 See Hearing, page 314 Hoechst's French i 
was aware of the pat ients initial hemolytic anemia episode at least by February 10, 1! 
date it wrote a letter on the case . . 
2 " The description of the case derives from the details contained in this submission, v 
in subcommittee files Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ber 1, 1985, as involving "hemolytic anemia" with an "unreported" 
outcome. 
On August 19, 1986, seven months after Merital was withdrawn 
from the market, Hoechst notified FDA of another pre-approval 
death of a Merital patient who had developed hemolytic anemia. In 
this case, however, this 79-year-old French patient was reported to 
have died of another cause well after she had recovered from Meri-
tal-associated hemolytic anemia.2 5 6 
Dr. Temple testified during the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, 
hearing that, when it approved Merital, FDA had received no re-
ports of fatal, drug-associated hemolytic anemia.2 5 7 
The importance FDA eventually attached to fatal reports of Mer-
ital-associated immune hemolytic anemia cannot be underestimat-
ed. In its post-approval consideration of Mental 's safety, reports of 
such fatalities were of paramount concern to FDA. As Dr. Temple 
testified: 
I don't know the specific numbers [of hemolytic anemia 
reactions] that they [Hoechst] cited as being the basis for 
their withdrawal . . . But, more important to us in all this 
was the fact that fatalities began to appear . . . What im-
pressed us was that people were dying of it. That seemed 
very important.2 5 8 
In fact, Dr. Leber testified before the subcommittee that initial 
reports of fatal Merital-associated hemolytic anemia prompted a 
major revision in mid-1985 in the drug's labeling: 
You have to understand that we were interested, during 
the Spring and Summer of 1985, in having the labeling 
state in a very forthright way that fatal hemolytic ane-
mias could have occurred in association with nomifensine 
treatment. . . . We wanted, at that point, to emphasize 
that hemolytic anemia was a much bigger risk than it had 
seemed earlier, because the fact that you develop a hemo-
lytic anemia is not, in and of itself, too important if most 
of the cases were benign. . . . But prior to that there was 
really no appreciation of the seriousness of it because 
there hadn't been fatal cases.259 
The committee believes that Hoechst was responsible for and le-
gally required to make prompt, complete, and accurate reports to 
FDA of all significant Merital-associated adverse reactions known 
to it or any of its foreign affiliates. The committee can only specu-
late on the significance that FDA would have attached, prior to ap-
proving Merital, to several reports of death involving hemolytic 
anemia that it did not receive until months after Merital was re-
moved from the market. However, in light of the drug's post-ap-
"
f i T h e patient received Merital from November 7, 1980 to May 20, 1983. On April 1, 1983, 
during a hospitalization, she developed hematoma of the right pectoralis major muscle requiring 
drainage under local anesthesia. A positive direct Coombs test raised the possibility of hemoly-
sis In June 1983, her clinical status was noted to be good and in November 1983, it was evaluat-
ed as "normal " Subsequently, however, the patient died of "another cause." Records on the case 
were enclosed in a November 30, 1981, letter from Dr Claude Spriet Pourra of Iloechst's French 
affiliate. 
2 5 7
 Hearing, page 12. 
2r,H
 Hearing, pages 40 1 
2r>
-
>
 Hearing, pages 31-2. 
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proval regulatory history, the committee concludes that, at th 
very least, Hoechst's failure to report to FDA these fatalities ass< 
ciated with use of the drug rendered Merital, as originally labele< 
misbranded within the meaning of § 502(a) of the Food, Drug, an 
Cosmetic Act. 
On June 13, 1986, the subcommittee informed FDA of a numb< 
of other Merital-associated deaths that may have involved allerg 
reactions to the drug that were known to Hoechst prior to tl 
drug's U.S. approval but were not reported to FDA until after a 
proval.260 For example, Hoechst learned at least by March 2 
1982,261 of a Welsh case involving a 91-year-old woman who di 
on March 5, 1982, in association with an "allergic skin reactioi 
and "allergic pneumonitis [acute inflammation of the lung]." 2 
The sponsor, however, waited more than 3 years, until October i 
1985, to report the case to FDA as a 15-day alert report .2 6 3 
The sponsor was also notified by January 31, 1983,264 of t 
death on January 13, 1983, of a 62-year-old French woman who c 
perienced fever and other adverse effects suggestive of a possil 
allergic reaction to the drug. 2 6 5 Hoechst initially mentioned tl 
report to FDA in an April 24, 1986, submission,266 two years 
months later. Dr. Robert Temple's testimony before the subcomrr 
tee that "at the time of approval, in six years of marketing [of M 
ital outside the United States] . . . people had not died of [Merit 
2 6 0
 This letter and all of the details on these cases which follow, appear in Hearing, p 
431-8. 
2 6 1
 The earliest record in FDA'9 files indicating Hoechst's knowledge of the case was the 
that a Hoechst UK official signed an adverse reaction report concerning the case, which 
March 23, 1982. 
2 6 2
 According to a March 1982 adverse reaction report, on February 25, 1982, three days 
nomifensine administration, a 91-year-old female "developed an extensive erythematous all 
skin reaction" [Emphasis supplied ] On February 28, 1982, secondary bronchial pneumoni 
veloped, and the patient was diagnosed as having "allergic pneumonitis." [Emphasis supp 
The patient also had a "spiking temperature" that day. By March 1, 1982, the "skin cond 
had deteriorated to the extent that the total skin area was covered in erythematous lesions 
third of the skin had sloughed off and bleeding was noted from all mucous membranes. 
March 2, 1982, the patient's eosinophil count was a marketedly elevated 22 percent. The pa 
was also obviously anemic—her hemoglobin had descended to 11.6 g/dl, down from 13.6 g/ 
December 24, 1981, and 13.4 g/dl on January 14, 1982. The cause of death was cited as bro 
pneumonia; all lung areas were consolidated and the bronchi were filled with white greer 
The case report itself states that the patient's skin and lung conditions had been diagnos 
"allergic" reactions to Merital. In addition, eosinophilia, fever, and anemia (particularly I 
lytic anemia) have all been associated with hypersensitivity reactions to the drug. 
2 B 3
 In its October 31, 1985, submission, the sponsor included this case among those "previ 
reported to FDA on or before May 7, 1984, but are now known to involve deaths." The sul 
mittee staff could not locate any report of this case made on or before May 7, 1984. In any € 
all of the details reported on October 31, 1985, were known to the sponsor well before M 
1984. 
2 6 4
 Hearing, page 300. 
2fiS
 The patient was given Merital for a year. On January 4, 1983, she developed Ziyperm 
her temperature had risen to 40° C or 104° F. Additionally, the patient experienced shock, 
nea, and loss of consciousness On January 5, 1983, the patient first showed liver functic 
abnormalities, her LDH had risen to 610, markedly higher than the upper range of non 
330 On January 8, 1983, the patient had pneumonopathy of the left side. On January 9 a 
1983, further evidence of liver function test abnormalities was found, with SGOT, SPT, 
and LDH markedly in excess of normal. 
According to Hoechst's May 15, 1986, submission, the original suspicion of "maligna 
perthermia has not been confirmed." Although Dr. Claude Spriet-Pourra of Hoechst s 1 
affiliate wrote that "possible septicemia is the final diagnosis, ' the sponsor acknowledge 
hemocultures, which are often relied upon to diagnose septicemia, "were negative." Wh 
report lacks sufficient detail definitively to conclude that the patient experienced an e 
reaction to Merital, many of her symptoms—including hyperpyrexia, pneumonopathy 
function abnormalities, shock, dyspnea, and loss of consciousness—have all been associate 
hypersensitivity reactions to the drug. 
2fi6
 The first mention of the case was in an April 24, 1986, quarterly report to the I 
NDA Records on the cases, however, were not submitted to FDA until May 15, 1986. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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associated] fever"267 may reflect the firm's failure to report this 
case prior to the drug's U.S. approval. 
The nomifensine-associated death on November 30, 1977, of a 62-
year-old German man from thrombocytopenia purpura was report-
ed to Hoechst in a December 2, 1977, letter.2 6 8 Hoechst reported 
this case to FDA as a 15-day alert report on May 15, 1986,269 8V2 
years later.2 7 0 Another thrombocytopenia-related death, this one 
involving a Belgian user who also suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, 
was known to Hoechst at least by September 17, 1982,271 and was 
known by Hoechst s U.S. affiliate by June 13y 1984, prior to FDA 
approval.212 It was not reported to f DA, however, until May 15, 
1986. 
By December 21, 1981, Hoechst's French affiliate had learned of 
the death of a 72-year-old female Merital patient.2 7 3 Viral hepati-
tis, leukopenia, thrombocytopenia, thrombin increase, and abnor-
mal liver function tests were implicated in her death.2 7 4 The death 
was first mentioned to FDA in a July 30, 1986, submission, with 
additional details provided to the agency on August 15, 1986.275 
Hoechst claimed that the case had been reported in a table includ-
ed in a January 9, 1984, submission to FDA as "liver damage" or 
"hepatitis" or "worsening of viral hepatitis." No other details, in-
cluding the fact of the patient's death, were supplied at that time. 
Hoechst had known since January 1984 2 7 6 of the anemia-related 
death of a 59-year-old female Merital user who died on October 10, 
1983, but waited until October 31, 1985, to inform FDA in a 15-day 
alert report that she had developed anemia, and to provide the 
agency with records it had received on the case in January and 
February 1984.277 Whether the patient had developed hemolytic 
reac 
2r
'
7
 Hearing, page 16. 
2fiS
 The patient s psychiatrist discussed the case in a December 2, 1977, letter to Hoechst AG. 
This patient had been taking Merital for approximately two weeks prior to the onset of the 
.^action. According to his psychiatrist, the patient was treated for "our idea of an existing aller-
gic diathesis fi.e., condition]." The patient appeared to be anemic in that his hemoglobin was 
recorded as 10.9 g/dl. It is noteworthy that an immune hemolytic anemia death reported by 
Hoechst to FDA on May 21, 1985, also involved thrombocytopenia (i.e., a depressed platelet 
count of 53,000/mm '). An immune hemolytic anemia case reported in the British Medical Jour 
rial (Prescott, et al, 281: 1392, November 22, 1980) also involved thrombocytopenia [i.e., a de-
pressed platelet count of 40,000/mm3). 
It is noteworthy that "a drug induced immune mechanism" has been offered as the probable 
explanation for some cases of Merital-associated thrombocytopenia. See, for example, the case 
reported by Green, et al., in the British Medical Journal, 288: 830, March 17, 1984. 
269 fne s n 0 | l s o r stated in its May l.r>, 1986, submission, that this case had been reported to 
FDA on January 9, 1984. The only reference to a thrombocytopenia purpura case in the January 
9, 1984, submission was contained in one of several tables appended to the submission. The Jan-
uary 9, 1984, submission mentioned no details of the case, including the fact of the patient's 
death, although the sponsor had received them several years before. 
2 7 0
 Hearing, page 42. 
271
 Hearing, page 288. 
2 7 2
 See the inspectional observations (FDA Form 483) issued by FDA field investigators to 
Hoechst's U.S. affiliate in March 1987, in subcommiti.ee files. 
2 7 3
 Hearing, page 304. 
2 7 4
 The patient reportedly discontinued use of the drug in March 1981, some months before 
her death, and Hoechst AG believes that it was unrelated to use of the drug. 
27r>
 The facts recited here come from these submissions, which are in subcommittee files. 
2 7 6
 Hoechst UK was contacted by the coroner's office about the case on January 12, 1984. Ac-
cording to a February 2, 1984, letter from Hoechst UK, a January 19, 1984, inquest into the 
patient's death was attended by an official from Hoechst UK and one from Hoechst AG. 
2 7 7
 On October 31, 1985, Hoechst advised FDA that she developed "cardiac arrhythmia and 
shock in the face of severe anemia." One line of a computer printout submitted to FDA on May 
7, 1984, listed the case as follows: "cardiac arrhythmia—asystole—death." No mention was made 
at that time that she had also developed "severe anemia, ' although that fact was prominently 
mentioned in records received by the firm in January and February 1984. 
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anemia cannot be discerned from the report.278 The patient 
course, however, which culminated in a shock-like reaction, is n 
inconsistent with some Merital-associated reports of fatal hemolyt 
anemia submitted to FDA following the drug's approval.279 
Dr. Robert Temple testified that FDA was particularly "ii 
pressed" by reports of Merital-associated "fatalities" that includ 
cases of €'arguably . . . allergic type responses" to the drug.2 
Hoechst's failure to report to FDA deaths brought to its attenti 
from 1977-1984 that may fall into this category prevented FI 
from appreciating before it approved Merital that the drug m 
have been capable of inducing fatal allergic reactions. 
The subcommittee's June 13, 1986, letter to FDA also cited sev 
al other Merital-associated deaths known to Hoechst prior to FI 
approval of the drug that were not reported to FDA until after tl 
approval, including three deaths involving cardiac compli 
tions,2 8 1 and ten cases of drug-associated suicide and/or fatal ov 
dose.282 On July 30, 1986, subsequent to the subcommittee's lett 
Hoechst also reported a pre-approval Merital-associated death 
volving hyponatremia (i.e., salt depletion).283 
In addition, on January 30, 1987, Hoechst reported to FDA se^ 
German deaths associated with the use of Psyton, a combinat 
product containing Merital, that were known to the comp; 
before Mental 's U.S. approval.284 Included among those dee 
were five suicides and two cases of lung edema. 
Despite a number of potentially important deaths involving 
molytic anemia, allergic pneumonitis and exfoliative dermat 
2 7 8
 There is no indication that a test for hemolysis was performed. 
2 7 9
 On September 16, 1983, the patient received the drug for the first time. She die< 
hours after taking her last tablet. The patient became severely anemic, with her hemoj 
descending to 7.5 g/dl. Records indicated no previous history of anemia. Air passages in he 
piratory system contained flakes of mucoid secretions. Cut lung surfaces showed some mil 
gestion in the right lung in the apical region. Focal chronic bronchitis was also noted. Tl 
tient reportedly had difficulty breathing. 
According to the coroner's report of January 23, 1984, a reviewing pathologist "said th 
thought that a therapeutic dosage of Merital when the deceased was in an anaemic con 
caused the side effects and led to death." 
Evidence that the patient died from cardiac arrhythmia was apparently lacking, as C 
zanne M. Streichenwein of Hoechst AG noted in a memorandum of a January 19, 1984, m 
in the United Kingdom. Moreover, that the terminal event may have involved cardiac con 
tions does not necessarily deny the contributory role of the patient's anemia. In this conni 
the death of a UK woman attributed to hemolytic anemia that Hoechst reported to FDA oi 
21 and September 11, 1985, ultimately involved ventricular fibrillation progressing to as; 
2 8 0
 Hearing, page 40. 
2 8 1
 A report of a fatal case involving congestive heart failure was received by Hoechst C 
on October 3, 1983, but was not reported to FDA until May 15, 1986. A second fatal caa 
entailed worsening of a pre-existing atrial flutter condition that occurred in France in 191 
also reported to FDA on May 15, 1986 Another pre-approval death, this one involving e 
defined cardiac reaction" was reported to FDA on October 31, 1985. 
2 8 2
 Four of these cases were reported to FDA on October 31, 1985, while six others w 
ported to FDA on May 15, 1986. As some of the submissions on these deaths indicate, si 
ports raise questions, not only about Mental 's efficacy as an antidepressant for some pi 
but also whether the drug increases the risk of suicide in some patients. For example, a n 
gist reportedly told a Hoechst official on October 20, 1978, that Merital might have "trig 
one of the suicides reported to FDA on May 15, 1986 In subcommittee files. Similarly, ac< 
to a Hoechst AG memorandum dated June 16, 1981, the physician who reported anothe 
tal associated suicide "wishes to know whether there has been any report lately indicati 
(Merital) drives depressed patients to suicide." In subcommittee files. 
2 8 3
 This July 30, 1986, submission is in subcommittee files. Hoechst claimed that this 
case was reported in a table appearing in its January 9, 1984, submission .to FDA. No 
including the fact of the pat ients death, were submitted to FDA at that time. It appea 
the company number assigned to the case that Hoechst was notified of the case in 1981. 
2 8 4
 In subcommittee files Psyton combined Merital and clobazam, a benzodiazepine de 
not marketed in the U.S. Psyton was marketed in Germany from 1982 to 1985. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fever, thrombocytopenia, and liver damage28r> that were reported 
to Hoechst between 1977 and 198H, Dr. P. D. Stonier, a Hoechst UK 
official, stated in a paper presented on the safety of Merital at an 
October 1983 symposium in San Diego California, that "no deaths 
have been associated directly with the use of nomifensine." 2 8 6 
Hoechst also failed to report to FDA large numbers of serious, 
nonfatal Merital-associated immune reactions prior to the drug's 
approval on December 31, 1984. Close examination of a submission 
Hoechst made to FDA on November 1, 1985, approximately 10 
months after approval, revealed that at least 94 cases of hemolytic 
anemia/hemolysis had been reported to the firm prior to the drug's 
approval on December 31, 1984.287 This means that, with the addi-
tion of 14 other such cases that the company reported to FDA on 
April 24, 198(),2»« and January 30, 1987,2ft9 Hoechst had received 
at least 108 reports of hemolytic anemia/hemolysis prior to the 
drug's approval. Another analysis performed by the subcommittee 
staff, largely based on data the sponsor furnished the subcommit-
tee, yielded a similar finding; 2 9° namely, that the firm knew of 
109 cases of hemolytic anemia/hemolysis prior to the drug's ap-
proval. Experts have noted that no other drug has been associated 
with more than 100 documented cases of immune hemolytic 
anemia.2 9 1 Hoechst, however, claimed to have reported only 41 he-
molytic anemia cases to FDA prior to that approval.292 As Dr. 
Charles F. Thayer of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate noted in a September 
25, 1985, letter, there were sharp "discrepancies" between the num-
bers of hemolytic anemia cases "reported to FDA" and those con-
tained in the files of the company's German headquarters.2 9 3 Actu-
ally, both the subcommittee staff and FDA,294 in preparation for 
the subcommittee's hearing, concluded that the sponsor had only 
reported between 27 and 30 such cases prior to approval, a circum-
stance that probably reflects the confusing, if not misleading, 
manner in which the sponsor purportedly reported several hemo-
lytic anemia cases in summary tabular form to FDA in January 
1984.295 
The sponsor cited the marked increase from 1984 to 1985 in num-
bers of reports of hemolytic anemia cases from abroad as the prin-
cipal reason for withdrawing Merital from worldwide distribu-
2Hr
* Hoechst had reported four liver related deaths to FDA on July 22, 1981. Hearing, page 49. 
A fifth such death was reported to FDA on January 9, 1984. In subcommittee files 
2Hf>
 Hearing, page 49 
2 8 7
 The sponsor had advised the subcommittee staff that the first two digits of the case num-
bers listed in that submission represent the year in which Hoechst received the adverse reaction 
report It was based on this information that the subcommittee arrived at the number of hemo-
lytic anemia cases known to the company prior to the drug's approval on December 31, 1984. 
Hearing, page 35. 
2MB
 Seven such cases were reported to FDA on April 24, 1986. Hearing, page 36. 
2 8 9
 On January 30, 1987, Hoechst reported large numbers of adverse reactions associated with 
the use of Psyton, a combination of Merital and elobazam (a benzodiazepine derivative not mar-
keted in the U.S.) that was marketed in Germany from 1982 to 1985. The submission contained 
seven additional hemolytic anemia cases known to Hoechst prior to U.S. approval of the drug. 
29t )
 Hearing, page 36. 
2®» Mueller Eckhardt and Salama, Dtsch.med.Wschr. I l l (1986), page 12G2. 
2!
'
2
 See the sponsor's November 1, 1985, submission to FDA, Hearing, page 191}. 
2 9 3
 Hearing, page 36. Dr. Thayer noted that, as of the date of his letter, Hoechst's U.S. affili-
ate had reported 45 such cases while 89 were indicated to be in the company's German files. 
2 9 4
 Dr. Leber testified: "By my own count, there may be between twenty-seven and thirty. 
And I just discovered that the other day in preparing for this hearing " Hearing, page 35. 
2«»f» o n ( n e misleading manner in which these cases were reported in a January 9, 1984, safety 
update, see Hearing, pages 460-1 
tion.2 9 6 However, had Hoechst reported all hemolytic anemia reac-
tions known to it prior to Mental 's US approval, a marked increase 
from worldwide marketing experience with the drug would have 
been observable for 1984 as compared to 1983.297 Information sub 
mitted by Hoechst to the subcommittee, as well as its November 1 
1985, and April 24, 1986, submissions to FDA, indicated that 
Hoechst, prior to Mental 's approval, had reported 11 cases for 1981 
and four cases for 1984. Had Hoechst made full reports prior to ap 
proval, a marked increase, from 19 to 51 cases, would have beer 
discernible in those two years.2 9 8 
Serious, Merital-Associated Adverse Reactions Reported t 
FDA Prior to the Drugs Approval Were Not Submittet 
in a Timely Manner 
Dr. Temple testified that in mid-January 1986, FDA "contacte 
the Committee on Safety of Medicines" who expressed "concer 
about the increased number of cases of hemolytic anemia reporte 
during 1984 and 1985 without clear explanation [emphasis su] 
plied]." 2 9 9 Dr. Paul Leber, in fact, conceded that Merital, whic 
"had been marketed for a long time in Europe with a very goc 
safety record, . . . may have fallen apart in 1984 and 1985 . . ." 3( 
Nothing in the record, however, reflects any awareness by FC 
prior to or shortly after approving Merital in late 1984 that tl 
drug began to "fall apart" in Europe in 1984.301 
The subcommittee's review of the sponsor's major safety subm 
sions to the Mertial NDA and IND, uncovered delays—sometin 
amounting to several years—in some of the reports of Merital-as 
dated adverse effects submitted to FDA prior to the drug's appr< 
al. 3 0 2 The subcommittee asked FDA whether it regarded th< 
delays as constituting violations of agency reporting requiremer 
but the agency declined to respond as it was conducting an invei 
gation of this mat ter . 3 0 3 The committee believes that pre-marl 
reports of serious, even fatal Merital-associated reactions ye 
after they came to the sponsor's attention could hardly compi 
"prompt reports of "findings" pertinent to the drug's saf 
within the meaning of § 312.1(a)(6) of FDA's IND regulations. 
2 9 6
 Hearing, page 39. 
2 9 7
 Hearing, pages 39-40. 
2 9 8
 Hearing, page 41. 
2 9 9
 Hearing, page 14. 
3 0 0
 Hearing, page 74. In his prepared testimony, Dr. Temple stated: ' It is possible, hov 
that the CSM itself stimulated such reporting [of increased numbers of hemolytic anemia 
during 1984 and 1985] by highlighting the risks of antidepressant drug use in a communit 
to physicians, urging that physicians be sure to report adverse reactions occurring with 
drugs. The publication specifically noted the occurrence of hemolytic anemia with nomife 
perhaps leading physicians to recognize additional cases of it." Hearing, page 14. The pi 
tion to which Dr. Temple referred is the July 1985 issue of Current Problems. The commi 
aware of no such publication from the CSM prior to 1985 that can be cited as possibly res 
ble for the increased number of hemolytic anemia reports made during 1984. 
3 0 1
 In fact, the record does not reflect such an awareness until FDA's January 1986 c 
with the Committee on Safety of Medicines. 
3 0 2
 For example, a July 22, 1981, submission to the Mental IND on liver toxicity ass< 
with commercial marketing of the drug outside the United States revealed that delays up 
years occurred in the reporting of serious adverse liver reactions to the agency. This subr 
also revealed lengthy delays in reporting several liver-related deaths, including, for ex 
one delay of 3 years, nine months The subcommittee staffs May 1986 review was atta< 
the subcommittee's July 14. 1986, letter to FDA and appears at Hearing, pages 4547 . 
3 0 3
 See FDA's November 5, 1986, response to a subcommittee letter of July 14, 1986. H 
page 483. 
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Hoechst's Reports to FDA Did Not Include All Relevant 
Records in Its Possession 
As already noted, some of Hoechst's adverse reaction reports to 
FDA—including reports of death—did not include important 
records in the firm's possession. The subcommittee's investigation 
uncovered additional evidence of the sponsor's failure to share with 
FDA detailed information it had concerning Merital-associated ad-
verse experiences submitted to FDA prior to the drug's approval. 
In briefly mentioning a liver-related death associated with use of 
the drug in a January 9, 1984, submission,304 for example, Hoechst 
neglected to include records indicating that the patient had devel-
oped urticaria and fever as well as inflammatory liver infiltrates— 
all of which are suggestive of a possible allergic reaction—and that 
one of her treating physicians had sought information on levels of 
Merital-specific antibodies found from the serological series done 
on her.305 
In addition, Hoechst sometimes reported adverse reactions to 
FDA in a manner that should have indicated that it was withhold-
ing relevant information in its possession. Unfortunately, FDA 
overlooked or acquiesced to this. For example, FDA allowed 
Hoechst to "report" significant adverse reactions to the drug—most 
notably hemolytic anemia reactions—merely as numbers of cases 
listed in tables appended to a January 9, 1984, submission, without 
any details concerning clinical course or the characteristics and 
medical histories of the patients involved.306 Similarly, FDA al-
lowed Hoechst to "report" other potentially important adverse re-
actions on May 7, 1984, merely as one-line entries in a computer 
printout, unaccompanied by any additional information. 
The committee believes that FDA should require sponsors, when 
reporting serious reactions associated with an investigational new 
drug, to supply all relevant details in their possession concerning 
the nature and course of such reactions, as well as the characteris-
tics and medical histories of the patients who experience them. 
Absent such information, FDA cannot make responsible evalua-
tions of the toxicity of such drugs. 
B. Hoechst Did Not Comply With FDA s Adverse Reaction Report-
ing Requirements for Approved New Drugs 
Non-Compliance With 15-Day Alert Reports 
Section 314.80(c)(1) of FDA's regulations requires that serious 
and unexpected (i.e., "not listed in the current labeling for the 
31,4
 In this submission, Hoechst described the case as follows: 
The fifth patient |who died from liver-related disease| received nomifensine for ap-
>roximately 4 days (data imprecise). A month later she had jaundice and abnormal 
iyer function tests (peak S(iOT= 1325, normal range and units not given). Four months 
after nomifensine treatment the patient died with severe liver damage. A postmortem 
biopsy (no autopsy) showed postmortem necrosis The relationship to nomifensine is un-
clear and doubtful. 
See the subcommittee's July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 447. 
3 0 s S e e the subcommittee's July 14, 198*5, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 447. FDA advised the 
subcommittee that these records were not supplied to FDA. See FDA s November 5, 1986, letter 
to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 474-5. 
3{)R
 See the subcommittee's July 14, 1986, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 448 These tables were 
presented in such a misleading and confusing manner that it was not even clear how many he-
molytic anemia reports they purportedly showed. Hearing, pages 460-1. 
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drug") 30T adverse reactions associated with the use of approyt 
new drugs be reported to FDA "within 15 working days of initi 
receipt of the information.'' "Initial receipt" according to FDA, i 
eludes the date that any foreign affiliate of a sponsor is notified 
such a reaction.308 The subcommittee's review reveals that 15-d; 
reports of serious and unexpected adverse experiences associat 
with use of Merital outside the United States rarely arrived 
FDA on time.309 Information FDA supplied for the hearing reco 
confirmed this finding.310 The agency, however, took no regulate 
action in connection with Hoechst's failure to meet 15-day repo 
ing requirements.3 *l 
According to § 314.80(a) of FDA's regulations, a "serious" re; 
tion always includes a "death" and an "unexpected" reaction 
eludes "an event that may be symptomatically and pathophysio 
gically related to an event listed in the labeling, but differs fr< 
the event because of greater severity . . ." Since fatal liver inju 
or the potential for such injury, was not mentioned in the Meri 
labeling, Dr. Temple testified that the liver-related death of 
female Merital user who had pre-existing liver disease that was 
ported to the sponsor on December 2, 1985,312 "perhaps shoi 
have been" submitted to FDA as a 15-day report.313 Hoechst, h< 
ever, waited six weeks to report the case to FDA. 
Dr. Temple noted, however, that the 
. . . importance of the case to us was that it was a case 
of hemolytic anemia in which either the anemia itself, or 
more probably the treatment of the anemia ith steroids, 
led an already fragile patient to die. So, we count that as 
something that might have been the responsibility of no-
mifensine, possibly related to hemolytic anemia.314 
Hoechst classified the case as a possible hemolytic anemia fat 
ty and did not submit it to FDA as a 15-day report, probably 
cause it did not regard the reaction as "unexpected" within 
meaning of § 314.80(a) of FDA's regulations, since by the time 
firm learned of the case, the Merital labeling reflected the dri 
association with fatal hemolytic anemia. 
Section 314.80(cX2) of FDA's regulations requires that all rep< 
of serious adverse experiences associated with domestic market 
of a recently approved new drug that are not subject to the 15-
alert requirement—that is, serious but expected [i.e., listed in 
drug's current labeling] reactions—be included in quarterly rep 
3 0 7
 21 CFR § 314.80(a) 
3nH
 In a November 5, 1986, letter, FDA advised the subcommittee: 
We expect drug firms to adopt procedures to ensure that adverse reaction informs 
tion is expeditiously communicated among company officials and affiliates I nus. tn 
t imeclock^il l generally be considered as running when the foreign affiliate receive 
the information indicating that the 15-day criteria have been met. The result of this^ 
that U S applicant* are responsible for establishing reasonable mechanisms to ensui 
rapid information transfer from their foreign affiliates Hearing, page 484 
3 0 9
 Hearing, page 42. 
3 , 0
 Hearing, pages 225-338. 
3
" See Testimony of Dr. Robert Temple, Hearing;, page 42
 n , , % 3 , 2
 The case was reported to the sponsor while the patient was still alive on October Zo 
Her death was reported to the company on December 2. 1985 
3 1 3
 Hearing, page 50. 
3 , 4
 Hearing, page 50. 
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submitted to the agency. Accordingly, Hoechst waited until it sub-
mitted its quarterly report for the last quarter of 1985 to report the 
case. This submission was not received by FDA until January 23, 
1986,3lr> after the sponsor had already withdrawn the drug from 
the market. 
Actually, FDA was not aware of this case until long after its re-
ceipt on January 23, 1986: 
Mr. WEISS. Would we be safe in assuming that FDA was 
not aware of this death when it stated in a January 28, 
1986, Talk Paper that "no deaths in this country known to 
be attributable to hypersensitivity reactions had been re-
ported to FDA at the time of the product's announced 
withdrawal on January 21, 1986"? 
Dr. TEMPLE. Yes, I don't think we were conscious of that 
case.316 
In fact, as of February 25, 1986, Dr. Thomas Laughren, then the 
supervisory medical officer for Merital, wrote that he was "not 
aware of any domestic deaths from hemolytic anemia associated 
with Merital use."3 1 7 
At no time prior to Mental 's withdrawal from the market did 
the sponsor alert FDA to this important case. That the case instead 
was buried, as Chairman Weiss observed, "as part of hundreds of 
reactions" comprising a quarterly repor t 3 1 8 probably contributed 
to FDA's lack of knowledge of it. 
In view of its oft-stated concern with Merital's potential to 
induce fatal hemolytic reactions, FDA would likely have benefited 
frpm being promptly alerted to a report of a Merital-associated 
death possibly involving hemolytic anemia that occurred during 
the drug's brief and limited marketing in the United States. Yet, 
the sponsor could have plausibly argued that the report involved a 
case of fatal hemolytic anemia and therefore did not have to be 
submitted as a 15-day alert report. The committee believes that, in 
executing its mandate to protect the public from the toxic effects of 
new drugs, FDA should not exempt the report of any death associ-
ated with an approved new drug, regardless of the contents of the 
drug's approved labeling, from the 15-day alert reporting require-
ment. 
Non-Compliance With Quarterly Report Requirements 
In the preamble to its NDA re-write regulations, FDA stated that 
the requirement for quarterly reports—effective for the first three 
years following approval of a new drug—reflects the ". . . agency's 
experience that the most important safety problems with a new 
drug are usually discovered during the first 3 years of market-
ing." 31* 
Hoechst included a total of 16 cases of Merital-associated adverse 
experiences in the reports it submitted for the first three quarters 
31 s
 This is the date that FDA received the January 1«">, 1980, quarterly rej>ort that included 
the case 
3 , K
 Hearing, page 51 
1 ,7
 Hearing, page 51 
: l
'
 H
 Hearing, page 51. 
" " See 50 Fed Keg 7\12 (February 22, 1(.»H5). 
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of 1985.320 On January 16, 1986, Hoechst submitted the fourth 
quarter report for 1985, which was not received at FDA until Janu 
ary 23, 1986, after Hoechst had announced its intent to withdraw 
the drug from the market. The submission contained 547 initial ad 
verse reaction reports, 49 of which involved reactions Hoechst clas 
sified as serious, and 7 of which were designated as hemolyti< 
anemia reactions.321 At least 100 of the 547 reports were brough 
to Hoechst's attention during the third quarter of 1985. Most c 
these, according to Hoechst's own classification scheme, were su| 
gestive of hypersensitivity reactions to Merital, and one was repor 
ed as a hemolytic anemia reaction.322 By contrast, Mr. Davi 
Barash of the Reports Evaluation Branch, FDA's Division of Drt 
and Biologic Product Experience (DDBPE), noted that "[a]s of J an 
ary 17, 1986, there are 50 domestic reports in our spontaneous r 
porting system . . . We have received no cases to date of hemolyi 
anemia." 3 2 3 
Clearly, FDA, at the time Merital was removed from the markt 
was not aware of the large numbers of adverse reactions in t 
United States that had been reported for the drug. Inasmuch 
the quarterly reported contained 547 reports, Dr. Paul Leber not 
in a January 27, 1986, memorandum: 
In particular, DDBPE's January 17, 1986 response to our 
request for a cumulative update on Merital adverse event 
reporting to our system contains far fewer reports (50) 
than were identified in the firm's January 21, 1986 submis-
sion (made in response to my January 16 inquiry). For ex-
ample, DDBPE had no domestic reports of hemolytic 
anemia, and the firm had at least 7 in their files.324 
The inclusion in a January 16, 1986, quarterly report to FDA 
many adverse reactions made known to Hoechst during the fou 
quarter of 1985 accounts for much of the disparity noted by 
Leber. Some of that discrepancy, however, is attributable to rep 
that Hoechst did not forward to FDA during the previous quar 
The committee believes that the sponsor was required to incl 
those reports in its October 9, 1985, submission for the third q 
ter of 1985. As Dr. Robert Temple stated in his appearance be 
the subcommittee: "If they had them in time for the third qua 
report, they are supposed to submit them then." 3 2 5 
C. FDA Does Not Require Sponsors To Report All Serious Ad\ 
Reactions Associated With Foreign Use of a Drug Approvei 
Marketing in the United States 
Dr. Temple was particularly impressed by the numbers of 
hemolytic anemia eventually reported for Merital. In fact, he 
fied that if he "had known that there were going to be fatal h 
lytic anemias in significant numbers," he would not have rev 
3 2 0
 Hearing, pages 42-3. Hoechst included none in its May 20, 1985, report; 4 in its « 
1985, report, and 12 in its October 9, 198f>, report. 
5 2 1
 In subcommittee Tiles. 
3 2 2
 Hearing, page 43. One U.S. hemolytic anemia reaction was reported to the sponsor 
tember 9, 1985 
3 2 3
 See his January 17, 198(>, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files. 
3 2 4
 In subcommittee files 
3 2 5
 Hearing, page 43. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
60 
his mid-1984 determination that the drug's approval be conditioned 
on its being restricted to second-line use.326 Yet, reports of only 
four, or 50 percent, of the eight hemolytic anemia deaths currently 
known to have come to Hoechst's attention during 1985 were re-
ceived by FDA prior to Hoechst's announcement that it was with-
drawing the drug from the market. 
In addition to the American hemolytic anemia death previously 
discussed that was received by FDA on January 23, 1985, other 
Merital-associated fatalities not known to FDA prior to the drug's 
withdrawal include: 
1. A South African case reported to Hoechst AG on Novem-
ber 6, 1985, which was not reported to FDA until February 5, 
1986; 
2. A German case reported to Hoechst AG on December 9, 
1985, which was not reported to FDA until February 5, 1986; 
and 
3. A U.K. case that was mentioned in the December 16, 1985, 
issue of Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin as having been report-
ed to the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines, 
which the sponsor noted in a January 21, 1986, letter to 
FDA.327 
That FDA was caught unaware in January 1986 by other na-
tion's serious reservations about the safety, and in the case of the 
United Kingdom, the continued approvability of Merital, in part, 
may reflect its lack of knowledge of several reports of drug-associ-
ated hemolytic anemia deaths reported to Hoechst in the weeks 
preceding the drug's withdrawal. Prompt reporting of a South Afri-
can hemolytic fatality, for example, could have shed light on the 
information FDA received from Hoechst on January 16, 1986, that 
"the South Africans were modifying the labeling of Merital to 
advise that it should be used only in seriously ill patients and then 
only with caution." 3 2 8 
Actually, however, Hoechst was not legally obligated to report 
any of these reactions to FDA. Because reference to fatal hemolytic 
anemia by this time was contained in the Merital labeling, none of 
these three reactions was "unexpected" within the meaning of 
§ 314.80(a) of FDA's regulations and, therefore, was not subject to 
the 15-day alert requirement.329 Furthermore, because they in-
3 2 0
 Hearing, page 7.'i. 
327
 Reports of these cases are in subcommittee files. 
32H
 Hearing, page 14 In addition a report appearing in a South African publication in April 
1985 concerning a case of hemolytic anemia and jaundice leading to cardiovascular collapse con-
cluded: "It is thus clear . . that the use of nomifensine can be associated with a life-threaten-
ing hemolytic anemia and that the indication for its use must be made critically." See Halland, 
"Nomifensine-associated Hemolytic Anemia," South African Medical Journal, vol 67, pages 
VAVA-4, April 21, 1985. 
3 2 9
 Nonetheless, Hoechst reported the first two reactions on February 5, 1986, as 15-day alert 
reports. 
The only way in which serious, but expected, reactions occurring outside the United States 
would be subject to 15-day reporting requirements would be if they met the "increased frequen-
cy" requirement set out in 21 CFR § 314.8(McXlMii), which states that a sponsor "shall review 
periodically (at least as often as the periodic reporting cycle) the frequency of reports of adverse 
drug experiences that are both serious and expected, regardless of source, and report any signifi-
cant increase in frequency (as defined in §'H4 80(a)) as soon as possible but in any case within 
15 working days of determining that a significant increase in frequency exists." However, in 
reviewing the frequency of reports of serious and expected adverse reactions, sponsors are not 
clearly required to consider deaths separately from other adverse experiences. Thus, unless the 
Continued 
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volved "expected" (i.e., labeled) experiences associated with use of 
the drug outside the United States, Hoechst was under no legal ob-
ligation to include them in its January 16, 1986, quarterly report, 
since FDA relieves from periodic reporting requirements reports of 
any serious, although expected (i.e., listed in the labeling), reactions 
occurring abroad. Section 314.80(c)(2)(iii) of FDA's regulations ex-
empts post-marketing periodic reporting of "adverse drug experi-
ence information obtained from . . . foreign marketing experi-
ence." 
This regulation exempts a sponsor from the post-market obliga 
tion to submit to FDA serious, even fatal, reactions reported frorr 
foreign use of a drug if the reactions happen to be listed in the 
drug's labeling. In the case of Merital, FDA had deprived itself b} 
its own regulations of any legal right to timely access to informa 
tion bearing on the "significant numbers" of "fatal hemolytic ane 
mias" that were eventually of such great concern to the agency. 
In reflecting on the Merital experience, Dr. Paul Leber noted ii 
a January 27, 1986, memorandum: 
Unfortunately, if a drug does not have very much do-
mestic marketing (or real time reporting), DDPBE will not 
have much data to evaluate and little basis to warn 
anyone about anything. This may be the case here. . . . My 
point is rather that if a drug is already marketed abroad, 
domestic reporting may not provide as good a signal as 
non-domestic reporting.330 
The committee agrees and believes that FDA should amend i 
regulations to require sponsors to report all serious adverse expei 
ences associated with foreign use of a new drug approved for ma 
keting in the United States. 
D. Hoechst Did Not Report to FDA Laboratory Study Results Th 
Showed That Merital Was Highly Immunogenic 
As stated earlier, until the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, he; 
ing, four months after Merital was withdrawn from the mark 
FDA was not aware that the drug was highly immunogenic; that 
it induced drug-specific antibodies in a very high percentage of \ 
tients taking it. FDA's lack of awarness speaks, not only to t 
agency's unfamiliarity with relevant publications in the world 
erature, but also to the sponsor's failure to make full and tim< 
reports of this information. 
In its consideration of the initial reports it received of drug-as 
ciated hemolytic anemia, Hoechst set the stage for the significa 
that was to be attached to the detection of drug-specific antibod 
Merital was to be regarded as the cause of immune hemob 
anemia only in those cases where such antibodies had been detecl 
overall frequency of drug-associated hemolytic anemia rose, any fatal hemolytic anemia 
contributing to that increased frequency may not be subject to "increased fequency" 15-day 
reporting. Moreover, where an "increased frequency" report consists of both non-fatal and 
cases, nothing in 5 314 8(McXlXii) requires that details concerning individual cases (e.g., thai 
cases, notning in
 s .» i - . . .»- , -
involve deaths) be reported to Y DA 
3 3 0
 In subcommittee files 
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Subsequent to its March 13, 1979, report of the first four cases of 
hemolytic anemia associated with use of Merital, Hoechst specifi-
cally disavowed the role of the drug in three cases where such anti-
bodies had not been isolated. Hoechst classified only one of those 
cases—a French case—as drug-related, since only this case revealed 
Merital-specific antibodies in the patient's serum.3 : n Hoechst, how-
ever, never reported to FDA the findings of Dr. S. H. Davis, De-
partment of Haematology, The Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, who 
in a January 22, 1980, letter to the company, wrote that he had 
"good evidence" of "anti-nomifensine antibody" in another of the 
four patients featured in Hoechst's March 13, 1979, submission.332 
By this time, other unusual Merital-associated immunological 
findings had come to Hoechst's attention, none of which was re-
ported to FDA. At a March 15, 1979, meeting at Hoechst House, 
London, Hoechst officials discussed the commencement of retro-
spective studies in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, of 
blood specimens from patients taking nomifensine for at least three 
months to estimate "the extent and severity of the problem [of he-
molytic anemia)." 3 3 3 Results from a U.K. retrospective study were 
reported to Hoechst officials at a July 31, 1979, meeting at Hoechst 
House in London. At this meeting, Dr. J. Watkins,3 3 4 Department 
of Immunology, University of Sheffield, reported highly unusual 
immunological findings in the sera of all seven patients examined 
in his controlled, retrospective study.335 None of these findings was 
reported to FDA.3 3 6 
Dr. B. Habibi, a French hematologist, reported in the July 14, 
1979, issue of The Lancet one case of Merital-associated hemolytic 
anemia in which drug-specific antibodies had been detected. Initial-
ly, the detection methods employed on Merital blood samples re-
vealed no additional evidence of anti-nomifensine antibodies. 
Hoechst reported to FDA on July 7, 1980, that random "blood sam-
ples" taken from Merital patients who developed hemolytic anemia 
"have been negative for Nomifensine antibodies" 3 3 7 and immuno-
logical investigations that had been conducted of Merital-associated 
fever cases in Italy, Germany, and France had all yielded "negative 
results." 3 3 8 In a similar vein, in a 1981 article, Dr. Habibi, by then 
a Hoechst consultant, reported negative antibody findings in 104 
serum samples that he had assayed.339 
On July 7, 1980, Hoechst informed FDA that it had undertaken 
an extensive antibody investigations program called the European 
: | :
" In a .July 7, 19X0, amendment to the Merital NDA, Hoechst stated: "The report [from Dr. 
Streichenwein of Hoechst A(I| suggests that in only one of the patients thought to have had 
nomifensine associated hemolytic anemia were antibodies to nomifensine found | the French 
case| Therefore, it is concluded that only one patient suffered from a nomifensine related hemo-
lytic anemia." In subcommittee files. 
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 See FDA's November 5, 19K(>, letter to the subcommittee. Hearing, pages 47H-5. 
3 3 3
 The memorandum of this March l.r>, 15)79, meeting by Dr. Suzanne M Streichenwein of 
Hoechst A(J is in subcommittee files. 
3 3 4
 A January 10, 1979, letter from Hoechst AG to Dr. A. John Nelson of IIRP1, stated that 
Hoechst UK had informed Dr. Watkins of the two UK hemolytic anemia cases and that Dr. 
Watkins had asked "to investigate the matter further " In subcommittee files. 
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Surveillance Program which was then "in progress" and was to 
have "continue[d] indefinitely." 3 4° When, however, Hoechst was 
advised that Dr. K. Neftel and his Swiss colleagues had developed a 
more sensitive detection method capable of frequently isolating 
drug-specific antibodies in Merital patients, the firm did not bring 
this matter to FDA's attention. 
At a May 1982, Merital/Alival International Project Committee 
Meeting in Somerville, New Jersey,3 4 1 Hoechst U.S. officials were 
informed by Dr. Streichenwein (Hoechst AG) that Dr. K. Neftel 
had recently proposed to investigate blood samples from Merita 
patients for the presence of drug-specific antibodies. Dr. Neftel pro 
posed using the same method that he and his colleagues had usee 
to detect drug-specific antibodies in patients exposed to the live 
protective drug, Catergen (cyanidanol), which, like Merital, ha< 
been associated with apparent immune reactions such as fever am 
hemolytic anemia in Europe. Dr. Streichenwein stated that Di 
Neftel proposed to demonstrate that Merital acted as an "immun 
reactor."342 
Hoechst agreed to assist Dr. Neftel in his investigations and thu 
began what the company later characterized as its "collaboratio 
with Drs. Neftel and [M.] Waelti [one of Dr. Neftel's colleagues wh 
was affiliated with the Institute for Clinical Immunology, Inselsp 
tal, Bern, Switzerland]."343 
Correspondence between Dr. Waelti and Hoechst in early Mi 
1982 indicates that by that time Dr. Waelti had found Merital-sp 
cific antibodies in the blood of eleven patients, including three wl 
had developed hemolytic anemia and eight who developed fever.3 
That correspondence was not provided to FDA until October S 
1984,345 and, because it was buried in a submission consisting 
several hundred pages, apparently escaped the notice of FDA i 
viewers.346 
With the exception of the case he reported on July 14, 1979, 
The Lancet, Dr. B. Habibi, a French consultant to Hoechst h 
originally found no evidence of Merital-specific antibodies in t 
serum samples he tested. In July 1982, he commented that t 
positive antibody results found by Dr. Neftel and his colleagues 
blood samples that he had previously tested and regarded as nej 
tive indicated that their method "is more specific than his o1 
technique. . .[T]his could explain why he had negative results 
the same material ."3 4 7 
3 4 0
 In subcommittee files. 
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 The transcript of this meeting is in subcommittee files. 
3 4 2
 See pages 159-160 of the transcript of the May 10-11, 1982, Merital/Alival Internati 
Project Meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
3 4 3
 See a July 7, 1982, letter from Hoechst AG, which was included in the sponsor's Ocl 
29, 1984, submission to FDA, in subcommittee files. 
3 4 4
 Hearing, page 25. 
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Several Hoechst employees met with Drs. Neftel and Waelti in 
Frankfurt in September 1982 to discuss the latter's many positive 
antibody findings.348 None of these unpublished findings was re-
ported to FDA.349 
More than a year after that meeting, Drs. Waelti, Neftel and 
three other scientists, including a Hoechst employee,350 reported in 
the December 3, 1983, Swiss Medical Weekly their findings of Meri-
tal-specific antibodies in the blood of 51 of 51 patients given the 
drug. 
Neither a translation of that German language article, nor a 
copy of it, was ever submitted to FDA. Instead, the title of the arti-
cle was listed as the 94th of 97 literature references included in an 
annual report to the Merital IND file on December 11, 1984, more 
than a year after it was published and more than 2 years after 
Hoechst was advised of the findings it reported.351 
Hoechst did not submit the publication, indicating that it ap-
peared in a periodical (Schweizerische Medizinische Wochenschrift 
or Swiss Medical Weekly) on FDA's "designated journal list." At 
that time, sponsors were not required to submit copies of articles 
appearing on that list by virtue of Section 310.9 of FDA's regula-
tions, which was then in effect.352 
Dr. Robert Temple testified that if an article in the world litera-
ture "was important and if it needed to be submitted for other rea-
sons, I would be offended at least by the idea of having it left 
out." 3 5 3 He was not certain, however, whether the law required 
the sponsor promptly to bring the findings contained in the Decem-
ber 1983 Swiss paper to FDA's attention.354 
If a published paper contains important findings relevant to the 
safety of a new drug, the committee believes the sponsor is legally 
obligated to report them promptly. Nothing in § 312.1(a)(6) of FDA's 
regulations requiring prompt reporting to FDA of any "significant" 
finding pertinent to the safety of a new drug under investigation 
exempted a finding that happened to appear in a "designated jour-
nal." The legal test is not the form in which the finding is present-
ed, but rather the significance of that finding. Moreover, Hoechst 
was informed of Merital's antibody-inducing properties well over a 
year before they were published. 
In an October 29, 1984, submission to FDA, Hoechst included an 
August 23, 1984, letter from a hematological consultant, Dr. Sol 
Sherry, Dean of the School of Medicine at Temple University, 
which noted that "[a]ll patients on prolonged therapy develop 1GG 
antibodies to the drug."3 5 5 When confronted with this statement 
during the subcommittee's hearing, Dr. Robert Temple stated that 
"I don't think we know how Dr. Sherry knows that." 3 5 6 
:,4H
 See the Hoechst memorandum of this meeting, Hearing, pages l.r>:i-8. 
: ,4y
 Hearing, pages 24-5. 
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Dr. Sherry's statement likely reflects his review of the Waelti, 
Neftel paper, a translated copy of which he received from two 
Hoechst officials on July 2, 1984, six months before Merital was ap-
proved and more than five months before the paper was merely re-
ported as one of a multitude of literature references in an annual 
submission to the Merital IND.357 
Despite the evidence of Merital's antibody-inducing potential 
that was available to the sponsor as early as 1982, Dr. Paul Lebei 
testified: 
It is, thus, conceivable that many people exposed to no-
mifensine, including those with hemolytic anemia, had the 
antibody, but we didn't have the laboratory facility or 
technology to detect it. And, so I think that also has to be 
factored into what was knowable at the time of approval 
in 1984.358 
A laboratory method, however, was available to the spons< 
before 1984 showing that "many people exposed to nomifensine . 
had the antibody." In fact, as late as October 1985, the sponsor st 
considered that method valid for demonstrating the presence 
anti-nomifensine antibodies.359 
As earlier discussed, a paper by Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt a 
Salama in the August 22, 1985, New England Journal of Medici 
reported the detection of drug-specific antibodies in the blood of 
Merital patients. As was the case with Dr. Neftel and his assc 
ates, the authors of the New England Journal of Medicine arti 
were able to detect Merital-specific antibodies in blood samp 
that had previously been considered negative for the presence 
such antibodies.360 
The New England Journal of Medicine paper featured a metl 
using the urine of persons given Merital to detect the presence 
drug-specific antibodies (called an "ex vivo" method). In argu 
that a method for detecting antibody was not available earlier, 
Leber confined his discussion to this ex vivo method: 
But I would think the record ought to state very clearly 
that the mechanism for detecting antibodies, nomifensine, 
was the subject of a major paper that Dr. Adkinson men-
tioned on August 22nd, 1985. . . . The point made in that 
paper is that in order to detect the antibody, a variety of 
techniques had to be used that were not generally avail-
3 S 7
 Drs Michael F Murphy and Charles F. Thayer of Hoechst's U.S. affiliate, inch 
translated copy of the paper in a July 2, 1984, submission to Dr. Sherry, which is in subc 
tee files. 
5 5 8
 Hearing, page 19. 
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 An October 1, 1985, memorandum of a September !10, 1985, telephone conversatic 
Mr. Kckert, Pharmaceutical Research Radiochemistry Laboratory, by Dr. Rudiger N 
Hoechst AG states. 
A conversation was conducted with Mr. Eckert in order to review the ad hoc deter 
nation possibilities for Nomifensine antibodies available to us. . . . It can be immedii 
ly established, radioimmunoassay for the detection of antibodies directly exisl 
against Nomifensine This assay exists and is available IPjlease have the publ 
tion of Waelti and Neftel sent to Mr. Kckert. 
In subcommittee files. 
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able or in broad use prior to that. . . . So, as a conse-
quence, we have a problem of detection.361 
The decision of Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt and Salarna to use an "ex 
vivo" method to investigate for anti-nomifensine antibodies, howev-
er, was made years before the New England Journal of Medicine 
paper was published. In November 1984, they co-authored a paper 
in the British Journal of Haematology which reported on their use 
of an "ex vivo" method "to demonstrate presumptive metabolite-
specific antibodies . . . against nomifensine" in a patient who de-
veloped immune hemolytic anemia.362 The paper stated that it was 
received for publication on January 5, 1984. In fact, one of the au-
thors advised the subcommittee staff that the detection method fea-
tured in the paper was used for the first time in October 1983.363 
The work using the particular ex vivo method described in the 
New England Journal of Medicine article was begun in June 
1984.364 One of the authors advised the subcommittee staff that 
initial progress reports on their work were given to Hoechst in 
1984.365 In fact, findings for five of these 19 patients were pub-
lished in the German publication, Blut, in September 1984.366 Fur-
thermore, by January 1985, Hoechst had been informed of the re-
sults concerning all the blood samples it had supplied the authors 
for their work.367 In fact, their manuscript was originally submit-
ted for publication to the New England Journal of Medicine on 
January 23, 1985.368 One of the authors advised the subcommittee 
staff that the firm received a complete list of all their results by 
June 1985. The subcommittee, in fact, obtained a July 30, 1985, 
memorandum by Dr. Streichenwein (Hoechst AG) indicating that 
three weeks before the New England Journal of Medicine article 
was published, the company was aware of the authors' antibody 
test results for a total of 43 hemolytic anemia patients who had re-
ceived Merital.369 Neither this memorandum, nor the findings it 
contained, were submitted to FDA.370 
: ,fi l
 Hearing, page 19. 
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 See Salama, Mueller-Eckhardt, Kissel, Pralle and Seeger, "Ex vivo antigen preparation for 
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r>«, pages 525-r>:n. 
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1985 Hearing, page 30 
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 Hoechst provided 11 of the 19 blood samples analy7,ed by the authors of the New England 
Journal o)'Medicine article. Hearing, page 30. 
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 See the memorandum by the subcommittee staff of its May 2 and 5, 198(1, telephone con-
versations with one of the authors. He told staff that the manuscript was prepared in November 
and December 1984. 
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 Hearing, page 31. The memorandum stated that of the 43 serum samples tested by Dr. 
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Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt and Salama also indicated that Dr. 
Habibi, a French consultant to Hoechst, had confirmed the findings 
reported for one of the blood samples discussed in their New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine paper.371 Dr. Habibi apparently did addi-
tional work confirming their findings, which culminated in a 
report dated July 9, 1985.372 However, the sponsor never submitted 
this report to FDA.373 
With the exception of the Blut summary, buried in a July 1985 
quarterly report, Hoechst did not report to FDA any of the findings 
of Drs. Mueller-Eckhardt and Salama until they were published in 
the New England Journal of Medicine on August 22, 1985. Accord-
ingly, not until it reported that article on August 25, 1985, several 
weeks after the drug's marketing was launched in the United 
States, did Hoechst suggest modifications to the Merital labeling to 
reflect receipt of this information. Hoechst changed the statement 
in the labeling's hemolytic anemia section that antibodies against 
nomifensine had been "isolated" in a "few instances" to 
"[ajntibodies to nomifensine and/or its metabolites have been iso-
lated." 3 7 4 In addition to mentioning the detection of antibodies 
against the drug's metabolites,375 Hoechst, as Chairman Weiss 
noted "dropped the implication that . . . it occurred in only rare 
few cases and went to a more generalized statement which, at 
least, did not suggest the opposite of what was the case." 3 7 6 Inas 
much as Hoechst originally emphasized the relatively few cases o 
drug-associated hemolytic anemia in which drug-specific antibodiei 
were found as evidence that the reaction was not Merital-induced 
this change was significant. 
Dr. Temple testified, however, that, in the context of hemolyti 
anemia, the labeling "expressed what was known to us" 3 7 7 in thai 
. . . antibodies to nomifensine had only been isolated in 
a few of those cases at that time. In some cases, they had 
been looked for and not found. But, there is always the 
question of whether they had been looked for well.378 
Not only had the New England Journal of Medicine findinj 
been known to Hoechst well before their publication on August 2 
3 7 1
 Citing a personal communication with Dr. Habibi, the authors wrote that "upon the 
change of serum samples with us, Dr Habibi has been able to confirm the exclusive reactivitj 
serum from patient 3 with Metabolite 3 but not with nomifensine." See page 473 of their paj 
which appears in Hearing, page 95 Assuming that this personal communication occurred pi 
to the date the manuscript was submitted, Dr Habibi had begun confirming their results pi 
to January 23, 1985, the date the manuscript was submitted. 
n 7 2
 A Hoechst memorandum of a September 9, 1985, visit to Dr. Habibi in Paris stated. ' 
Habibi is not surprised by the heterogeneity of the antibodies {reported in the paper publis 
in the August 22, 1985. Neiv England Journal of Medicine on antibodies to nomifensine anc 
its metabolites] which does not differ from his own results (his report dated July 9, 1985)." 
the subcommittee's July 14. 1980, letter to FDA, Hearing, page 44U 
: ,7:
' See FDA's November 5, 198(i, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, pages 473 and 47.> 
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1985, but the seven patients who developed hemolytic anemia 
whose sera were tested for the December 3, 1983, Swiss Medical 
Weekly paper on Mental 's immunogenicity all were found to have 
developed antibodies to the drug and/or its metabolites. In short, 
information on frequent drug-specific antibody formation was pub-
lished more than IV2 years before Hoechst proposed a labeling 
change concerning the detection of antibodies to the drug and/or 
its metabolites.-'*79 Once the "question of whether [anti-nomifensine 
antibodies] had been looked for well" was answered by use of the 
detection method featured in this paper, the detection of drug-spe-
cific antibodies in the blood of hemolytic anemia patients could no 
longer be fairly characterized as an uncommon event. 
Hoechst also neglected to mention in Mental 's labeling what it 
had known since 1982—that antibodies had been found in the blood 
of large numbers of Merital patients who did not develop hemolytic 
anemia or, for that matter, any adverse reactions to the drug. In 
fact, Hoechst waited until October 29, 1984, to provide FDA any 
reference to a finding of drug-specific antibodies in Merital patients 
other than some who developed hemolytic anemia.3 8 0 This infor-
mation consisted of a few pieces of correspondence buried in a mas-
sive submission on Merital-associated fever, the introduction to 
which concluded that "[f]ever associated with Merital administra-
tion, regardless of its magnitude, has a characteristic pattern ob-
served with other drugs consistent with an immunologic reaction 
mediated by drug-induced antibodies."3 8 1 There is, however, no 
evidence that any FDA reviewer considered the implications of this 
statement or noted correspondence supporting it that was inserted 
nurnerous pages later in that submission. 
Dr. Temple testified that "I would certainly say that if I had 
known that antibodies were formed in everybody, I would put that 
in the labeling." 3 8 2 Nonetheless, he did not believe that the failure 
of Merital's original labeling to state this rendered the drug mis-
branded within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.383 
It is at least arguable that physicians considering whether to pre-
scribe Merital should have known that it had been very frequently 
associated with drug-specific antibody formation. Once, however, 
the sponsor made the decision to mention such antibodies in the la-
beling, the committee believes the sponsor had a responsibility to 
assure that its discussion of them was not misleading. In this con-
nection, the committee concludes that it was misleading (1) to 
single out hemolytic anemia victims who developed drug-specific 
antibodies without mentioning that a large number of other Meri-
tal patients also developed such antibodies and (2) to intimate that 
a finding of Merital-specific antibodies was a "rare" occurrence. 
Accordingly, the committee finds additional grounds for concluding 
that the drug was misbranded within the meaning of § 502 of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
37!>
 Hearing, page 'A\. 
MHO Hearing, page 25. 
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E. Hoechst Did Not Alert FDA to the Common Immunological 
Origin of Many Merital-Associated Adverse Effects 
On October 29, 1984, Hoechst acknowledged that, collectively, he-
molytic anemia, fever, liver function test abnormalities, and eosino-
philia "probably reflect different target organ sensitivities to a 
single immunological event." As earlier discussed, Merital's origi-
nal labeling did not call attention to the drug's capacity to induce a 
range of apparently allergic adverse effects, some of which appear 
to comprise a drug-related syndrome or syndromes. And while FDA 
failed to note clinical evidence of the drug's allergenicity, the com-
mittee finds that, with the exception of its one-sentence acknowl-
edgment concerning the "single immunological event" buried in a 
massive submission on Merital-associated fever, Hoechst did not 
advise FDA of the drug's wide-ranging allergic potential. 
Even before the Merital NDA was submitted on December 26 
1978, Hoechst apparently suspected that different types of adverse 
effects reported for Merital represented various manifestations o 
an immunological response to the drug. Thus, in a January 10 
1979, letter to Dr. A. John Nelson of Hoechst U.S., a Hoechst AC 
official stated that, in light of the 39 reports of "hyperpyretic [i.e. 
high fever] reactions to nomifensine" received by the firm by De 
cember 31, 1978, "it was not too much of a surprise to get notice o 
a case observed in France" of drug-associated hemolytic anemia.3 8 
On March 6, 1979, Hoechst AG officials reported four cases c 
drug-associated hemolytic anemia to the Institute for Drugs i 
West Germany. That letter stated that those cases ". . . evidentl 
have an immunological basis" and that the company had undertal 
en "investigations regarding the question whether Nomifensin 
therapy is associated with immunological side effects." 3 8 5 
Similarly, in an October 3, 1979, letter to Dr. Sesso of Hoechst 
Italian affiliate, Drs. Pola and Woelfel of Hoechst AG stated tru 
the serum of an Italian patient had been assayed for antibodies b< 
cause " . . . [w]e had several reports about fever under [Merita 
therapy . . . We are trying to explain this; the next step is I 
assume some immunopathological course (drug fever in the liter; 
ture)." 3 8 6 
Professor A.L. de Week, Director, Institute for Clinical Immune 
ogy, Inselspital, Bern, Switzerland, and a co-author of the Decer 
ber 3, 1983, Swiss report on Merital's immunogenicity, noted in 
September 30, 1986, letter to the subcommittee that "immunolo^ 
cal side effects of Nomifensine were recognized (and partly pu 
lished by us) as early as 1981. . . ." These "side effects," he conti 
ued, "were certainly known to the company who introduced t 
drug and to the control authorities." 3 8 7 
When positive antibody findings did emerge from the work 
Drs. Neftel and Waelti, the firm was clearly aware of the probab 
ty that certain reported adverse reactions were immunological 
character. Thus, for example, Hoechst received a May 10, 19 
3 8 4
 In subcommittee files 
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letter from Dr. Waelti who, in noting that Merital-specific anti-
bodies had been found in one fever patient, wrote: 
I think it possible that his further exposure to [Merital] 
would induce immune reactions. Proper precautions and 
monitoring certainly are called for.388 
Dr. J. Gartmann, medical director of the Swiss Drug Monitoring 
Center, wrote of this same patient in an October 15, 1982, letter to 
a Hoechst official: 'The duration of the process probably varies 
greatly once the immunological reactions started, as is the case 
with lung infil trates."3 8 9 It is noteworthy that Mental 's labeling 
did not mention that lung infiltrates such as alveolitis (i.e., inflam-
mation of the small airsacs of the lung), like hemolytic anemia or 
fever, may represent an allergic response to the drug until Novem-
ber 1985, more than four years after this letter was written. 
In November 1985, FDA presumed that a wide range of Merital-
associated adverse effects represented allergic responses to the 
drug. By contrast, in 1983 Hoechst was unequivocally characteriz-
ing several reported drug-associated adverse effects—including skin 
reactions, drug fever, lung infiltrates, yellow discoloration of the 
skin, and hemolytic anemia—in the West German labeling for the 
drug as "immunologically caused hypersensitivity reactions." 
By late 1983, there were many reports of the various components 
of Mental 's immune toxicity, many associating them as parts of a 
possible syndrome or syndromes. Throughout most of the NDA 
review, however, Hoechst made no effort to discuss Merital-associ-
ated adverse effects as various manifestations of the drug's toxicity 
to the human immune system. Instead, the sponsor consistently re-
ported these manifestations as separate and discrete aspects of the 
drug's toxicity without any reference to the probability that they 
shared a common immunological origin. Hoechst segregated its re-
ports on drug-associated events such as hemolytic anemia, fever, 
liver injury, and eosinophilia, never emphasizing that they often 
occurred in various combinations with one another, or that they 
collectively could be regarded as various organ manifestations of a 
"single immunological event." In this connection, Dr. Adkinson has 
expressed the view that the "regulatory responsibility of the 
agency was somewhat impaired . . . by the fragmentary documen-
tation of serious allergic reactions which the record indicates the 
FDA received." 3 9° 
In fact, Hoechst sometimes implied that no such immunological 
link among various drug-associated adverse effects existed. For ex-
ample, Hoechst repeatedly downplayed the immunological implica-
tions of frequently observed, Merital-associated eosinophilia, which, 
according to Dr. Adkinson, normally "indicate(s) an ongoing in-
flammatory or allergic or immunologic reaction of some type or an-
other." 3 9 1 In a July 7, 1980, submission, for example, Hoechst in-
formed FDA that "while eosinophilia is often mentioned in the lit-
erature in association with drug allergies, there is no evidence that 
3 8 8
 This letter was included in the sponsor's October 2!), 19H4, submission to FDA, which is in 
subcommittee files 
: ,8! ,Ibid 
:,!l
° See his September 2\), 1!>K(5, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 527. • 
3»i Hearing, page (>. 
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it has any clinical significance." 3 9 2 Eosinophilia accompanied a 
large fraction of the international fever cases reported in this same 
submission. Potentially allergic adverse effects reported to FDA in 
subsequent submissions also commonly involved eosinophilia. 
When Hoechst finally acknowledged on October 29, 1984, only 
two months before FDA approved Merital, that eosinophilia, like 
several other adverse reactions, probably emanated from a "single 
immunological event" associated with the drug's use, FDA, by this 
late date, was already conditioned to overlook the implications oi 
such an acknowledgment. Consequently, on December 28, 1984, Dr 
Paul Leber wrote that "the eosinophilia is asymptomatic and no1 
linked to any specific clinical syndrome of significance" 3 9 3 anc 
FDA approved labeling stating that the "development of eosinophi 
lia did not appear to correlate with abnormal liver function tests 
fever, hemolytic anemia, or other abnormal laboratory or clinica 
findings." 3 9 4 
F. Hoechst's Failure To Report Safety Information to FDA: Ai 
Overview 
The subcommittee's investigation revealed that Hoechst neglect 
ed to advise FDA prior to Mental 's approval of several reports o 
deaths it received from 1977-1984 suggesting the ^bssibility tha 
Merital was capable of inducing life-threatening allergic reactions 
Hoechst also failed to inform FDA prior to Mental 's approval c 
large numbers of other serious drug-associated allergic reactions re 
ported to it from 1982-1984. In addition, the firm withheld dat 
brought to its attention in 1982 indicating that Merital was e> 
traordinarily immunogenic; that is, an exceptionally large perceni 
age of Merital patients manifested an immune response to Merits 
through the development of antibodies to the drug and/or its met* 
bolites. Taken collectively, the information Hoechst failed to dii 
close to FDA prior to Mental 's approval obscured the natun 
extent, and severity of the drug's toxicity to the human immur 
system, and rendered the drug, especially as originally labeled, mi 
branded within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Ac 
4. FDA'S ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ADVERSE REACTION REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS W A S INADEQUATE 
FDA Overlooked Clear Evidence of the Sponsors Failure To Subm 
Merital-Associated Safety Information 
The conclusion that Hoechst did not comply with a wide array 
agency adverse reaction reporting requirements is largely based c 
information contained in FDA's files: 
Reports made to FDA on October 31, 1985, April 24, 198 
and May 15, 1986, contained information clearly indicatii 
that the company did not report to FDA, until after Merit 
3 9 2
 In subcommittee files. 
3 9 3
 Hearing, page 344. Nonetheless, FDA approved labeling proposed by Hoechst that sta 
that "(d)rug therapy with Merital (nomifensine maleate) should be discontinued in patients v 
develop eosinophilia." t 
3 9 4
 In subcommittee files. 
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was approved, drug-associated deaths known to the company 
well before approval.395 
A post-approval submission made to FDA on November 1, 
1985, revealed very large numbers of serious adverse effects— 
including approximately 60 hemolytic anemia reactions—that 
were known to the company prior to approval. 
Information contained in 15-day alert reports demonstrated 
non-compliance with the agency's 15-day reporting require-
ment. 
Hoechst's quarterly report for the fourth quarter of 1985 con-
tained at least 100 adverse reactions that were designated as 
having been reported to the firm during the previous quarter. 
Hoechst's October 29, 1984, submission contained a letter 
from a U.S. consultant stating that "all patients on prolonged 
therapy develop IgG antibodies to the drug" as well as infor-
mation showing that, by May 1982, Hoechst had been advised 
that drug-specific antibodies had been identified in the blood of 
three Merital patients who had developed hemolytic anemia 
and eight who had developed fever. 
After Chairman Weiss noted that "several Hoechst submissions 
. . ., on their face, show that the sponsor had not met its adverse 
reaction reporting requirements," the following exchange took 
place during the subcommittee's hearing: 
Mr. WEISS. What regulatory action, if any, did FDA take 
when it received submissions that plainly revealed that 
the sponsor did not report large numbers of adverse reac-
tions in the timely manner required by law? 
Dr. TEMPLE. Well, we didn't take any regulatory action, 
to my knowledge. But, I'm not sure that we recognized 
them as being out of compliance.396 
Hoechst's own submissions provided abundant evidence of its 
noncompliance with FDA reporting requirements. The committee 
is concerned that such noncompliance was not "recognized" by 
FDA prior to the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing. 
However, prior to Merital's approval, agency personnel did sus-
pect that the sponsor had not supplied important safety informa-
tion to FDA in a sufficiently timely manner. In a mid-1984 review, 
Dr. Thomas Hayes, then the supervisory medical officer for Meri-
tal, concerned that the sponsor may have previously withheld data 
from FDA showing the high degree of fever experienced by some 
Merital patients, wrote: 
Safety updates were not intended as a panoply behind 
which adverse events of critical importance (to the approv-
al process) may be hidden. "Full reports" means just what 
the term conveys.397 
His superior, Dr. Paul Leber, echoed his sentiments in a Decem-
ber 28, 1984, memorandum: 
:,HS
 Additional reports made to FDA following the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing con-
tained similar tyj>es of information. 
n9fi
 Hearing, page A'.l. 
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They [Hoechst] have not always provided all information 
on a particular problem in a timely manner [T]he ap-
parent delayed expression of our staffs concern about hy-
perpyrexia is a direct reflection of Hoechst-Roussel's fail-
ure to provide all relevant information about this poten-
tially serious risk at an early time.398 
Despite concerns that the firm did not provide "critical" at 
"relevant" safety information in a timely manner, FDA witness< 
acknowledged at the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing th 
the matter of the sponsor's reporting practices was not brought 
the attention of the Division of Scientific Investigations, FDA's i 
vestigative arm.399 Nor was any agency investigation undertake 
when, on February 5, 1985, the subcommittee staff advised the I 
vision of Scientific Investigations of Dr. Hayes' and Dr. Leber's ; 
legations of the sponsor's failure to make timely reports of signi 
cant safety information.400 In short, until the subcommittee's M 
22, 1986, hearing, FDA had initiated no investigation of the firn 
reporting practices regarding Merital.401 
This is not the first instance when the committee has found dc 
ciencies in FDA's enforcement of agency reporting requiremen 
In a unanimously approved report issued on November 9, 1983, < 
titled Deficiencies in FDA s Regulation of the New Drug "Orafle: 
the committee noted that, despite what FDA acknowledged as 
"full-fledged" and "ongoing" investigation of the reporting pr 
tices of Eli Lilly and Company, the agency did not undertake 
inspection of Lilly's international report files concerning deaths 
sociated with the arthritis drug Oraflex (benoxaprofen) outside i 
United States until after it had been informed by the subcomn 
tee that the company had failed to report 13 such deaths to Fl 
prior to the agency's approval of Oraflex on April 19, 1982.402 U 
mately, Lilly pled guilty to criminal charges for failing to make 
gaily required reports of Oraflex-associated deaths to FDA. 
On the heels of revelations concerning Lilly's failure to rep 
drug-associated adverse effects occurring outside the United Stat 
the committee found that FDA did not conduct any investigat 
upon learning that Pfizer Pharmaceuticals similarly failed 
report to FDA at least 26 "serious adverse reactions associa 
with use of its arthritis drug, Feldene (piroxicam), outside 
United States" prior to the drug's approval on April 6, 1982.403 
3 9 8
 Hearing, page 45. That Drs. Hayes and Leber did not previously know that Merital 
been associated with hyperpyrexia or extremely elevated fever (i.e., 40°C or 104°F or abovi 
fleets their lack of awareness of information contained in the Merital NDA as well as ii 
medical literature. Two such cases were reported in the U.S. clinical trials, one of which 
discussed at a December 3, 1981, Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee meeting 
page 155 of the verbatim transcript of this meeting, which is in subcommittee files. The sp 
also reported on July 7, 1980, 9 international cases of fever of 40°C or more. 
In addition, several publications in the world literature reported such cases. See Hunzik 
al , Sihweiz.med Woehenschrift, September 6, 1980; Weihe, Thybo, and Magnussen, Ugeskn 
Ixieger, May 18, 1981; Neilsen and Lund, "Drug Fever Due to Nomifensine Treatment i 
tients with Endogenous Depression," Int. Pharmacopsychiat; Nielsen, Lund, Ebert-Peterser 
Liisbergand, Ugeskrift for Ixieger, May 18, 1981 
39» Hearing, page 46. 
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At that time, the committee concluded that "FDA places the 
public's health at risk when it does not vigorously enforce the legal 
requirement that a sponsor report all significant adverse reactions 
to a new drug under clinical investigation, since this information is 
needed to weigh the risks of the drug against its potential bene-
fits." 4 0 4 
Based on its review of FDA's regulation of Merital, the commit-
tee believes that the agency has repeatedly failed to stress to its 
personnel the need for vigorous enforcement of its reporting re-
quirements. FDA's continuing failure to ensure that sponsors 
assume the legal consequences for failing to meet these require-
ments undermines public confidence that the agency is receiving 
all the information it needs to make informed and responsible deci-
sions about the risks of new drugs. 
FDA Misconstrues Its Legal Mandate in Defending Hoechst s Fail-
ure To Make Full and Timely Reports of Merital-Associated 
Safety Information 
At time of approval, FDA erroneously thought it had received 
only 17 reports of hemolytic anemia,4 0 5 a number which Dr. 
Thomas Hayes, then the supervisory medical officer for the Merital 
review, characterized as "disturbing" in a June 26-July 2, 1984, 
memorandum.406 When asked about Dr. Hayes' statement, Dr. 
Robert Temple testified: "But, in any event, all he is saying is that 
it is disturbing. Of course, it's disturbing." 4 0 7 Indeed, he testified, 
"We were worried about the frequency and in some cases the sever-
ity of the hemolytic anemia." 4 0 8 (Emphasis supplied.) 
Accordingly, when he was confronted with the subcommittee's 
finding that the company knew of approximately 100 cases of he-
molytic anemia/hemolysis prior to the drug's approval, Dr. Temple 
initially suggested that, if those reports suggested a change in fre-
quency, the company may have been legally obligated to report 
them, if not before approval under the IND reporting regula-
4
"
4
 Ibid. 
4(,r
* In a June 2(5 July 2, 1984, review, Dr. Thomas Hayes, Group Leader for the Merital 
review, wrote that 17 such reports had been received, a statement that was repeated in the 
Summary Basis of Approval for Merital completed after the drug was approved. In subcommit-
tee files. Dr. Temple, however, testified: "I don't think that 's right, by the way. I think there 
were actually a few more than that." Hearing, page 32. 
4(>6 Hearing, page 32 
4 ( n
 Hearing, page 34 
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 Hearing, page 33 
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tions,4 0 9 at least shortly after approval under the NDA reporting 
requirements.4 * ° 
When, however, he was asked to clarify his position, Dr. Temple 
although earlier stating that 17 reports of hemolytic anemia was 
"disturbing," minimized the importance of at least 60 or so such 
cases that FDA never had the opportunity to review before approv 
ing Merital: 
Mr. WEISS. Well, assuming that our information is cor-
rect, somewhere around 101 or 102 cases had been report-
ed to Hoechst, while you had received 17 or 27 or perhaps 
40 or so reports of hemolytic anemia associated with 
worldwide experience with the drug. Would that difference 
have been of sufficient significance to have required 
Hoechst to report all the hemolytic anemia cases known to 
it? 
Dr. TEMPLE. Well, that 's relatively close. If we knew of— 
if the number that they had reported was 40 and if the ad-
ditional 60 or approximately like that, that 's very close to 
whether it would have made much difference.411 
The committee believes this view of law enforcement contradict 
the letter and spirit of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The lege 
requirement that a sponsor report all significant adverse reactior 
to a new drug under clinical investigation is designed to ensui 
that FDA receives all the information it needs to assess a drug 
risks prior to determining whether it may be approved for comme 
cial marketing. By publicly minimizing, after approval, the failui 
to report large numbers of reports of potentially serious adven 
4 0 9
 In 1982, Dr. Temple testified that the IND regulations required sponsors to report any si 
stantial increase in frequency of an adverse reaction associated with a new drug under inves 
gat ion. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "T 
Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The New Drug Review Pr 
ess," August 3, 1982, page 93. 
Despite this, FDA has advised the subcommittee that it had not specifically defined what c< 
stitutes a "significant increase in frequency" for an adverse reaction associated with an inva 
gational new drug that must be promptly reported to FDA under §312.1(aX6) of the agenc 
IND regulations. See FDA's November 5, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 4 
By contrast, for approved drugs, FDA has defined "increased frequency" as an "increase in t 
rate of occurrence of a particular adverse drug experience, e.g., an increased number of repo 
of a particular adverse drug experience after appropriate adjustment for drug exposure." See 
CFR § 314.80(a) FDA currently requires 15-day alert reports for "any significant increase in f 
quency" of a serious but expected adverse reaction associated with an approved new drug i 
21 CFR §314.80(cKlXii>. This section requires sponsors to review the frequency of reports of si 
reactions "at least as often as the periodic reporting cycle." 
4 , 0
 Hearing, page 38 Dr Temple noted, however, that "the IND is not the ideal place to | 
new reports related to a pending new drug approval because everybody is concentrating on 
(new drug| application at that time So, we have what is called a safety-update, which we ask 
just prior to final action And that 's the place to put additional reports that have accumulate 
Hearing, page 39. Section 314.r>0(dxr>MviXb) of the NDA regulations, which did not go into efi 
until several months after Merital was approved, requires sponsors to "update periodically 
pending application with new safety information learned about the drug that may reasona 
affect the statement of contraindications, warnings, precautions, and adverse reactions in 
draft labeling." This requirement, like the IND reporting requirements in general, is not spec 
as to what sponsors are required to report to FDA. As Dr. Temple acknowledged, "sometii 
one can argue about whether a group of events change the overall impression' and, therefi 
must be included in a safety update report Hearing, page 39. Furthermore, unless FDA requ< 
otherwise, sponsors are only required to submit safety updates twice during the history of 
NDA—four months after the initial NDA submission and following receipt of an approv* 
letter Sometimes, as in the case of Merital, several years separate these two points in ti 
During this interval, it is only to the IND, which, by FDA's acknowledgment, "is not the ic 
place to put new reports related to" a new drug under NDA review, that sponsors are gener; 
required to report "significant" safety developments '• 
4
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drug reactions, FDA compromises its ability to review important 
safety data. Additionally, it sends a signal to sponsors that they 
need not ensure that FDA is informed of all potentially relevant 
safety data in their possession. 
The importance of 60 additional reports of drug-associated hemo-
lytic anemia is significantly enhanced if, as the Merital experience 
suggests, adverse reactions experienced in other nations may be se-
riously under-reported, particularly in comparison with the United 
States. In this connection, the committee notes that for the few 
months of American marketing, 20 cases of hemolytic anemia were 
reported among an estimated user population of 100,000 pa-
tients.412 Not included among such cases are several reported as 
"anemia," "normochromic anemia" or "normocytic anemia," some 
of which could actually have involved a hemolytic process. If, as 
often stated, only 1 in 10 adverse drug reactions is ever reported, 
this would represent an incidence of 2 cases per 1,000 patients, or 
.20 percent, which is vastly in excess of that claimed from the Eu-
ropean experience. 
The sponsor's contention that "the occurrence of hemolytic 
anemia associated with Merital treatment is rare by any standard, 
with an estimated incidence per million patients months of 
1.07," 4 1 3 lacks credibility. So, too, does its claim that no hemolytic 
anemia cases occurred during the U.S. clinical trials.414 During its 
limited review of adverse effects reported for those trials, however, 
the subcommittee staff found at least one clinical trial patient who 
developed apparent hemolytic anemia 4 1 5 in conjunction with 
fever, and liver damage, including granulomatous lesions in the 
liver.416 This case suggests, not only a lack of care in the review of 
clinical trial data,417 but also that the incidence of drug-associated 
hemolytic anemia might be substantially higher than the sponsor 
claimed was indicated by foreign reporting systems.418 Dr. Leber's 
4 , 2
 Seven cases were reported in the January 16, 1986, quarterly report for Merital; 6 cases in 
the April 24, 10X6, quarterly report; and 2 cases in the July 29, 1986, quarterly report; and 4 
cases were included in the January HO, 1987, quarterly report. In addition, a possible hemolytic 
anemia fatality associated with Merital was reported to FDA on February 3, 1987. 
4 1 1
 See lloechst's May 7, 1984, submission to the Merital NDA, in subcommittee files. 
4 , 4
 See, for example, the sponsor's May 7, 1994, submission to the Merital NDA, in subcom-
mittee files. 
4
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 l)r Adkinson testified in connection with this case: 
That case interestingly involved a low red blood cell count, a low hematocrit, and had 
other laboratory values in the case report, an elevated haptoglobin, and increased retic-
ulocyte count and a normal bone marrow aspiration, all of which taken together strong-
ly suggest that a hemolytic process was responsible for the anemia 
Hearing, page 7 
On November 22, 19K2, Hoechst also reported to FDA that a U.S. patient receiving Merital as 
part of the "humanitarian' ' protocol had a positive Coombs test. In subcommittee files. 
4 1 6
 Records from the case appear at Hearing, Appendix I. In an August 8, 1977, letter to the 
sponsor, the clinical investigator wrote: "The liver biopsy itself was suggestive of a type of hy-
persensitivity reaction . " In subcommittee files. 
4 1 7
 Over the past four years, the committee has twice noted FDA's failure to note important 
adverse reactions experienced during clinical trials. In The Regulation of Zomax, the committee 
found that FDA had overlooked clinical trial evidence of that drug's association with anaphylac-
toid reactions. In Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Oraflex, the committee 
found that FDA was not aware of reports it received of liver and kidney reactions in the clinical 
trials. 
4 1 H A U S incidence of 20 percent translates to 2 cases of hemolytic anemia per 1,000 pa-
tients. Although the incidence of hemolytic anemia would increase with time on the drug, it 
may not be surprising that at least one case of hemolytic anemia occurred among a clinical trial 
population of more than 1,000 Merital patients. 
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testimony that Merital-associated hemolytic anemia had been re-
ported at "a vanishingly small rate" before the drug was marketed 
in the U.S.419 may reflect the nature of foreign reporting systems. 
While factors such as the drug's newness on the market and pub-
licity may have influenced the rate of such reporting, the Merital 
experience suggests the possibility of particularly significant under-
reporting of drug-associated adverse reactions in other nations. II 
anything, this possibility enhances the significance of Hoechst's 
pre-approval failure to report to FDA a number of hemolytic 
anemia cases associated with use of the drug abroad. 
Dr. Robert Temple was also reluctant to state that agency report 
ing requirements had been violated in connection with the spon 
sor's failure to inform FDA that Merital had been found to bt 
highly immunogenic. When initially asked whether the agency*! 
IND regulations required prompt submission of the finding tha 
Merital had been associated with very frequent antibody formation 
Dr. Temple testified: 
I would think findings related to antibody formation 
would be part of what should be submitted. . . . Unless it 
was completely redundant with other information. And I 
don't think it was. So, yes, I would say that kind of infor-
mation is pertinent.420 
When asked whether "pertinent" meant that the company was h 
gaily obligated promptly to report this information, however, Di 
Temple began to retreat: 
Again, I believe that section says that the information— 
if the information is pertinent to warnings, precautions 
and so on, it has to be submitted. . . . I would say that in-
formation of that kind is somewhat at the margin, because 
we already knew that antibodies could be formed. . . . 
[We] would like to know, as part of the review, the details 
of who is developing antibodies and who is not and how 
frequent it is and all of those things. But, again in the ab-
sence of information linking antibody formation to specific 
adverse reactions, I think it's debatable whether the find-
ing of antibody formation has to do with warnings, precau-
tions and so on, and therefore requires reports to the 
IND. . . 4 2 1 
The committee believes it is clear that FDA should require spo 
sors, at minimum, to bring matters such as the extraordinary ii 
munogenicity of Merital, to its attention. As earlier stated, Merit 
may have been unique in the degree to which antibodies develop 
in patients exposed to it. Such information, in suggesting tl 
drug's potential to induce allergic reaction, constituted clinical 
significant evidence that reactions that appeared to be allergic 
nature were, indeed immune-mediated. 
FDA's argument that "in the absence of information linki 
antibody formation to specific adverse reactions" it is "debatal 
4 , 9
 Hearing, page 35. 
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 Hearing, page 26. 
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whether the finding of antibody formation has to do with warnings, 
precautions and so on" would mean, for example, that sponsors 
may not be legally required to submit positive results from an 
animal carcinogenicity study because comparable human findings 
have not been observed. Plainly, this has not been the agency's po-
sition. 
When reminded that Dr. Adkinson had testified that the finding 
of frequent Merital-associated antibody formation was "significant 
in assessing Mental's safety," Dr. Temple responded that "Dr. Ad-
kinson is talking now, after the fact, and that helps . . . one 
judge." 4 2 2 However, because FDA was not alerted to the antibody 
findings for Merital, it did not review their significance "before-
the-fact." 
Section 505(b) of the Food, Drug, and Costmetic Act requires as 
part of a new drug application "full reports of investigations which 
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for 
use. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) In this connection, Mr. William W. 
Goodrich, then Assistant General Counsel, Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, testified before the subcommittee in 1964: 
The law plainly requires that full reports of all clinical 
studies be submitted in the new drug application. Progres-
sively over the years, as we have revised the new drug 
form and instructions, this has been made more and more 
emphatic, that the full reports are expected. . . . But the 
law itself expresses this in terms of full reports of studies 
bearing on safety.423 (Emphasis supplied.) 
Thus, that same year, John L. Harvey, then FDA's Deputy Com-
missioner, wrote in connection with the cholesterol-lowering drug 
MER/29: 
With respect to MER/29 the manufacturer was required 
to submit to FDA at the time the NDA was submitted or 
while it was being considered by the FDA and not yet 
made effective, or when a supplement thereto was filed, all 
results of investigations and all reports pertinent to an 
evaluation of the drug's safety.424 
The "full reports" requirement of law was designed to ensure 
that FDA has all the information it needs to make reasoned, re-
sponsible, and independent evaluations of the safety and efficacy of 
new drugs. Accordingly, any test data involving a new drug that 
might have any bearing on the agency's independent assessment of 
safety and efficacy of a new drug under investigation should and 
must be promptly reported. 
Dr. Temple questioned whether FDA would have found the anti-
body findings to be "significant" and therefore required to be re-
ported by speculating that FDA may not have altered its view of 
the drug had it received them: 
422
 Hearing, page 27 
423
 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "Drug 
Safety (Part 2>," April 28, li)64, page 601. 
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But I'm not sure—and it's hard to say in retrospect look-
ing now, I'm not sure it would have made any difference to 
our conclusions about the drug. That is, mechanism is not 
what determines what you think about a drug, at least not 
usually.425 
But in mandating "full reports," the law clearly did not contem 
plate speculation by FDA on the significance of "pertinent" infor 
mation that FDA acknowledges "should [have] be[en] submitted" tc 
FDA prior to its approval of a new drug. 
As earlier discussed, at a September 1982 meeting, Hoechst offi 
cials were provided data showing frequent antibody formation wit! 
Merital. Referring to this meeting, Dr. Temple testified: 
The fact that there were Hoechst employees who were 
part of that study, I think tells you further that while the 
mechanism is considered interesting and perhaps impor-
tant, it is not considered something that tells you, per se, 
without other information, whether the drug has a big 
problem or doesn't have a big problem.426 
Absent evidence that the company did not intend to conceal tHi 
information from FDA, the committee does not believe such excu 
patory speculation is warranted. Moreover, any standard that pu 
ports to allow companies to determine what safety data are "signi 
icant" and therefore required to be reported to FDA, is no standai 
at all. FDA insists on receiving post-market reports of adverse e 
periences that sponsors may not consider "drug related" so that 
can make its own assessment of drug-relatedness.427 Likewis 
FDA should not permit companies to preclude it from judging f< 
itself whether pre-market investigations of the safety of new drui 
have yielded "significant" findings. 
FDA's policies and statements should make it abundantly cle 
that sponsors are legally obligated to ensure that the agency a 
conduct an independent review of all investigations that could pc 
sibly bear on the safety of a new drug under review. Agency tes 
mony that speculates whether data it has never seen before wou 
have been found to be "significant" had it been reviewed frustrat 
Congress' clear intent that the agency be given the opportunity 
conduct such a review. 
At the time of the subcommittee's hearing, section 312.1(aX6) 
FDA's regulations stated that a sponsor "shall promptly . . . repc 
to the Food and Drug Administration any findings associated wi 
use of the drug that may suggest significant hazards, contraindi( 
tions, side-effects, and precautions pertinent to the safety of t 
drug." (Emphasis supplied.) The "significance" test refers, not 
the level of importance attached by FDA upon reviewing a "fii 
ing," but rather to the level of importance needed merely to bri 
the matter to FDA's attention. Thus, the legal standard governi 
reporting was, not that a finding establishes "significant hazar 
contraindications, side-effects, and precautions pertinent to i 
4 2 5
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safety of the drug," but rather that it "may suggest" them. As ear-
lier stated, the committee believes the antibody findings clearly 
met this standard. However, if FDA determines that the "signifi-
cance" standard in its regulations is of sufficient ambiguity that it 
compromises enforcement of the statutory requirement that it re-
ceive "full reports" of all safety and efficacy investigations under-
taken by a new drug sponsor, the agency should replace it with a 
standard that clearly places the legal burden on sponsors to ensure 
that FDA is able to review any data that even remotely can be 
argued to have a bearing on the agency's assessment of drug safety 
and efficacy. 
5 . THE EFFICACY OF MERITAL WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM ADEQUATE A N D WELL-CONTROLLED STUDIES, 
AS REQUIRED BY LAW 
"[I]t was standard textbook knowledge in Germany that Nomi-
fensine was not an effective antidepressant," according to Dr. Peter 
S. Schoenhoefer, formerly with West Germany's drug regulatory 
authority.428 Leading authorities there stated that it is "doubtful" 
whether the drug had a real antidepressant effect.429 But under 
German law, lack of effectiveness does not preclude approval.430 
Conversely, in the U.S., Congress declared that as a condition of 
approval, a sponsor provide "substantial evidence . . . consisting of 
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical in-
vestigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experi-
ence to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis 
of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such ex-
perts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represent-
ed to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof." 4 3 1 
Dr. Adkinson testified that the risks associated with Merital 
were of such magnitude that the drug would need to "have a com-
pelling or unique therapeutic benefit in order to justify itself to the 
medical profession." 4 3 2 The committee concludes, however, that 
the administrative record reflects grossly insufficient evidence of 
effectiveness for FDA to permit exposure to the unusual panoply of 
risks presented by the drug. 
FDA has long interpreted § 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act to require, as a condition for NDA approval, that efficacy be 
demonstrated by at least two adequate and well-controlled stud-
ies.433 In his testimony before the subcommittee, Dr. Paul Leber, 
4 2 8
 See his November 19, 1986, letter to the subcommittee, which is in subcommittee files. 
4 2 9
 See Kuschinsky and Luellmann, Kurzes Lehrbuch tier Pharmakologie and Toxikologie, 
Verlag, Stuttgart, 1984, page 294. 
4 3 0
 In his November 19, 198(i, letter, Dr. Peter S Schoenhoefer wrote: 
It is an annoying fact that approval of a drug license under the provisions of the 
present German Drug Law does neither prevent nor exclude the licensing of ineffective 
drugs. . . Therefore, license was granted to nomifensine by the (German Federal 
Health] Office in spite of the fact that serious doubts on the efficacy of nomifensine 
were standard textbook knowledge. 
4 3 1
 See § 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
4 3 2
 Hearing, page 8. 
433 Hearing, page 59. This policy emanates from the statutory requirement that efficacy be 
supported by "adequate and well-controlled investigations" in the plural. 
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Director, FDA's Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, 
cited three positive studies as the basis for FDA's conclusion that 
Merital was an effective drug; by investigator name, these were the 
Georgia, Meredith and Varga studies.434 
Dr. Richard Stein, FDA's statistician, however, testified that two 
of these studies—the Varga and Georgia trials—did not provide 
substantial statistical evidence that Merital had a therapeutic 
effect.435 Thus, in his judgment, the drug's efficacy was not sup 
ported by at least two adequate and well-controlled studies, as re 
quired by law and established agency policy. 
Only seven and nineteen patients received Merital in the Vargc 
and Georgia studies, respectively.436 Early in the review of the 
Merital NDA, FDA's clinical reviewer cited these small numbers ir 
concluding that these studies could not serve as "pivotal" evidence 
of the drug's efficacy.437 Thus, on December 28, 1979, FDA advisee 
the sponsor that Merital was nonapprovable, stating that these 
"two studies cannot be considered pivotal because the . . . the 
number of patients in each study was small." 4 3 8 
Dr. Temple defended use of the Varga study because it was founc 
to yield "statistically significant" results in favor of Merital, not 
withstanding that: 
. . . If you were planning a study with the hope of dem-
onstrating an effect, it would probably be imprudent . . . 
to have fewer than perhaps ten patients on each treatment 
in it. You would be unlikely to be able to show an effect 
with a study of that size. . . . So, even though it might 
have been not the smartest thing in the world to go into a 
study that was that small, it worked out that there was a 
statistically significant difference.439 
Dr. Temple made a similar for the Georgia study: 
Mr. WEISS. What additional evidence was submitted by 
Hoechst to enable this study to be considered sufficiently 
large to constitute independent pivotal evidence of the 
drug's effectiveness? 
Dr. TEMPLE. I don't think there was any additional sta-
tistical evidence. But the study was not too small to show 
statistical significance. One could make the judgment that 
it wasn't as big as you wanted it to be to be a pivotal 
study. 
Mr. WEISS. NO, we are talking pivotal, right? Pivotal evi-
dence of the drug's effectiveness. That's what you have to 
have. Isn't that correct? 4 4 ° 
In its December 28, 1979, nonapprovable letter FDA stated th< 
the sponsor had not submitted at least two studies that were a 
4 3 4
 Hearing, page 53. 
4 3 5
 Hearing, page 59. 
4 3 6
 Hearing, pages 53 and 57. . ,.,
 c 
4 3 7
 See, for example, Dr. Hillary Lee's September 14, 1979, review, in subcommittee files. 5 
wrote that these "studies cannot be considered pivotal because the number of patients 
each study was small. 
438 Hearing, page 371. 
4 3 9
 Hearing, pages 53-4. 
4 4 0
 Hearing, page 57 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ceptable as "pivotal" studies—that is, as studies that served as reli-
able evidence of the drug's effectiveness. As Dr. Temple recognized 
at the subcommittee's hearing, the 
. . . word "pivotal" is not the same word "statistically 
significant," however. That was an expression of doubt [in 
December 1979] that a study that small should be relied 
upon.441 
Reliance on the Varga and Georgia studies as "statistically sig-
nificant" cannot be reconciled with the agency's concern with the 
studies' small numbers—namely, that results from studies with 
small patient numbers may not be representative of the universe of 
depressed patients for whom the drug was indicated. Studies show-
ing statistically significant improvement in favor of the drug under 
review may yield spurious results if they involve insufficient num-
bers of patients.442 As Dr. Leber recognized during the third meet-
ing of the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee on 
Merital: 
. . . If you use a small sample, it is conceivable that you 
will not have adequately sampled the universe of de-
pressed patients . . . if the sampling is in some way dispar-
ate or unusual or not really giving us a good sample, that 
poses a problem. . . . Small size, however, I think is an im-
portant issue.443 
It is in this context that Dr. Hillary Lee, FDA's clinical reviewer 
for Merital, stated during the October 15, 1979, meeting of FDA's 
Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee, that she thought 
the Varga study "was not sufficient because . . . the number of 
subjects was very small." 4 4 4 
Thus, several FDA reviewers had cited small sample size as a 
basis for concluding that the Varga and Georgia studies could not 
be accepted as pivotal evidence of Merital's efficacy, and, in fact, 
FDA could not identify a single medical or statistical review that 
detailed the basis for its conclusion that these trials contained suf-
ficient numbers of Merital patients to serve as pivotal studies.445 
4 4 1
 Hearing, page .r»4. 
4 4 2
 In this connection. Dr. Bonnie Camp, Chairperson, Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory 
Committee (PDAC l, stated at a February 25, 1983, PDAC meeting on Merital: 
The other question was that when you went away from protocol 308 (which contained 
the Meredith study], every study that had been presented . . . that was of good signifi-
cance was a small sample study. . . (A)re you going to point to studies that have seven 
subjects in them and say that the drug can be marketed on that basis, and I consider 
that absurd I personally want to see 30 subjects in there at least. . . . My personal 
experience with small sample size has been horrendous. . . . (MJy personal repetitive 
experience is that the first seven to ten patients you ever get in a clinical study often 
give you highly significant results, and by the time you've got 50, they are washed 
out . . . 
See the verbatim transcript of the PDAC meeting, pages 122ff., in subcommittee files 
4 4 3
 See the verbatim transcript of that February 25, 1983, meeting, page 11-139, which is in 
subcommittee files. 
4 4 4
 See pages 187-8 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
44r>
 See FDA's November 5, 198(5, letter to the subcommittee, Hearing, page 496. In that letter, 
FDA, however, stated: 
The size of a study is not ordinarily a standard by which the "pivotal" quality of a 
study may be judged . . Nowhere in regulations describing an adequate and well-con-
trolled investigation |21 CFR 314 126) is there any suggestion that a study must be of 
some particular size 
Continued 
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FDA regulations require agency personnel to document the basis 
of every significant FDA decision for the administrative file.446 
Since senior FDA officials had urged that the Varga and Georgia 
studies be rejected on the basis of sample size, the committee be-
lieves that the supporting evidence leading to the agency's eventu-
al acceptance of these trials should have been appropriately docu-
mented in the administrative file. 
The Varga study was carried out only on geriatric patients, and 
the Georgia study consisted almost entirely of male patients.447 As 
a result, FDA reviewers stated on several occasions that the Varga 
study results were not representative of the large numbers of non-
elderly patients for whom Merital was also indicated, and the Geor-
gia study results could not be extrapolated to women, who com-
prised the substantial majority of clinical trial patients covered by 
the Merital NDA. 
FDA's statistician, Dr. Richard Stein, testified that the Varga 
study results could not be extrapolated to the non-elderly.448 And, 
according to him, additional studies by the sponsor in geriatric pa-
tients did not prove Merital's efficacy in this population.449 Dr. 
Temple testified that the one geriatric study that was "reviewed in 
detail" by FDA—the Cohn study—"did not provide support at all— 
all the action was in the Varga group." 4 5 0 
When asked whether the sponsor ever provided "adequate statis-
tical evidence for applying the Georgia study to women as well as 
men," Dr. Richard Stein testified: "In my opinion, never." 4 5 1 
Dr. Temple testified that the issue of whether the results of the 
Varga and Georgia studies could be generalized to the non-elderly 
and women, respectively, was "more a clinical concern than a sta-
tistical one." 4 5 2 
The committee notes, however, that early in the course of the 
agency's review of the Merital NDA, FDA's clinical reviewers, as 
well as its statisticians, concluded that the studies were not gener-
alizable and, therefore, had to be rejected as pivotal support of the 
drug's efficacy. Thus, Dr. Hillary Lee wrote in a September 14, 
1979, memorandum: 
While FDA's regulations do not define the minimum size needed to attain "pivotal" study 
status, in the case of Merital, several agency reviewers, including the former Associate Director 
for New Drug Evaluation, rejected the Varga and Georgia studies as "pivotal" evidence of the 
drug's efficacy on the grounds that they were too small. 
4 4 6
 See 21 CFR § 1070 (a) and (bXl). 
4 4 7
 Males outnumbered females in the Georgia study 41-9. Hearing, page 58. 
4 4 8
 Hearing, page 55 
4 4 9
 Hearing, page 55 
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 Hearing, page 55. Dr. Temple testified, however, that another "was said to have been sup-
portive but we didn't review it in detail.'' Ibid These additional geriatric studies were completed 
in 1979 but not submitted to FDA until May 1984. after the sponsor had received its first ap-
provable letter for Merital. Because the sponsor did not submit these studies in support of the 
drug's efficacy, Dr Thomas Hayes, Group leader for the Merital review, wrote in a June 26-
July 2, 1984, memorandum "The geriatric studies now submitted were an attempt to extend or 
replicate those results. Apparently, it didn't work. We must assume that these studies do not 
support drug efficacy and add four more studies to the fairly substantial number that don't.' 
Hearing, page 55. 
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 Hearing, page 58 See his presentation beginning at page 71 of the verbatim transcript ol 
the December M, 1981, meeting of the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee, in sub 
committee files As early as July 16, 1979, Ms. Lucille Pogue, then FDA's statistical reviewer foi 
Merital. noting the largely male make-up of the Georgia study, wrote: "Due to the results o 
many protocols (and investigators) where most of the patients were females it might be advisa 
ble to initiate additional studies to investigate the effectiveness of Merital for males as com 
pared to females." In subcommittee files. , 
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In summary nomifensine has been demonstrated to be 
effective in three studies . . . in out-patient depressions, 
one of which involved elderly patients and one, primarily 
males. The latter two cannot be considered pivotal in that 
they are not representative of depressions in general.4 5 3 
A few months later, on December 28, 1979, Dr. Marion Finkel, 
then Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, notified the 
sponsor that Merital was not approvable, in part because the 
Varga and Georgia "studies cannot be considered pivotal because 
the patients are not representative of depressions in general 
" 454 j ) r Finkel, a clinician, was expressing a clinical as well as 
statistical judgment. 
According to Dr. Temple, Dr. Stein's statistical objections repre-
sented the only agency non-concurrence in the decision to declare 
Merital an effective antidepressant. So, the Summary Basis of Ap-
proval (SBA) for Merital stated in connection with the Georgia 
study: 
Although the study population is not representative of 
other studies in the NDA in that there was a preponder-
ance of males in this study, analyses for the entire NDA in-
dicate that gender was not related to study outcome.455 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The SBA for the Varga study similarly states: 
Although the mean patient age in this study was older 
than that of depressed patients in general, analyses of the 
NDA data show that age was not related to outcome.456 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
FDA, however, never performed any such analyses. Not one 
agency medical review detailed the basis for FDA's conclusion that 
the Varga study results could be extrapolated to the non-elderly 
and the Georgia study results could be extrapolated to females.457 
Ultimately, FDA's clinical reviewer decided that Merital had 
only "a mild antidepressant effect" and wrote that "a more effec-
tive antidepressant should produce less equivocal results." 4 5 8 As-
suming that Merital had only a mild antidepressant effect, Dr. 
Stein testified that larger studies should have been done to docu-
ment effectiveness 4 5 9 and that "if I were going to do more studies, 
and I were going to proceed in a practical fashion, I believe I said 
about fifty patients would be required per treatment group" to 
demonstrate efficacy.460 Dr. Stein stated, however, that "Hoechst 
submitted no studies that I reviewed that had even fifty patients 
per treatment group. They were all smaller." 4 6 1 
4r>
' In subcommittee files Also see her comments at pages 187-8 of the verbatim transcript of 
the October lf», 1!)7<), meeting of the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee, in sub-
committee files 
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The larger studies that were done on the drug did not demon-
strate that Merital performed significantly better than placebo.462 
As Dr. Stein wrote in a memorandum of a March 18, 1986, tele-
phone conversation with the subcommittee staff: "Mdst of the stud-
ies which recruited larger numbers of patients such as those of 
Goldberg, Kiev, Rickels, Feighner 4 6 3 and Hay man provided incon-
clusive evidence of the effectiveness of Merital." 4 6 4 
In fact, Dr. Stein testified that placebo outperformed Merital in 
many of these studies, and one of them demonstrated the signifi-
cant superiority of placebo to Merital .4 6 5 Dr. Stein's concerns 
about this were shared by Dr. Hillary Lee, the clinical reviewer for 
Merital, who noted in a September 14, 1979, review: 
Here it can be seen that placebo patients achieved more 
improvement than nomifensine patients in a substantial 
proportion of the studies. In fact, there were several stud-
ies in one protocol where the differences in favor of place-
bo approached significance and this is disturbing. In addi-
tion, of the ten studies with imipramine, nomifensine pro-
duced slightly less improvement (never significantly so) 
than imipramine in eight. . . , 4 6 6 
Notwithstanding the problems previously discussed in the studies 
that FDA ultimately accepted as "pivotal," Dr. Stein testified that 
if, as he stated in his June 3, 1982, review, the sponsor submitted 
17 placebo controlled studies, at least 14 of them did not show sta-
tistically adequate superiority of Merital to a placebo treatment.4 6 7 
This led Dr. Stein, in a June 3, 1982, review, to write that the 
issue of whether the patient population in a study like the Georgia 
trail is sufficiently representative of depressed patients in general 
. . . is a secondary question which begs somewhat the pri-
mary issue whether Merital has any therapeutic effect. 
The purpose of these studies was to demonstrate the anti-
depressant activity of Merital .4 6 8 
FDA has interpreted the law to require that NDA approval b( 
based on at least two adequate and well-controlled studies support 
ing effectiveness. Nothing in the law forces FDA to disregard larg< 
numbers of negative studies if it has concluded that two such stud 
ies have been submitted. In fact, according to Dr. Marion Finkel 
formerly the Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, th 
agency has customarily given considerable weight to negative stuc 
ies in determining whether efficacy has been demonstrated, as n 
quired by law: 
4 R 2 I b i d 
4 6 n
 Although Dr. Stein included the Feighner trial among those that "provided inconclusi 
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Although the law requires that we must have studies 
which show safety and effectiveness, and we have inter-
preted that to be at least two adequate and well-controlled 
studies which demonstrate the contribution of the drug to 
the claimed indications, if, in fact, there are 15 studies 
which are well-controlled, 13 of which do not adequately 
show that the drug is effective, and yet the design of the 
study was sufficient to draw a conclusion as to whether 
the drug is effective or not, and two investigators have 
managed to show that the drug is effective, then that is 
not considered substantial evidence for effectiveness. 
There has to be a preponderance of evidence among the 
well-controlled studies that the drug is effective.469 
Dr. Leber echoed a similar view before the Psychopharmacologic 
Drugs Advisory Committee on February 25, 1983: 
But we want to get away from this idea that's a little 
Procrustean that all you need to do is find two studies, 
period, and then walk away, because it is really the idea 
that there must be a plural of investigations, but the con-
cept that you need only two out of 100 is certainly not 
there, that you've got two out of two may not be enough. 
. . . [W]e never pick one or two or two trials out of a 
whole forest of evidence. We really try to get in some way 
an integrated sense of what is going on.4 7 0 
The administrative record fails to present documentation that a 
substantial evidence test has been met when the overwhelming ma-
jority of studies demonstrate either no statistically significant supe-
riority to placebo or, in some cases, inferiority to placebo. So, Dr. 
Leber reportedly advised the sponsor during a January 12, 1983, 
meeting that its "studies yielded so many divergent results we do 
not have convincing evidence of efficacy before us which would 
allow us to approve the drug." 4 7 1 Even the sponsor, according to 
the memorandum of that meeting, "acknowledged that the studies 
yielded inconsistent efficacy results." 4 7 2 
But FDA ultimately found the evidence supporting the efficacy 
of Merital to be "convincing," prompting Chairman Weiss to ob-
serve: 
So, you throw out the 14 tests which, in fact, prove no 
effectiveness. You take three which, aside from questions 
about their statistical validity, seem to demonstrate effec-
tiveness, and you say those are the ones that count? 4 7 3 
FDA responded that in five of six "three-way" studies comparing 
imipramine—an approved antidepressant—with Merital and a pla-
cebo, imipramine also did not outperform placebo. So, Dr. Temple 
argued, since 
4 0 9 See the verbatim transcript of the May 1, 1980, meeting of FDA's Radiopharmaceutical 
Drugs Advisory Committee, pages 122-3. 
4 7 0
 See the verbatim transcript, pages II-21ff. and 11-35, in subcommittee files. 
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 Hearing, page 420 . 
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. . . no one doubts [imipramine] is effective . . . [and] 
. . . [i]n five of those six studies . . . it was impossible to 
distinguish either nomifensine from placebo or imipramine 
from placebo, . . . [w]hat that tells you is that in five of six 
seemingly well-designed studies—we don't see any obvious 
flaws in them—it was impossible to tell the standard ther-
apy that everybody recognizes as effective from placebo.474 
In short, Dr. Temple testified, the studies lacked "assay sensitivi-
ty." 4 7 5 
By Dr. Temple's theory, the negative studies did not evidence 
Merital's ineffectiveness but merely represented failed studies: 
. . . an unsuccessful trial truly gives no information. It 
is not a negative trial of a drug, especially when the stand-
ard agent fails in exactly the same way in the same study. 
It is no information; it is not negative information.476 
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, it is not FDA's respon-
sibility to assume that a drug is effective, even an approved drug 
such as imipramine, where a particular study or, in this case, five 
of six studies, do not support effectiveness. Rather the law requires 
that a sponsor present "substantial evidence" of effectiveness. That 
another drug did not fare better than placebo does not prove that 
Merital has been shown significantly superior to placebo, as Dr. 
Temple acknowledged: 
Mr. WEISS. It sure . . . doesn't mean that [Merital] does 
work, does it? 
Dr. TEMPLE. It certainly doesn't. . . ,4 7 7 
The only three-way study that FDA did not regard as 'Tailed' 
was, of course, the one trial that appeared to yield positive results 
in favor of Merital; namely, the Varga study. But, as previously 
discussed, the Varga study's small sample size and exclusively geri 
atric make-up, in the judgment of several agency reviewers, raised 
serious questions about its representativeness. That five of the si> 
three-way studies were "unsuccessful" would constitute even great 
er grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the Varga study re 
suits.478 
The committee further notes that many of the negative studies 
were only two-way studies; they only compared Merital, and not i 
standard agent, with placebo. If as Dr. Leber wrote on Decembei 
28, 1984, a total of 12 negative placebo-controlled studies were per 
formed on Merital, at least six placebo-controlled trials that did no 
show Merital superior to placebo were two-way, not three-way 
studies. 
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In arguing that negative studies for Merital represent "failed" 
studies and not evidence against the effectivensss of the drug, Dr. 
Temple assumed that the results of the five three-way studies were 
applicable to all other negative placebo-controlled trials. 
Just to give a prediction, the results of the three-way 
studies suggest, if you could assume that the other studies 
have the same designs and problems, that when you study 
nomifensine or imipramine against placebo six times, only 
one time will you be able to distinguish the active drug 
from placebo. That's what that would predict if these stud-
ies are all identical*19 (Emphasis supplied.) 
Even assuming the validity of FDA's position that the three-way 
studies did not argue against the effectiveness of Merital, Dr. Tem-
ple's argument still requires an "assumption" that "all" other neg-
ative trials were "identical" to these studies in that they were 
"failed" studies. Since the law places the burden for demonstrating 
efficacy on the sponsor, it is simply not appropriate for FDA to be 
making "assumptions" that enable several negative studies to be 
considered other than as evidence of the drug's ineffectiveness.480 
Since the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, hearing, FDA has contin-
ued its practice of dismissing substantial amounts of negative evi-
dence. For example, in approving the new drug Buspar (buspirone 
hydrochloride), an anti-anxiety drug, on September 29, 1986, the 
agency disregarded several negative efficacy studies submitted for 
the drug. On May 27, 1986, five days after the subcommittee's hear-
ing, Dr. Temple expressed concern that in the three-way studies 
submitted to the Buspar NDA, diazepam, unlike Buspar, proved to 
be a more effective anti-anxiety drug than placebo: 
Unfortunately, the rest of the sponsor's reasonably ex-
tensive U.S. study program [other than the Rickels study] 
has been, to put it charitably, a bust. The difficulty is that 
. . . there are 4 domestic studies . . . that do not [clearly 
support the efficacy of buspirone]. More than that, while 
two of them can probably be considered methodological 
failures, i.e., "no-test," it is not so clear that the other two 
are failed studies, and they may actually provide some evi-
dence against buspirone. . . . [I]t . . . seems possible that 
we need another supportive U.S. study prior to approv-
al.481 
In the three-way studies, diazepam was shown superior to a place-
bo while Buspar was not. In short, Buspar failed the "assay sensi-
4 7 9
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tivity" test that FDA presented as its sole basis for disregarding 
negative results in the Merital clinical studies program. 
In a July 10, 1986, response to Dr. Temple's memorandum 01 
Buspar, with which Dr. Temple later concurred,482 Dr. Lebe' 
wrote: 
Your argument, reduced to its generic state, is that stud-
ies failing to provide statistical support for the efficacy of 
a new drug, especially those studies that have an internal-
ly documented sensitivity to detect a drug effect (e.g., three 
way parallel design studies in which the standard control 
is significantly superior to placebo) are evidence against 
the efficacy of a new drug. Generally, I do not agree with 
this interpretation of "negative" studies.483 
Dr. Leber has abandoned the "assay sensitivity" rationalizatioi 
that he and Dr. Temple 4 8 4 presented as the one reason they coult 
overlook the plethora of negative studies submitted for Merital ii 
declaring that drug to be an effective antidepressant. 
In his July 10, 1986, memorandum on Buspar, Dr. Leber conclud 
ed: 
[T]he studies failing to provide evidence of efficacy must 
not persuasively contradict the conclusions of the studies 
identified as positive. I believe there are relatively few re-
sults that can be interpreted as convincing evidence of a 
lack of efficacy. . . . For the moment . . . I'm not sure 
that we are in a position to interpret with confidence stud-
ies that merely fail to discriminate among treatments.485 
If FDA can find two "positive" studies that it regards as accept* 
ble, it appears that it will disregard, in almost all circumstance! 
numerous studies in which the drug was not shown superior to 
placebo. In addition, FDA has subtly shifted the burden of proof fc 
demonstrating efficacy from the NDA sponsor to itself. A sponsc 
need not submit "convincing evidence' that a drug is effective 
even when in most trials it has not been shown to be superior to 
placebo. Instead, FDA has the burden for providing "convincing 
or "persuasively contradictory" evidence that large numbers ( 
negative studies do evince a "lack of efficacy." 
After Dr. Leber decided that Merital had been shown to be a 
effective antidepressant, he nonetheless stated in a June 11, 198 
memorandum that "[a]t best, Merital has been shown to be a dru 
with very modest antidepressant effects." 4 8 6 To be certain, in tr 
most controlled environments in which the drug's efficacy was ii 
vestigated—inpatient settings in which patient compliance wit 
protocols requirements could be most tightly monitored—Merit 
had not been shown to be effective, leading Dr. Leber to concluc 
that "it may not work in severely ill hospitalized patients." 4 8 7 D 
4 8 2
 In a note dated July 16, 1986, Dr. Temple wrote: "Concur with conclusions " In subcomn 
tee files. 
4 8 3
 In subcommitee files 
4 8 4
 Dr. Leber presented that same "null study" argument that was advanced by Dr. I em 
at Hearing, page 66. 
4 8 5
 In subcommittee files 
48B
 Hearing, page 67. 
4 8 7
 See his June 11, 1984, memorandum, Hearing, page 423. 
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spite this, FDA did not require that Merital only be indicated for 
mild depression. 
To Dr. Leber's observation that Merital had been demonstrated 
"to be a drug with very modest antidepressant effects," Dr. Temple 
disagreed, emphasizing that only the "evidence of effectiveness is 
modest." 4 8 8 Dr. Temple's distinction defies logic. It is data—that 
is, evidence—that FDA always evaluates in determining whether a 
drug is both safe and effective within the meaning of the law. 
Moreover, the Food, Drug, and Costmetic Act clearly states that 
the evidence supporting the efficacy of a new drug not only must 
be derived from adequate and well-controlled studies, but must be 
"substantial." The committee cannot imagine how the "substantial 
evidence" test can be met by evidence that FDA concedes is 
"modest." 
Dr. Leber also testified that because the law requires that evi-
dence of efficacy be evaluated by "experts qualified by scientific 
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness" of a new 
drug, and since the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Commit-
tee that voted in favor of approving Merital consisted of experts, 
that the test was met.489 This misconstrues the clear mandate of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which speaks not to advisory 
committee experts, but rather to the "expert" qualifications re-
quired by those who conduct the clinical investigations submitted in 
support of a new drug's efficacy and safety. So, Section 505(d) of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires sponsors to submit " 'sub-
stantial evidence' . . consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations . . . by experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved . . . " 
FDA's own records are replete with additional statements by its 
own personnel that "substantial evidence" had not materialized 
from the data generated by the sponsor's clinical program. 
In a July 16, 1979, review, Dr. Lucille P. Pogue, an agency statis-
tician, wrote: 
Based on the statistical evaluations of the eleven proto-
cols with placebo control group it appears that this submis-
sion presents suggestive but not substantial evidence of 
the superiority of Merital as compared to placebo for pa-
tients who manifest various symptoms of depression.490 
On September 14, 1979, Dr. J. Hillary Lee, the clinical reviewer 
for Merital, wrote that it is 
not possible to identify "more than one adequate and 
well controlled trial which demonstrates substantial evi-
dence of efficacy," the criterion for approval.491 
In a December 13, 1979, review, agency statistician Jerome Sen-
turia wrote: 
4 8 8
 Hearing, page 67 
4 8 9
 Hearing, page 68. 
4 9 0
 In subcommittee files. 
4 0 1
 In subcommittee files. 
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This submission does not contain substantial evidence of 
the efficacious and safe use of nomifensine maleate in the 
management of depression.492 
In FDA's December 28, 1979, nonapprovable letter, Dr. Marion J. 
Finkel, then Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, FDA's 
Bureau of Drugs, advised the company: 
[T]he NDA does not contain "substantial evidence con-
sisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations," a 
criterion for approval." 4 9 3 
In a December 23, 1980, review, Dr. Donald A. Pierce, a consult-
ant to FDA from Oregon State University, wrote: 
In my opinion there is not substantial evidence for gen-
eral efficacy of Merital, compared to placebo,494 
a conclusion with which FDA statistician, Dr. Richard Stein, con-
curred in a January 14, 1981, review: 
I am in agreement with Dr. Pierce that substantial sta-
tistical evidence is lacking for the general efficacy of Meri-
tal.495 
In a November 23, 1981, review, FDA's clinical reviewer, Dr. J. 
Hillary Lee, wrote: 
The main issue with this NDA is to determine whether 
there is more than one study showing substantial evidence 
of efficacy. . . . This submission continues to have one piv-
otal study (Meredith) and two strongly supportive studies 
of restricted generalizability (Georgia-males and Varga-el-
derly).496 
Even Dr. Leber, according to a memorandum of a July 20, 1982, 
meeting, expressed "severe doubts of whether the drug is an effec-
tive antidepressant" 4 9 7 and reportedly informed the sponsor at a 
January 12, 1983, meeting that "[w]e would be troubled if this drug 
were approved when effective drugs are available." 4 9 8 
In light of the persistent doubts expressed by agency clinicians 
and statisticians alike, Dr. Leber also advised the sponsor in July 
1982 that "[w]e cannot conclude the drug is effective based on stud-
ies presented to date." 4 9 9 Nonetheless, as FDA acknowledged in 
its appearance before the subcommittee, the agency's decision to 
declare Merital effective was based on studies included in the origi-
nal NDA submission of December 1978 and not on any additional 
studies submitted after that meeting.500 In the six years that FDA 
spent analyzing and re-analyzing the questionable efficacy data 
submitted in support of Merital's efficacy, the agency did not re-
4 9 2
 In subcommittee files. 
4 9 3
 Hearing, page 371. 
4 9 4
 In subcommittee files. 
4 9 5
 In subcommittee files. 
4 9 6
 In subcommittee files. 
4 9 7
 Hearing, page 67. 
4 9 8
 Hearing, page 67. 
4 9 9
 Hearing, page 68. 
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quire the firm to conduct any additional studies to determine 
whether the efficacy data met the requirements of law. 
When the Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee first 
met to discuss Merital on October 15, 1979, more than five years 
before Merital was approved, it recommended that additional stud-
ies be considered if re-analysis of the efficacy evidence upon subse-
quent pooling of the data did not show substantial evidence of ef-
fectiveness.501 When re-analysis of subsequent data poolings did 
not yield favorable results in support of the drug's efficacy, the 
firm still was not required to conduct additional studies. 
In view of the agency personnel's persistent reservations about 
whether "substantial evidence" of efficacy had been demonstrated, 
the record lacks support for FDA's failure to have required the 
sponsor to perform new efficacy studies for submission to the Meri-
tal NDA. 
During his testimony before the subcommittee, Dr. Leber made a 
revealing comment about the agency's apparent perspective on the 
new drug review process for Merital: 
The first thing we did after that—this was back in De-
cember 1981—was to have a meeting to figure out how to 
approve this drug, because the advisory committee had 
looked at the evidence, having first turned it down in 1979, 
and now said it was positive.502 (Emphasis supplied.) 
The statement describes what becomes clear after examining the 
history of the agency's review of Mental 's efficacy; namely, that 
rather than require the firm to produce the kind of "substantial 
evidence" required by law, FDA spent many years re-analyzing the 
same set of questionable data in an effort "to figure out how to ap-
prove this drug." 
Congress did not authorize FDA, in its review of new drug appli-
cations, to engage in any function other than assuring that spon-
sors have demonstrated new drugs safe and effective within the 
meaning of the law. While FDA is expected to process new drug 
applications in an efficient and economical manner, it is not the 
agency's function to try to devise means by which new drugs may 
be approved. 
6. F D A ' s LATE DECEMBER APPROVAL OF MERITAL REFLECTS PRESSURE TO 
MEET I N A P P R O P R I A T E E N D O F - T H E - Y E A R DEADLINES 
In recent years, FDA has approved a disproportionate number of 
new drugs during the month of December. Of the 22 new molecular 
entities approved in 1984, seven (31.8 percent), including Merital, 
were approved in December.503 Of the record number of 30 new 
molecular entities that FDA approved in 1985, 16 (53.3 percent) 
were approved in December.504 Forty (30 percent) of the 133 new 
chemical entities approved since 1980 were approved in Decem-
•>i»i See pages 230 1 of the verbatim transcript of this meeting, in subcommittee files. 
5 0 2 Hearing, page (12. 
r,
° ' Hearing, page i\\). 
'«" Ibid. 
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ber.5 0 5 By contrast, only 1 (0.8 percent) of these 133 drugs was ap-
proved in the month of January . 5 0 6 
FDA frequently cites its record number of new drug approvals as 
a sign of its progress in improving new drug review procedures.507 
But the subcommittee raised questions during its hearing about 
this flurry of activity in December and FDA's desire to improve its 
"annual scorecard." 5 0 8 FDA maintained that large numbers of De-
cember approvals reflect companies' desire to meet end-of-the-year 
deadlines rather than an agency program to improve yearly score-
cards.5 0 9 
The administrative record in the Merital case, however, suggests 
otherwise. On August 1, 1984, FDA advised Hoechst that, in view of 
Mental 's unusual panoply of risks, the drug could only be approved 
as "second-line" therapy.5 1 0 A week later, FDA's medical reviewer 
told the sponsor that he did not believe "we would be receptive to 
approving the drug" without limiting it to "second-line" use.5 1 1 On 
October 31, 1984, Hoechst objected, stating that such a step "virtu-
ally precludes the marketing of this drug." 5 1 2 
This and all other "outstanding issues" were resolved during a 
lengthy teleconference on December 21, 1984. As agreed during this 
teleconference, Merital was approved ten days later without a 
"second-line" restriction on its use.5 1 3 
Dr. Temple rejected the suggestion that in late December 1984 
FDA "walked away from, or bowed to, the company's objection to 
[FDA's] determination that Merital should be labeled as a second-
line d rug . " 5 1 4 Dr. Temple testified that FDA decided that it 
"didn't have a basis" for requiring Merital to be restricted to 
"second-line use," but that "had we pressed that point and insisted 
on it, the company would have accepted second-line labeling." 5 1 5 
As the end of 1984 approached, FDA was prepared, if necessary, to 
tell Hoechst to "[t]ake it or leave it." 5 1 6 
Although FDA's regulations require documentation of all signifi-
cant contacts with the regulated industry,517 no memorandum was 
prepared of the agency's December 21, 1984, teleconference with 
Hoechst.518 The only record of this important contact was pre-
pared by Hoechst officials. According to their account, Dr. Paul 
Leber of FDA told the company that "FDA was determined to re-
s o s
 Ibid. 
M , R , b i d
 noc u 
5 0 7
 For example, in Summary of Significant Accomplishments and Activities in 1985, the 
agency stated: "In 1985, FDA approved 30 new chemical entities. This total surpassed the previ 
ous record of 28, and was 12 more than the number of NCEs approved in 1984." 
so8 H e a r ing , page 71 
s n 9
 Hearing, page 70. 
5 . 0
 FDA's August 1, 1984, letter is in subcommittee files. 
5 . 1
 Dr Thomas Hayes' memorandum of an August 7, 1984, telephone conversation with the 
sponsor is in subcommittee files. 
S l 2
 Hearing, pages 350-2. 
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 Hearing, page 487. , 
r , M
 Hearing, page 73. Dr. Temple testified that "we made the conclusion some time before 
December 1984 
5 1 s
 Ibid 
5 . 6
 Hearing, page 73 
5 . 7
 See Section HMif> of FDA's regulations. 
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solve the Merital NDA before the end of 1984." In fact, FDA appar-
ently informed the company that it planned to approve the drug on 
December 31, 1984, as it eventually did.519 Hoechst,characterized 
FDA's abandonment of its insistence that Merital be approved as 
second-line therapy as a "concession" that ''satisfies [Hoechst's] 
minimal needs for a marketable drug. . . ." 5 2° 
The record amply reflects that it was FDA's determination to ap-
prove the Merital NDA by the end of 1984, not the firm's desire to 
meet an end-of-the-year deadline, which drove the approval process 
for the drug and may have been responsible for FDA's abrupt deci-
sion in late December 1984 to drop its insistence that Merital be 
marketed only as "second-line" therapy. 
FDA is prohibited by law from approving new drugs unless they 
have been shown to be safe and effective and their labeling bears 
adequate directions for use. It is imperative that the agency ensure 
that its approval actions are not influenced by arbitrary, self-im-
posed, end-of-the-year deadlines. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The committee recommends that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services take prompt action to assure the correction of the 
deficiencies identified in this report. The committee specifically rec-
ommends that: 
1. FDA ensure timely receipt and review of all important 
publications in the world literature pertinent to evaluating the 
safety and efficacy of a new drug under review, including 
translations of all such publications appearing in foreign lan-
guages. In this regard, FDA should require its scientists to 
review relevant bibliographical listings from the Medical Liter-
ature Analysis and Retrieval System (MEDLARS) concerning 
such drugs, particularly before approving them for marketing. 
2. FDA require sponsors to submit information relating to 
the marketing and investigation of new drugs under review in 
the United States, including 
(a) all labeling approved by foreign regulatory agencies; 
(b) all standardized warning or information letters dis-
tributed to practitioners, pharmacists, and other health 
professionals in foreign nations; and 
(c) accounts of all important regulatory developments 
concerning such drugs in foreign countries. 
3. FDA ensure that sponsors submit to it timely and full re-
ports of all information in their possession possibly bearing on 
the safety of a new drug under review. FDA should take steps 
to ensure that its personnel correctly interpret and strictly en-
force all legal adverse reaction reporting requirements. 
4. FDA amend its adverse reaction reporting regulations to 
r>,i>See the December 2C>, 1984, letter from officials in Hoechst's U.S. affiliate to the parent 
firm in Germany, in subcommittee files. In their December 26, 1984, account of their December 
21, 1984 teleconference with FDA, Hoechst officials wrote that the company "expects Merital 
NDA approval on December -U" 
*
2
" Ibid 
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(a) require timely reports of all deaths, whether or not 
"unexpected," associated with the foreign use of a new 
drug approved for marketing in the United States; 
(b) precisely define a "significant increase" in the fre-
quency of an adverse effect reported for a new drug under 
investigation that must be promptly brought to the agen-
cy^ attention. 
5. FDA prevent the marketing of any new drug whose effica-
cy is not supported by "substantial evidence" derived from 
"adequate and well-controlled" clinical studies, as required by 
Section 505(d) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. In deter-
mining whether such evidence has been provided, FDA should 
give appropriate weight to all controlled clinical trials that 
demonstrate, or fail to demonstrate, the drug's efficacy for its 
intended use. 
O 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Union Calendar No. 634 
100th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - House Report 100-1086 
FDA'S DEFICIENT REGULATION OF THE 
NEW DRUG VERSED 
SEVENTY-FIRST REPORT 
BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
OPERATIONS 
together with 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS 
OCTOBER 13, 1988.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
88-890 WASHINGTON : 1988 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
JACK BROOKS, Texas, Chairman 
JOHN CONYERS, JR. , Michigan 
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois 
GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma 
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 
TED WEISS, New York 
MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma 
STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina 
DOUG BARNARD, JR., Georgia 
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 
TOM LANTOS, California 
ROBERT E WISE, JR. , West Virginia 
MAJOR R OWENS, New York 
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR. , South Carolina 
JOE KOLTER, Pennsylvania 
BEN ERDREICH, Alabama 
GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin 
ALBERT G BUSTAMANTE, Texas 
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California 
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio 
LOUISE M SLAUGHTER, New York 
BILL GRANT, Florida 
NANCY PELOSI, California 
FRANK HORTON, New York 
ROBERT S WALKER, Pennsylvania 
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR. , Pennsylvania 
AL McCANDLESS, California 
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 
HOWARD C N1ELSON, Utah 
JOSEPH J. DioGUARDI, New York 
JIM LIGHTFOOT, Iowa 
BEAU BOULTER, Texas 
DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio 
AMORY HOUGHTON, JR., New York 
J. DENNY HASTERT, Illinois 
JON L. KYL, Arizona 
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 
WILLIAM M. JONES, General Counsel 
DONALD W. UPSON, Minority Staff Director 
HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 
TED WEISS, New York, Chairman 
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio JIM LIGHTFOOT, Iowa 
JOHN CONYERS, J R , Michigan CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California DONALD E "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio 
NANCY PELOSI, California 
JACK BROOKS, Texas 
E x OFFICIO 
FRANK HORTON, New York 
JAMES R. GOTTLIEB, Staff Director 
DANIEL W. SIGELMAN, Counsel 
GWENDOLYN S. MCFADDEN, Secretary 
MARY VIHSTADT, Minority Professional Staff 
( II ) 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
Washington, DC, October 13, 1988. 
Hon. JIM WRIGHT, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Washington, DC. 
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, I submit herewith the committee s seventy-lirst 
report to the 100th Congress. The committee s report is based on a 
study made by its Human Resources and Intergovernmental Rela-
tions Subcommittee. ^ ^ ^
 Chaima^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONTENTS 
Page 
I. Introduction 1 
II. Background 2 
III. Findings and conclusions 10 
A. The conscious sedation doses originally approved by FDA were 
excessive 10 
B. The originally approved conscious sedation doses understated 
Versed's potency relative to Valium 13 
1. The importance of reliable total dosage recommenda-
tions 15 
2. The role of medical mismanagement in assessing the 
safety of Versed 17 
C. FDA was unaware of studies demonstrating the efficacy of 
Versed at doses lower than it originally approved 19 
1. FDA did not familiarize itself with important papers in 
the world literature prior to approving Versed 20 
2. FDA did not review all significant information in its 
files concerning Versed prior to approving the drug 21 
D. FDA was not aware of the manner in which Versed was regulat-
ed in foreign nations 22 
1. Foreign labeling 22 
2. Important foreign regulatory developments 25 
3. Promulgating regulations requiring the submission of 
potentially important information related to foreign 
use of a new drug under FDA review 28 
E. Roche did not make timely reports to FDA of important informa-
tion pertinent to the safe use of Versed 29 
1. Roche's failure to report Versed-associated deaths 29 
2. Roche's failure to report important clinical trial data 32 
3. Roche's failure to report and warn about the markedly 
greater potency of Versed relative to Valium 35 
F. FDA's enforcement of its reporting requirements continues to be 
grossly deficient 37 
G. Noncompliance with Federal reporting requirements may have 
reached epidemic proportions 40 
H. Physicians were insufficiently warned about the risks of Versed-
associated respiratory toxicity 40 
IV. Recommendations 44 
VIEWS 
Additional views of Hon. Jim Lightfoot, Hon. Frank Horton, Hon. William F. 
Clinger, Jr., Hon. Al McCandless, Hon. Larry E. Craig, Hon. Howard C. 
Nielson, Hon. Joseph J. DioGuardi, Hon. Donald E. "Buz" Lukens, Hon. 
Amory Houghton, Jr., Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, and Hon. James M. Inhofe.... 45 
( V ) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Calendar No. 634 
100TH CONGRESS 1 f REPORT 
2d Session J HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | iQO-1086 
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OCTOBER 13, 1988.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
the Union and ordered to be printed 
Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on Government Operations, 
submitted the following 
SEVENTY-FIRST REPORT 
together with 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS 
BASED ON A STUDY BY THE H U M A N RESOURCES AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 
On September 27, 1988, the Committee on Government Oper-
ations approved and adopted a report entitled "FDA's Deficient 
Regulation of the New Drug Versed." The Chairman was directed 
to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee 
on Government Operations has responsibility for studying the oper-
ation of Government activities at all levels. The committee has as-
signed this responsibility as it relates to the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) to the Human Resources and Intergov-
ernmental Relations Subcommittee. 
Pursuant to its ongoing oversight of FDA's regulation of new 
pharmaceutical products, the subcommittee in 1987 undertook a 
review of FDA's regulation of the new drug Versed (midazolam hy-
drochloride), an anesthetic and sedative manufactured by Hoff-
mann-La Roche Inc. (or Roche) of Nutley, New Jersey, a subsidiary 
of F. Hoffman-La Roche & Company Ltd. of Basle, Switzerland. 
(l) 
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FDA approved Versed on December 20, 1985, for preoperative se-
dation, induction of general anesthesia, and conscious sedation J for 
short diagnostic or endoscopic procedures.2 For preoperative seda-
tion, the drug is administered by an intramuscular injection; for 
conscious sedation and general anesthesia, it is given intravenous-
ly. 
Since it was approved for marketing, Versed has been associated 
with numerous reports of respiratory and cardiac arrest,3 a high 
percentage of which have involved deaths. Most Versed-associated 
cardiorespiratory fatalities have occurred in elderly patients, pri-
marily in connection with the drug's use for conscious sedation in 
endoscopy settings where patient monitoring and emergency resus-
citation capacities have been inadequate. 
The subcommittee's investigation included public hearings on 
May 5 and 10, 1988.4 
II. BACKGROUND 
Roche submitted an investigational new drug (IND) application 
for intravenous 5 midazolam on September 26, 1975.6 
On September 15, 1982, Versed was introduced to the worldwide 
market in Switzerland, the home of Hoffmann-La Roche. Three 
months later, Hoffmann-La Roche submitted its new drug applica-
tion (NDA) for Versed to FDA.7 On January 1, 1983, Versed en-
tered the U.K. market.8 
1
 Conscious sedation, as the name implies, involves a patient who is sedated but remains con-
scious and can speak and, where necessary, cooperate with the physician. 
2
 Endoscopies involve inspections of bodily cavities by means of special scopes. These entail 
gastroscopy (inspection via an instrument that passes down the throat through the esophagus 
into the stomach), bronchoscopy (inspection via an instrument that passes through the larynx 
down into the trachea and into the bronchii of the lungs), colonoscopy (inspection via an instru-
ment that is inserted past the anus through the rectum into the colon), and cystoscopy (inspec-
tion via an instrument inserted through the urethra of the penis into the bladder). Versed is 
also indicated for conscious sedation during coronary angiography and cardiac catherization. 
3
 Patients have often experienced cardiac complications following a severe episode of Versed-
associated apnea and respiratory arrest. Versed-induced respiratory and cardiac depression lead 
to diminished oxygen saturation of the blood. One published study reported a decline in oxygen 
desaturation rates to below 80 percent in 7 percent of patients given Versed during a gastrosco-
py, which was of "considerable concern" to the authors because "cardiac arrhythmias are par-
ticularly liable to occur at times of hypoxaemia (decreased oxygen in the blood]." See Bell, 
Reeve, Moshiri, Morden, Coady, Stapleten, and Logan, "Intravenous midazolam: a study of the 
degree of oxygen desaturation occurring during upper gastrointestinal endoscopy," Brit. J. Clin. 
Pharmacol. 23: 703, 1987. Versed suppresses the normal drive or signal to breathe in the pres-
ence of accumulating, excess carbon dioxide. See Alexander and Gross, "Sedative Doses of Mida-
zolam Depress Hypoxic Ventilatory Responses in Humans," Anesth. Analg. 67: 377, 1988. 
4
 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "FDA's Reg-
ulation of the New Drug Versed," May 5 and 10, 1988, hereafter referred to as Hearing(s). 
5
 An INI) application for an intramuscular version of midazolam was submitted on June 26, 
1980. 
6
 The application was assigned to FDA's Division of Neuropharmacologies Drug Products. It 
was transferred to the agency's Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products on September Hi, 
1977. 
The IND was submitted for the maleate salt of midazolam. This maleate formulation was 
later changed to a hydrochloride solution, which was thereafter employed in clinical investiga-
tions. FDA subsequently regarded the hydrochloride solution as clinically equivalent to the ma-
leate solution. 
7
 Summaries from Roche's December 15, 1982, submission of the Versed NDA are in subcom-
mittee files. 
H
 It was first marketed in the U.K. for use in conscious sedation It was not until 1985 that 
Versed was approved in the U.K. tor intramuscular preoperative sedation and for the induction 
of general anesthesia. 
On March 1, 1981, the drug was launched onto the West German market. In May 1985, it was 
introduced to the Swedish market 
3 
The Versed NDA and IND were reviewed by two FDA divisions, 
the Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products and the Division of 
Neuropharmacological Drug Products. On December 20, 1985, three 
years after the NDA was submitted, FDA approved Versed for U.S. 
marketing.9 
Versed is a member of the benzodiazepine family of drugs, as is 
Valium (diazepam), another Roche drug which, in its injectable 
form, is also indicated for conscious sedation.10 However, Valium, 
unlike Versed, is not indicated for general anesthesia. 
Depression of the respiratory center is a known adverse effect of 
the benzodiazepines,11 and is often dose-related; that is, the risk in-
creases with dose. The risk of respiratory depression is particularly 
enhanced when Versed is used in conjunction with central nervous 
system depressants, particularly narcotic analgesics such as De-
merol (meperidine).12 
Shortly after U.S. marketing of Versed commenced on March 19, 
1986, Rochet U.S. affiliate began to receive reports of serious and 
frequently fatal cardiorespiratory reactions associated with the 
drug's use. On April 14, 1986, for example, Roche received the 
report of the death of a 60-year-old German man who received 7 
mg. of Versed before a colonoscopy.13 
On April 23, 1986, approximately one month after U.S. market-
ing began, Roche received the first report of a fatal reaction associ-
ated with American use of the drug.14 The case was submitted to 
FDA as a 15-day alert report on May 13, 1986. 
On May 13, 1986, Roche also received information from its Basle, 
Switzerland, parent on 6 fatal and 19 nonfatal cases of drug-associ-
ated respiratory depression and/or cardiotoxicity, most of which 
were associated with the drug's use for conscious sedation.15 Four 
of these fatal and 10 of these nonfatal cases had not been previous-
ly reported to FDA.16 
Two days later, a Roche representative phoned Dr. David L. 
Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, to discuss possible revi-
9
 FDA advised Roche that Versed was approvable on November 8, 1985. Around that time, 
FDA apparently informed the firm that the drug would be approved before the end of the year, 
since, on November 20, 1985, two Roche officials wrote that "we have learned recently that 
Versed will be FDA approved by January 1, 1986." See May 5 Hearing, galley page 30. On the 
inappropriateness of FDA's establishment of end-of-the-year deadlines for new drug approvals, 
see FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, House Rep. No. 100-206, Fifteenth Report by the 
Committee on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., July 8, 1987, pages 92-4. 
10
 Versed is generally claimed as having some advantages over Valium, including a quicker 
onset of sedation, less patient recall of the events preceding (i.e., retrograde amnesia) and follow-
ing (i.e., anterograde amnesia) unpleasant procedures. Because it is water soluble, it also pro-
duces less vein irritation (thrombophlebitis) than the version of Valium marketed in the United 
States. In Europe, the Diazemuls version of diazepam is marketed in an emulsion solvent which, 
unlike the U.S. formulation utilizing a propylene glycol solvent, does not typically cause vein 
irritation. 
1
' See the testimony of Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical 
School, and Co-Chairman, Respiratory-Surgical Intensive Care Unit, Beth Israel Hospital, 
Boston, May 5 Hearing, galley page 22. 
12
 Accordingly, the labeling for Versed has consistently recommended a 25 to 30 percent re-
duction in dose when narcotics are also used. 
13
 Records on this case are in subcommittee files. The case was reported to FDA as a 15-dav 
alert reaction on May 1, 1986. The patient eventually experienced cyanosis and respiratory fail-
ure. The .159 mg/kg dose he received was regarded as "a very high dose for sedation" since he 
had a history of respiratory insufficiency. 
14
 The case involved a 67-year-old male who became agitated after receiving Versed intramus-
cularly for an endoscopy. Records on this case are in the subcommittee files. 
16
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 67. 
16
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 67. 
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sions in the labeling instructions governing the drug's use for con-
scious sedation.17 
On May 30, 1986, two weeks after this telephone call, the Drugs 
Commission of the German Medical Profession published a warn-
ing on Versed-associated apnea (cessation of respiration) and cardi-
ac arrest.18 The May 30, 1986, Deutsches Artzeblatt article entitled, 
"Take Care When Giving Midazolam!," was based on reports of 
fatal cardiorespiratory reactions to the drug.19 By this time, Roche 
had received another U.S. report of a fatal reaction to Versed.20 
On June 3, 1986, Roche notified FDA of eight of the serious cases 
of respiratory depression associated with Versed's foreign market-
ing that were reported to it by its Swiss parent on May 13, 1986, 
five of which involved fatalities.21 
On June 20, 1986, Roche proposed revisions to the package insert 
for conscious sedation.22 Versed's originally approved labeling rec-
ommended that, for conscious sedation, the drug be "titrated" or 
slowly injected to the point where patient speech is slurred. The la-
beling further stated that "[gjenerally 0.1 to 0.15 mg/kg" of Versed 
"is adeqn
 s but up to 0.2 mg/kg may be given, particularly when 
concomitant narcotics are omitted." 23 Roche now proposed clarify-
ing 0.1 and 0.15 as total doses and, for the first time, suggested that 
patients be given an initial titration dose of 2.5 milligrams, to be 
administered over 2 to 3 minutes.24 
In view of the serious cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed that 
had recently been reported, FDA wrote officials in West Germany, 
France, and Switzerland on July 7, 1986, to inquire about their ex-
periences with the drug.25 
That same day, Dr. Russell Katz, a medical officer in FDA's Divi-
sion of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, completed a review 
of reports received of foreign and domestic cardiorespiratory reac-
tions to the drug.26 In three domestic cases he characterized as 
"strongly suggestive of a drug effect," Dr. Katz noted that the 
. . . doses [used] were within the currently recommended 
dose ranges, even considering the fact that these patients 
had certain "risk" factors. . . . It should be pointed out 
that two of the domestic cases both experienced fatal 
17
 Ibid. There is no record that Dr. Scally was told during that call that just two days earlier 
Roche had received from its Swiss parent several reports of respiratory depression and cardio-
toxicity, including fatalities, generally associated with the drug's use for conscious sedation. In 
addition, Dr. Scally testified that he did not recall receiving such information during that tele-
phone conversation. Ibid. 
18
 FDA did not learn of this publication until well over a year later. Dr. Scally asked Roche 
for it on July 10, 1987—more than one year after it was published—and it was sent to FDA on 
August 19, 1987. May 5 Hearing, galley pages 67-8. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 On May 22, 1986, Roche received the report of a 73-year-old woman who died from respira-
tory arrest after receiving 2 mg or .045 mg/kg of Versed for a colonoscopy. The case was report-
ed to FDA as a 15-day alert report on June 12, 1986. Records on this case are in subcommittee 
files. 
21
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. Only one of these five had previously been reported to FDA 
and then had only been briefly summarized in a July 26, 1985, submission to FDA. Ibid. 
22
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 71. 
2 3
 The labeling, however, advised dosage reductions of 25 percent to 30 percent "if narcotic 
Eremedication is used." It also stated that "(pjatients 60 years or older may require doses lower y about 30% than younger patients." Hearings, Appendix I. 
24
 Hearings, Appendix I. 
2 5
 FDA's July 7, 1986, letters are in subcommittee files 
2
* Dr. Katz's July 7, 1986, review is in subcommittee files. 
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events . . . after having been given Versed in doses that 
would (probably) have been consistent with the new dosing 
recommendations.2 7 
On August 1, 1986, The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeu-
tics reported that it had been advised by consultants that "the 
manufacturer's current dosage recommendations for midazolam 
may be too high for some patients." 2 8 
On September 10, 1986, Dr. Scally, a medical officer with FDA's 
Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products, noted this statement 2 9 
in his first review of post-market reports of adverse reactions asso-
ciated with domestic and foreign use of Versed. He concluded in 
that review that physicians using Versed, not the drug itself, were 
principally responsible for the adverse outcomes reported for the 
drug: 
It is not surprising to see cases of underventilation or 
apnea following i.v. administration of a drug which is suit-
able in larger doses for induction of general anesthesia. I 
therefore conclude that some practitioners who use mida-
zolam to facilitate endoscopy are not competent by train-
ing and/or preparation to administer i.v. drugs which may 
depress respiration.30 
Dr. Scally echoed this view in a proposed "Dear Doctor" letter 
concerning Versed he drafted on October 1, 1986, more than four 
months before Roche first distributed such a letter to U.S. physi-
cians. That draft letter began: 
Preliminary data on five U.S. cases of respiratory and 
cardiac arrest and 6 worldwide suggest that endoscopists 
and others may not be fully aware of the preparation 
needed prior to use of midazolam. The high mortality— 
over 80 percent—dictates that a reminder is indicated.31 
On October 18, 1986, Roche representatives informed several out-
side anesthesiologists serving on the company's advisory board for 
Versed that the firm had been barraged by reports from endosco-
pists of oversedation and respiratory depression associated with the 
27
 Ibid. 
2 8
 The review article in the August 1, 1986, issue of The Medical Letter on Drugs and Thera-
peutics on "Midazolam" is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
2 9
 Dr. Scally observed that "[t]here has been speculation that current dosage recommenda-
tions for midazolam may be too high for some patients, especially the elderly." Accordingly, he 
recommended that the "sponsor might be asked if more specific dosage experience in the elderly 
has accumulated since the original submission of the new drug application." Dr. Scally's Sep-
tember 10, 1986, review is in subcommittee files. 
In an April 12, 1985, review of 12 pharmacokinetic studies, which is in subcommittee files, 
Paul Hepp, FDA's Pharmacokinetics Evaluation Branch, concluded that Versed "has not been 
found acceptable to the Division of Biopharmaceutics" in part because "the data presented on 
pharmacokinetics in elderly persons is extremely weak." The one pharmacokinetic protocol for 
the elderly, he continued, 
. . . looked at patients in their fifties and all females at that. Benzodiazepines might be 
expected to show gender dependency and the rather significant increases in volume of 
distribution and half-life might become very pronounced in older individuals. Though 
both might be termed "elderly", there are big differences between most 55 year olds 
and 80-85 year olds and the term "elderly" requires explanation. 30
 I  subcommittee files. 
31
 In subcommittee files. 
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drug's use for conscious sedation,32 many of whom, according to 
one Roche representative, "seem to be giving too much [Versed] too 
quickly. . . ." 3 3 By this time, Roche had received reports of over a 
dozen Versed-associated deaths. 
On November 14, 1986, Dr. Janet Arrowsmith and Mr. David 
Barash, both of FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, 
wrote that since marketing FDA had received 29 reports of serious 
cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed, 17 of which involved 
deaths.34 They further noted that "[w]ith one exception, patients 
received acceptable doses of the drug, except that some were receiv-
ing additional central nervous system depressants."35 
In a November 19, 1986, review, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medi-
cal reviewer for Versed, noted that half of the clinical trial cases of 
Versed-associated apnea reported to the Versed IND appeared to 
have been "severe" or "moderately severe"; that is, countermeas-
ures were required to insure adequate ventilation.36 By contrast, 
all of the apnea cases reported to the Versed IND for clinical trial 
patients given Valium appeared "mild".37 Dr. Scally concluded 
that it "would appear that i.v. midazolam is a bigger threat to ade-
quate ventilation than is i.v. diazepam when administered slowly to 
the same endpoint of slurred speech."38 
In a November 26, 1986, review of U.S. adverse reaction reports 
for Versed, Dr. Robert Temple, then Director of FDA's Office of 
Drug Research and Review, found several "reasonably plausible" 
cases of drug-induced cardiorespiratory toxicity, which, while con-
stituting what he regarded as only a "weak signal," nonetheless 
warranted a "Dear Doctor" letter that provided "a prompt remind-
er to physicians about the need to observe particular care in using 
midazolam."39 
A few days later, the safety of Versed was the subject of a meet-
ing of FDA s Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Commit-
tee. At that December 1, 1986, meeting, a Roche representative 
stated that "we think endoscopy is where the problem is." 4 0 FDA's 
medical reviewer for Versed, Dr. David Scally, also remarked that 
the: 
. . . clinicians may have used [Valium] without the same 
sort of problems that they are getting into with [Versed]. I 
can't prove that but it looks that way. . . . 41 
32
 Roche officials stated at that meeting, according to a tape recording obtained from Hoff-
mann-La Roche: 
Our major problem is dosing. We have oversedation, agitation—it's more potent than 
was reported. . . . All the reports that we're getting back are really from endoscopists. 
People calling on endoscopists to say, I gave that to a patient, they were apneic [i.e., 
unable to breathe] or they stopped breathing, or they went into an arrest or whatever it 
might be, and now we're going to go back to Valium. 
Hearings, Appendix I. 
3 3
 See the transcript of this meeting, Hearings, Appendix I. 
34
 Eighteen of the 29 reports were domestic and 11 were foreign. 
35
 Their November 14, 1986, memorandum is in subcommittee files. 
36
 In subcommittee files. Dr. Scally was asked to review the Versed IND for apnea cases at a 
November 6, 1986, internal FDA meeting. 
37
 Ibid 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 In subcommittee files. 
40
 See the statement of Roche's Dr. Philip Del Vecchio in the verbatim transcript of that 
meeting, page 1-69, which is in subcommittee files. 
41
 See page 1-63 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
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In addition, advisory committee member, Dr. Casey Blitt, informed 
the meeting attendees that his hospital had had "at least a dozen 
near misses in the first month" of the drug's marketing and that 
"as soon as we dropped the dose to at least half, if not more, the 
problem immediately disappeared." 4 2 He, therefore, opined that 
the doses recommended in the Versed package insert were too 
high. 
Two weeks following the advisory committee meeting, FDA re-
quested that Roche provide special bimonthly submissions of all se-
rious cardiorespiratory reactions reportedly associated with use of 
Versed.43 
Versed, like Valium, was originally available in a 5 milligram 
per milliter solution. Roche also acknowledged to the advisory com-
mittee on December 1, 1986, that several physicians had reported 
difficulties titrating the drug at such concentrated levels.44 Three 
weeks later, the company submitted a supplemental new drug ap-
plication for a less concentrated, 1 mg/ml solution of the drug.45 
In February 1987, Roche issued a "Dear Doctor" letter that, 
noting reports of Versed-associated respiratory and cardiac arrest, 
re-emphasized the package insert instructions for safe use of the 
drug.46 The letter also recommended an initial titration dose for 
conscious sedation of 1 to 1.5 mg for older or chronically ill or de-
bilitated patients, which marked a 50 percent reduction from the 
previously recommended starting dose.47 
On May 19, 1987, FDA's Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Ad-
visory Committee again addressed the safety of Versed. By that 
time, FDA had recorded a total of 30 domestic reports of serious 
cardiorespiratory reactions for the reporting period from March 
1986 through April 1986, 13 of which had been received since De-
cember 1, 1986.48 At the meeting, Roche indicated that it had 
moved to effect reductions in recommended dosages.49 In fact, on 
March 19, 1987, Roche had submitted a supplemental new drug ap-
plication that called for lowering recommended total conscious se-
4 2
 See the verbatim transcript of that meeting, page 1-79, in subcommittee files. In a similar 
vein, Dr. Robert M. Julien, Staff Anesthesiologist, St. Vincent Hospital and Medical Center, 
Portland, Oregon, testified before the subcommittee that at his institution "we have had at least 
six, perhaps many more very close near misses. . . . We have been, frankly, lucky that we have 
not had several deaths at our hospital." May 5 Hearing, galley page 6. 
4 3
 The December 16, 1986, letter to Roche from Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, FDA's Office of Epide-
miology and Biostatistics, is in subcommittee files. 
44
 See page 1-77 of the verbatim transcript of the December 1, 1986, meeting of FDA's Anes-
thetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee, which is in subcommittee files. 
4 5
 Roche's December 22, 1986, supplemental new drug application is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
4 6
 This letter is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
47
 At an October 18, 1986, meeting, one anesthesiologist serving on Roche's advisory board for 
Versed, recommended to Roche representatives that elderly patients receive Versed in "no more 
than half milligram increments" given over 2- to 3-minute periods. See the transcript of that 
meeting, Hearings, Appendix I. A published letter to the British Dental Journal in 1985 similar-
ly stated: "Because midazolam exhibits such high potency when it is administered intravenous-
ly, it is necessary to titrate small incremental doses of 0.5 mg. against the clinical response ob-
tained in the patient." (Emphasis supplied) See Harris, "Midazolam in Dentistry, British 
Dental Journal, 158: 158, 1985 In a similar vein, Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen 
Health Research Group, similarly testified that he knew "of gastroenterologists . . . who tell me 
that some people can respond to as little as half a milligram or 1 milligram of this drug." (Em-
phasis supplied.) May 5 Hearing, galley page 32. 
4 8
 See the May 8, 1987, update by Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and 
Biostatistics, in subcommittee files. 
4 9
 See page 41 of the verbatim transcript of the May 19, 1987, advisory committee meeting, 
which is in subcommittee files. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dation doses for non-elderly, healthy adults to a maximum of 0.1 
mg/kg.50 
On May 26, 1987, FDA approved this application as well as the 
December 22, 1986, application to make available a more dilute, 1 
mg/ml. solution.51 
During his appearance before the subcommittee, Dr. Carl Peck, 
Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, testified 
that from late May through mid-June, FDA received reports of se-
rious cardiorespiratory reactions in four "apparently otherwise 
healthy" patients "in their mid-20's to mid-30's," which "added to 
our impression that the recommended dose was too high and that 
more emphasis needed to be placed on appropriate precautions and 
warnings for resuscitation while using midazolam." 52 
At an August 19, 1987, meeting with Roche, Dr. Robert Temple, 
then Director of FDA's Office of Drug Research and Review, em-
phasized that, while only elderly patients initially appeared to be 
at risk for serious cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed, such reac-
tions had recently been observed in younger patients, and that the 
number of reported cases had not diminished since the February 
1987 "Dear Doctor" letter. Dr. Temple expressed his preference for 
a boxed warning to draw practitioners' attention to the dangers of 
respiratory arrest, since they did not appear "to be getting the 
message."53 Actually, Dr. David Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for 
Versed, had recommended discussion of a "possible box warning [in 
the Versed package insert] to ensure that practitioners use 
[Versed] according to directions" on November 19, 1986, nine 
months earlier.54 
Although admitting that a boxed warning would hurt sales, 
Roche's Dr. Philip Del Vecchio told FDA at the August 19, 1987, 
meeting that he was unpersuaded that such a warning would prove 
effective.55 
On September 18, 1987, Roche submitted to FDA a draft of a pro-
posed second "Dear Doctor" letter.56 Suggested revised labeling 
also contained in that submission did not include a boxed warning, 
because, as Roche stated at that time, such a warning was not pref-
erable to intensified physician education efforts.57 
However, at an October 7, 1987, internal meeting, FDA officials 
resolved to request that Roche include a boxed warning in the 
Versed package insert.58 Accordingly, FDA requested, in an Octo-
ber 9, 1987, letter to the company, that the package insert begin 
50
 This supplemental new drug application is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
81
 FDA's May 26, 1987, approval letter is in Hearings, Appendix I. This concentration was 
first made available to physicians in July 1987. 
82
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 48. Two of these patients had received the drug prior to cosmet-
ic surgery, one prior to nasal surgery and one during a tubal ligation. 
53
 See the memorandum of this meeting, in subcommittee files. 
54
 His November 19, 1986, review is in subcommittee files. 
8 5
 See the memorandum of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
86
 See Roche's September 18, 1987, submission, which is in subcommittee files. 
87
 Ibid. 
88
 See the October 7, 1987, review of proposed labeling by FDA medical officer David Scally, 
which is in subcommittee files, which references an FDA internal meeting that day at which 
this resolution was made. According to Dr. Scally, Dr. Robert Temple, then the Director of 
FDA's Office of Drug Research and Review, "was very persuasive in support of a BOX WARN-
ING" at this meeting. 
9 
with such a warning.59 In late October 1987, Roche acceded to this 
request.60 
On October 23, 1987, Roche advised FDA that it considered it es-
sential that the Versed package insert state that "some patients 
may respond to as little as 1 nig." of Versed and that more than 5 
mg. of the drug was not generally necessary for the sedation of 
non-elderly, healthy adults.61 In addition, a maximum total con-
scious sedation dose of 3.5 mg. of Versed would be generally recom-
mended as adequate for elderly patients.62 Such changes were in-
corporated, in fact, into the Versed package insert. Roche also in-
formed FDA at this time that future "[promotional campaigns will 
emphasize the potency of Versed relative to diazepam."63 Accord-
ingly, a "Dear Doctor" letter that was issued the following month 
opened: 
Versed is a potent sedative agent which has been widely 
used for conscious sedation. Clinical experience indicates 
that it may be three to four times as potent per mg as dia-
zepam (Valium)." 6 4 (Emphasis supplied.) 
On February 12, 1988, the Public Citizen Health Research Group 
(HRG) publicly revealed that the agency had originally approved 
conscious sedation doses for Versed substantially greater than 
those shown to be effective in published studies and approved in 
the United Kingdom. HRG also petitioned FDA on this date to con-
traindicate the drug's use in conscious sedation and in patients 
over 60.65 
As of the subcommittee's May 1988 hearings, FDA had processed 
70 domestic reports of serious Versed-associated cardiorespiratory 
reactions, 36 of which involved fatalities.66 By early July 1988, the 
total had risen to 80 reports of serious cardiorespiratory reactions, 
including 43 deaths.67 By September 15, 1988, FDA had processed 
86 reports of serious, Versed-associated cardiorespiratory events, in-
cluding 46 fatalities.6711 
69
 In subcommittee files. 
8 0
 According to Dr. David Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, in late October 1987, 
Roche agreed to "add a boxed WARNING to the package insert, a request which they had previ-
ously opposed." See Dr. Scally's October 27, 1987, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files. 
61
 Roche's October 23, 1987, letter to FDA is in subcommittee files. 
8 2
 Ibid. 
6 3
 Ibid. 
64
 Hearings, Appendix I. The letter also emphasized that Roche had recently received reports 
of serious cardiorespiratory reactions in younger, healthy patients who did not receive other 
medications and that some major reactions had occurred in patients receiving doses within the 
recommended dosage range. 
6 5
 HRG's February 12, 1988, petition to FDA is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
6 8
 Dr. Robert Julien, Staff Anesthesiologist, St. Vincent Hospital,. Portland, Oregon, testified 
that, in view of the seven Versed-associated deaths of which he was aware in Portland alone, he 
believed that the 36 Versed-associated cardiorespiratory deaths reported to FDA by that time 
"grossly" understated the number of such fatalities that had occurred in the United States. May 
5 Hearing, galley page 7. 
67
 See the July 7, 1988, memorandum by Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, Medical Epidemiologist, Epi-
demiology Branch, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, which is in subcommittee 
files. According to the memorandum, Roche submitted four additional reports, including three 
deaths, but with insufficient information for inclusion in Dr. Arrowsmith's line listings. 
67
* Dr. Janet Arrowsmith of FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics conveyed this in-
formation to the subcommittee staff during a September 19, 1988, telephone conversation. 
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III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. THE CONSCIOUS SEDATION DOSES ORIGINALLY APPROVED BY FDA 
WERE EXCESSIVE 
The committee finds that FDA approved conscious sedation doses 
substantially higher than those shown to be effective in published 
studies. 
Originally, the recommended total dosage for conscious sedation 
in a healthy, non-elderly adult ranged from 0.1 to 0.15 mg/kg and, 
if necessary, up to 0.2 mg/kg,68 notwithstanding that several stud-
ies published in the medical literature years before FDA approved 
Versed in December 1985 revealed such doses to be excessive. 
In October 1982, Al-Khudhairi, Whitwam, and McCloy of the 
Royal Postgraduate Medical School in London reported in a gas-
troscopy study published in the British literature that 0.1 mg/kg of 
Versed—the lower end of the originally recommended dose range 
in the United States—proved excessive for several patients.69 
Moreover, the 0.1 mg/kg dose had only been selected in the first 
place after a pilot study had shown a 0.15 mg/kg dose—also within 
the originally approved U.S. dosage range—to have been unaccept-
ably high.70 
Another gastroscopy study published the following month by the 
Departments of Anaesthetics, The Queen's University of Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, and Royal Brisbane Hospital, Brisbane, Queens-
land, Australia, mentioned that a previous pilot study had "found 
that midazolam 0.1 mg/kg appeared to be an effective dose for 
most patients, but they had a tendency to be oversedated and 
became uncooperative." 7 1 "For this reason," the authors wrote, "a 
smaller dose was preferred." The study found that Versed produced 
adequate sedation at 0.07 mg/kg. 
On August 8, 1983, Whitwam, Al-Khudhairi, and McCloy of Lon-
don's Royal Postgraduate Medical School published a second gas-
troscopy study, which this time favorably compared 0.07 mg/kg of 
Versed with 0.15 mg/kg of Valium.72 
Several additional conscious sedation studies involving the De-
partment of Anesthetics, the Queens University of Belfast, North-
68
 In this regard, the original Versed labeling stated that "[generally 0.1 to 0.15 mg/kg is ade-
quate, but up to O.J nig/kg may be given." May 10 Hearing, galley page 3. Roche's proposed 
labeling revision of June 20, 1980, although not altering these total dosage recommendations, 
did characterize 0.2 mg/kg as a "rare" necessity. This revision is in Hearings, Appendix I 
However, doses were to be reduced 30 percent if the patient was elderly or debilitated and yet 
another 25 percent to HO percent if the patient received certain other kinds of drugs, such as 
narcotics 
f>9
 Cooperation was lost from four patients for a period. May 10 Hearing, galley page 3. See, 
Al-Khudhairi, Whitwam, and McCloy, "Midazolam and diazepam for gastroscopy," Anaesthesia, 
37: 1002, October 19K2, which is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
'" Ibid, 
71
 See Brophy, Dundee, Heazelwood, Kawar, Varghese and Ward, "Midazolam, a Water-solu-
ble Benzodiazepine, for Gastroscopy" Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, 10: 344, November 1982, 
which is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
'
2
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 4. Whitwam, Al-Khudhairi and McCloy, 'Comparison of mida-
zolam and diazepam in doses of comparable potency during gastroscopy," British Journal of An 
aesthesia, 55: 773, August 8, 1983. 
11 
ern Ireland, published in 1982,73 1983,74 and 1984, 7 5 demonstrated 
the adequacy of total Versed doses between 0.07 and 0.10 mg/kg. In 
fact, according to Professor J. W. Dundee of that department, titra-
tion and trial and error had originally demonstrated the appropri-
ateness of these doses for conscious sedation.76 
An American study published by White et al. shortly before the 
subcommittee's hearings confirmed these earlier findings.77 In that 
study, 0.10 mg/kg of Versed—the lowest dose in the originally rec-
ommended U.S. dose range for the drug—oversedated (i.e., put to 
sleep) 40 percent of patients and .15 mg/kg of Versed—also within 
the originally approved U.S. dose range—oversedated 75 percent of 
patients.78 The White study also postulated that an optimal dose 
7 3
 See Dundee, Kawar, Gamble and Brophy, "Midazolam as a Sedative in Endoscopy," British 
Journal of Anaesthesia, 54: 1186, October 1982, which also investigated Versed at 0.07 mg/kg., 
and which is in Hearings, Appendix I; Kawar, McGimpsey, Gamble, Browne and Dundee, "Mi-
dazolam as a Sedative in Dentistry," British Journal of Anaesthesia, 54: 1137, October 1982, 
which studied Versed at 0.10 mg/kg and was included in an annual report to the Versed 1ND on 
August 15, 1986, and which is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
74
 See McGimpsey, Kawar, Gamble, Browne, and Dundee, "Midazolam in Dentistry," British 
Dental Journal, 155: 47, July 23, 1983, which investigated Versed at 0.10 mg/kg and which is in 
Hearings, Appendix I. The manuscript of this study, which is dated September 1, 1982, was sub-
mitted in an annual report to the Versed IND on August 19, 1983. 
7 5
 Kawar, Porter, Hunter, McLaughlin, Dundee, and Brophy, "Midazolam for upper gastroin-
testinal endoscopy," Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, 66: 283, July 1984, 
which studied Versed at an average dose of 0.087 mg/kg and which is in Hearings, Appendix 1. 
76
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 5. During his appearance before the subcommittee, Dr. Carl 
Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, testified that some of the lower 
dose clinical trial results published prior to FDA approval 
. . . were based on studies in which a single full dosage was given as an initial dosage, 
after which time an assessment of the effectiveness and toxicity of the drug administra-
tion was made. In the NDA that we evaluated and eventually approved, dosage was on 
a much different basis. It approved dosage on the basis of titration to a clinical end-
point, not a full dosage to 0.1 or 0.15 or 0.2. In the initial labeling we cautioned the 
physician to use a dosage that was consistent with the identified clinical endpoint and 
not to blindly give a total dosage. 
May 10 Hearing, galley page 7. However, as the subcommittee staff learned, the total dosages 
used in the U.K. studies had been previously derived from titration and trial and error. May 10 
Hearing, galley page 5. 
Contrary to the implication of Dr. Peck's testimony, some lower dose published studies in-
volved titration to a clinical endpoint rather than a fixed total dose. For example, the lower dose 
gastroscopy study published in 1984 by Kawar, Porter, Hunter, Mclaughlin, Dundee, and 
Brophy, supra, primarily involved administration of Versed to the clinical endpoint of ptosis 
(drooping of the upper eyelid) and dysarthria (imperfect articulation in speech). Elaboration on 
this point appears in the summary of this study appearing in Roche's August 31, 1988, submis-
sion to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. According to this submission, Versed was adminis-
tered to the clinical endpoint of slurred speech in other lower dose studies completed years 
before FDA approval, including a cardiac catherisation study by G. Hendrix at a mean dose of 
0.06 mg/kg of Versed. In another unpublished gastroscopy study conducted prior to FDA approv-
al that was summarized in Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, B. L. Dowling, through 
titration, achieved a satisfactory, albeit unspecified, sedation endpoint in his patients at a mean 
dose of 0.076 mg/kg of Versed. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding Dr. Peck's testimony, the originally approved labeling for 
Versed, while it recommended titration to the endpoint of slurred speech, did not caution physi-
cians to start with a dose substantially less than the recommended total dose of 0.1 to 0.15 or 0.2 
mg/kg for healthy, non-elderly adults It was not until June 20, 1986, six months after approval, 
that Roche proposed adding to the Dosage and Administration section of the Versed labeling an 
instruction to start with a titration dose of 2.5 mg. 
77
 See White, Vasconez, Mathes, Way, and Wender, "Comparison of Midazolam and Diazepam 
for Sedation During Plastic Surgery, The Journal of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, 81: 
703, May 1988, which is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
7 8
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 25 Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research, testified that the design of the White study rendered its findings of limited rel-
evance to the manner in which the drug was recommended for use. 
[TJheir paradigm was to give a total dosage over a very rapid infusion, a paradigm 
which we have never actually sanctioned. We have always recommended that it be 
given in incremental doses, titrated to a clincial end point and preferably as a slow in-
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for conscious sedation might be 0.075 mg/kg, which, as Dr. Robert 
M. Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesi-
ology and Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, 
noted, "is almost identical" to the 0.07 dose that was demonstrated 
to be effective "in the European literature in 1983." 79 
Fundamental to the science of pharmacology is the establish-
ment of the lowest effective dose because, as Dr. Robert M. Julien 
testified before the subcommittee, "[i]f you go to doses higher than 
[that], which are effective, you increase the likelihood of toxici-
ty." 8 0 He expressed the judgment that the conscious sedation 
doses originally approved by FDA violated this pharmacological ob-
jective. The 0.07 to 0.10 mg/kg doses suggested as "appropriate" by 
several studies conducted in the early 1980's, he testified, were "at 
least 50 percent below that which was promoted in this coun-
try." 8 1 Accordingly, Dr. Julien concluded that the originally ap-
proved conscious sedation doses for Versed "were consistent with 
overdosage rather than with a safe level of conscious sedation," 8 2 
a judgment with which Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of An-
esthesia, Harvard Medical School, concurred.83 
The committee finds it noteworthy that, as Dr. Carl Peck, Direc-
tor, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, acknowl-
edged,84 in November 1987 Roche finally reduced the total recom-
mended U.S. conscious sedation dose for Versed to 5 mg 8 5 or 0.07 
mg/kg (for a 70 kg. person), essentially the same dose found to be 
effective in published studies predating Versed's U.S. approval.86 
However, Roche did not submit any post-approval studies substanti-
ating Versed's efficacy at or below 0.07 mg/kg to support its new, 
lower dose range.87 Studies supporting such efficacy were pub-
lished in the medical literature and therefore available to FDA 
before it approved the drug for marketing in the United States. The 
committee, therefore, finds it indefensible that it was not until No-
vember 1987, almost two years after FDA approval, that the gener-
fusion with significant periods in between each incremental dose to assess clinical out-
come. 
May 10 Hearing, galley page 19. As subcommittee Chairman Weiss noted, the published report 
of the White study 
. . . indicates that Versed was administered over 30 to 90 seconds. That would not be 
considered to be a rapid bolus injection. 
May 10 Hearing, galley page 20. 
Furthermore, contrary to Dr. Peck's testimony, when FDA approved Versed, it did not "rec-
ommend that it be given in incremental doses." As he acknowledged in his prepared testimony, 
"editorial revisions' were made in the Versed labeling in June 198G "to help prevent the possi-
bility of a clinician starting titration with a whole dose of 0.1 to 0.15 milligrams per kilogram 
rather than titrating the dosage to a desired response. . . . A suggested initial dose, 2 to 2.5 
milligrams in an average healthy adult was given for the first time." May 5 Hearing, galley 
pages 45-6. 
79
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 26. See the 1983 study by Whitwam, et al., supra. 
80
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 26. 
81
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 23. 
82
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 26. 
8 3
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 25. 
84
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 18. 
85
 Roche stated in the November 1987 version of the Versed labeling that a "total dose great-
er than 5 mg. is not usually necessary to reach the desired endpoint' for conscious sedation in 
healthy, non-elderly adults. May 5 Hearing, galley page 25. 
88
 In this regard, see the testimony of Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, 
Harvard Medical School, May 5 Hearing, galley page 25. 
87
 See the testimony of Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, May 10 Hearing, galley page 8. 
13 
ally recommended maximum Versed conscious sedation dose was fi-
nally lowered to 0.07 mg/kg. 
By November 1987, the Versed labeling also stated that "some 
patients may respond to as little as 1 mg.," or 0.014 mg/kg for a 70 
kg. person, of the drug.88 That the drug's originally approved label-
ing recommended a minimum total dose seven times higher (0.10 
mg/kg or 7 mg. for a 70 kg. person) than this underscores the ex-
cessiveness of that dose. 
B. THE ORIGINALLY APPROVED CONSCIOUS SEDATION DOSES 
UNDERSTATED VERSED'S POTENCY RELATIVE TO VALIUM 
The subcommittee's investigation revealed that by mid-1986 
Roche regarded Versed as three to four times as potent as injecta-
ble Valium. Despite this, Roche did not reduce the recommended 
doses of Versed at this early stage of the drug's marketing to 1/4 to 
1/3 of those recommended for Valium to conform to this assess-
ment of the drug's relative potency.89 In fact, members of Roche's 
sales force apparently detailed Versed to physicians as comparably 
potent to, or only slightly more potent than, Valium.90 Moreover, 
the generally recommended dose of 10 mg. of Valium translates to 
0.14 mg/kg for a 70 kg. person, which was squarely within the rec-
ommended dose range for Versed of 0.10 to 0.15 or 0.2 mg/kg that 
was in effect until mid-1987. 
That Versed was recommended for use at doses comparable to 
those of a drug of 1/4 to 1/3 its potency graphically illustrates the 
excessiveness of the conscious sedation doses at which it was origi-
nally approved. 
Versed was not only recommended for use at doses comparable 
to Valium but was also packaged in the same concentration— 
namely, 5 milligrams per milliliter. This led the prestigious medi-
cal journal, The Lancet, to note in a July 16, 1988, editorial that 
the 
. . . normal adult dose [in the United States] was therefore 
not dissimilar to that of diazepam (0.14 mg/kg), and the 
formulation was the same (5 mg/ml). The implication was 
that the drugs could be used in a similar fashion. . . .9 1 
To be certain, U.S. physicians assumed that they could use 
Versed in the same manner that they had used Valium. For exam-
ple, in informing Roche of a fatal respiratory reaction to Versed, 
one physician, after noting Versed patients in other hospitals in his 
8 8
 Dr. Robert M. Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesiology and 
Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, has advised the subcommittee staff that as 
little as 1 mg. may even be capable of inducing general anesthesia in some patients. 
8 9
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 23. After consulting anesthesiologists advised Roche represent-
atives at an October 18, 1986, that they thought Versed was 3 to 4 times as potent as Valium, 
one anesthesiologist asked, "Do they [endoscopists] know what that means to reduce the dose 
[to] one third or one quarter?" to which a Roche employee responded, "We can make it a little 
bit more clear." Hearings, Appendix I. 
9 0
 See the testimony of Dr. Michael Morrisey, Westchester Plastic Surgical Associates, Yon-
kers, New York, May 5 Hearing, galley pages 9 and 20. Dr. Robert M. Julien, staff anesthesiol-
ogist, St. Vincent Hospital, Portland, Oregon, testified before the subcommittee: "Some of my 
colleagues in other specialties such as cardiology and endoscopy, when they believed from the 
representative that the drug was equal to Valium, they were initially using doses as high as 20 
milligrams, which is way above a dose for induction of general anesthesia." May 5 Hearing, 
galley page 10. 
91
 "Midazolam—Is Antagonism Justified?", The I^ancet, July 16, 1988, page 141. 
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area "going into respiratory and cardiac arrest," observed "that be-
cause of the similarity of size and total milligrams of dosage of this 
product and Valium, physicians are prescribing this product as 
they would Valium/'9 2 Dr. Joan W. Flacke, a member of FDA's 
Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee, similarly 
remarked at the December 1, 1986, meeting of that committee that 
"people are used to using [Valium] in this concentration and now 
you [Roche] have packaged this in the same concentration."93 Ac-
knowledging Roche's concern that Versed was "being used as a 
single bolus or as rapid intraveneous administration despite what 
the package insert says," a company representative at that meet-
ing, Dr. Philip Del Vecchio, stated that 
. . . there is some indication that that may be happening. 
That may be related to the way that they are used to 
using Valium. I think it has been more common to use 
Valium more rapidly for that titration.94 
Several weeks earlier, at an October 18, 1986, meeting with con-
sulting anesthesiologists, a Roche official acknowledged that endos-
copists were using Versed as if it were Valium, and, as a result "we 
are getting into trouble."95 
This, as Dr. Laurence R. Dry, editor and publisher, Attorney's 
Medical Advisory Letter, wrote in October 1986, before FDA or 
Hoffmann-La Roche had publicized the drug's association with life-
threatening cases of respiratory arrest, was a prescription for disas-
ter: 
[Midazolam is 3 to 4 times as potent as Valium but is 
marketed in the same dilution, 5 mg/ml. This means that 
each 5 mg. of midazolam is equivalent to 15-20 mg. of 
Valium and physicians used to using Valium may easily 
overdose patients with the newer drug. . . . The packaging 
of the drug in 10 mg. ampules and syringes (equivalent of 
30-40 mg. of Valium) by its manufacturer, Roche, was a 
gross error.96 
9 2
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 17. 
9 3
 See page 1-77 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
94
 See page 1-69 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
9 5
 That official acknowledged that "we're finding that what they're [i.e., endoscopists] doing 
is . . . trying to mimic their use of Versed as they had with injectable Valium and we re get-
ting into trouble." May 5 Hearing, galley page 18. Another company official noted that "one of 
the things that I just communicated to the sales force [is] that everybody is into the Valium 
routine.' The transcript of the October 18, 1986, meeting is in Hearings, Appendix I. 
When Roche launched Versed, a company told several anesthesiologists on Roche's advisory 
board on Versed at that October 18, 1986, meeting that 
. . . [o]ne of the foremost things in the back of our mind was that we knew that we had 
to get the product |Versed] on board and into your [i.e., anesthesiologists'] hands before 
generic diazepam [i.e., Valium] became a stronghold. 
After hearing a tape recording of this statement, some witnesses appearing before the subcom-
mittee speculated that Roche marketed Versed in a manner that minimized differences in pack-
aging and dosing from Valium so as to ease physician conversion from Valium—a familiar drug 
that had recently gone off patent—to Versed. See the testimony of Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, Direc-
tor, Public Citizen Health Research Group, May f> Hearing, galley page 19; Dr. Michael Morri-
sey, Westchester Plastic Surgical Associates, Yonkers, New York, Ibid. Dr. Douglas C. Walta, 
the Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hospital, Portland, Oregon, testified that if the com-
pany had admitted how potent Versed was, the drug would have presented such a thin safety 
margin that he would not have converted to it. May 5 Hearing, galley pages 27-8. 
9 8
 He wrote this in the October 1986 issue of the Attorney's Medical Advisory letter. May 5 
Hearing, galley page 17. 
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Versed, Dr. Dry concluded, is "a very dangerous drug if improp-
erly used and improper use is openly invited with current packag-
ing/ ' 9 7 The "errors" made by Roche, Dr. Dry presciently predicted, 
"will cost some lives before packaging of the drug is corrected" 
since "no warning in the package insert can be deemed sufficient 
to counteract the disasters invited by current packaging of the 
drug."98 
1. The Importance of Reliable Total Dosage Recommendations 
Roche has argued that package insert instructions for individual-
ized titration to desired sedation levels, not labeled total dosage 
ranges, should govern proper dosing.99 
The pharmacological properties of Versed, however, have often 
prevented physicians, particularly non-anesthesiologists, from rec-
ognizing when patients given Versed are already amply sedated 
and should not be administered additional doses of the drug. These 
aspects of Versed's action make it imperative that the drug's pack-
age insert recommend use of the lowest total doses at which Versed 
has been generally found to be effective. 
As one of Roche's consulting anesthesiologists, Dr. Ronald Miller 
of the University of California at San Francisco, has observed, a 
Versed patient can be moving yet be heavily sedated and "one trap 
a person unaware of [Versed's] pharmacologic properties can fall 
into is not recognizing that" such a patient can be undergoing 
"severe respiratory depression."100 "If one keeps giving more mi-
dazolam until the patient does not move or complain," Dr. Miller 
added, "respiratory depression will ensue, especially if midazolam 
is combined with a narcotic."101 Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Profes-
sor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical School, concurred with this as-
sessment, noting during his appearance before the subcommittee 
that in clinical practice, the failure to differentiate between insuffi-
cient and excess sedation among patients receiving Versed could 
prove dangerous: 
Many times when people are hypoxic or not receiving 
enough oxygen to their brain, they become agitated. Abso-
97
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 17. Dr. Dry elaborated before the subcommittee: 
Versed was packaged as though it was Valium and it isn't. It's three to four times as 
strong. When an endoscopist, who is basically unfamiliar with the drug but who has 
been told it's the greatest thing s'ince white rice decides to use the drug, he is going to 
look at the package insert, he's going to look at the size of the ampule. . . The typical 
modus is to assume that the proper dose is a vial or a predrawn syringe. That's why 1 
said that the packaging invited disaster. It invites you to use one ampule, which is a 
whopping dose for most people. 
May 5 Hearing, galley page 18. 
Dr. Douglas Walta, the Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hospital, Portland, Oregon, 
presented similar testimony to the subcommittee: "[0]ne point is the way the dosage vial comes 
out, in Valium it came out 10 milligrams in one vial. You draw up the 10 milligrams in a 
syringe, and that's usually the standard dose. When Versed came out, it came in a 10 milligram 
per vial or syringe. You drew it up in the syringe, 10 milligrams. That is a huge dose now, in 
retrospect." May 5 Hearing, galley pages 10-11. 
9 8
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 22. 
9 9
 See its April 25, 1988, letter to FDA in response to the Public Citizen Health Research 
Group petition of February 12, 1988, Hearings, Appendix 1. 
ioo May 5 Hearing, galley page 29. 
101
 See Miller, "Midazolam in Plastic Surgery." in Midazolam in Clinical Anesthesiology, ed. 
by Epstein and Reves, page 12, 1987, in Hearings, Appendix I. 
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lutely, at that time, the wrong thing to do is to inject them 
with more drug.102 
Dr. Lisbon further testified that a recently published s tudy 1 0 3 
indicated that use of Versed may obscure serious losses of oxygen 
because it suppresses some of the clinical responses such as in-
creased breathing that normally signal such trouble.104 
Prudent, scientifically supportable total dosage recommenda-
tions, Dr. Lisbon testified, are important in minimizing the risk 
that physicians unaware of Versed's pharmacological dynamics will 
inadvertently oversedate their patients.105 
Clearly, labeling instructions to titrate Versed to desired seda-
tion levels cannot substitute for total dosage recommendations that 
are scientifically demonstrated to be excessive. 
Moreover, originally recommended total doses, as well as subse-
quent reductions in such doses, were presumably inserted into the 
Versed labeling for a purpose—namely, to provide guidance to the 
practitioner. Even Roche acknowledged that "[d]rug labeling gener-
ally provides a dosage range to guide the physician as to how much 
drug might be needed during the procedure." 106 It is contradictory 
to disclaim the importance of specific total dosage information that 
has consistently comprised an integral part of the drug's labeling. 
That Versed should be individually titrated to a particular end-
point need not detract from the desirability of providing guidance 
as to a typically appropriate total dose range. As Dr. Sidney Wolfe, 
Director, Public Citizen Health Research Group, testified, 
. . . to omit the importance or underemphasize the impor-
tance of the range where you are supposed to get going as 
opposed to the titrating kind of thing, it's just misleading. 
People need as much information as possible.107 
The labeling for Versed has steadily advised titration to the clini-
cal endpoint of slurred speech. According to Dr. Alan Libson, As-
102
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 29. One published study similarly observed: 
In addition, we were impressed by the close temporal relationship between the onset 
of gagging, coughing/choking and a fall in oxygen saturation. It would be tempting to 
administer further intravenous sedation to such patients, thereby further depressing 
ventilation, with potentially disastrous consequences. 
Bell, Reeve, Moshiri, Morden, Coady, Stapleten & Logan, "Intravenous midazolam: A study of 
the degree of oxygen desaturation occurring during upper gastrointestinal endoscopy," British 
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 23: 703, June 1987. 
103See Alexander and Gross, ''Sedative Doses of Midazolam Depress Hypoxic Ventilatory Re-
sponses in Human," Anesthesia and Analgesia, 67: 377, February 1988, which is in Hearings, 
Appendix I. 
104
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 29. He testified that 
. . . if you make some people hypoxic or you deprive them of oxygen, then there are 
various physiological responses that people have. A drug like midazolam—and there are 
papers that show this particularly about midazolam—blunts these kind of responses 
that people in endoscopy for example, are used to looking for. When most people 
become hypoxic or they are deprived of oxygen, their pulse rate goes up. There are 
studies in the literature that show if you have given these people midazolam, then their 
pulse rates don't go up, as you would expect them to do. 
May f> Hearing, galley page 22. 
105
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 29. In this connection, he testified that the likelihood that 
many physicians, particularly endoscopists, administering Versed will not realize that their pa-
tients are already sedated and do not need more of the drug enhances the importance of recom-
mending the lowest effective doses. Ibid. 
106
 See Roche's April 25, 1988, letter to FDA in response to the February 12, 1988, petition 
concerning Versed from the Public Citizen Health Research Group, Hearings, Appendix I. 
107
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 32. 
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sistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard Medical School, this 
advice is "foolhardy," because at this endpoint, 
. . . there will be a significant amount of respiratory de-
pression and the patient may lose their ability to protect 
their airway. I think that even those recommendations are 
excessive.108 
Even an anesthesiologist on Roche's advisory board for Versed, Dr. 
Ronald Miller of the University of California at San Francisco, has 
expressed the opinion that "it seems better not to reach the point 
of slurred speech, but merely to take the edge off precise 
speech." I 0 9 
To the extent that slurred speech may have been an inappropri-
ate clinical endpoint, the committee believes it was particularly im-
portant that physicians were not misled by recommended total 
doses shown to be excessive in well-controlled scientific studies. 
2. The Role of Medical Mismanagement in Assessing the Safety of 
Versed 
In a May 6, 1988, letter to the subcommittee, Dr. Donald R. 
Stanski, Associate Professor of Anesthesia and Medicine at the 
Stanford University School of Medicine, echoed a theme that per-
meates FDA's post-market consideration of the safety of Versed— 
namely, that physicians failing to recognize and treat respiratory 
depression, not Versed, were responsible for subsequent respiratory 
arrest and death. 1 1 0 T o b e certain, many Versed-associated deaths 
appear to have resulted, at least in part, from medical mismanage-
ment of patients experiencing life-threatening respiratory depres-
sion. As Dr. Laurence Dry, editor and publisher, Attorney's Medical 
Advisory Letter, has noted, 
Supportive treatment is required until the drug is 
"worn-off'—the patient's airway must be controlled and 
his ventilation assisted. This is particularly important 
when the drug is given in the endoscopy suite for bron-
choscopy or gastroscopy. Here, . . . monitoring equipment 
is not frequently used, and abilities of personnel to recog-
nize respiratory depression and treat it may not be suffi-
cient. 111 
By the nature of their tasks, endoscopists must concentrate on 
performing the endoscopy rather than observing the patient. Anes-
thesiologists, who focus their full attention on monitoring patient 
response to drugs like Versed 112 and are often more cautious in 
108 May 5 Hearing, galley page 28. 
109
 He wrote this in a paper presented at a February 1986 Roche-sponsored conference in 
Phoenix. May 5 Hearing, galley page 28. 
1 , 0
 Records furnished to the subcommittee following its May 1988 hearings on Versed indicate 
that Dr. Stanski was at the time he wrote this letter a paid consultant to FDA. FDA reimbursed 
Dr. Stanski and a colleague for a three-day stay in the Washington, D C. area. Dr. Stanski also 
received an honorarium for presenting a seminar to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search scientific staff on "Pharmacokinetics of "Versed" in the Elderly. 
1 !
' See the October 1986 issue of the Attorneys Medical Advisory Letter, in Hearings, Appen-
dix I. In fact, as Dr. Dry testified before the subcommittee, in endoscopy settings "lt]he people 
that are giving the drug are typically not physicians. They are either untrained technicians or 
nurses." May 5 Hearing, galley page 22. 
112
 One anesthesiologist advised Roche representatives at an October 18, 1986, meeting: 
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administering such drugs 1 1 3 and more experienced in dealing with 
respiratory depression,114 are rarely present during such proce-
dures. 
That death and other severely adverse outcomes may ultimately 
result from inadequate recognition and treatment of respiratory 
distress, however, certainly does not justify excessive dosage recom-
mendations that may have unnecessarily contributed to such dis-
tress in the first instance. To the contrary, the failure of some en-
doscopists to administer Versed properly or to recognize and ade-
quately treat patients experiencing respiratory depression en-
hances rather than diminishes the case for recommended doses 
that are not excessive. Endoscopists, if anything, need a drug with 
a wide margin between effective and toxic doses. 
Patient mismanagement after drug-induced respiratory depres-
sion occurs, while it may have contributed to an adverse outcome, 
does not exonerate the drug as the initial cause of the toxic reac-
tion. To the extent that patient monitoring capabilities are known 
to be inadequate in endoscopy settings, the committee believes that 
problems with an exceptionally potent drug such as Versed were 
foreseeable. 
At the December 1, 1986, meeting of FDA's Anesthetic and Life 
Support Drugs Advisory Committee, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA' s 
medical reviewer for Versed, stated that practitioners "may have 
used diazepam without the same sort of problems that they are get-
ting into with midazolam." 1 1 5 That Versed is capable of inducing 
serious, even life-threatening respiratory depression at substantial-
ly lower doses than Valium may be germain to evaluating the 
safety of its use in the endoscopy setting. 
The committee notes, in fact, that the Public Citizen Health Re-
search Group has petitioned FDA to contraindicate Versed's use 
for conscious sedation precisely because of the increased likelihood 
. . . [Wje're monitoring the hell out of the patients now, particularly the elderly pa-
tients and the patients with conscious sedation who are having regional anesthesia, and 
we're seeing with pulse oximeters fairly major drops in oxygen saturation . . . and it's 
as far as I can tell, it was rectified with some oxygenation, but you can't get the endos-
copists to do anything like that. 
See the transcript of this meeting, Hearings, Appendix I. 
1 , 3
 At an October 18, 1986, meeting with consulting anesthesiologists, a Roche representative 
stated that "[ojur problem is with the endoscopists. . . . jbjecause what's happening out there is 
they seem to be giving too much too quickly." In response, one of the consulting anesthesiol-
ogists observed that "anesthesiologists are used to titrating drugs, and the endoscopists get fixed 
combinations." Another anesthesiologist noted that "their [endoscopists') problem with overseda-
tion" is "probably mostly due to the lack of patience on their part in waiting for the desired 
effect to take place." Along similar lines, another anesthesiologist advised Roche representatives 
at this meeting that: 
. . . the endoscopists that I've spoke to that were going back to Valium have said that 
they're happy with Valium. What the hell do they need this drug for? . . . [I)f you want 
to take the time to inject the dose in a proper manner which we can give you a formula 
for, then they want to know why they should bother. 
The transcript of the October 18, 1986, meeting appears in Hearings Appendix I. 
114
 Anesthesiologists are more accustomed to dealing with respiratory depression, inasmuch 
as they seek to produce underventilation when they use larger doses of a drug like Versed to 
induce general anesthesia. By contrast, endoscopists would view respiratory depression as an un-
toward side effect of such a drug. See the June 1, 1988, letter to Rep. Jim Lightfoot from Dr. 
Stanley B. Benjamin, Chief, Division of Gastroenterology, Department of Medicine, Georgetown 
University Hospital, in Hearings, Appendix II. 
115
 See the verbatim transcript of that meeting, page I 63, in subcommittee files. At that 
same meeting, Dr. Philip Del Vecchio of Hoffmann-La Roche stated "In regard to Valium, I 
don't have the details on when Valium was first marketed intravenously but I know that the 
reports were much less than this." Ibid, page 1-74. 
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of patient mismanagement in this setting. Similarly, several wit-
nesses appearing before the subcommittee testified that use of 
Versed had been limited to anesthesiologists in their institu-
tions,116 a circumstance that generally all but precludes the drug's 
use for endoscopies.117 France, in fact, has limited promotion and 
use of the drug to anesthesiologists.l *8 While the committee takes 
no position on the safety of Versed for use by non-anesthesiologists, 
it believes that the likelihood of medical mismanagement cannot be 
divorced from the question of whether the drug is appropriately in-
dicated for this purpose. 
C. FDA WAS U N A W A R E OF STUDIES DEMONSTRATING THE EFFICACY OF 
VERSED AT DOSES LOWER THAN IT ORIGINALLY APPROVED 
Some of the previously discussed studies suggesting the efficacy 
of Versed at total doses as low as 0.07 mg/kg were completed prior 
to the December 16, 1982, submission of the Versed NDA. For ex-
ample, a paper on the study by Whitwam et al. was presented at a 
March 1982 meeting of the British Society of Gastroenterolo-
gists.119 
However, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for 
Versed, testified before the subcommittee that he "did not see any 
mention'' made of these lower, effective doses for conscious seda-
tion in the NDA that Roche submitted to FDA on December 15, 
1982.120 Nor did FDA review any of these studies prior to approv-
ing Versed in December 1985.121 In fact, neither Dr. Scally 1 2 2 nor 
116
 Dr. Douglas C. Walta, Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hospital, Portland, Oregon, 
testified that "[i]n our facility, Versed is used only by the anesthesiologist." May 5 Hearing, 
galley page 7. Dr. Michael Morrisey, Westchester Plastic Surgical Associates, Yonkers, New 
York, similarity testified that Versed is used only by anesthesiologists in the three hospitals in 
which he works. May 5 Hearing, galley page 8. Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthe-
sia, Harvard Medical School, and Co-Chairman, Respiratory-Surgical Intensive Care Unit, Beth 
Israel Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, testified that with very few exceptions endoscopists at 
Beth Israel do not use Versed. May 5 Hearing, galley page 23. 
1 , 7
 Dr. Robert Julien, staff anesthesiologist, St. Vincent Hospital, Portland, Oregon, remarked 
before the subcommittee that the U.S. lacks the manpower and funding through Medicare and 
other sources to support use of anesthesiologists in endoscopies. May 5 Hearing, galley page 23. 
1 1 8
 On July 7, 1987, based on worldwide reports of respiratory insufficiency, France recom-
mended that Versed only be administered by anesthesiologists and, since then, Roche has limit-
ed promotion of the drug in France to anesthesiologists. May 10 Hearing, galley page 28. Since 
Roche did not report these developments to FDA, FDA did not find out about them until it re-
ceived a December 18, 1987, letter from the French regulatory authority. May 10 Hearing, 
galley page 28. 
1
 *
9
 May 10 Hearing, galley pages 4-5. 
1 2 0
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 5. 
121
 See the testimony of Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, Ibid. 
122
 May 10 Hearing, galley pages 5-6. As late as the December 1, 1986, meeting of FDA's An-
esthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee meeting on Versed, Dr. Scally did not 
question the recommendation that Versed be administered at doses comparable to those recom-
mended for Valium, noting that in the Valium vs. Versed studies, the "dosage came out the 
same." See page 1-81 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
In a June 23, 1988, memorandum, which is in subcommittee files, Dr. Scally, acknowledging 
that the "amount of drug initially prepared now seems large," wrote: 
[T]he preparation of equal doses of midazolam and diazepam could have affected 
dosage results by suggesting to the persons administering the drugs that the dose of 
midazolam would be close to the dose of diazepam, then a more familiar drug. . . . 
During clinical investigation of i.v. midazolam and diazepam for the production of con-
scious sedation, the ratio of the mean midazolam/mean diazepam dose varied between 
0.757 (75.7%) and 0.897 (89.7%), depending on the age group selected and whether or 
not the protocol included use of a narcotic. This would suggest that the average dose of 
midazolam would be approximately 4/5 the customary dose of diazepam. I hope that my 
retrospective analysis includes valid reasons why this ratio may not be correct. 
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any FDA representative appearing before the subcommittee on 
May 10, 1988, was aware of any of these studies prior to FDA ap-
proval.123 
1. FDA Did Not Familiarize Itself With Important Papers in the 
World Literature Prior To Approving Versed 
That FDA did not know about several studies suggesting that the 
originally approved conscious sedation dose range of 0.1 to 0.2 mg/ 
kg for Versed was too high evidences the agency's lack of aware-
ness of important papers on Versed in the world literature. 
The subcommittee's investigation also revealed that a Swedish 
gastroscopy study published by Berggren et al. in Britain in April 
1983, more than two years before Versed was approved for U.S. mar-
keting, suggested that Versed was S times as potent as Valium.124 
Accordingly, the Versed dose used was three times smaller than the 
Valium dose to which it was compared; the study generally con-
trasted 0.05 mg/kg of Versed with .15 mg/kg of Valium and found 
them both to produce adequate sedation.125 
Roche did not submit the Berggren study to FDA 126 and only 
first mentioned its existence in an April 25, 1988, submission to the 
agency, and when FDA approved Versed for conscious sedation at 
0.1 to 0.2 mg/kg, FDA was not aware that the drug could be consid-
ered three to four times as potent as injectable Valium. Indeed, as 
earlier discussed, the doses it originally sanctioned for the drug as-
sumed that it was of comparable potency to Valium. In fact, as late 
as the subcommittee's May 10, 1988, hearing, FDA witnesses testi-
fied that they were not familiar with the Berggren study.127 
This is not the first case in which the committee has found FDA 
uninformed about major papers in the published medical litera-
ture. For example, last year we concluded that FDA's regulation of 
the antidepressant, Merital (nomifensive maleate), did not reflect 
review of important articles in the world literature and, according-
ly, we recommended that FDA adopt measures to ensure "timely 
receipt and review of all important publications in the world litera-
ture pertinent to evaluating the safety and efficacy of a new drug 
under review." 1 2 8 The committee further recommended that FDA, 
prior to approving a new drug, "require its scientists to review" a 
compilation of the world literature concerning that drug provided 
by the computerized Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval 
System (MEDLARS) maintained by the National Library of Medi-
123 May 10 Hearing, galley pages 5-6. 124
 May 10 Hearing, galley pages 24-5. See Berggren, Eriksson, Mollenholt and Wickbom, "Se-
dation for Fibreopiic Gastroscopy: A Comparative Study of Midazolam and Diazepam," British 
Journal of Anaesthesia, 55: 289, April 1983, which is in Hearings, Appendix I. A previous pilot 
study discussed in this paper yielded that conclusion. In an April 25, 1988, submission to FDA, 
Roche cited a 1982 publication for what appears to be the same work of Berggren et al. May 10 
Hearing, galley page 25. 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 See Roche's August 12, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. FDA has 
advised the subcommittee that "(wje have no record of the Berggren study being submitted to 
the Food and Drug Administration." Hearings, Appendix I. 
127
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 25. 
128 M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 6. 
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cine.129 To date, FDA has failed to implement this recommenda-
tion.130 
During his appearance before the subcommittee, the Director of 
FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Dr. Carl Peck, 
when asked what steps FDA had taken to adopt committee recom-
mendations aimed at ensuring agency review of important publica-
tions in the medical literature, testified that in 1985 FDA promul-
gated new regulations requiring a "brief description of the market-
ing history" of any new drug covered by "any NDA submitted after 
that date." 131 Nothing in this regulation, however, guarantees 
agency review of all important publications regarding such a drug. 
Yet, Dr. Peck acknowledged to the subcommittee that "[w]e should 
be aware of and we should be in a position to take into account 
information available in the world literature on the subject 
drug." 1 3 2 The committee agrees, and hopes that FDA will take 
steps to obtain and review all publications in the world literature 
that are relevant to a responsible assessment of the conditions 
under which a new drug may be safely and effectively used. 
2. FDA Did Not Review All Significant Information in Its Files 
Concerning Versed Prior To Approving the Drug 
Some of the previously discussed lower dose studies concerning 
Versed had actually been reported to the agency. For example, the 
manuscript of the study by Al-Khudhairi et al. that was published 
in October 1982 was submitted to the Versed IND on August 19, 
1983.133 Similarly, a manuscript of the study by Whitwam et al. 
was reported to the Versed IND on August 24, 1984.134 
That FDA approved Versed without knowing about such studies 
indicates that the agency was oblivious to information that had 
been reported to the Versed IND. In 1983, the committee likewise 
found that FDA approved the anti-arthritis drug, Oraflex (benoxa-
profen), in ignorance of relevant safety information that had been 
reported to the Oraflex IND. The committee recommended that, 
prior to approving a new drug, FDA establish procedures to ensure 
review of all files that might contain potentially important infor-
mation concerning it.135 
None of the previously discussed lower dose studies, including 
those reported to the Versed IND, was ever submitted to the 
Versed NDA file.136 Yet, as FDA medical reviewer, Dr. David 
Scally, testified, once an NDA is filed, most agency attention is fo-
cused on the NDA rather than its companion IND file.137 In view 
1 , 2 9 See FDA s Regulation of the New Drug Merital, H. Rep. 100-206, Fifteenth Report by the 
Committee on Government Operations, July 8, 1987, page 94. 
1 3 0
 Ibid, pace 41. 
131
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 6. 
132
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 7. 
1 3 3
 On August 19, 1983, Roche included a January 19, 1982, manuscript of this study in an 
annual report to the Versed IND. May 10 Hearing, galley page 4. 
134
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 4. Roche included a manuscript of this study in an annual 
report to the Versed IND. Ibid. 
135
 See Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug "Oraflex", House Rep. No. 98-511, 
Fourteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Novem-
ber 9, 1983, page 8. 
136 M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 4. 137
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 4. Similarly, FDA testified before the subcommittee in 1982: 
"After the NDA is filed, the primary attention of the reviewers is on the NDA and not the IND. 
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of this state of affairs, the committee believes that consideration 
should be given to consolidating the NDA and IND files for all in-
formation submitted to the agency in connection with the safety 
and efficacy of a new drug for which a new drug application has 
been submitted. 
At the very least, as subcommittee Chairman Weiss noted, it 
makes sense to "have someone looking at the IND submissions as 
well to evaluate their impact on the decisions being made," an ob-
servation with which Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research, agreed.138 Should FDA continue to 
permit sponsors to submit potentially important information re-
garding a new drug under NDA review only to the companion IND 
file for the drug, the committee believes that the agency should 
take steps to assure a thorough examination of all IND submissions 
that might contain such information. 
D. FDA WAS NOT AWARE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH VERSED WAS 
REGULATED IN FOREIGN NATIONS 
1. Foreign Ixibeling 
FDA officials learned for the first time at the subcommittee's 
May 10, 1988, hearing that United Kingdom regulatory authorities 
relied on eventually published studies in approving conscious seda-
tion doses for the drug. 1 3 9 In this connection, on April 20, 1988, 
Professor J. G. Whitwam of the Royal Postgraduate Medical School 
in London informed the subcommittee staff that the U.K. Commit-
tee on Safety of Medicines primarily drew from his and his col-
leagues' work 1 4 0 and investigations by the Queens University of 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, for the conscious sedation doses that 
were recommended in the British labeling.141 In an April 28, 1988, 
telephone conversation with the subcommittee staff, Professor J. 
W. Dundee of the Department of Anesthetics, the Queens Universi-
ty of Belfast, Northern Ireland, confirmed this.142 At the time of 
U.K. approval of Versed, Professor Dundee reviewed anesthetic 
and sedative drugs for the Committee on Safety of Medicines, the 
U K ' s FDA equivalent.143 
That is the primary document." See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, "The Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration: The 
New Drug Review Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, page 120. 
138 fyjav 1() Hearing, galley page 8. 139
 See the testimony of Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, May 10 
Hearing, galley page 5. 
M O The study by Whitwam et al., supra, published in August 1983 was actually completed 
before Versed was marketed in the United Kingdom in January 1983. May 10 Hearing, galley 
pages 4-5. Dr. Whitwam was also one of the co-authors of the study by Al Khudhairi, et al. 
published in October 1982. 
In an April 29, 1988, letter to the subcommittee, Dr. Whitwam, referring to these two studies, 
stated that they constituted "the data from which formed a substantial part of the submission to 
the Committee on the Safety of Medicines in the U.K." In subcommittee files. 
141
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 5. 
142
 Ibid. In an October 1984 review article, Dr. Dundee summarized previously conducted 
studies and concluded: "Dosage should be titrated according to patient response; but as a guide, 
midazolam 0.07 to 0.1 mg/kg is usually given for intravenous sedation . . ." Dundee, et al. "Mi-
dazolam: A Review of its Pharmacological Properties and Therapeutic Use," Drugs, 28: 519, 
1984. 
143
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 5. 
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Months after the subcommittee's hearings, Hoffmann-La Roche 
itself confirmed that four studies involving Whitwam,144 
Dundee,145 and their respective associates were among the 14 
study report summaries submitted to British regulatory authorities 
for U.K. marketing approval.146 Also included among these sum-
maries were reports on other sedation studies demonstrating the 
efficacy of Versed at doses less than 0.1 mg/kg.147 
Consistent with the clinical findings of studies conducted prior to 
the U.K. approval of Versed, the original British labeling for the 
drug dated December 1982 stated: "As a guide, 0.07 mg/kg body-
weight has been shown to be adequate in most cases." 1 4 8 (Empha-
sis supplied.) The committee finds it remarkable that it was not 
until November 1987—almost five years later and two years after 
Versed was approved for U.S. marketing that the generally recom-
mended conscious sedation dose in the U.S. package insert was re-
duced to approximately this level. 
Unbeknownst to FDA, the Swedish study by Berggren et al. that 
was published in the British literature in April 1983 suggested that 
a Versed dose as low as 0.05 mg/kg could be adequate for conscious 
sedation.149 Perhaps not coincidentally, at least five countries— 
Switzerland,150 West Germany,151 Sweden,152 Norway,153 and the 
Netherlands 154—had approved Versed for conscious sedation at a 
recommended dosage range of 0.05 to 0.10 mg/kg well before FDA 
approval. The West German label even warned that "doses higher 
than 0.1 mg/kg of body weight may produce oversedation. . . .' 1 5 5 
144
 Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, stated that 
the following two study reports were included in the British marketing application as summa-
ries: Al-Khudhairi, Whitwam, and McCloy, "Midazolam and Diazepam for Gastroscopy," supra; 
and Whitwam, Al-Khudhairi, and McCloy, "Comparison of Midazolam and Diazepam in Doses of 
Comparable Potency During Gastroscopy," supra. 
1 4 5
 In an August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, Roche stated 
that the following studies were included in the British marketing application as summaries: 
Kawar, Porter, Hunter, McLaughlin, Dundee, and Brophy, "Midazolam for upper gastrointesti-
nal endoscopy," supra; Dundee, Kawar, Gamble and Brophy, "Midazolam as a Sedative in En-
doscopy," supra. 
146
 In a June 2, 1988, letter to Roche, which is in subcommittee files, Dr. Philip G. Walters, 
Acting Director, Division of Surgical-Dental Drug Products, Office of Drug Evaluation 1, request 
ed reports of studies "submitted to the regulatory agency in England to support approval of mi-
dazolam for conscious sedation." Roche responded with an August 31, 1988, submission, which is 
in subcommittee files. 
147
 See, for example, a gastroscopy study by B.L. Dowling at a mean dose of 0.076 of Versed, 
and a cardiac catherisation study by G. Hendrix at a mean dose of 0.06 mg/kg of Versed. These 
studies are summarized in Roches August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommit-
tee files. The work of Hendrix was eventually published. See Hendrix and Usher, "A comparison 
of midazolam and diazepam for sedation during cardiac catheterization." Clin. Res. Abs., 31: 
706A, 1983. 
1 4 8
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 9. 
1 4 9
 See Berggren et al., supra. 
iso May 10 Hearing, galley page 9. 
151
 Ibid. 
152
 Ibid. 
1 5 3
 See Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. In a Sep-
tember 30, 1986, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, Roche stated that Versed 
was initially marketed in Norway on May 1, 1985. 
154
 See Roche's August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files. In a Sep-
tember 30, 1986, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, Roche stated that Versed 
was initially marketed in the Netherlands on August 1, 1984. 
IAS May 10 Hearing, galley page 9. Such a warning was consistent with the October 1982 gas-
troscopy study published by Al Khudhairi et al. in which 0 1 mg/kg of Versed had proven exces-
sive for four patients from whom cooperation was lost for a period See Al-Khudhairi et al., 
supra. 
In an unpublished Roche internal research report dated December 16, 1982, entitled, "Study 
of the efficacy and safety of midazolam i.v. administered to patients undergoing bronchoscopy, ' 
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In addition, since December 1982, the British labeling prominent-
ly stated: 'THE ELDERLY ARE MORE SENSITIVE TO THE EF-
FECTS OF BENZODIAZEPINES AND IN THESE PATIENTS THE 
LOWER DOSE OF 2.5 MG. [.036 MG/KG FOR A 70 KG. PERSON] 
MAY BE ADEQUATE/'156 (Emphasis supplied.) By contrast, FDA 
originally approved labeling recommending conscious sedation 
doses from 5 to 10 mg. (or 0.07 to 0.14 mg/kg) for a 70 kg. elderly 
patient,157 two to four times higher than those recommended years 
before in the United Kingdom. 
Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, testified 
that, to his knowledge, not only did Hoffmann-La Roche fail to 
inform FDA of the lower foreign dosage recommendations before 
the drug was approved for U.S. marketing,158 but also that he did 
not know about them prior to approval.159 In fact, it was not until 
after FDA received the February 12, 1988, petition from the Public 
Citizen Health Research Group that discussed the lower Versed 
doses recommended in the United Kingdom before FDA approval 
that the agency requested from Roche all foreign labeling in effect 
for the drug.160 
Last year, the committee found that FDA had not informed itself 
of important aspects of the manner in which the antidepressant, 
Merital, had been labeled in other nations. Accordingly, we recom-
mended that the agency require all sponsors to submit to it "all la-
beling approved by foreign regulatory agencies."161 On the basis of 
Dr. R. Keller, Chief of Staff, Pneumological Department, Canton Hospital of Aarau, found that 
patients given approximately 0.1 mg/kg of Versed during a bronchoscopy developed serious res-
piratory disturbances, including acute hypoxemia and brief apnea and that "simultaneous ad-
ministration of oxygen is necessary to avoid hypoxic crises." The subcommittee staff found no 
FDA reviews of this study, which was buried in a multi-volume annual report to the Versed 
IND made on August 24, 1984. Although the study was uncontrolled and involved small num-
bers of patients, its recommendation for supplemental oxygen was reiterated years later in a 
published report that the administration of nasal oxygen prevented hypoxaemia during gastro-
intestinal endoscopy. See Bell, Bown, Morden, Coady, Logan, "Prevention of Hypoxaemia 
During Upper-Gastrointestinal Endoscopy by Means of Oxygen Via Nasal Cannulae," The 
Lancet, 1940: 1022, May 2, 1987. In the report of another study, Dr. Bell and associates wrote: 
It was of considerable concern to us that 1% of our patients desaturated to below 
80% during the endoscopic procedure, since cardiac arrhythmias are particularly liable 
to occur at times of hypoxaemia. 
Bell, Reeve, Moshiri, Morden, Coady, Stapleten & Logan, "Intravenous midazolam: A study of 
the degree of oxygen desaturation occurring during upper gastrointestinal endoscopy." British 
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 28: 708, June 1987. 
156
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 8 and Hearings, Appendix I. In fact, in 1984, Roche's U.K. 
affiliate defended a case involving Versed's use in the death of a 76-year old endoscopy patient 
who had been given 10 mg. of Versed on the grounds that 10 mg. was a "dose 4 times higher 
than the recommended dose (i.e., of 2.5 mg] recommended for a person of his age." May 10 
Hearing, galley pages 8-9. This observation, which emphasized the British labeling's 2.5 mg. 
total dosage recommendation for elderly patients, was not included when Roche reported the 
case to FDA on July 2(5, 198f>, as one line in a printout of several cases. May 10 Hearing, galley 
page 9. 
According to Roche, this recommendation was based on the "1980 policy of the U.K. Commit-
tee on the Review of Medicines that the recommended dosing instructions for any benzodiaze-
pine be reduced by 50% in elderly patients." See footnote 7 of Roche's April 25, 1988, response 
to the February 12, 1988, petition concerning Versed from the Public Citizen Health Research 
Group, Hearings, Appendix I. 
157
 These doses reflect the 80 percent reductions from suggested doses for younger, healthy 
adults that were recommended for elderly patients in the originally approved labeling for 
Versed. 
158 Mav 10 Hearing, galley page 9. 
159
 Ibid. 
l f i oIn a March 7, 1988, letter, Dr. Paula Botstein requested all such foreign labeling from 
Roche. In subcommittee files. 
161
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 9. 
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the Versed case, the committee must reiterate this recommenda-
tion. 
2. Important Foreign Regulatory Developments 
Prior to approving Versed, FDA was not informed of important 
events surrounding regulation of the drug outside the United 
States. Particularly noteworthy was the agency's lack of awareness 
of actions taken in the United Kingdom to minimize the risk of 
Versed-associated respiratory depression. 
From January 1983 until early 1985, the concentration of the in-
travenous solution of Versed permitted in the United Kingdom was 
5 milligrams per milliliter,162 the same as that originally approved 
in the United States. A letter published in the British Dental Jour-
nal in April 1984, more than 20 months before FDA approved the 
drug, stated that Versed "is at least two or three times as potent as 
[Valium] and is therefore hard to titrate against patients' response 
in such a relatively concentrated form" and should probably "be 
available in a more dilute form."163 (Emphasis supplied.) In a 
letter to the same journal the following month, another U.K. prac-
titioner similarly wrote: 
I have had some experience in the intravenous use of 
both diazepam and midazolam and there is no doubt that 
the latter is far too concentrated to allow careful titration 
against the patient. There is a real need for the manufac-
turers to present the drug in a more dilute form.164 
Responding to the first letter discussed in the previous para-
graph, the head of medical affairs of Roches U.K. affiliate ac-
knowledged in May 1984, more than 1V2 years before FDA approval, 
that with Versed "it need not be difficult to oversedate the pa-
tient" and that Roche was "looking to see whether further benefits 
could ensue from a more dilute solution being made available" in 
the United Kingdom.165 
On February 4, 1985, several months before FDA approval of 
Versed, a more dilute 10 milligram per 5 milliliter solution was in-
troduced in the U.K.166 This represented a reduction in concentra-
162 M a y 10 Hearing, galley pages 25-6. At the time. Versed was marketed in the U.K. as a 10 
mg/2 ml solution, which was the same as that approved in the U.S. This concentration trans-
lates to 5 mg. of drug for each ml. of solution. 
lea May 10 Hearing, galley page 25. C. M. Hill wrote this in the April 7, 1984, British Dental 
Journal. 
Roche submitted this published letter to FDA on August 15, 1986, almost eight months after 
approval, as part of an annual report to the Versed IND. FDA was apparently unaware of this 
letter prior to approving Versed. FDA's medical officer for Versed, Dr. David L. Scally, testified 
at the subcommittee's May 10, 1988, hearing that he only "(rjecently" learned of this letter. May 
10 Hearing, galley page 25. 
164
 See the letter by B. Royston Sillers in the May 19, 1984, British Dental Journal, May 10 
Hearing, galley page 25 and Hearings, Appendix I. Another letter to the British Dental Journal 
appearing the following year similarly stated. 
Because midazolam exhibits such high potency when it is administered intravenously, 
it is necessary to titrate small incremental doses of 0.5 mg against the clinical response 
obtained in the patient. Such amounts are difficult to dispense accurately from a 2 ml 
solution containing 10 mg midazolam. 
See Harris, "Midazolam in Dentistry," British Dental Journal, 158: 158, 1985. 
185
 May 10, Hearing, galley page 26. P A. Harris, head of medical affairs, Roche Products 
Ltd., wrote this in the May 19, 1984, issue of the British Dental Journal. 
lee May 10 hearing, galley page 26. 
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tion from 5 mg. of drug in 1 ml. of solution to 2 mg. of drug in 1 
ml. of solution. 
Around this time, the U.K. regulatory authority circulated to 
physicians throughout the United Kingdom a publication "alerting 
them to the problems which had been reported of respiratory de-
pression with this drug/ ' 1 6 7 After discussing seven reports of respi-
ratory depression, including two deaths, the publication concluded: 
An additional preparation of [Versed], containing 10 mg 
in 5 mil., is to be made available to enable easier individ-
ual titration of dosages. . . . It is hoped that [this measure] 
will prevent further cases of respiratory depression with 
this drug. . . . 1 6 8 (Emphasis supplied.) 
Roche did not report this publication to FDA prior to the drug's 
approval,169 or, for that matter, that the concentration of the drug 
had been reduced in the United Kingdom in order to minimize the 
risk of oversedation and serious respiratory depression.170 Nor did 
FDA learn that years before Versed was approved, prominent 
American anesthesiologists advising Roche, including several 
Versed clinical investigators, urged the company to market a more 
dilute solution to protect against oversedation, particularly by en-
doscopists unable to dilute it.171 
Not surprisingly, prior to approving Versed, FDA did not learn 
of the changes made in the concentration of the intravenous solu-
tion of the drug in the United Kingdom. In fact, during his appear-
ance before the subcommittee, FDA medical officer, Dr. David 
Scally, testified that he still did not know when a more dilute solu-
tion became available in the United Kingdom.172 
Judging from the post-market history of Versed in the United 
States, FDA would clearly have benefited from pre-approval knowl-
edge of events surrounding changes in the drug's concentration in 
the U.K., since once Versed was introduced to the American 
market, U.S. physicians experienced the same difficulties in titrat-
ing the drug and its highly concentrated, 5 mg/ml. solution as did 
their British counterparts prior to February 1985. At a December 
1, 1986, meeting of FDA's Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advi-
sory Committee, for example, a Roche official acknowledged that 
physicians had been complaining that they "had difficulty titrat-
167
 The February 1985 issue of Current Problems is discussed in the May 10 Hearing, galley 
page 26. 
168
 Ibid. 
169 prjA has advised the subcommittee that "|w)e have no record of a United Kingdom regula-
tory publication being submitted to the Food and Drug Administration." Hearings, Appendix I. 
In fact, FDA did not learn of this publication until it received a copy of it in a July 28, 1986, 
letter from the United Kingdom's Department of Health and Social Security, months after the 
drug was approved and attention had been focused on Versed-associated respiratory depression 
in the United States. Ibid. 
170
 See the testimony of FDA medical officer, Dr. David L. Scally, May 10 Hearing, galley 
page 27. 
171
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 27. According to a Roche tape of an October 18, 1986, meet-
ing of several anesthesiologists on Roche's advisory board for Versed, Dr. Paul White of Stan-
ford Medical School, a board member and Versed clinical investigator, stated: "They [endosco-
pists] are given 5 mg. These guys can't dilute it. We [anesthesiologists] have a bag of fluid. We 
just reach up and draw it up on a syringe. And that's the problem. That's why several years ago, 
Reves [J R. Reves, a Versed clinical investigator and professor of anesthesiology at Duke Uni-
versity Medical School] and half the other people here encouraged you [i.e., Roche] to come out 
with a more dilute solution In Europe they have a more dilute solution. . . . [I]t's the wrong 
concentration. . . It's not easy for them [i.e., endoscopists! to dilute it." Ibid. 
172
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 26. 
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ing" the 5 mg/ml solution of Versed.173 Similarly, Dr. Robert M. 
Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesiolo-
gy and Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, wrote 
the company on February 18, 1987: 
A typical 60 kg., elderly, debilitated patient is brought to 
the endoscopy, radiology or bronchoscopy suite after a 
small dose of narcotic premedication (a common situation). 
The dosage of 0.035 mg/kg (2.1 mg. in this patient) is re-
duced by 60%1 7 4 to give a total dose of 0.84 mg/kg. Ad-
ministered as you suggest over a 3 minute period implies a 
dose of 0.28 mg/minute. This translates to a minute 
volume injected of 0.056 cc/minute. I would state to any 
jury that 56/1,000 of a single cc1 7 5 is virtually impossible 
for any physician to accurately inject by any known 
human technology. In other words, the presentation of 
Versed is not only impractical, it is dangerous and any in-
dication on your part that drug overdosage is the sole re-
sponsibility of the physician176 is blatantly wrong. The 
dosage presentation [of 5 mg/ml] should be altered by a 
factor of five. A concentration of 1 mg/cc would greatly 
reduce the overdoses that currently occur.177 
Dr. Julien appealed to Roche's sense of "corporate responsibility" 
in urging a dilution of the solution concentration for the drug.1 7 8 
It was not until July 1987, more than two years after the concen-
tration of the intravenous solution of Versed was reduced in the 
United Kingdom that a more dilute, 1 mg/ml. solution of the drug 
was first made available to U.S. physicians.179 Thereafter, Roche 
strongly endorsed use of this concentration to minimize the likeli-
hood of oversedation. For example, in its November 1987 "Dear 
Doctor" warning letter, the company stated: "Since some patients 
may respond to as little as 1 mg, we strongly recommend the use of 
the 1 mg/mL formulation to facilitate slow titration to the desired 
endpoint of conscious sedation." 1 8 0 
1 7 3
 See page 1-77 of the verbatim transcript of that meeting, which is in subcommittee files. 
174
 The Versed package insert recommends such a reduction for patients who, in addition to 
being elderly and debilitated also receive narcotic premedication. 
175
 Dr. Julien testified that this represents "much less than a drop. . . ." May 5 Hearing, 
galley page 13. 
176
 In early 1987, more than one year after the drug was approved, Roche for the first time 
included the following statement in the Versed package insert: "For ease of titration, Versed 
may be diluted with 0.9 percent sodium chloride or 5 percent dextrose in water to two to five 
times the original volume." May .r> Hearing, galley page 21. Dr. Julien testified that this meas-
ure was 
. . . grossly inadequate, because it places the onus for drug use entirely on the physi-
cian, attempting to take it off the manufacturer. . . . In addition, many people in en-
doscopy or bronchoscopy or other nonanesthesiologists, don't have the fluids readily 
available to them to make these dilutions In addition, you then have in your work 
area, two different syringes. You have the original company syringe plus you have one 
that you have had to dilute up, and that adds an additional problem of having two dif-
ferent concentrations available for what we call syringe swaps or making a mistake and 
grabbing the wrong syringe and injecting it. 
May 5 Hearing, galley page 21. 
177
 Hearings, Appendix I. 
1 7 8
 Ibid. 
1 7 9
 FDA approved Roche's application to market this more dilute solution on May 26, 1987 
and it was launched in July 1987, according to a September 1, 1987, letter to FDA from Roche. 
May 10 Hearing, galley page 28. 
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3. Promulgating Regulations Requiring the Submission of Potential-
ly Important Information Related to Foreign Use of a New 
Drug Under FDA Review. 
On the basis of its review of FDA's regulation of the new drug 
Merital, the committee recommended last year that FDA require 
sponsors to submit information relating to the foreign marketing 
and investigation of new drugs under agency review, including, "all 
labeling approved by foreign regulatory agencies; all standardized 
warning or information letters distributed to practitioners, phar-
macists, and other health professionals in foreign nations; and ac-
counts of all important regulatory developments concerning such 
drugs in foreign countries." 181 
Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, advised the subcommittee that FDA is developing a 
"guideline" calling for drug sponsors to submit such information to 
the agency.182 If FDA agrees that it should have the information 
called for by this guideline, the committee believes the agency 
should require its receipt by regulation. 
Conceding during his appearance before the subcommittee that 
"[b]y definition, a guideline, as such, does not have the force of 
law," 1 8 3 FDA Chief Counsel Scarlett testified that violations of a 
guideline would carry penalties if they also constituted violations 
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act).184 Pursuant to the con-
gressional mandate that drug sponsors establish and maintain 
records and make such reports as the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services finds necessary, the Act authorizes the Secretary 
to promulgate "regulations," not guidelines, to enforce this man-
date.185 Mr. Scarlett acknowledged before the subcommittee that a 
violation of an interpretative guideline, unlike that of a regulation, 
does not constitute a per se legal violation. A guideline, he testi-
fied, "usually attempts to provide objective guidance in relation to 
complying with some other standard which usually does have the 
181
 See FDA 's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, supra, page 94. 
182
 Dr. Peck testified that the guideline will call for 
. . . reports obtained from foreign regulatory authorities, including reports of, or analy-
ses of, adverse effects, warning letters sent to physicians, and major changes in market-
ing status or labeling information resulting from marketing or other experience. A copy 
should be provided of any letter from a foreign regulatory body that refuses drug ap-
proval on safety grounds. . . . Important differences from proposed U.S. labeling with 
respect to contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, or dosing instruc-
tions should be emphasized. 
May 5 Hearing, galley page 49. 
i83 May JO Hearing, galley page 10. 
184
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 11. 
1 8 5
 Section 505(iK3) of the Act states that the Secretary shall "promulgate regulations" provid-
ing for "the establishment and maintenance of such records, and the making of such reports to 
the Secretary, by the manufacturer or the sponsor of the investigation of such drug, of data 
(including but not limited to analytical reports by investigators) obtained as the result of such 
investigational use of such drug, as the Secretary finds will enable him to evaluate the safety 
and effectiveness of such drug in the event of the filing o f a new drug application (NDA). (Em-
phasis supplied). Section SOfHjXl) states that the NDA holder for an approved drug shall "estab-
lish and maintain such records, and make such reports to the Secretary, of data relating to clini-
cal experience and other data or information, received or otherwise obtained by such applicant 
with respect to such drug, as the Secretary may by general regulation, or by order with respect 
to such application, prescribe on the basis of a finding that such records and reports are neces-
sary in order to enable the Secretary to determine, or facilitate a determination, whether there 
is or may be ground for invoking subsection (e) of this section . . ." (Emphasis supplied) 
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force of law, presumably the reporting requirements in the regula-
tions." 186 Thus, Mr. Scarlett acknowledged, 
. . . in order to demonstrate the violation of a regulation 
based on the violation of a guideline, the FDA might have 
to offer evidence relating the factual allegations to the reg-
ulatory standard, whereas if something is in the regula-
tion, then the agency wouldn't have to offer evidence on 
that but simply point to the regulation. If you have violat-
ed a guideline, the agency may have to offer more evi-
dence to demonstrate that you've also violated a regula-
tion.187 
The committee believes that the greater evidentiary burdens that 
would attend enforcement of a guideline would lessen the probabil-
ity of industry compliance with it. 
During his appearance before the subcommittee, Mr. Scarlett de-
fended the agency's proposed guideline approach on the grounds 
that "you don't want to overburden the regulations themselves 
with a lot of detail." 1 8 8 The committee notes, however, that, when 
deemed necessary or appropriate, agency regulations, such as those 
applicable to tests and methods of assay of antibiotic and antibiot-
ic-containing drugs,189 have been exceedingly detailed. The com-
mittee believes that the issue should turn, not on the degree of reg-
ulatory detail involved, but rather on the importance of the infor-
mation called for in furthering FDA's capacity to protect the public 
from unsafe, ineffective, or misbranded new drugs. 
Mr. Scarlett also noted in his testimony that 
. . . it is simpler for the agency to put out guidelines than 
it is to go through the fairly complicated process of putting 
together a regulation and getting that through the system. 
I think you can often get results quicker by indicating to 
the industry exactly what you want in the form of a guide-
line.190 
Because guidelines can be put into effect much more expeditious-
ly than regulations, the committee recommends that FDA issue 
guidelines that will remain in effect pending the completion of 
notice and comment rulemaking. 
E. ROCHE DID NOT MAKE TIMELY REPORTS TO FDA OF IMPORTANT 
INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SAFE USE OF VERSED 
1. Roche s Failure To Report Versed-Associated Deaths 
On May 30, 1986, the Drugs Commission of the German Medical 
Profession published a warning on Versed-associated apnea and 
cardiac arrest.1 9 1 The subcommittee's investigation revealed that 
186
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 10. 
187
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 15. 
188 May 10 Hearing, galley page 10. 
188
 See 21 CFR 436. 
190 May 10 Hearing, galley page 10. 
191
 See the May 30, 1986, Deutsches Artzeblatt article entitled, "Take Care When Giving Mi-
dazolam!", May 5 Hearing, galley page 67. FDA was first informed about this publication in an 
August 19, 1987, Roche submission. 
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this warning was largely based on fatal cases involving use of the 
drug for conscious sedation that were known to Hoffmann-La 
Roche prior to FDA approval but were not reported to FDA until 
June 3, 1986,192 more than five months after approval and only 
after publication of the warning in Germany.193 On June 3, 1986, 
Roche reported to FDA eight serious cases of respiratory depression 
associated with foreign marketing of Versed,194 five of which had 
proven fatal.195 Although all five of these cases were known to 
Hoffmann-La Roche prior to FDA approval, only one of them had 
previously been reported to FDA before approval, and then had 
only been briefly summarized in a July 26, 1985, submission to the 
agency.196 
When Hoffmann-La Roche reported these fatalities on June 3, 
1986, it acknowledged that they were both "serious" and "unla-
beled" (i.e., not listed in the approved labeling).197 To be certain, 
these cases played an important role in FDA's post-market review 
of the drug's safety. Dr. Gerald Faich, Director, FDA's Office of Ep-
idemiology and Biostatistics, testified that they were partly respon-
sible for prompting FDA "to actively make inquiries of foreign au-
thorities about the occurrences of other cases." 1 9 8 
Records obtained from Hoffmann-La Roche indicate that a total 
of at least six deaths involving respiratory depression associated 
with foreign marketing of Versed were known to Hoffmann-La 
Roche by approval time, but were not reported to FDA until after 
approval.199 Five of these deaths involved endoscopies. In addition, 
several nonfatal but serious cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed 
reported to the company before approval were not forwarded to 
FDA until after approval.200 
FDA testified before the subcommittee that Hoffmann-La Roche 
was required to report these cases before the drug was approved in 
December 1985. Section 314.50(d)(5)(vi)(b) of FDA's regulations re-
192 May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. 
1 9 3
 In an August 19, 1987, letter to FDA, Roche indicated that this warning was based on sev-
eral "reports of apnea or cardiac arrest," including three German deaths, that were reported to 
FDA "on June 3, 198(>," four days after the warning was published in West Germany. May 5 
Hearing, galley page 68. 
194
 Ibid. 
«95 May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. 
196
 Ibid. On July 26, 1985, Roche submitted an international safety update to FDA that in-
cluded line summaries on two fatal and 10 nonfatal cases involving respiratory depression, as 
well as a prose summary of another fatal case. In a December 10, 1985, review of this update, 
Dr David Scally discussed the fatal case described in the prose summary, which involved the 
death of a 61-year-old man that he did not attribute to the drug. Hearings, Appendix I. His 
review took no note of the two other deaths briefly reported on July 26, 1985, or of any of the 
other nonfatal respiratory depression cases reported on that date. Roche more fully reported one 
of these two deaths, which involved a 76-year-old man who underwent a gastroscopy, to FDA on 
September 11, 1987. In a similar vein, there does not appear to be any record establishing that 
an FDA medical officer had reviewed Roche's June 12, 1984, report to the Versed IND of the 
death of a 72-year-old man from cardiac arrest and respiratory failure given 0.21 mg/kg of 
Versed for a gastroscopy. This case was included among three cases of respiratory depression 
discussed in a May 17, 1984, letter from the United Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medi-
cines to Roche's U.K. affiliate. The June 12, 1984, report to the Versed IND is in subcommittee 
files. 
197
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. In her June 3, 1986, submission to FDA, Dr. Loretta M. 
Itri, Director of Roche's Clinical Safety Surveillance Department, so characterized the cases. The 
company reiterated this conclusion in a June 25, 1986, letter to FDA. Ibid. 
i98 May 5 Hearing, galley page 71. 
i»9 May 5 Hearing, galley page 71. Subcommittee staff review revealed that Hoffmann-La 
Roche also failed, prior to FDA approval, to report to the agency several cases of Versed-associ-
ated deaths not involving respiratory depression that had been brought to its attention 
2oo May 5 Hearing, galley page 72. 
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quire an NDA sponsor, following receipt of an approvable letter, to 
update the NDA with "new safety information learned about the 
drug that may reasonably affect the statement of contraindications, 
warnings, precautions, and adverse reactions in the draft label-
ing." 2 0 1 Dr. Paula Botstein, Deputy Director, Office of Drug Eval-
uation I, testified that, pursuant to this regulation, Hoffman-La 
Roche was required to include any previously unreported Versed-
associated respiratory arrest deaths known to it in a safety update 
submitted to the Versed NDA between its receipt of FDA's Novem-
ber 8, 1985, approvable letter for Versed and agency approval of 
the drug on December 20, 1985.202 
The committee also believes that pre-market reports of these 
cases to FDA were required under FDA's IND regulations. Prior to 
FDA approval, Roche was required by Section 312.1(a)(6) of these 
regulations "promptly" to report to FDA "any finding" associated 
with a new drug under investigation "that may suggest significant 
hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions pertinent 
to the safety of the drug." 2 0 3 The committee believes that deaths 
that played an important role in FDA's decision to contact foreign 
nations for any additional information on similar cases certainly 
qualify as "significant" events within the meaning of this subsec-
tion. 
In acknowledging to FDA on June 3, 1986, that several previous-
ly unreported cardiorespiratory reactions to Versed—including 
many of these deaths—were both "serious" and "unexpected" 
within the meaning of Section 314.80 of FDA's postmarket report-
ing regulations, Roche conceded that they were required to be re-
ported to FDA within 15 working days following the drug's approv-
al .2 0 4 Inasmuch as none of these deaths were reported within this 
timeframe, the committee finds that Roche, by its own admission, 
failed to comply with the agency's legal reporting requirements. 
During his appearance before the subcommittee, however, Dr. 
Gerald Faich, Director, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatis-
tics, testified that 
. . . reports that had an origin in 1984 were actually not 
covered by the NDA rewrite that talked about 15 day sub-
mission of serious unlabeled reactions. That is, those regu-
lations were not intended, I don't believe, to be retrospec-
2 0 1
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 73. 
202 May 5 Hearing, galley page 73. 
203 May 5 Hearing, galley page 70. On March 19, 1987, FDA issued rewritten IND regulations 
which replaced this subsection. Newly drafted Section 312.32 of FDA's IND regulations requires 
sponsors to notify the agency within 10 working days of all "serious" and "unexpected" adverse 
reactions associated with a new drug under clinical investigation. See 52 Fed. Reg. 8797, 8837. A 
"serious" reaction "means any experience that suggests a significant hazard, contraindication, 
side effect, or precaution" and "includes any experience that is fatal." An "unexpected" reac-
tion is one "that is not identified in nature, severity, or frequency in the current investigator 
brochure; or, if an investigator brochure is not required, that is not identified in nature, severi-
ty, or frequency in the risk information described in the general investigational plan or else-
where in the current application, as amended." That Roche on June 3, 1986, categorized several 
of these deaths as both "serious" and "unlabeled" within the meaning of Section 314.80 of 
FDA's postmarket reporting regulations provides strong evidence that they also would have been 
"serious" and "unexpected ' within the meaning of Section 312.32 of FDA s IND regulations. 
2 0 4
 Section 314.80XcXl) of FDA's regulations requires that serious and unexpected (i.e., "not 
listed in the current labeling for the drug") adverse reactions associated with the use of ap-
proved new drugs be reported to FDA "within 15 working days of initial receipt of the informa-
tion." 
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tively applied. . . . I am telling you that the reporting 
and submission of foreign post-marketing reports of deaths 
such as apnea was [sic] clarified in August 1985. Prior to 
that, it was not in the post-marketing regulations. It 
wasn't 314.80 that applied to the submission of those re-
ports.205 
That the 15-day postmarket reporting requirements of Section 
314.80 of the NDA rewrite did not go into effect until August 1985 
is irrelevant to Roche's post-approval reporting obligations in this 
instance since Versed was approved several months after this, in De-
cember 1985.206 
2. Roche s Failure To Report Important Clinical Trial Data 
As earlier discussed, a study published in May 1988 by White et 
al. in The Journal of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery suggested 
that the Versed conscious sedation doses originally approved by 
FDA were excessive. The subcommittee's investigation revealed 
that the results of this study were available to Roche prior to FDA 
approval, but not reported to the agency until several months after 
approval. 
The White study was actually conducted under Roche's IND for 
Versed, the protocol for which was submitted to that IND on April 
13, 1982.207 The clinical portion of the study was completed in the 
first half of 1984.208 A draft statistical report of the study findings 
was completed by November 28, 1984, more than one year before 
FDA approved Versed on December 20, 1985.209 On February 5, 
1985, more than 10 months before FDA approval, this report was 
designated as "final."210 
205 May 5 Hearing, galley page 69. 
206 Furthermore, any implication that fatal Versed-associated cardiorespiratory reactions oc-
curring outside the United States would not have been subject to 15-day reporting requirements 
had Versed been approved prior to August 1985 is incorrect. Section 310.3(MHbX2Mi) of FDA's reg-
ulations, which was superseded by Section 314.80 that month, set forth as subject to 15-day re-
porting requirements information related to an approved drug 
. . . concerning any unexpected side effect, injury, toxicity, or sensitivity reaction or 
any unexpected incidence or severity thereof associated with clinical uses, studies, in-
vestigations, or tests, whether or not determined to be attributable to the drug . . . 'Un-
expected' as used in this subdivision refers to conditions or developments not previously 
submitted as part of the new drug application or not encountered during clinical trials 
of the drug, or conditions or developments occurring at a rate higher than shown by 
information previously submitted as part of the new drug application, or than encoun-
tered during such clinical trials. 
The Justice Department cited this regulation in prosecuting SmithKline Beckman Corpora-
tion for failing to report to FDA serious liver toxicity associated with foreign use of its anti-
hypertensive drug, Selacryn (ticrynafen), and Eli Lilly and Company for failing to report fatal 
hepato-renal reactions outside the United States to its anti-arthritis drug, Oraflex (benoxapro-
fen). See Elements of the Offense and Factual Basis for the Pleas, in United States v. Smith-
Kline Beckman Corporation, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, Criminal No. 84-00227, in subcommittee files; and United States v. Eli Lilly and Company 
and William Ian H Shedden, United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 
Criminal Nos. IP85 53 CR and IP85 54 CR, in subcommittee files. Insofar as cardiorespiratory 
fatalities associated with foreign use of Versed reveal an "unexpected' side effect of the drug, or 
a reaction to Versed of "unexpected . . . incidence or severity ' within the meaning of Section 
310.300(bK2Ki), the committee finds that Roche would have been required to report them to FDA 
within 15 working days, even had Versed been approved before the August 1985 effective date 
for Section 314.80 of the NDA rewrite. 
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 This was revealed by a subcommittee staff review of case report forms for the study. May 
10 Hearing, galley page 18. 
209 May 10 Hearing, galley page 18. 
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FDA first learned at the subcommittee's May 10, 1988, hearing 
that the paper published by White et al. in May 1988 was based on 
the data analyzed in this Roche report of SV2 years earlier.211 As 
earlier discussed, Versed was originally recommended for use in 
conscious sedation at 0.1 to 0.2 mg/kg for healthy non-elderly 
adults. The November 1984 statistical report showed that 40 per-
cent of patients receiving 0.10 mg/kg of Versed for conscious seda-
tion became oversedated—that is, were put to sleep—and half of 
that 40 percent were unarousable. At 0.15 mg/kg, 75 percent of pa-
tients became oversedated. Four-fifths (Vs) of these oversedated pa-
tients, or a staggering 60 percent of all patients receiving 0.15 mg/ 
kg of the drug, were put to sleep and were unarousable. The report 
further indicated that significantly fewer Valium patients receiv-
ing twice these Versed doses became oversedated.212 
Roche did not supply this report to FDA prior to the drug's U.S. 
approval. In fact, FDA advised the subcommittee that "the statisti-
cal report for the White study was submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration on May 4, 1988," 2 1 3 one day before the subcommit-
tee opened its hearings on the agency's regulation of Versed and 
then only after the subcommittee had requested and already re-
ceived that report. 
All of the important findings of the statistical report reappeared 
in Roche's final clinical report of this study, which was dated Sep-
tember 4, 1985, more than three months prior to FDA approval.214 
Despite this, the study was not included in the Summary Basis of 
Approval for Versed.215 
In fact, this final report was not submitted to FDA until Septem-
ber 26, 1986, nine months after approval, in an annual report to the 
Versed IND.216 Buried as it was in a voluminous, post-approval 
IND submission, this report, not surprisingly, apparently went un-
reviewed by FDA.217 In fact, Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical 
reviewer for Versed, did not even become aware of the existence of 
this study report until shortly before the subcommittee's hearing, 
and only then because the subcommittee staff had been asking for 
"information on it." 2 1 8 
Dr. J.G. Reves, a Versed clinical investigator and Roche advisor 
on the drug, has concluded that the "most significant finding" in 
Dr. White's study is that Versed 
. . . has a steeper dose-response curve than [Valium]. This 
means that there may be less room for dosing error with 
[Versed]; in other words, overdose with [Versed] is easier 
to achieve than with [Valium]. [Versed's] steeper dose-re-
2 1 1
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 20. Dr. David L. Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, 
testified that he was not aware of this fact, while Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for 
Drug Evaluation, indicated that he was not even aware of the published paper: "I haven't had a 
chance to review the paper you're referring to. Published this month, you say?" Ibid. 
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 May 10 Hearing, galley page 20. 
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 Ibid. However, in an August 31, 1988, submission to FDA, which is in subcommittee files, 
Roche stated that this report was supplied to the agency on May 2, 1988. 
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sponse curve suggests that vigilance is required when the 
drug is used for conscious sedation.219 
To be certain, based on an assessment of sedation levels, the study 
revealed that the dose-response curve for Versed was markedly 
steeper than for Valium.220 With Valium, as Dr. Robert M. Julien, 
formerly Associate Professor, Departments of Anesthesiology and 
Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences University, testified, 
. . . as you increase a dose over a fairly large range, you 
only get slight increases in sedation. You can increase a 
dose of Valium perhaps fivefold or sixfold in a patient and 
still not put them at great risk.221 
By contrast, "very modest increases in dose" of Versed, he testified, 
. . . will take a patient from very lipht sedation to a pa-
tient who basically is in a state of general anesthesia. You 
have induced anesthesia, they are apneic, they are unre-
sponsive. So the drug, while it is more potent, it is also less 
safe in that increases in dose produce a huge increase in 
response.222 
Dr. Alan Lisbon, Assistant Professor of Anesthesia, Harvard 
Medical School, concurred with this assessment: 
There is no margin of safety with the drug because it 
has such a steep dose response curve. . . . With a drug 
like midazolam, . . . a little bit too much, because it is so 
potent, will have somebody stop breathing or run into car-
diovascular and respiratory complications.223 
Having established a "narrower therapeutic dosage range for mi-
dazolam," the White study concludes that "careful titration of mi-
dazolam using incremental doses of 1 to 2 mg to achieve the de-
sired clinical effect is critically important to avoid overdosing pa-
tients" and producing "potentially life-threatening complications 
(e.g. apnea)." 2 2 4 
2 1 9
 May 10 Hea r ing , gal ley page 19 and t h e repr in t of his discussion of t h e p a p e r by W h i t e et 
al . in Hea r ings , Appendix 1. 
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o m m e n d e d for use in combina t ion w i t h Versed a n d would rare ly be so used. May 10 H e a r i n g , 
galley page 27. 
T h e use of k e t a m i n e did not confound t h e repor ted comparison be tween Versed and V a l i u m 
because t he sedat ion levels recorded for each d r u g were assessed after p a t i e n t s in i t ia l ly received 
e i the r of these d r u g s but before t h e y received k e t a m i n e . May 10 H e a r i n g , gal ley page 19. T h e 
published paper by W h i t e et al . s t a t e s t h a t t h e "degree of sedat ion w a s r a t ed . . . 2 to 3 m i n u t e s 
Con t inued 
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The White study also provides additional evidence of the signifi-
cantly greater potency of Versed relative to Valium. That Versed 
patients, at one-half the dose given to Valium patients, experienced 
significantly more oversedation than their Valium counterparts, 
Dr. Robert M. Julien, formerly Associate Professor, Departments of 
Anesthesiology and Pharmacology, Oregon Health Sciences Univer-
sity, testified, "most certainly" suggested that Versed's "potency is 
more than twice that of Valium." 2 2 5 In fact, an abstract of the 
study stated: "With respect to its sedative properties, [Versed] was 
2-4 times more potent than [Valium]," 2 2 6 a finding which, as 
Roche advisor and Versed clinical investigator, Dr. J.G. Reves, 
noted, "has obvious dosing significance." 2 2 7 
3. Roche's Failure To Report and Warn About the Markedly Greater 
Potency of Versed Relative to Valium 
At the May 10, 1988, hearing, the subcommittee informed FDA 
that by June 1986, shortly after marketing of Versed began, Roche 
officials had privately concluded that the drug was 3 to 4 times as 
potent as Valium.228 On June 6, 1986, a preliminary draft of an 
article on Versed by The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeu-
tics, which was circulated to Roche personnel for their review, 
stated that the drug was "about twice as potent . . . as" 
Valium.229 (Emphasis supplied.) A Roche medical official subse-
quently recommended that this be changed to "3 to 4" times as 
potent. In accordance with this recommendation, Roche, in a July 
3, 1986, letter to The Medical Letter, suggested that the publication 
after t h e in i t ia l dose of" Versed or V a l i u m and , af ter t h a t , " d u r i n g t h e k e t a m i n e infusion." Ac-
cordingly, t ab l e IV of t h e p a p e r r e p o r t s seda t ion levels for "[ajfter ini t ia l sedat ive a d m i n i s t r a -
t ion" of e i t h e r Versed or V a l i u m s e p a r a t e l y from those levels r epor ted for "(a]fter k e t a m i n e ad-
m i n i s t r a t i o n . " M a y 10 H e a r i n g , ga l ley page 19. Dr. J . G. Reves, a Versed cl inical inves t iga to r 
and long-t ime Roche advisor on t h e d rug , h a s w r i t t e n t h a t t h e " p a p e r by W h i t e . . . is a well-
designed s tudy t h a t c o m p a r e s [Versed] and [ V a l i u m ) " whose "mos t s ignif icant finding" is t h a t 
Versed " h a s a s t eepe r dose-response cu rve t h a n [Va l ium) . " Ibid. Obviously, Dr. Reves would not 
have m a d e th i s obse rva t ion w e r e t h e r e a n y possibil i ty t h a t t h e in i t ia l seda t ion a s s e s s m e n t s re-
flected i n t e r ac t i ons be tween t h e s e d r u g s a n d k e t a m i n e . 
225 M a y 5 H e a r i n g , ga l ley page 26. Dr. Whi te ' s p a p e r was s u b m i t t e d for publ icat ion on Feb ru -
a ry 27, 1987. See Whi t e , Vasconez, M a t h e s , Way, and Wender , s u p r a , H e a r i n g s , Append ix I. At a 
M a r c h 14, 1987, Roche-suppor ted sympos ium in O r l a n d o , Dr. W h i t e s u m m a r i z e d his findings a s 
follows: 
One prob lem in c o m p a r i n g t h e potencies of midazo lam and d iazepam may r e l a t e to 
t he fact t h a t t h e slopes of t h e dose-response cu rves may not be para l le l (figure) . . . Mi-
dazolam a p p e a r s to h a v e a s t eepe r dose-response cu rve t h a n d iazepam, m a k i n g it diffi-
cul t to d e t e r m i n e t h e exac t po tency rat io . Most inves t iga tors have repor ted t h a t midazo-
lam is twice a s po ten t as d i azepam. However , midazo lam ' s more rapid onset of ac t ion a s 
compared wi th t h a t of d i azepam m a k e s midazolam a p p e a r to be even more potent . 
lW|e found d u r i n g t h e ope ra t ion itself, t h e s u p p l e m e n t a l dose ol midazolam requ i red 
was less t h a n hal f t h a t of d i azepam, reflecting a n even g r e a t e r potency ra t io be tween 
midazo lam a n d d iazepam. 
See discuss ions sect ion of "Midazo lam in Plas t ic S u r g e r y , " in Midazolam in Clinical Pharmacol 
ogy, ed. by Eps te in and Reves, pages 15-Hi, in Hea r ings , Append ix I. 
2 2 6
 H e a r i n g s , Append ix I. 
2 2 7
 Hea r ings , Append ix I. Dr. Reves regarded t h e s tudy a s showing Versed to be "a t least two 
to t h r e e t imes a s po ten t a s d i a z e p a m . " See his c o m m e n t a r y on the publ ished paper by W h i t e et 
al., Hea r ings , Append ix I. 
2 2 8
 May 10 H e a r i n g , gal ley page 22 On April 2'i, 1986, a p p r o x i m a t e l y one m o n t h a f te r U.S. 
m a r k e t i n g of Versed began , Roche received the first repor t of an A m e r i c a n d e a t h assoc ia ted 
wi th domestic m a r k e t i n g of t h e d r u g from a phys ic ian who advised a company official t h a t , 
upon observ ing Versed ' s "ac t iv i ty , " he though t Versed was i to 4 times as potent as Valium and 
had, the re fore , reduced the Versed doses he gave to V* to V:\ of those he gave of Valium A Roche 
m e m o r a n d u m w r i t t e n of a May 19, 1986, t e l ephone conversa t ion with t h e physic ian ind ica tes 
t h a t he conveyed th i s in format ion to t h e company May 10 Hea r ing , gal ley page 22. 
2 2 9
 May 10 H e a r i n g , gal ley page 22. 
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characterize Versed as "three to four times' (Emphasis supplied.) 
rather than "twice" as potent as Valium.230 This characterization 
did appear in the August 1, 1986, Medical Letter on Versed, but 
without any attribution to Roche.231 
As FDA medical officer, Dr. David L. Scally testified, Roche did 
not reduce the recommended dose of Versed at this early stage of 
the drug's marketing to conform to this assessment of the drug's 
potency relative to Valium; 2 3 2 that is, doses were not reduced to 
lA to Va of those recommended for Valium.233 
Dr. Scally testified that he did not recall Roche's specifically ad-
vising him that it regarded Versed as three to four times as potent 
as Valium,234 and, in a submission to the subcommittee hearing 
record, FDA has advised that 
. . . [w]e have been unable to determine from our review 
of our files when the Food and Drug Administration was 
informed that Versed was three to four times more potent 
than Valium. We are continuing to try to make that deter-
mination.235 
In any event, the first "Dear Doctor" letter regarding cardiac 
and respiratory arrest during endoscopy that Roche sent to 100,000 
physicians in February 1987 failed to warn that Versed was 3 to 4 
times as potent as Valium.236 
Eventually, however, Roche highlighted the importance of the 
markedly greater potency of Versed. On October 23, 1987, Roche 
advised FDA that future "[promotional campaigns will emphasize 
the potency of Versed relative to diazepam. '2 3 T Accordingly, the 
230 M a y 10 H e a r i n g , gal ley pages 22-3 . At a n October 18, 1986, m e e t i n g wi th Roche represen t -
at ives, severa l of t h e c o m p a n y ' s consu l t ing anes thes io logis t s s imi la r ly advised t h a t t h e y consid-
ered Versed to be 3 to 4 t i m e s a s po ten t as V a l i u m . See t h e t r ansc r ip t ion of selected excerp t s 
from t h e t a p e record ing of t h a t mee t ing , H e a r i n g s , Appendix I. 
Assessmen t s of re la t ive potency, to a g r ea t e x t e n t , a r e a m a t t e r of cl inical impress ion , s ince as 
FDA medica l reviewer, Dr. David Scally, wrote in a J u n e 23, 1988, m e m o r a n d u m : 
I h a v e eva lua ted no a d e q u a t e and well cont ro l led s tud ies l ead ing to a scientific con-
clusion t h a t midazolam is m u c h more po ten t t h a n d iazepam. Fo r e x a m p l e , I c a n n o t con-
firm anecdota l re ferences to m i d a z o l a m / d i a z e p a m rat ios of 1/3, 1/3.5, 1/4, 1/5, etc . Nev-
e r the le s s , it would now a p p e a r safer to p r e s u m e a potency r a d i o s o m e w h e r e in t h i s 
r a n g e when a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e ini t ial and followup doses of i n t r a v e n o u s midazolam. 
In subcommi t t ee files. It is pa r t i cu l a r ly difficult t o cha rac te r i ze the po tency of Versed re la t ive to 
Va l ium wi th scientific precis ion, s ince, a s t h e p a p e r publ ished by W h i t e e t al. , sup ra , demon-
s t r a t e s , t h e dose reponse cu rves for t h e two d r u g s may not be para l le l . 
23i ^ | a y |Q n e a r u i g ( gal ley page 23. 
2 : i 2
 May 10 Hea r ing , gal ley page 23. 
2:1:1
 For safe m e a s u r e , one consu l t ing anes thes io logis t informed Roche r ep re sen ta t ives at an 
October 18, 198(5, mee t ing , t h a t he advises phys ic ians to a d m i n i s t e r Versed a t one fifth t h e dose 
they use of Va l ium. See t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t ha t mee t ing , Hear ings , Append ix I. 
2 3 4
 May 10 Hea r ing , gal ley page 22. 
2.ih p r i o r to t he s u b c o m m i t t e e s hea r ings , FDA staff had wr i t t en t h a t "(ujsing s lu r r ed speech 
as t h e endpo in t , | Versedj was d e t e r m i n e d to be approx imate ly 1.3 to 1.7 t imes as po ten t as 
[Val ium] ." May 5 Hea r ing , gal ley page 28. However , Dr. Robert M. J u l i e n , formerly Associate 
Professor, D e p a r t m e n t s of Anes thes io logy and Pharmaco logy , Oregon H e a l t h Sciences Univers i -
ty, testified t ha t , in his j u d g m e n t , use of such an endpoin t would h a v e led to u n d e r s t a t i n g 
Versed*8 potency re la t ive to Va l i um: 
Because at t h e point of s l u r r e d speech, you can still see resp i ra to ry depress ion and 
decreases in blood oxygena t ion In addi t ion , t h e d rug has a s lower onset of act ion t h a n 
you would expect . If you t i t r a t e p a t i e n t s to t h e point of s lur red speech, they will cont in-
ue to absorb addi t iona l d r u g in to t h e bra in for several minu te s af ter t h a t point, so they 
ac tua l ly become more deeply seda ted following the point where you in tended to go. 
May 5 Hea r ing , gal ley page 29. As ea r l i e r discussed, t he selection of s lu r r ed speech as a cl inical 
endpoin t may have been i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 
2:»e M a y 10 Hea r ing , gal ley pages 23-4. 
2:17
 Roche 's October 23, 1987, submiss ion is in subcommi t t ee files. 
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following month, approximately 17 months after Roche concluded 
Versed to be approximately three to four times as potent as 
Valium, the company highlighted this conclusion as the second sen-
tence of a "Dear Doctor*' warning letter 2 3 8 and, for the first time 
emphasized it in the bold-faced introduction to the Dosage and Ad-
ministration section of the Versed labeling.239 
F . F D A ' S E N F O R C E M E N T O F ITS R E P O R T I N G R E Q U I R E M E N T S C O N T I N U E S 
TO B E G R O S S L Y D E F I C I E N T 
In the past, the committee, after documenting serious deficien-
cies in FDA's enforcement of its legal reporting requirements, has 
recommended that the agency substantially increase its commit-
ment to ensuring industry compliance with those requirements. On 
the basis of its review of the Versed experience, the committee 
must conclude that FDA's performance in this critical law enforce-
ment area remains woefully inadequate. 
Most notably, FDA failed to investigate Hoffmann La-Roche's ad-
verse reaction reporting practices for Versed, even though data 
FDA received from the company strongly suggested that the firm 
may have failed to submit to the agency reports of deaths known to 
it prior to the drug's U.S. approval. 
When Roche reported several serious and sometimes fatal cases 
of respiratory and cardiac arrest to FDA on June 3, 1986, a few 
months after American marketing began, it forthrightlv acknowl-
edged that they "cover[ed] a two to three year period.' 2 4° To be 
certain, all of these foreign cases were designated by "84" and "85" 
case numbers, 2 4 1 thereby indicating that they were logged into a 
Hoffmann-La Roche affiliate in 1984 or 1985. That these cases were 
reported to a company affiliate in 1984 or 1985 suggested that it 
was likely that most, if not all of them, were known to Hoffmann-
La Roche prior to FDA approval in late December 1985. When con-
fronted with these case numbers at the subcommittee's May 5, 
1988, hearing, in fact, Dr. Paula Botstein, Deputy Director, Office 
of Drug Evaluation I, acknowledged that "[i]t may be the case" 
that the firm failed promptly to report to FDA a number of foreign 
deaths, including some that were known to it a year or more earli-
er.2 4 2 
The committee notes that the subcommittee staff, on the basis of 
the company case numbers accompanying postmarket reports to 
FDA of Versed-associated deaths and other serious reactions, recog-
nized possible reporting lapses the very first time it examined 
those reports. This prompted the subcommittee to request addition-
al detailed information from Roche, 2 4 3 which confirmed receipt by 
238 j ^ a y 10 H e a r i n g , gal ley page 24. T h a t l e t t e r opens : " V e r s e d is a po t en t seda t ive a g e n t 
which h a s been widely used for conscious sedat ion . Cl inical e x p e r i e n c e indica tes t h a t it may be 
three to four times as potent per mg as d i azepam (Val ium) . " ( E m p h a s i s suppl ied.) See t h a t l e t t e r 
in H e a r i n g s , Append ix I.
 A. i 
2 3 9
 May 10 H e a r i n g , gal ley page 24. F ina l p r in t ed label ing c o n t a i n i n g th i s conclus ion was 
da t ed N o v e m b e r 23, 1987. Roche s u b m i t t e d draf t l abe l ing wi th th i s conclusion to FDA on Sep-
t e m b e r 18, 1987. 
2 4 0
 May 5 H e a r i n g , ga l ley page 69. 
2 4 1
 May 5 H e a r i n g , ga l ley page 68. 
2 4 2
 May 5 H e a r i n g , gal ley page 73. . . . . . « •• * A nu r 
2 4 3
 See t h e s u b c o m m i t t e e ' s October 9, 1987, l e t t e r to Mr. I rwin Le rne r , P r e s i d e n t a n d Chief 
Execu t ive Officer, Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., which is in s u b c o m m i t t e e files. 
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the sponsor and/or its foreign affiliates of several reports of serious 
and sometimes fatal Versed-associated adverse reactions prior to 
the drug's U.S. approval. 
FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, Dr. David Scally, testified 
that he was not aware of these 1984-85 accession numbers, 2 4 4 
even though in his September 10, 1986, and November 19, 1986, re-
views of postmarket reports of serious cardiorespiratory reactions 
to Versed,245 he used those company numbers to identify each re-
viewed case. 
Dr. Scally testified that, initially, the "adverse experience results 
were not routed directly to me," but rather to FDA's Division of 
Neuropharmacological Drug Products (DNDP) and the agency's 
Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics (OEB).246 The record does 
not reveal a single instance in which any DNDP or OEB 2 4 7 re-
viewer who received and examined Roche's postmarket adverse re-
action reports noticed that they had been logged into Hoffmann-La 
Roche's international system in 1984 and 1985, long before they 
were reported to FDA. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that, in 1986, FDA did not investi-
gate the circumstances surrounding the delayed reporting of the 
several cases reported to it in mid-1986. In fact, no agency inquiry 
was even contemplated until 1988, and then only as a result of a 
petition received from the Public Citizen Health Research 
Group 2 4 8 and after Roche had made available to FDA internation-
al adverse reaction data requested by the subcommittee,249 which 
had already initiated such an inquiry after reviewing evidence of 
delayed reporting in some of the company's postmarket submis-
sions to the agency. 
As previous subcommittee investigations demonstrate, this is not 
the first time that FDA has not acted on evidence furnished to it 
suggesting that sponsors have not met their adverse reaction re-
porting obligations. For example, last year the committee found 
that the "conclusion that Hoechst did not comply with a wide 
array of agency adverse reaction reporting requirements" concern-
ing its antidepressant, Merital (nomifensine maleate), was 
. . . largely based on information contained in FDA's files. 
[S]everal Hoechst submissions, on their face, show that the 
244
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. 
245
 Both reviews are in subcommittee files. 
246
 May 5 Hearing, galley page (>8. 
247
 Notwithstanding the initial testimony of Dr. Gerald Faich, Director, Office of Epidemiolo-
gy and Biostatistics, that post-market reports from 1984 and 1985 were not routed to his office, 
reports of this kind that were contained in Roche's June 3, 1986, submission to FDA were ini-
tially addressed to Dr. Julie Millstein of Dr. Faich's office. May 5 Hearing, galley page 68. When 
confronted with this evidence, Dr. Faich acknowledged that they "came to my office . . ." May 5 
Hearing, galley page 69. When asked whether he was "aware that the case numbers were for 
1984 and 1985," Dr Faich testified that "1 can't say that I was, but 1 think we agreed that those 
should be submitted at that point." Ibid. 
2 4 8
 FDA has advised the subcommittee: "An internal review of the files was begun in Febru-
ary, subsequent to the receipt of a petition filed by Public Citizen on February 12, 1988 " May 5 
Hearing, galley page 74. In its February 12, 1988, petition to FDA, the Public Citizen Health 
Research Group requested that FDA "[d]etermine whether Roche fully and promptly informed 
FDA prior to U.S. approval of all British deaths from midazolam, British studies on midazolam, 
and the lower midazolam doses approved in Britain." Hearings, Appendix I. FDA's "internal 
review" of Roche's reporting practices was in such as embryonic stage by the subcommittee's 
May 5, 1988, hearing, that no FDA onsite inspection had yet been ordered of the company's files. 
2 4 9
 On December 15, 1987, February 12, 1988, and March 15, 1988, Roche submitted to FDA 
the records it made available to the subcommittee. 
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sponsor had not met its adverse reaction reporting require-
ments. . . . 2 5 0 
The committee expressed concern that "such noncompliance was 
not recognized by FDA prior to the subcommittee's May 22, 1986, 
hearing" on FDA's regulation of Merital. 
In 1983 and again last year, we recommended that FDA "ensure 
that its personnel correctly interpret and strictly enforce all legal 
adverse reaction reporting requirements." 2 5 1 If FDA persists in its 
failure to require prompt reporting of serious adverse drug reac-
tions, the committee concludes that it cannot ensure the American 
public protection from potentially unsafe and misbranded new 
drugs. 
The committee is also concerned that some FDA personnel are 
insufficiently knowledgeable about the legal obligations of sponsors 
to report serious adverse reactions to the agency. For example, Dr. 
Paula Botstein, Deputy Director, Office of Drug Evaluation I, testi-
fied that adverse safety information derived from foreign marketing 
experience with a new drug was not required to be reported to the 
IND.252 This testimony is belied by the historical record. As Chief 
Counsel Scarlett acknowledged, in considering the reporting prac-
tices of Eli Lilly and Company for the new drug, Oraflex (benoxa-
profen), FDA determined that the IND reporting regulations "could 
be interpreted to require the reporting of foreign marketing experi-
ence." 2 5 3 Effective law enforcement demands that the agency 
ensure that all of its reviewing personnel are familiar with, and 
fully understand, the specific reporting obligations of new drug 
sponsors. 
The committee also concludes that FDA has committed insuffi-
cient law enforcement resources to investigating suspected noncom-
pliance with agency reporting requirements. For example, FDA ini-
tiated a major investigation of Hoechst's reporting practices for its 
antidepressant, Merital (nomifensine maleate), after the subcom-
mittee supplied evidence to the agency in mid-1986 of Hoechst's 
failure to report to FDA a large number of deaths and other impor-
tant adverse safety data associated with use of Merital prior to 
that drug's U.S. approval.254 At the subcommittee's hearings con-
cerning Versed two years later, FDA Chief Counsel Scarlett testi-
fied that the results of that "extensive investigation" had not yet 
arrived at his office.255 Yet, on January 11, 1988, FDA's Office of 
Compliance recommended a grand jury investigation into Hoechst's 
adverse reaction reporting practices for Merital.256 
In a similar vein, no action has been taken by FDA since it com-
pleted inspections in 1987 of the reporting practices of several 
Johnson & Johnson (J&J) subsidiaries—including McNeil Pharma-
ceutical and Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation—in connection 
2 5 0
 See FDA 's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, supra, pages 71-2. 
2 5 1
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 78. 
2 5 2
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 70. 
2 5 3
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 71. FDA subsequently requested a grand jury investigation 
into Lilly's failure to report deaths associated with use of Oraflex during foreign marketing of 
the drug. 
2 5 4
 See FDA 's Regulation of the New Drug Merital, supra, pages 47-80. 
26s M a y 10 Hearing, galley page 34. 
2 5 6
 In subcommittee files. 
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with J&J's analgesic, Suprol (suprofen).257 Prior to this time, the 
subcommittee had advised FDA of J&J's failure to report promptly 
to FDA significant safety data concerning Suprol, including several 
studies in which single doses (or repeat single doses) of the drug 
produced acute kidney injury, including flank pain, in healthy 
young male volunteers.258 Suprol was eventually withdrawn from 
the market after being associated with more than 300 reports of 
acute kidney damage in the United States, primarily in healthy 
young men.259 
In a May 27, 1988, ' 'post-mortem*' meeting following the subcom-
mittee's hearings on Versed, Mr. Scarlett reportedly stated: 
Why don't prosecutions happen faster? Why does it take 
so long to prepare and file a criminal prosecution case. A 
priority case? 2 6° 
Inasmuch as the Statute of Limitations is running on potentially 
significant violations of agency reporting requirements, the com-
mittee shares these concerns and urges FDA to commit itself more 
vigorously to investigating and, where appropriate, recommending 
criminal prosecution of sponsors that have seriously violated those 
requirements. 
G. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS MAY 
HAVE REACHED EPIDEMIC PROPORTIONS 
The subcommittee's hearings on Versed marked the third set of 
hearings in two years where the subcommittee presented to FDA 
evidence suggesting that a drug manufacturer seriously violated 
legal reporting requirements.261 
With each case, the committee becomes increasingly concerned 
that serious reporting lapses by major pharmaceutical companies 
may have reached epidemic proportions within some segments of 
the industry. At the very least, FDA has not been receiving infor-
mation vital to protecting human health and safety. If FDA is to 
continue to enjoy the confidence of the American public, the com-
mittee believes it is imperative that it do a far better job of ensur-
ing that it has the information required to regulate new drugs. 
H. PHYSICIANS WERE INSUFFICIENTLY WARNED ABOUT THE RISKS OF 
VERSED-ASSOCIATED RESPIRATORY TOXICITY 
The committee finds that for almost two years following Versed's 
approval, neither FDA nor Roche ensured that physicians were 
adequately warned about Versed's cardiorespiratory toxicity. 
FDA did not require the February 1987 Dear Doctor" letter on 
Versed-associated respiratory depression to be issued as a "Drug 
Warning" letter, even though deaths and other serious reactions 
^
 2 5 7
 See the testimony of FDA Chief Counsel Scarlett, May 10 Hearing, galley page 34. Also see 
FDA's submission for the hearing record, Hearings, Appendix I. 
2 5 8
 Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "FDA's 
Regulation of the New Drug Suprol," May 27, 1987. 
2 5 9
 Ibid. 
2 8 0
 Notes of this meeting are in subcommittee files. 
2 6 1
 See Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, "Over-
sight of the New Drug Review Process and FDA's Regulation of Merital," May 22, 1986; and 
Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, FDA's Regula-
tion of the New Drug Suprol," supra. 
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had already been reported for Versed, particularly when used by 
endoscopists for conscious sedation.262 Section 200.5(c) of FDA's 
regulations requires that information in a "Dear Doctor" letter 
concerning "a significant hazard to health" be sent as a "Drug 
Warning" letter in an envelope bearing the words "Important 
Drug Warning" in large red letters.263 FDA permitted the Febru-
ary 1987 letter to be sent as a far less precautionary "prescribing 
information" letter; that is, the envelope only bore the words "Im-
portant Prescribing Information" in blue letters.264 
The result, if the experience of Dr. Douglas Walta, a Portland, 
OR, gastroenterologist, is representative, is that much of the target 
audience of the February 1987 letter was not alerted to the prob-
lems that had been reported for Versed. Dr. Walta testified that 
the letter didn't "grab" his "attention" because 
. . .[i]t didn't have a warning on it at all. It was just an-
other standard letter, pushing Versed, like thousands of 
other drugs are pushed upon us. There was no red warning 
flag, no indication that this is something that better get 
your attention.265 
By contrast, Dr. Walta testified, 
. . . the big red warnings when they come out, get every-
body's attention. They recognize that something has hap-
pened to this product that made the FDA either force the 
drug company or encourage the company to communicate 
to us that there's a problem. A red warning gets my atten-
tion.266 
Dr. Carl Peck, Director, FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, testified that in the months following the drug's market-
ing 
. . . the situation . . . was considered to be a serious signal 
deserving of careful evaluation. Indeed, the Office of Epi-
demiology and Biostatistics got into gear and began to 
have frequent safety conferences to review the data as it 
came in.267 
The committee concludes, however, that that seriousness was not 
adequately imparted to the medical profession. 
The February 1987 Dear Doctor letter also downplayed the po-
tential seriousness of Versed-associated respiratory depression. Al-
though by February 1987 FDA had received at least 16 reports of 
fatal Versed-associated cardiorespiratory reactions, the "Dear 
Doctor" letter Roche sent that month neglected to mention that 
deaths had been associated with the drug's use.268 Yet, that same 
month the company added to the Versed package insert the state-
ment that "respiratory depression, apneas, respiratory arrest and/ 
2 6 2
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 31. 
2 8 3
 Ibid. 
2 8 4
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or cardiac arrest, sometimes resulting in death" 2 6 9 (emphasis sup-
plied) had been associated with use of Versed. 
During the subcommittee's hearing, Dr. Janet Arrowsmith, Medi-
cal Epidemiologist, FDA's Office of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, 
defended the omission of any mention of deaths on the grounds 
. . . that we did not consider the events reported to us to-
tally unexpected. . . [I]n this case, respiratory depression 
and CNS depression is part of the desired effect of the 
drug and it is dose-dependent.270 
Dr. Arrowsmith's testimony, however, does not make the case that 
death was an expected outcome of Versed use. Her testimony only 
establishes that respiratory depression was "not . . . totally unex-
pected" under some circumstances with Versed: 
When the drug is given at a higher than recommended 
dose, especially in the face of, for instance, meperidine, 
which is a CNS depressant, Fentanyl and phenobarbital, 
which many of these patients were receiving at the time 
that they got the Versed, giving the full dose, and in pa-
tients who are elderly, giving the full dose of Versed, respi-
ratory depression is not unexpected.271 
That respiratory depression is known to be a dose-related conse-
quence of benzodiazepine use, particularly when other CNS depres-
sants are used, does not mean that large number of fatal cardiores-
piratory reactions to Versed were to be "expected". In fact, Dr. Ar-
rowsmith's superior, Dr. Gerald Faich, Director, FDA's Office of 
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, testified before the subcommittee 
that "[t]here is an instance where death as an event, might be 
deemed expected and might not necessarily be anticipated or re-
portable—that is not the case with this drug, however, where death 
is not an expected event or at least wasn't early on." 2 7 2 
Dr. Arrowsmith also maintained that deaths need not have been 
mentioned in the February 1987 "Dear Doctor" letter because 
. . . cardiac arrest and respiratory arrest, if unattended, 
are fatal events. That's what it means. The heart has 
stopped and breathing has stopped. . . . So that it's redun-
dant in some ways to say cardiac arrest, respiratory arrest 
or death.273 
Mentioning that several deaths had been associated with Versed 
use, however, would certainly have underscored and alerted physi-
cians to the gravity of failing to administer Versed under proper 
conditions. In fact, FDA medical officer, Dr. David Scally, noted in 
an.October 1, 1986, draft of a proposed Versed "Dear Doctor" 
letter, that the "high mortality" observed in connection with re-
ports of Versed-associated respiratory and cardiac arrest "dictates 
269 May 10 Hearing, galley page 29. 
2 7 0
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 29. Dr. Arrowsmith testified that "among the first 17 cases 
that we received, when we evaluated these as to the unexpectedness, given concomitant drugs, 
the age of the patient, the setting, the use, the dose of midazolam, we only actually felt that one 
of those was unexpected." May 10 Hearing, galley page 28. 
2 7 1
 Ibid. 
2 7 2
 May 5 Hearing, galley page 72. 
2 7 3
 May 10 Hearing, galley page 30. 
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that a reminder [about the conditions of safe use of the drug] is in-
dicated." 2 7 4 
It is noteworthy that Roche justified its November 1987 "Dear 
Doctor" warning by explicit reference to the deaths associated with 
Versed's use. That letter, unlike its February 1987 predecessor, 
stated: "Because serious adverse events, including respiratory de-
pression, apnea, cardiac arrest and death, have been associated 
with its use, we wish to reemphasize the need for careful individ-
ualized dosing." 2 7 5 (Emphasis supplied.) The November 1987 letter 
also introduced the new boxed warning that had been added to the 
Versed package insert, which similarly stated: 
Intravenous VERSED has been associated with respira-
tory depression and respiratory arrest, especially when 
used for conscious sedation. In some cases, where this is 
not recognized promptly and treated effectively, death or 
hypoxic encephalopathy has resulted.276 (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
The administrative record reveals that FDA requested this boxed 
warning emphasis on Versed-associated deaths in an October 9, 
1987, letter to Roche.277 Eventually, when left to its own devices, 
FDA, notwithstanding some of the agency's testimony before the 
subcommittee, considered it important to emphasize that "death" 
was the outcome of some reported cases of "respiratory arrest". 
That Versed-associated cardiorespiratory arrest had proven fatal 
in several instances also could suggest that it may be significantly 
more difficult to resuscitate patients experiencing cardiorespiratory 
reactions to Versed than alternative drugs. In this connection, Dr. 
Douglas C. Walta, the Gastroenterology Clinic and Providence Hos-
pital, Portland, Oregon, testified that, in his experience, respiratory 
depression induced by Valium could be far easier to counteract 
than that produced by Versed.278 
FDA also understated the potential gravity of Versed-associated 
respiratory depression in its communication with health profession-
als. The April 1987 FDA Drug Bulletin on Versed-associated respi-
ratory and cardiac arrest, like Roche's February 1987 "Dear 
Doctor" letter, failed to mention that many such reactions involved 
deaths.219 The bulletin simply stated that "FDA has received 17 
domestic reports" of serious cardiorespiratory reactions to 
Versed.280 By April 1987, however, FDA had received more than 17 
reports of fatal cardiorespiratory reactions to the drug.281 Prior to 
April 1987, FDA had received at least 19 reports of Versed-associat-
ed cardiorespiratory deaths and 35 total reports of serious cardio-
respiratory reactions to Versed.282 
2 7 4
 In subcommittee files 
275 Hearings, Appendix I. 
2 7 6
 Ibid. 
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 This letter is in subcommittee files. This letter requested that Roche use the same lan-
guage that was drafted by Dr. David Scally, FDA's medical reviewer for Versed, in an October 7, 
1987, review, which is in subcommittee files. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The committee regrets that many of the deficiencies found in 
this report have been identified by the committee in earlier re-
ports, but FDA has failed to take adequate remedial action. These 
and the other deficiencies enumerated in this report should be cor-
rected immediately. The committee specifically recommends that 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services promptly take steps 
to ensure that: 
1. FDA receives and reviews all potentially important publi-
cations in the medical literature regarding the safety and effi-
cacy of new drugs before it approves them for marketing. 
2. FDA thoroughly examines all documents and files that 
might contain information important to assessing the safety or 
efficacy of new drugs under agency review. The agency should 
consider the feasibility of consolidating the companion IND 
and NDA files for any new drug following the submission of a 
new drug application for that drug. 
3. FDA promulgates regulations requiring sponsors to submit 
to it information from foreign nations relating to new drugs 
under agency review, including 
(a) all labeling approved by foreign regulatory authori-
ties; 
(b) all standardized warning or information letters dis-
tributed to practitioners abroad; 
(c) all reports and analyses obtained from foreign regula-
tory authorities of adverse drug reactions and other signif-
icant aspects of the toxicity of such drugs; 
(d) all correspondence and related documents received 
from foreign regulatory agencies related to any denial of 
marketing approval on safety grounds; and 
(e) accounts of all important regulatory developments, 
including major changes in marketing status or labeling 
information, in connection with the use of such drugs out-
side the United States. 
The committee recommends that FDA publish guidelines call-
ing for the aforementioned information that will remain in 
effect pending completion of notice and comment rulemaking. 
4. FDA vigorously enforces all legal adverse reaction report-
ing requirements applicable to new drug sponsors. FDA should 
alert its new drug reviewers, on a periodic basis, to the need 
for prompt investigation of all evidence received of potentially 
serious breaches of these requirements. Towards this end, FDA 
should take immediate steps to guarantee that its reviewers 
are familiar with and understand the specific reporting obliga-
tions of new drug sponsors. 
5. FDA permit "Dear Doctor" letters designed to caution 
practitioners about potentially serious drug safety problems to 
be issued only as "Drug Warning" letters in accordance with 
the procedures set forth in Section 200.5(c) of FDA's regula-
tions. 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. JIM LIGHTFOOT, HON. FRANK 
HORTON, HON. WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., HON. AL 
McCANDLESS, HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, HON. HOWARD C. 
NIELSON, HON. JOSEPH J. DioGUARDIA, HON. DONALD E. 
"BUZ" LUKENS, HON. AMORY HOUGHTON, JR., HON. J. 
DENNIS HASTERT, AND HON. JAMES M. INHOFE 
The Committee plays an important oversight function. It is the 
Committee's responsibility to review and study the operation of 
government activities at all levels, including the regulation of 
drugs and other products by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). In reviewing these activities, the Committee must strive to 
present as fair and complete of a picture as possible. 
In the case of this report, the Committee has raised a number of 
legitimate concerns that question FDA's regulation of the new drug 
Versed. For example, the Committee finds that the drug sponsor 
did not submit timely reports to FDA of important information and 
that FDA was not familiar with foreign marketing of Versed. The 
Committee assumes that if FDA had been aware of this informa-
tion, then many of the problems associated with the use of Versed 
could have possibly been avoided. This could be the case; however, 
it will be FDA's responsibility to determine whether knowledge of 
this information would have made a difference in the regulation of 
the drug. 
In light of the Subcommittee's investigation and the Committee's 
report, as well as the Public Citizen Health Research Group's citi-
zens' petition on Versed, we would expect that FDA will review 
closely the issues that have been raised. We note that at this time 
no definitive answers have been put forward. Therefore, we will 
await FDA's review of this matter before we make any indictments 
on whether information was submitted in a timely manner and 
whether FDA appropriately reviewed important information. 
Another point we would like to address is the role of medical 
mismanagement in the safety and use of Versed. When FDA began 
to receive adverse drug reaction reports, there were some concerns 
that the drug was not being used properly and that adequate moni-
toring of the patient during use was not occurring. In light of these 
concerns, FDA and the drug sponsor initiated steps to inform the 
medical community of among other things the importance of indi-
vidualizing the dosage, administering the drug slowly, and monitor-
ing the patient closely. We believe these steps, i.e. "Dear Doctor 
letters and revised labeling, were beneficial in informing the medi-
cal profession of the precautions that were needed when using this 
drug. 
The Committee, however, raises a question about whether the 
first "Dear Doctor" letter was suficient to warn physicians about 
problems with Versed. The Committee finds that a "Drug Warn-
ing" letter would have been more appropriate than a letter discuss-
(45) 
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ing drug prescribing information. Witnesses at the hearing indicat-
ed that they often don't read all of their mail, such as "Dear 
Doctor" letters, because of the enormous amount of promotional and 
other material they receive. While we can sympathize with them 
on this issue, we also believe that more care needs to be taken phy-
sicians to review material which will assist them in performing 
their jobs. 
In addition, we would encourage FDA to review whether "Dear 
Doctor" letters are effective in relaying information to physicians. 
If these letters are going unread because they do not have a "Drug 
Warning" message on the envelope, then perhaps FDA should 
devise an alternative system to inform physicians about important 
drug information. 
The final issue which we would like to address is the objectivity 
of the hearing held on Versed. While we fully support the role of 
the Subcommittee to conduct oversight on FDA's activities and 
while we believe that the Committee has raised legitimate concerns 
in this report, we question whether the original hearing was held 
in as fair and as objective manner as possible. For example, minori-
ty members of the Subcommittee were not informed of the hearing 
until reading about it in a trade publication. They were also not 
informed of who would be testifying until less then 24 hours before 
the hearing, although the majority of the witnesses were invited to 
testify five to six weeks prior to the scheduled date of the hearing. 
In addition, it appeared that a balanced picture of Versed was not 
sought. 
Versed is a potent drug, and is one that should be used with 
care. Inappropriate use of Versed can result in adverse reactions. 
However, the drug has been and continues to be used successfully 
by many anesthesiologists and gastroenterologists, which, in our 
opinion, was not a picture presented by the non-FDA witnesses at 
the hearing. Two of the witnesses testified about their experiences 
with Versed. In both cases, they had patients whose deaths were 
associated with the use of Versed. Naturally they testified that they 
would never use Versed again. 
However, what was not told about the two fatalities was that 
when FDA reviewed the cases, other factors could have played an 
important role in the fatal reaction. For instance, FDA's assess-
ment of one case was that "the Versed dose was excessive consider-
ing the patient age and concomitant narcotic exposure" and that 
"the contrast dye may have been the precipitating agent"; FDA's 
assessment of the other case showed among other things that 
"Versed was not being used for an approved indication and was not 
administered in an appropriate dose or by an approved and appropri-
ate method." (May 12, 1988, Memo from Drs. Arrowsmith and Faich 
to the Hearing Record, Appendix 2) 
We believe that a different perspective on Versed should be pre-
sented at this time. In a June 28, 1988, response to a letter from 
Congressman Lightfoot about his experiences with Versed, Dr. J.G. 
Reves, a Professor of Anesthesiology at the Duke University Medical 
Center, wrote: 
* * * I would state that Versed has been an important 
new addition to the formulary. In my own practice I use it 
every day in every patient that I care for. I have had ab-
47 
solutely no complications from this drug which is clearly 
superior to Diazepam and other benzodiazepines in my 
practice. In my own clinical practice and in a number of 
clinical investigations with this drug I have found it to 
be a very predictable and effective compound of great value 
to clinicians." (Hearing, Appendix 2) 
In a June 1, 1988, letter to Congressman Lightfoot, Dr. Stanley 
B. Benjamin, Chief of the Division of Gastroenterology at George-
town University Hospital, wrote: 
It is my sincere belief that we can not blame the drug 
for what would appear in many situations to be (a) lack of 
monitoring of patients under their care. I believe this drug 
is a(n) important part of the safe and effective practice of 
Gastroneterology but it must be used with caution and re-
spect. (Hearing, Appendix 2) 
Another comment received was from Dr. David Fleischer, Chief 
of the Endoscopy Unit at Georgetown University Hospital; he wrote 
in a July 5, 1988, letter that: 
I personally, and the majority of my colleagues, feel that 
midazolom (Versed) presents a significant advance over 
diazepam (Valium) for patients who undergo endoscopic 
procedures. It is shorter-acting and the amnesic effect is 
greater. I believe there is nothing intrinsically more dan-
gerous about midazolom than diazepam and I believe that 
if appropriate monitoring precautions are taken, the drug 
can continue to be a useful and valuable product for the 
care of patients with gastrointestinal diseases who undergo 
endoscopic procedures. (Hearing Appendix 2) 
Granted, others might have different views on Versed, but the 
central point is that a balanced picture be presented. 
In conclusion, we believe the Committee has raised some signifi-
cant questions which need further exploration. We also believe that 
our oversight responsibilities as it pertains to the FDA can signifi-
cantly improve the safety of drugs used by the American public. 
We would hope that the Committee continues to exercise its re-
sponsibilities in this area in as objective and complete manner as 
possible. 
J I M LIGHTFOOT. 
FRANK HORTON. 
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR. 
AL MCCANDLESS. 
LARRY E. CRAIG. 
HOWARD C. NIELSON. 
JOSEPH J. DIOGUARDI. 
DONALD E. " B U Z " LUKENS. 
AMORY HOUGHTON, JR. 
J. DENNIS HASTERT. 
JAMES M. INHOFE. O 
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98TH CONGRESS ) HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIVES f EEPORT 
1st Session ) \ No. 98-584 
FDA'S R E G U L A T I O N O F ZOMAX 
DECEMBER 2, 1983.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
State of the Union and ordered to be printed 
Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on Government Operations, 
submitted the following 
T H I R T Y - F I R S T R E P O R T 
together with 
A D D I T I O N A L AND D I S S E N T I N G V I E W S 
BASED OX A STUDY BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND 
H U M A N RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE 
On November 15, 1983, the Committee on Government Operations 
approved and adopted a report entitled "FDA's Regulation of 
Zomax." The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker 
of the House. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
Government Operations has responsibility for studying the operation 
of Government activities at all levels from the standpoint of economy 
and efficiency. The committee has assigned this responsibility as it re-
lates to the Department of Health and Human Services ( H H S ) to 
the Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources Subcommittee. 
Few governmental activities affect the public's health more than 
those involved in determining whether powerful new drug products 
are safe and effective for human use. For this reason, a high priority of 
the subcommittee has been to examine the administrative performance 
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in protecting the public 
from unsafe and ineffective drugs. 
FDA's regulation of the pain reliever, Zomax (generic name zome-
pirac sodium), had been the focus of an ongoing subcommittee investi-
gation into FDA's policies and procedures for assuring the safetv of 
new drugs when its manufacturer, McNeil Pharmaceutical, a subsidi-
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>f Johnson and Johnson, withdrew Zomax from the market on 
•h 4, 198'), because of a large number of serious allergic reactions, 
iding deaths, associated with its use. 
io. subcommittee's investigation of FDA's regulation of Zomax in-
H\ two days of public hearings on April '2(5 and '27, lOH .^1 Wit-
's included the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administra-
an expert toxicologist, practicing physicians and Zomax patients, 
representatives of McNeil Pharmaceutical. 
io subcommittee also examined the relevant scientific literature 
FDA documents, including correspondence, internal memoranda 
reports, safety and eflicacy reviews, verbatim transcripts of FDA 
sory committee meetings, and information contained in new drug 
lieation (NDA) and investigational new drug (IND^ files. The 
prehensive nature of this review has enabled the subcommittee 
valuate FDA's policies and procedures for approving and regu-
ig the use of Zomax, and, by extension, new drugs in general. 
I I . BACKGROUND 
DA approved Zomax on October 28, 1980, for the relief of mild 
moderately severe pain. Zomax was the first nonsteroidal anti-
ammatory drug (NSAID) approved for this purpose.2 
omax was synthesized in 19(>9 by its manufacturer, McNeil Phar-
:eutical (NcNeil).3 McNeil submitted an investigational new7 drug 
dication (IND) for Zomax on July 22, 1974, and a new drug 
dication (NDA) on December 18, 1978. Approximately 3,(>00 users 
ticipated in the Zomax clinical trials in the United States. 
Fornax is the only approved nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug 
isidered by FDA to pose a possible cancer risk to humans. Because 
its carcinogenic potential, the Zomax package insert advised 
it ion in prescribing Zomax for long-term use, and recommended 
linst use by children. 
5omax has oeen associated with a large number of reports of ana-
ylactoid reactions—allergic or hypersensitivity reactions which 
lerally involve rapid onset (i.e., within 20 minutes of taking the 
ug), lowered blood pressure, breathing difficulty, swelling of the 
!e and/or other areas, rash, and itching. Patients going into ana-
ylactic shock can lose consciousness. Serious anaphylactoid reac-
ns require emergency room treatment with epinephrine (adrena-
i), often accompanied by an antihistamine. 
The first published report of a Zomax-associated anaphylactoid 
iction appeared in the April 1G, 1981, issue of the New England 
>urnal of Medicine,.4 Dr. Judith Jones, formerly Director, FDA's 
ivision of Drug Experience, testified that this report was probably 
e agency's "first signal of a problem." 5 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on (Joverninent Operations, House 
Representatives. "FDA's Regulation of Zomax," April 26 and 27, 1083, hereafter re-
red to as Hearings. 
'On May 3. 1077, McNeil requested permission, based on early Phase II clinical trial 
uilts, to develop the drug as an analgesic ra ther than as a nonsteroidal anti lnrlam-
itory drug. 
1
 Zomax Is almost identical in chemical s t ructure to Tolectln (generic name tolmetin 
Hum), another nonsteroidal anti inflammatory drug manufactured by McNeil which 
is approved more than four years before Zomax. 
Mn subcommittee files. The case was reported by McNeil to FDA on March 18. 1981. 
IIN ease report is in subcommittee flies. 
0
 Hearings, page 418. 
3 
On May 26, 1981, approximately seven months after Zomax was ap-
proved, FDA listed Zomax third among the drugs in its class in total 
number of reports received of drug-associated anaphylactoid reac-
tions.6 On July 23, 1981, McNeil added to the precautions section of 
the drug's package insert a statement that u [a js with other non-
steroidal antiinflammatory drugs, anaphylactoid reactions have been 
reported" for Zomax.7 
On March 12, 1982, McNeil received its first report of a fatal 
Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reaction.8 One week later, McNeil 
notified FDA that it was considering the dissemination of a Dear 
Doctor warning letter in light of an aincreasing number of serious 
allergic and anaphylactic reactions" associated with Zomax.9 On 
March 22 and 29, 1982, the company met with FDA to discuss the 
types of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions which had oc-
curred and to review McNeil drafts for such a letter.10 On April 9, 
1982, the company sent a Dear Doctor letter to over 200,000 physicians, 
urging caution in prescribing Zomax for patients who previously 
showed hypersensitivity to Zomax or any other nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs, particularly aspirin and Tolectin (generic name 
tolmetin sodium), another McNeil drug nearly identical in chemical 
structure to Zomax.11 
On February 8, 1983, McNeil reported a second death from Zomax-
associated anaphylaxis.12 At the company's request, FDA met with 
McNeil on February 11, 1983, to discuss development of new Zomax 
labeling. FDA recommended package insert revisions which would 
emphasize that patients restarting Zomax after a layoff period are 
at greater risk. At this meeting, the company informed FDA officials 
that it had received 908 reports of Zomax-associated allergie/anaphy-
lactoid reactions.13 
Following two additional reports of Zomax-associated deaths, Mc-
Neil and FDA met again on February 28, 1983. McNeil proposed at 
the meeting to promote Zomax primarily for chronic use, in view of 
the increased risk associated with intermittent use of Zomax.14 
On March 3, 1983, a Syracuse, New York, television program fea-
tured a local physician, who recounted his life-threatening anaphy-
lactoid reaction to Zomax.15 In the wake of the publicity this gen-
erated,16 McNeil announced on March 4, 1983, that it was temporarily 
removing the drug from the market, pending an evaluation of its 
• Hearings, pages 277-280. Fourteen such reports had been made for Zomax, compared 
to 17 for Tolectln and 43 for Motrin (ibuprofen). 
7
 The July 23, 1081. labeling supplement is In subcommittee files. The labeling change 
was Immediately put Into effect, although it was not formally approved by FDA until Sep-
tember 24. 1981. 
* The report of this death is In subcommittee files. 
"See memorandum by Dr. Marlon Flnkel. Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, 
of a March 10. 1982. telephone conversation with Edward Lemanowlcz of McNeil, which 
la In subcommittee files. 
" H e a r i n g s , pages 108-9. 
11
 Hearings, page 110. 
11
 The report of this death Is In subcommittee flies. 
18
 Hearings, page 126. 
M
 Hearings, pages 1 1 6 7 . 
"•The phvsician. Dr. Jack Yoffa. testified at the subcommittee's hearings. 
16
 Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, learned of 
the upcoming program during a March 3. 1083, telephone conversation with Dr. Patr ick 
Seay of McNeil. According to Dr. Temple's memorandum of that conversation, which is in 
subcommittee files. Dr. Seay "was a lit t le worried about what everyone would say." In 
addition, an FDA memorandum of a March 4. 1083. meeting with McNeil states : "The 
S>racuse t.v. broadcast was discussed . . . Both the firm and FDA had already been receiv-
ing calls from physicians, pharmacists , and consumers and many more were anticipated." 
See Hearings, p. 175. 
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idverse effects and the development of new labeling. At the time of 
vithdrawal, the company stated that a total of 5 deaths from Zomax-
issociated anaphylactoid reactions had been reported. Three of these 
leaths occurred in individuals who restarted the drug after a layoff 
>eriod and were not allergic to aspirin. McNeil advised F D A shortly 
titer removing Zoinax from the market that 75% of the serious cases 
)f allergic/anaphylactoid reactions reported for Zomax involved drug 
•estarts.17 
Following the Zomax withdrawal, McNeil proposed new labeling 
>tating that "anaphylactic reactions, sometimes life threatening and 
rarely fatal, have been reported more frequently to Zomax than to 
)ther nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs." The proposed labeling 
ilso emphasized that the majority of serious hypersensitivity reac-
tions appear "to occur in individuals without a prior allergic 
listory." 18 
On August 19,1982, seven months before Zomax was removed from 
the market, F D A data from May 1981 showing 14 reports of Zomax-
stssociated anaphylactoid reactions, were published in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine™ I n addition to this report, only five other 
reports of such reactions, involving a total of six cases, had been pub-
lished in the medical literature prior to the ding's withdrawal from 
the market.20 At the time of withdrawal, McNeil stated that it had re-
ceived a total of 1,100 reports of Zomax-associated allergic/anaphylac-
toid reactions since the drug's approval.21 
On April 26 and 27,1983, the subcommittee held hearings on FDA' s 
review and post-market regulation of Zomax. In addition, the sub-
committee questioned F D A concerning the conditions which would 
have to be met before it would permit the drug's remarketing. 
FDA referred the question of whether Zomax should be remarketed 
to its Arthritis Advisory Committee. On August 19,1983, the advisory 
committee voted to recommend remarketing of Zomax on the condi-
tion that the sponsor conduct studies during remarketing to determine 
whether there is a population for whom Zomax, in view of its greater 
risks, could be shown superior to other drugs in its class.22 The F D A 
has yet to act on the advisory committee's recommendation. 
As of September 15, 1983, Zomax has been associated with a total 
of 2,161 reports of allergic/anaphylactoid reactions since its ap-
proval.23 Based on McNeil adverse reaction reports, FDA has recently 
determined that Zomax-induced anaphylactoid reaction has probably 
caused nine or ten deaths in the United States since the drug's ap-
17
 Hearings, p. 175. 
1S
 In subcommittee flies. ,. __ _ . . 
w
 Rossi, et al., "Tolmetin-Induced Anaphylactoid Reactions, New England Journal of 
Medicine, Vol. 3, No. 8 (August 19, 1982), pages 499-500. 
*> Samuel, "Apparent Anaphylactic Reaction to Zomepirac (Zomax), New England Jour-
nal of Medicine, Vol. 304. No. 16 (April 16, 1981), page 978; Smith Anaphylactic Shock, 
Acute Rennl Failure, and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation, Journal of the Amer-
ican Medical Association, Vol. 247, No. 8 (February 26. 1982), pages H72-3 ; Ross, et al.. 
"Near Fatnl Bronehospasm Induced by Zomepirac Sodium," Annals of Allergy, Vol. 48, 
* See March 4, 1983, McNeil press release, which is in subcommittee files. 
« The verbatim transcript of the advisory committee meeting is in subcommittee files. 
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proval.24 The F D A has also concluded that such a reaction cannot be 
ruleu out as causing zb other sudden, unexpected deaths. Some of these 
28 deaths, however, occurred in patients with a history of cardiovas-
cular disease. Too few details were available to classify the remaining 
portion as likely due to drug-induced anaphylactoid reaction.25 
I I I . F D A APPROVED ZOMAX WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE T H A T ITS 
BENEFITS OUTWEIGHED ITS POSSIBLE CARCINOGENIC I I I S K 
Dr. liobert Temple, Acting Director, FDA's Office of New Drug 
Evaluation, testitied that, based on animal studies, F D A believes 
Zomax has the "potential to . . . cause malignant tumors . . . in man." 26 
F D A has held in the past that if a drug which has been found to be 
a carcinogen in animal studies has not been demonstrated superior to 
alternative drugs already on the market which do not have a carcino-
genic potential, it is not usafe for use" within the meaning of the Food 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.27 The Committee finds that F D A failed to 
apply this standard in approving Zoinax without the required 
evidence from adequate and well-controlled studies of its superiority 
to alternative drugs which are not potentially carcinogenic. 
THE POTENTIAL CARCINOGENICITY OF ZOMAX 
FDA's pharmacologist found up to a 30% incidence, or a three-
fold increase, in adrenal medullary tumors in male rats fed Zomax 
in a two-year study.28 The agency's statistician concluded that this 
evidence was statistically significant.29 In addition, an F D A path-
ologist—the only agency reviewer to examine the rat tumor slides— 
diagnosed the tumors as "malignant." 30 
Based on his independent review of the report of this study, Dr. M. 
Adrian Gross, a former F D A toxicologist currently serving as a senior 
u
 This analysis has been performed by Dr. John Harter, Group Leader for FDA's 
Zomax review, based on an October 7, 1983, adverse reaction submission from McNeil. 
* Ibid. 
29
 Hearings, page 115. 27
 Hearings, page 190. 38
 Hearings, page 146. 28
 Hearings, pages 156-7. The statistician's review was based on the tumor classlflca 
tlons of McNeil's pathologists. A consulting pathologist to McNeil found an even mon 
significant trend in adrenal tumorlgenlclty in the rat study. See Hearings, pages 60 and 
236-7. 30
 Hearings, pages 160-2. He diagnosed them as malignant pheochromocytoma tumors 
Dr. Marion Finkel, formerly Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation, testified thai 
the pathologist had "told us verbally that he felt that the tumors were not malignant.' 
Hearings, page 163. However, no document In FDA's files contradicts his written conclu 
slons as to their malignancy. In a May 10, 1983, letter to the subcommittee, the pathologls 
reiterated his diagnosis that the tumors were malignant and noted that he would hav 
ensured that any change in diagnosis were documented as part of the agency's Zoma: 
review record. Hearings, page 167. 
On March 7, 1983, three days after McNeil withdrew Zomax from the market, FDJ 
approved a February 4, 1982, proposed labeling revision which characterized the ra 
tumors as "benign". At an August 19, 1983, meeting of FDA's Arthritis Advisory Com 
mittee, Dr. Temple of the FDA stated, however. "I don't think we (FDA J would be pr« 
pared to say they ar« unequivocally benign." Transcript of advisory committee mcetinj 
page 60. In subcommittee files. Dr. Temple acknowledged before the subcommittee tha 
some experts might characterize these tumors as exhibiting a "low order of malignancy. 
Hearings, p. 177. 
Dr. M. Adrian Gross testified before the subcommittee that "it is the policy of tli 
National Cancer Institute to regard all tumor inducing agents as carcinogens" (Hearing 
page 83). He further testified that "there Is no agent known that produces only benlg 
tumors ; therefore to denote a drug as a 'tumorlgen* is akin to using a misnomer." Heai 
ings. pace 63. Similarly, Dr. Temple of the FDA acknowledged that a finding of "benign 
tumors in experimental animals 'could reorcsent some carcino«?enlc risk for man" (Hea 
« -iKrtv rn «i«„. rtf this Acknowledgment, the committee questions the agency 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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iientific adviser with the Environmental Protection Agency, testified 
tat, correcting for surface area differences between rat and human, 
omax showed carcinogenic potential in rats at less than one-fifth of 
te recommended human dose.31 Since most carcinogens are identified 
1 studies in which test animals are administered doses many times 
uger than the intended human dose, Dr. Gross testified that Zomax 
irried a "highly significant" human cancer risk.32 Dr. Gross also found 
lat tumors appeared to occur earlier as the dose was increased, a phe-
onienon which constituted sufiicient evidence of the drug's potential 
ircinogenicity.33 
I t is FDA policy that a positive carcinogenicity study must be 
reproducible," although "not [necessarily] at the same level of sig-
ificance as the first study." ;u In this case, FDA has acknowledged 
liat a subsequent rat study, which showed a higher incidence of ad-
^nal tumors among treated male rats than controls, partially con-
rmed the results of the first study.35 Although the trend, unlike that 
i the first study, was not statistically significant,30 the rats were ad-
tinistered even less Zomax than those in the original study.37 
31
 I'age 65, Hearings. The ra t s were administered 4.15 percent to 17.70 percent of the 
commended human dose. Hearings, p. 38. Despite FDA's view that "there is no overriding 
;asou to assume, in compuring doses administered to test animals with those recommended 
>r humans, that extrapolation tfrom the test animal to the human] based on surtace area 
any more reliable or precise ' (Hearings, page 511) than extrapolation based on body 
eight (nig/kg), one of the most widely used toxicology texts presents a different view: 
Due might also view dosage on the basis of weight as being not as appropriate as other 
ises, such as surface area. Such a dosage term would reduce interspecies variation and 
ten reduce variation in a single species where there is a wide variation in size, such 
* occurs in man." Casarett and DouU's Toxicology, ed. by J. Doull, C. D. Claasen, and 
[. O. Amdur (McMillan Publishing Company, Inc. : New York, 1080), 2nd ed., page 22. 
Even on a body weight or mg/kg basis, the rats were administered one half to three-
•urths the recommended human dose, according to FDA's pharmacologist, who found 
tbeling approved by FDA sta t ing tha t the rats were fed "approximately the human 
ose in mg/kg' ' to be "misleading". (Hearings, page 204.) 82
 Hearings, page 67. 
:w
 Hearings, page 65. The first death with tumor among the high-dosed ra ts occurred 
t day 406 in the two-year study, as compared to day 602 in the low dosed group. 34
 Hearings, page 520. 85
 Hearings. 520. Following the subcommittee's hearings, FDA acknowledged a weak 
trend toward increased tumors" in the second Zomax ra t study. Hearings, page 520. How-
ver, on March 7, 1083, throe days following the drug's removal from the market, FDA 
pproved labeling stat ing there had been "no increase of tumors in males" in this study, 
u a similar vein, former Commissioner Hayes testified before the subcommittee that a 
relimlnary report of this study showed no tumor increase. Hearings, page 03. However, 
lie only review performed by FDA's pharmacologist of the second Zomax rat study, 
hich was based on this preliminary report, concluded that "tumor incidence was higher 
i all three treated groups than in controls. Probably the three treated groups combined 
ould give a significant difference against control." Hearings, page 107. Dr. Hayes lm-
lied that once the full report of the second Zomax rat study had been received and re-
iewed by the agency, FDA approved new labeling denying that tumors had increased in 
he study. Hearings, page 03. Dr. Temple of the FDA acknowledged before the subeom-
ilttee, however, that the only pharmacology review performed prior to approving this 
ibeling revision was the one which identified an increased tumor incidence among treated 
lale rats. In fact, the full report of second ra t study was never reviewed until shortly be-
fore the agency was to appear before the subcommittee, and more than two years after 
'DA received it. Hearings, page 93. 
38
 The results of the second rat study are statistically significant if. as FDA suggested 
u connection with the results of a one year Zomax monkey study, hyperplasia (or the ab-
ormal growth of normal cells) can be seen as a precursor lesion to neoplasia or tumors. 
Commissioner Hayes testified tha t the absence of hyperplasia in a one-year Zomax monkey 
tudy was evidence of the non-tumorigenleity of Zomax, Hearings, page 93 ) If hyperplasia 
» a precursor to tumors, then the second r a t study which, according to FDA. shows "total 
yperplasla and tumors were significantly increased" (Hearings, page 520) would reveal, 
ike the first Zomax rat trial, a statist ically significant trend towards adrenal gland tu-
lorlgenlcity. See Hearings, p. 60. 37
 Hearings, page 66. FDA testified tha t two eighteen month Zomax mouse studies did 
ot show tuinorigenicity. However, the animals in the higher dose mouse trial , according 
o Dr. Gross, were administered, on a body-surface basis, only .70 to 5.68 percent of the 
oeommended human dose, or a small fraction of the already small doses administered to 
he r a t s in the first Zomax rat study. Hearings, page 45. In addition, despite an FDA-
upported study showing that mice fed known carcinogens often take longer than 18 months 
o develop tumors (Hearings, page 212 ; see also memorandum of October 16, 1080 meeting, 
ictween FDA and McNeil in Hearings, page 166), the agency did not implement Its phar-
naeologist's recommendation to extend the mouse studies to 24 months. Hearings, pages 
31 and 235. 
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Dr. Temple testified for FDA that Zomax "is and was considered a 
tumorigen"; 38 the rat tumor findings "could represent some degree of 
carcinogenic risk for man."39 Dr. Temple, in fact, characterized the 
low doses at which Zomax induced tumors in the rat as "scary".40 
FDA'S RISK/BENEFIT DETERMINATION 
Before Zomax, FDA had never approved a nonsteroidal anti-inflam-
matory drug (NJ5A1D) which it considered potentially carcinogenic. 
FDA's pharmacologist recommended nonapproval of Zomax, "pending 
resolution of whether adrenal medullary tuinorigenicity and hyperpla-
sia can or cannot be tolerated in a drug for which there are alternative 
therapeutic agents available."41 AVhiie maintaining that it regarded 
the potential carcinogenicity of Zomax as a asenous matter," 42 the 
agency testified that evidence of the drug's unique effectiveness was 
"sufficient to support its approval . . . despite the tumorigenicity/hyper-
plasia in male rats." 43 . 
However, FDA has not determined from scientific evidence that 
Zomax is superior to alternative drugs which do not have a carcino-
genic potential. Although he had previously questioned "the need for 
another analgesic Lnamely, ZoniaxJ equal to aspirin with codeine or 
acetaminophen with codeine." " Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director 
of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, testified that some agency 
personnel believed Zomax was enormously valuable as a non-narcotic 
equivalent to and "potential replacement for modest doses of mor-
phine." 45 The agency, however, has never approved claims of equiva-
*» Hearings, page 150. FDA testified that the ra t studies were inconclusive because 
-adrenal medullary tumors were of a type common in untreated ra t s • ' Hearings». I»«Ke ^ 2 . 
Since a •tumorigen ', as FDA acknowledges, is an agent which udutvH a s iU»»^ai l increase in tumors in treated as compared to untreated animals (Hearings, page o l b ) , 
^ i u u ^ e r h l l U s u c h t u . n o r s occur spontaneously in untreated rats. See H**™**-™* 
64 Moreover the incidence with which such tumors occur spontaneously in rats appears 
to'be a matter of scientific dispute. See Hearings, pages 58-60. 'iv...i.l«» U 
*• Hearings, page loll. In acKiiowledging tlie carcinogenic risk of Zomax Dr. lemple lb 
s t i t i i ig FDV's insti tutional position, as well as the views of its reviewing pharmacol-
ogists See Hearings, W e 158. That Zomax may be carcinogenic is not as Dr. Robert 
UussTn VicePres ident for Scientific Affairs a t McNeil, testified, the view of a lone agency 
' ^ " ^ n ^ ^ ^ t t o r e the subcommittee tha t " the ra t is a poor model with 
respect to prediction of the effect of zomepirae in man since the rat " f ^ ^ * z ^ i v sorv 
sodium differently from man." At an August 10 1083, meeting of the Art | ri f^  fch i sop 
Committee Dr. Temple of the FDA did not find this argument persuasUe gi\cii the 
i n h e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n s in testing for human carcinogenicity: "Everyone should be aware 
tha t t h e r e r i a l i are only two species typically used in cancer studies : rats andI mice 
and various s trains of all of them, and it is unusual and ; e r y u e k y y o u h v j a , , 
reason to think the metabolism of the rat and he mouse tor any <»™* J * " * 1 } £ " 
is for humans So to say tha t something is or is not a good model because it doesn 
meUbolS": .TexaeUy t h e W i e . that is just par t of the basic.facts o f f ^ ^ , ! » v r ^ ( ^ 
mice That is often true. It may be true here also, but it is sort of ordinarm irue as 
w i n ' " Verbatim transerint of August 10, 1083, Arthri t is Advisory Committee meeting, 
pages II -58 51 I X H I S t , files. Moreover,' the Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act places 
oon tl e spo sor of a new drug the burden for proving its product safe for market ng. 
That t i e r a n U g h t b V a s McNeil maintains, a poor model for predicting human earcino-
L'. citv does ot mean that McNeil has established the long term safety of Zomax More-
ov s i M Adrian dross testified, " l U h e s e are the data tha t have been submitted as 
e d e m - e of s'af<.v by McNeil ' (Hearings, page 81) and the "least that we can state here 
is that none of these tests establish that Zomax is safe from a carcinogenic point of vie*. 
( I V M I ! ^ Despite such a characterization. FDA rejected the recommenda-
tion of i s pharmacologist who. noting that Zomax had a "potential toxicity l i e ear-
rVinotrenic tv not see with other unproved NSAIDs." recommended "a box warning in 
the l abe l ing 1 as a minimum . ! . alerting to the carcinogenic and hyperplastic potential 
basel on 2 vr rat studv." Hearings, page 238. 
«i Hearings, page 238. 
" H e a r i n g s , page 159. 
*
3
 Hearings, page 88. 
" H e a r i n g s , page 174. 
45
 Hearings, page 176. 
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nee to morphine as part of the Zoniax labeling.46 Both the supervisory 
edicai oiiicer in the Zoniax review 4T and * D A s statisticians 48 do 
)t believe such an equivalence has been demonstrated. In approving 
3inax, FDA excluded statements of such an equivalence from the 
rug's labeling, pending submission of results from an important study 
miparing the eilicacy of Zoniax and morphine.45' Dr. John llarter, 
roup Leader in FDA's Zoniax review, testiiied that the study eventu-
ly proved to be "inconclusive." r,° 
Dr. Temple of FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation testified that 
jmax was "uniquely effective compared to other nonsteroidal anti-
irtammatory drugs'"51 in treating higher levels of pain. Dr. Marion 
inkel, who preceded him in that position, acknowledged, however, 
uit the eilicacy of the other NSAlDs had not been studied in similar 
lin levels. u|_iJf ^ i e y n a ^ been so studied," she testified, they "might 
so have been found to be as effective" as some considered Zoniax to 
5.52 Without clinical studies comparing the efficacy of Zomax to that 
t other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agents for more severe pain, 
lere is no scientific basis for concluding that Zomax had been shown 
miquely effective" in treating such pain. 
Dr. Temple of the FDA testified that "everyone . . . agrees" with 
le assessment of Dr. John l larter , Group Leader for FDA's Zomax 
jview, that if Zomax had advantages over other NSAIDs, it was as a 
nin reliever for acute, not chronic use.53 But chronic use, former Com-
issioner Hayes testified, would enhance the drug's carcinogenic risk, 
or that reason, he stated that Zoniax was approved primarily for use 
5 a short-term analgesic.04 
The Zomax package insert urged caution in prescribing the drug 
>r chronic pain. Chronic use, however, was not contraindicated.55 In 
ict, prior to approving Zomax, FDA expected that it would be used 
ironically. Because Zomax, like other anti-inflammatory drugs, had 
potential long-term uses," the agency's supervisory pharmacologist 
isisted that long-term studies be performed, notwithstanding that 
short-term analgesia is the [drug's] main indication." 56 The FDA 
ivision which regulates Zomax and the other NSATDs had estab-
shed a policy that all drugs with "anti-inflammatory properties," 
lcluding analgesic agents such as Zomax, "should meet the same . . . 
ireinogenicity requirements . . . This is because the likelihood is quite 
igh that they will be used . . . chronically" because of their anti-
*
6
 Hearings, page 189. 47
 Hearings, pages 180-1. 
*
8
 Hearings, pges 183-8. 
*
9
 Hearings, page 189. 00
 Hearings, page 190. 61
 Hearings, page 189. M
 Hearings, page 191. Also see her October 7, 1980, memorandum at Hearings, page 
2. At an August 19, 198.H. meeting of FDA's Arthrit is Advisory Committee, Dr. William 
•aver of Georgetown Universit3\ a consulting expert to McNeil on the drug's analgesic 
operties, acknowledged this same point and mentioned a recent study which showed 
a t Dolohid (generic name diflunisal) had actually peaked at the same level and provided 
nger relief in oral surgery pain than Zomax. See verbatim transcript of Arthri t is Advisory 
unmittee. pages II 35 0. in subcommittee files. This study appears in the medical litera-
re\ See Forbes, Butterworth, Hurchfleld, Heaver and Shackleford. "A 12-Hour Evaluation 
the Analgesic Kfficacy of Diflunisal. Zomepirae Sodium, Aspirin, and Placebo in Post-
•erative Oral Surgery Pain." Pharmacotherapy, Supplement 1, Vol. 3, No. 2 (March/April 
83) , pages 38S 40S. As discussed below, Dolobid (diflunisal) may be carcinogenic. M
 Hearings, page 119. 
54
 Hearings, page 92. 55
 Hearings, page 120. M
 Hearings, page 510. 
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inflammatory properties.57 FDA even allowed Zoniax to be heavily 
promoted for chronic use,58 and, according to FDA testimony beiore 
the subcommittee, approximately 20 percent of Zoniax patients were 
chronic users.59 
Because it now believes intermittent use of Zoniax increases the risk 
of serious anaphylactoid reaction, McNeil has proposed ureposition-
ing" the drug primarily for the relief of chronic rather than inter-
mittent, acute pain.00 Former Commissioner Hayes, however, testiiied 
before the subcommittee that FDA would have to "reconsider the 
implications" of the rat tumor findings before it could approve such 
a proposal.61 Since FDA has always known that Zomax would often 
be used chronically, the Committee believes it would have been appro-
priate to "reconsider the implications" of the drug's carcinogenic 
potential prior to its approval. Since FDA has permitted the drug to 
be promoted for chronic use, and has acknowledged that a large per-
centage of Zoniax patients were chronic users, the committee ques-
tions the agency's contention that it had taken the "tumorigenicity 
finding . . . seriously." 62 
The subcommittee's investigation also revealed that the FDA has 
approved several other drugs which have not been adequately tested 
for their cancer-causing potential. For example, the agency approved 
the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, Dolobid (generic name di-
flunisal), despite its possible association with lung (pulmonary adeno-
mas) and liver (hepatocellular adenomas) tumors in male mice,<>< and 
despite deficiencies in the conduct of the two-year Dolobid mouse study 
which could have prevented the development of additional tumors and 
thereby masked a significant carcinogenic risk.04 The sponsor agreed to 
conduct another such mouse study during the drug's marketing 
period.65 
The FDA also approved the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, 
Oraflex (generic name benoxaprofen), even though low survival rates 
among treated rats in a two-year rat study—the only completed car-
cinogenicity study reported prior to the drug's approval—prevented 
meaningful statistical analysis.'6 FDA's pharmacologist concluded: 
C1
 Hearings, pages 137-9. 
r8
 See Hearings, pages 135-7. The subcommittee reviewed a Zomax advertisement which 
emphasized in bold faced print the drug's usefulness for "chronic pain" such as "chronic 
osteoarthri t is and musculoskeletal pain." Hearings, page 135 6. Despite Dr. Temple's state-
ment tha t the advertisement presented an "unbalanced emphasis on the chronic uses" (Hearings, page 136), there is no record that FDA took any regulatory action against the 
sponsor in connection with this advertisement. 
r
* Hearings, pages 105-6. The number of chronic users was estimated at 100,000 per 
month. Hearings, page 107. 00
 Hearings, page 90. 
•i Ibid. 
•"Hearings, page 511. 
•
a
 Hearings, pages 409-11. 
** Even though all 10 of the surviving high-dosed animals were sacrificed three months 
prior to the completion of the trial (at week 85 ) . a statistically significant trend toward 
lung tumors almost developed. Noting that (*» of the 15 tumors in the mid dosed group oc-
curred between week 86 and 07. FDA's statistician concluded that : 
. . . tho result of the lifetime oral carcinogenicity study in mice should he inter-
preted with utmost caution. The trend analysis is technically non significant (p = 0.00(1) 
after adjustment for a number of tumor sites. It is very near to statistical signifi-
cance, however . . . Unfortunately, there is no way to obtain a better estimate. 
The killing of all the high dose animals at Week 85 might have masked the incidence 
of tumors in this group. The between group comparison shows that the incidence of 
lung adenomas In the medium dose male mice is significantly higher than that In the 
controls. Hearings, page 410. 6:1
 Physicians' Desk Reference, 37th ed., 1983, page 1290. 
•* Hearings, pages 405-0. 
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The two-year rat toxicity study does not support the safety of this 
Irug for its chronic use in humans.""7 At the time of approval, the 
ponsor had undertaken a two-year mouse study and had submitted 
i protocol for a one-year rat study.03 
In a similar vein, the FDA approved Feldene (generic name piroxi-
ani), another nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory (hug, even though its 
)harmacologist questioned whether 18-month studies hi the rat and the 
nouse were of sullicient duration to establish the drug's long-term 
tfifety.*"' FDA informed the sponsor u that a commitment to do a [ post-
ipproval ] 21 month animal study would be considered adequate for 
tpprox ability and would not slow the approval process." 70 
Although he could not speak to the details of FDA's reviews of Dolo-
>id, Oraflex, and Feldene, Dr. Temple of the FDA testified that before 
t would have approved these drugs the agency must have concluded 
hat their carcinogenicity studies "were sufficient to rule out a major 
isk."71 The observation that properly performed carcinogenicity 
studies might show a statistically significant association with lung 
cancer in mive [as with Dolobid] or the conclusion that "the safety of 
Oraflex J for its chronic use in humans" has not been demonstrated, 
lowever, suggest that the agency has approved drugs without the data 
needed to "rule out a major risk." The committee notes, in this coll-
ection, that a number of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs under 
investigation have been shown to be potentially carcinogenic. Some of 
hese drugs—including Clopirac,72 Driftalone,73 Kengasil,74 and Ciclo-
profen 7fi—were ultimately withdrawn by their sponsors from investi-
gational drug testing. Others—among them ketoprofen,76 Maxicam 77 
ind oxaprozin 78—are still under FDA review. 
The law requires FDA to ensure that new drugs are safe for use 
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
proposed labeling before approving them for marketing. XTnless the 
FDA, prior to approving a new drug, is able to conclude that its bene-
fits outweigh any drug-related risk of cancer which may be found after 
it is marketed, the committee does not believe the agency can meet its 
statutory responsibility for protecting the public from potentially un-
safe drugs when it approves a new drug which has not been adequately 
tested for its cancer-causing potential. 
The committee questions whether FDA always performs a risk-
to-benefit assessment before approving drugs which its experts do not 
believe have been shown safe for long-term use. For example, Dr. Itob-
87
 Hearings, page 403. 
*" Hearings, page 407. 
«•' Hearings, pages 380-90 and 392. On the Inadequacy of 18 month mouse studies for de-
termining carcinogenicity, sec note 37 above. 
70
 Hearings, page 392. 
71
 Hearings, page 412. 
72
 Clopirac has been associated with bladder and thyroid tumors in rats . Hearings, page 
352. 
7:
 Driftalone has been associated with hepatocellular carcinomas In mice and rats . 
Hearings, pages 353-4. 
74
 Kengasil has been associated with pancreatic adenomas In rats. Hearings, pages 
,158 m. 
7r
 Oicloprofen has been associated with liver tumors in mice. Hearings, pages 301-2. 
7f
 Ketoprofen has been associated with pituitary and mammary adenomas In ra ts . 
Hearings, page 300. 
77
 Maxicam has been associated with renal transitional cell tumors In rats . Hearings, 
pages 533-7. 
78
 Oxaprozin has been associated with testicular adenomas In rats. Hearings, page 545. 
Another ar thr i t is drug. Rldaura (generic name auranofln), which is an oral gold com-
pound rather than a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, has been associated with renal 
tubular neoplasia In a 12-month ra t study. Hearings, page 378. 
11 
ert Temple, Acting Director, FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, 
testified during the subcommittee's hearing on FDA's review of Fel-
dene on August 4, 1982, that the data ottered in support of the drug's 
effectiveness was considered ''marginal1' by "all parties" to that re-
view.79 Former Commissioner Hayes, in fact, acknowledged sharp dis-
agreement within the agency as to whether the drug's ellectiveness was 
supported by adequate and well controlled studies, as required by law.*0 
Both the Group Leader for FDA's Feldene review and FDA's statisti-
cian believed such support had not been provided. With only "mar-
ginal" evidence of the drug's effectiveness, FDA approved Feldene, 
.a drug for chronic use,81 even though its reviewers questioned whether 
its long-term safety had been established. In view of the approval of 
this drug, the committee is concerned that FDA's drug approval proc-
ess does not give sufficient consideration to the potential carcino-
genicity of new drugs. 
IV. FDA MONITORING OF ZOMAX-ASSOCIATED ADVERSE REACTION 
REPORTS WAS DEFICIENT 
Former Commissioner Hayes testified before the subcommittee that 
"[t]racking adverse reactions has a very high priority" at the Food and 
Drug Administration.82 In connection with I HIS proposals to speed 
the approval of new drugs, in fact, both Dr. Hayes 83 and former H H S 
Secretary Richard S. Schweiker 84 have proposed measures purportedly 
designed to strengthen surveillance of adverse effects reported for mar-
keted drugs.85 Although the agency has stated that it has "taken several 
administrative steps to correct problems" previously encountered in 
"processing and analyzing" incoming adverse reaction reports for mar-
keted drugs,86 the subcommittee's investigation of the agency's regula-
tion of Zomax revealed that agency monitoring of adverse reactions is 
still a serious problem. 
Mr. Robert Eaton is responsible in FDA's Division of Drug Experi-
ence for monitoring incoming adverse reaction reports for Zomax and 
the other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, l ie testified before the 
subcommittee that he was surprised when McNeil informed FDA offi-
cials on February 11, 1983, that it had submitted to the agency 908 re-
ports of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions since the drug's 
approval. Mr. Eaton had thought that FDA had only received approxi-
mately half that number of reports from the sponsor.87 An FDA memo-
randum of a February 28, 1983, meeting with McNeil revealed that 
shortly before the drug was withdrawn from the market, the agency's 
computerized tracking system contained only 270 reports of Zomax-
79
 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House 
of Representatives, "The Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration : 
The New Drug Review Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, page 431). 
">Ibi<l., pages 44-5 . 
81
 Feldene is Indicated for the relief of the chronic pain and inflammation of arthri t is . 82
 Hearings, page 128.
 tlnt, 88
 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, The 
Regulation of New Drugs by the Food and Drug Administration : The New Drug Review 
Process," August 3 and 4, 1982, page 25. , „ , • „ , „ 0 , f t 0 0 
•* HHS Fact Sheet. "New Drup Approval Reforms, June 23. 1982, page 3. 
*- Also see proposed revisions in the new drug approval process, 47 Fed. Reg. 46622, 46624 
- ~ • »• - *r\ + n o o v 
(October 19. 1982) 
**Md., page 46637. 
w Hearings, page 127. 
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Delated a l lergie /anaphylactoid reactions, compared to the more 
it i.H)0 which McNeil apparent ly had submitted.88 
The agency classiiicd Aomax anaphylactoid reactions as k 'B ' ' re-
t s—that is, as reports of serious adverse effects already listed in 
drug ' s labeling/1 ' E ighly-nine (8D) percent of the u i * " reports 
k 72 days or more to be entered into F D A ' s computerized t racking 
tern dur ing the most recently reported quarter preceding the sub-
uniittee's hearings. Added to these delays were the several weeks 
often took to classify such reactions once they were received by 
)A's Division of D r u g Experience.9 0 
Conner Commissioner Hayes maintained, however, tha t timely 
)cessing of UJJ" reports was not the agency's highest priori ty. The 
mcy, he testified, at tached the greatest importance to t racking " A " 
>orts—those not previously associated with a d rug and therefore not 
ed in its label ing: " I don't th ink the system keeps us from knowing 
ich are the serious or the unknown reactions . . . I think the track 
ord on tha t is ra ther good/ ' U 1 The subcommittee's investigation, 
wcver, revealed that F D A did not process its high priori ty " A " re-
nts in an eilicient and effective manner . According to the most recent 
a available to the subcommittee at the time of its hearings, it took 
days or more—how much more F D A records do not specify—for 
k
 agency to enter such reports into its computers once they had 
>n classified.1'2 In view of the agency's requirement tha t d r u g manu-
•turers report unexpected reactions within 15 days,93 the committee 
ils such long processing delays both surpr is ing and distressing. 
The law requires F D A to determine whether a marketed d r u g con-
iues to be safe under the condit ions of use for which it was ap-
ived 94 as well as to ensure tha t physicians are accurately informed 
ough product labeling of all impor tant clinical experience with 
h a <lru<^!,, The agency cannot carry out these vital public health 
;ponsibilities unless it efficiently ami effectively manages its adverse 
ict ion tracking and analysis system. 
The committee notes that on March 8, 198*2, more than a year before 
' subcommittee hear ings , the (Jeneral Accounting Office issued a re-
rt entitled, FDA (1an Further I mprove Its A<1 rcrxr Druy Reaction 
port'nu/ System^ which criticized F D A ' s Division of Drug Fxper i -
*e for taking an average of tt.tf months, and sometimes more than a 
ir . to enter adverse reaction reports into its computerized t racking 
;tem.fm The committee does not believe that the agency since this 
>ort has instituted management reforms to establish and mainta in 
'comprehensive and cur rent computerized file of adverse d r u g ex-
igences into which new repor ts can be processed quickly."9 7 
Former Commissioner Hayes minimized in his testimony before the 
)conunittee the importance of t rack ing the numbers of incoming 
>orts of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions because tho-
ng's association with such reactions had already been "s ignal led" : 
' Hon rings, page 110. 1
 Hearings, page 127. 
'Hearings, page 131. 
Hearings, page 133. 1
 Hearings, pa«e 131. 1
 21 <\F.R. $ 310.300(h) (2) . 
' § .r»05(e) of tin Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Art. 
'• $ 502 (:i) of the Food. I»r-«g. mill Cosnu'tio A<t. 
'Hear ings , page 132. (JAO Publication No. IIRD-82-37. 
r47 Fed. Reg. 4(i<>22, 4(i<>24 (October 11), 1982). 
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Mr . W E I S S . Le t me suggest t ha t both you and Dr. Meyer 
have now talked about a signal system. K ighH 1 assume tha t 
the signal system is only as valid as the information which 
comes in to set the signals off. 
Dr . H A Y E S . W e already had the signals. The impor tant 
th ing was not just keeping track of how many signals. The red 
flag was already up.9 8 
However , one of the agency's pr incipal adverse reaction "s ignal l ing 
method[sJ , " 9y the Surveil lance of Adverse Reactions or S O A K meth-
od, depends on t rack ing the numbers as well as the kinds of adverse 
effects repor ted for marketed drugs . The S O A R method compares, for 
a par t icu la r t ime period, a drug ' s proport ional share of a par t i cu la r 
type of adverse reaction reported for its class with its class marke t 
share as reflected by numbers of prescriptions filled.100 A d rug which, 
compared to other d rugs in its class, has a t t racted far more repor ts of 
• i :.i^ „nnni. d , o n wrmlrl hp. p.xnected from i ts marke t share compared to other a rugs m its ci»&&, 
a par t icu la r side effect t han would be expected from i ts marke t share 
would s t rongly signal the need for fur ther review. 
I n J a n u a r y 1981, for example, the agency completed a s tudy using 
the S O A R method which concluded t ha t Tolectin (generic name tol-
1
 - - * -
1
 — ±^ ~.*»1 i»A t l i c k t n i n n l 
t   t  WHICH C O I l c i u u e u i n u t x u i v ^ ^ w , . ^ 
metin sod ium) , a McNeil a r th r i t i s d r u g nearly identical in chemical 
s t ruc ture to Zomax, migh t have a higher incidence of anaphylac to id 
reactions than other d rugs in its class. Tolectin had 27 percent of the 
anaphylactoid reactions reported for its class while claiming only 
two percent of the class' market.1 0 1 
No similar type of analysis was performed for Zomax,102 even though 
D r . J o h n H a r t e r , G r o u p Leader for F D A ' s Zomax review, acknowl-
edged t h a t he began to suspect t ha t Zomax was associated with a h igher 
incidence of anaphylac to id reactions t han other d rugs in its class as 
early as May 1981. H e based th is suspicion on a May 26, 1981, agency 
repor t enti t led, " A Compar ison of Anaphylac to id Reactions Associ-
ated wi th Nonsteroidal Ant i - Inf lammatory Drugs , " which, only seven 
months after Zomax was approved for marke t ing , listed the d r u g t h i r d 
among the N S A I D s in total number of repor ts of anaphylac to id re-
actions associated wi th i t use.103 Us ing the da ta in th is repor t , the sub-
committee staff confirmed, based on an analysis resembling the S O A R 
method, t h a t Zomax may have already h a d a h igher incidence of such 
reactions t han all o ther d rugs in i ts class, inc luding Tolectin.104 Whi l e 
Zomax had only 1.2 percent of the total life-time marke t for the d rugs 
in i ts class (based on to ta l numbers of prescr ipt ions filled), i t had al-
ready been associated wi th 13.6 percent of the to ta l number of anaphy-
lactoid reactions repor ted for t h a t class.105 
M
 Hearings, page 128. 
w
 Hearings, page 267. 
100
 The method assumes that , for any comparable time period, tha t the ra te of non-
reporting of adverse effects is evenly distributed across the drugs in a class. 101
 Hearings, pages 264 and 276. 1W
 Hearings, page 276. 
vn
 Transcr ipt of a June 20, 1983, taped interview with subcommittee staff, page 16, 
in subcommittee flies. Mr. Robert Eaton of FDA's Division of Drug Experience similarly 
testified tha t he began to sense tha t Zoinax was a t t rac t ing more reports of anaphylactoid 
reactions than other drugs in i ts class in the fall of 1981. Hearings, page 124. 
104
 Hearings, pages 281-2. Zomax was associated with 30 percent more reports of 
anaphylactoid reactions per million prescriptions than Tolectin. 
» This calculation is based on the subcommittee staff analysis appearing a t page 282 of 
the Hearines. I t Is b^sed on total number of nonsteroidal ant i inflammatory drug pre-
scriptions filled since the first NSAII) was marketed in the United States and not on the 
number filled for the seven month period from the apnroval of Zomax to the May 26, 
1981 report. A similar analvsls based on prescrintlon data for tha t period would ahow 
Zomax to have been associated with a substantially larger percentage of the anaphylactoid 
reactions reported for i ts class. 
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Because Zomax has a virtually identical chemical structure to Tolec-
in, it is surprising that FDA never conducted a similar analysis.106 
n fact, while Tolectin was approved for use as an arthritis medication, 
of the 12 reports of Tolectin-associated anaphylactic reactions fea-
ured in an agency ADR Highlights published on June 20, 1979, ap-
Toximately 1G months before Zomax was approved, occurred upon 
estarting the drug after a layoff period.107 Since FDA knew that 
iOmax, unlike Tolectin, was to be used primarily for intermittent 
ather than chronic pain, it is particularly surprising that a SOAR 
r similar analysis of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reactions was 
ever performed.108 
In testifying that implementation of the SOAR methodology was a 
high priority7' for her division,109 Dr. Judith Jones, then the Director 
f FDA's Division of Drug Experience, informed the subcommittee 
lat resource constraints were responsible for the agency's failure to 
induct such an analysis; the SOAR methodology, she testified, "is 
nirly labor intensive." ,10 The committee notes that the subcommittee 
aff analysis based on the agency's May 20, 1981, listing of anaphy-
lactoid reactions reported for the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory 
rugs took less than an hour to perform. 
If resource constraints are preventing implementation of a "high 
riority" system for analyzing important safety information reported 
iv marketed drugs, the committee believes the agency and the De-
artment of Health and Human Services have an obligation to bring 
lis matter to the attention of the Congress. The committee notes, 
i this connection, that FDA was unable to provide for the hearing 
>cord the estimated costs for widescale implementation of the SOAR 
icthodology by its Division of Drug Experience.111 
Former Commissioner Hayes has testified on the importance of 
rong post-market surveillance to detect rare adverse effects which 
e not likely to occur in clinical trials: 
An essential purpose of clinical testing of a drug before 
market approval is to detect adverse effects that are frequent 
and serious. However, detection of relatively rare adverse 
effects cannot and should not be a goal of premarket test-
ing, because of the very large number of patients required. 
An adverse reaction with a frequency of 1 in 1,000 patients 
is considered uncommon, but if it is medically serious, it 
clearly assumes public health importance if the drug will 
be used by millions of people. The reporting of adverse 
events in patients who receive the drug after marketing is 
a useful way of detecting and determining the incidence of 
rare and infrequent adverse reactions. The monitoring of 
adverse reactions is well-accepted today as an essential scien-
tific endeavor that complements the pre-marketing evalua-
tion of a drug.112 
lM
 Silica the drug's removal from the market, according to Dr. Judith Jones of FDA's 
vision of Drug Experience, FDA has undertaken such an analysis. Hearings, page 276. 
07
 Hearings, page 341. 08
 Hearings, page 341. 
w
 Hearings, page 288. 
10
 Hearings, page 283. 
11
 Hearings, page 289. 12
 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and 
vironinent of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representa-
es, "Drug L*g," September 16, 1981, page 71. 
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While rigorous post-market surveillance is essential for protecting 
the public from the unexpected adverse effects of marketed drugs, 
the agency must ensure that it has obtained and made use of all avail-
able information on the safety of new drugs before approving them for 
marketing in the first place. The subcommittees investigation of 
Zomax has revealed that FDA had received clinical trial reports of 
Zomax-associated anphylactoid reactions—purportedly a rare and un-
expected reaction which only appeared subsequent to the approval of 
the drug—which had escaped the attention of the agency's reviewers 
prior to the drug's approval. Although the originally approved label-
ing for Zomax aid not mention such reports,113 and, according to Dr. 
Harry Meyer, Director, FDA's National Center for Drugs and Bio-
logics, "nothing indicating anaphylactic hypersensitivity reactions" 
occurred in the premarket trials,114 a board-certified allergist who re-
viewed Zomax clinical trial reports for the subcommittee identified 
anaphylactoid reactions among the drug-associated adverse effects sub-
mitted during the pre-market clinical trials. He characterized one of 
those reactions, involving a patient "with respiratory impairment re-
quiring intensive treatment in a hospital emergency room," as "life 
threatening." 115 Despite the testimony of Dr. Robert Temple, Acting 
Director, FDA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, that the reaction did 
not appear "unusually severe," 116 the agency later informed the sub-
committee that this case qualified as "serious" according to FDA 
criteria.117 The agency also acknowledged that this case "seems likely 
to have been a drug-related episode" and "a term such as broncho-
spasm, laryngeal edema, or asthma . . . could have been listed" in the 
drug's original labeling.118 In view of the virtual chemical identity 
between Zomax and Tolectin, a drug suspected before Zomax was ap-
proved to have a high incidence of anaphylactoid reactions, the com-
mittee believes the agency did not exercise sufficient care in reviewing 
pre-market reports of Zomax-associated adverse effects. 
In its recent report on "Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New 
Drug 'Oraflex'," the committee similarly found that FDA reviewers 
failed to note several reports of serious Oraflex-associated liver and 
kidney disease prior to approving Oraflex for marketing. This proved 
particularly important in light of the numerous reports received of 
fatal and serious drug-associated liver and kidney injury after the 
approval of Oraflex.119 
The committee appreciates the limitations of pre-market investiga-
tional drug trials in predicting the full range and severity of adverse 
reactions which will occur once a drug is marketed to a large popula-
tion. At the same time, the committee believes FDA has a responsibil-
lia P D A acknowledged that "the original Zomax labeling contained no warning regarding 
anaphylactoid reactions." Hearings, page 332. 114
 Hearings, page 284. McNeil similarly testified tha t "no anaphylactic reaction had oc-
urred in those clinical t r ials ." Hearings, page 402. See also March 4. 1983, McNeil press 
slease in subcommittee files. As late as the August 19. 19S3, meeting of FDA's Arthrit is 
and something more severe" had been repor 
script, page 11-71, in subcommittee flies. 
"
5
 Hearings, pages 299-300 and 322. 
1W
 Hearings, page 334. 
»" Hearings, page 332. 
116
 Hearings, page 332. 
" •Repor t by the Committee on Government Operations, "Deficiencies in FDA's Regu-
lation of the New Drug 'Oraflex'," II. Rep. No. 98 511, November 9, 1983, pages 9-11. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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prior to permitting marketing, to make use of all important safety 
>rmation in its possession. While the KJ)A is expected to process 
J drug applications as efficiently as its resources permit, the agency 
st not compromise the public protections intended by the law. 
V. F D A IGNORED EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE RISKS OF ZOMAX 
>inee Zomax was withdrawn from the market, McNeil has proposed 
uirketing the drug with labeling emphasizing that a "majority" of 
-threatening and fatal anaphylactic reactions reported for the drug 
urred in ind iv idua l s without a prior allergic history." 12° As dis-
sed above, the incidence of severe anaphylactoid reactions may have 
n higher for Zomax than for all other drugs in its class during most 
is marketing life. The inability to predict from past medical history 
ich users are most susceptible to such reactions compounds the 
g\s dangers. This has prompted some to suggest that the drug is 
safe for use. Dr. Kenneth Berneis, a family practitioner from 
inwell, Michigan, for example, expressed the opinion that the drug 
not be relabeled adequately to protect patients because "there is no 
y to predict who will react to tjie drug, either first occurrence or 
mdary use." 121 
Llmost two years before the Zomax market withdrawal, F D A had 
lence suggesting that anaphylactoid reactions unpredictably oc-
ring in patients without prior allergic histories had been reported 
more frequently for Zomax and its chemical analog, Tolectin, than 
other drugs in their class. The agency, however, never analyzed 
s evidence and, therefore, was never aware of the special danger in-
ving the use of these almost chemically identical drugs. 
)ata which F D A published in its May 2(>, 1J)81, APR Highlights 
it led, "A Comparison of Anaphylactoid Reactions Associated with 
nsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs," show that persons who ex-
ienced anaphylactoid reactions to Zomax or Tolectin appeared far 
i likely to have had a previous anaphylactoid reaction to either of 
se drugs or to any other drug in their class than individuals who 
1 experienced anaphylactoid reactions to other NSAIDs.12- Only 
I) percent of the individuals who had anaphylactoid reactions to 
max or Tolectin and who had previously taken other NSAIDs had 
>ericnced such reactions in the earlier exposure.12. By contrast, over 
percent of the individuals who reacted to NSAIDs other than Zomax 
Tolectin and who had previously taken different NSAIDs had ex-
•ienced anaphylactoid reactions in the earlier exposure.124 In addi-
n, only 14.;> percent of patients having an anaphylactoid reaction to 
max or Tolectin who had earlier taken the same drug had previously " T h i s labeling is in subcommittee files. 
' Hearings, page 15. Dr. I>ovrn Davis, an epidemiologist and toxieologist associated 
li the Environmental Law Ins t i t u t e and Johns Hopkins University, who herself ex-
it-need Zomax induced anaphylac t i c shock, presented a similar view. Hearings, page ;">. J
 All the calculations which follow in suppor t of this conclusion a re based on Table 1 
he A I Hi Highlight H, page UNO. 
' Th i r ty six (.Hi) ot the individuals who reacted to Zomax or Tolectin had been ex-
\H\ to other NSAIDs. Five of those M\ reacted to other NSAIDs. 
•Twen ty two of the individuals who reacted to a nonsteroidal ant i- inflammatory d rug 
er t han Zomax or Tolectin had previously taken a different NSAID. Thi r teen of these 
had earlier reacted to a different NSAID." Due to omissions in the ent ry of the asp i r in 
a. it was not possible to calculate bow many pa t ien t s who had reacted to aspir in had 
viously taken and reacted to o ther NSAIDs. 
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reacted to it.125 By comparison, 39.5 percent of the patients reacting to 
other N S A I D s who had previously taken the same drug had earlier 
reacted to it.l2(i The May 1U81 data show that it was signincantly more 
ditiicult to predict serious hypersensitivity reactions to Zomax and 
Tolectin, based on prior allergic history, than to other nonsteroidal 
anti-inflammatory drugs.127 These are the only data which F D A has 
generated which permitted such an analysis.1"0 
Approximately 10 months after publication of these data, McNeil 
proposed a Dear Doctor letter which, in part , warned physicians of 
the risk of unpredictable anaphylactoid reaction to Zomax. In late 
March 1982, McNeil submitted for F D A response a draft Dear Doctor 
letter which included a warning concerning users who had no prior 
history of allergy to Zomax or other NSAIDs. Among the users whom 
the draft characterized u a t higher risk of developing anaphylactoid 
reactions" were "patients with prior history of uneventful exposure 
[i.e. no prior hypersensitivity reactions] to Zomax or other nonste-
roidal anti-inflammatory drugs" who used the drug "intermittently." 
The draft letter urged physicians to consider this warning "before 
represcribing Zomax." 12y 
McNeil, however, failed to advise physicians of this risk in the 
Dear Doctor letter which it finally sent to over 200,000 physicians on 
Apri l 9, 1982. Although it stated that "hypersensitivity upon re-ex-
posure . . . cannot be ruled out" for patients who had previously 
had "mild reactions" to Zomax or other nonsteroidal anti-inflamma-
tory drugs, it deleted the warning concerning individuals who had no 
prior history of allergy to Zomax or other drugs in its class.130 Al-
though Dr. John Harter , Group Leader for FDA' s Zomax review, in-
formed subcommittee stall that he thought the warning "was still 
going to be in [the April 9, 1982, Dear Doctor let ter] ," i :n he testified 
before the subcommittee that u [ i ] t was probably my determination" 
to delete it because in March of 1982 Zomax users without a prior 
allergy history did not appear to be at serious r isk: 
I felt that of all the people who had developed anaphy-
laxis it was not those people who showed nothing on previous 
exposure. I t is true that they had some risk, but more impor-
tantly the high risk people were the people who had any 
evidence of allergic reaction on previous exposure. A person 
who took it before and didn't have any problem at all is at 
lower risk.132 
125
 Six of t he 42 individuals react ing to Zomax or Tolectin who had previously taken 
these drugs had earlier reacted to the same drug. Of the individuals who reacted to 
Zomax or Tolectin, 73.7 percent (42 of ,r>7 individuals) had taken them previously. 
" • S e v e n t e e n of the 43 individuals react ing to o ther NSAIDs who had previously taken 
the same d rug had ear l ier reacted to t h a t drug. 
127
 The differences are . in fact, s ta t i s t ica l ly significant. 
128
 On November 3. 11)83, several FDA personnel—among them Dr. John H a r t e r and 
Dr. Vincent Kerusai t l s , medical officers involved in the review of Zomax adverse react ion 
data , and Dr. Cheryl Graham of FDA's Division of Drug Experience—told subcommit tee 
staff t h a t FDA has not generated, and. to the i r knowledge. McNeil has not provided any 
other da t a on the percentage of individuals react ing to Zomax and the other NSAIDs who 
had previously reacted to the same drug or to ano the r NSAID. On November 2, 1983. 
Mr. Hubert Eaton of FDA's Division of Drug Experience, who assembled the da t a for 
the May 26, 1981. ADR Highlight, also informed staff tha t no such compara t ive ana lys i s 
has been done since t h a t repor t . 
»» Hear ings , pages 108 9 and i l l . 
130
 Hear ings , page 110. 
131
 T ransc r ip t of taped interview wi th subcommit tee staff on J u n e 20, 1983, page 11 . 
132
 Hear ings , page 111. 
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Former Commissioner Hayes testified that a warning to physicians 
that prior allergic history is not predictive of a patient's susceptibil-
ity to life-threatening anaphylactoid reaction would have been mis-
leading and contrary to the facts as then known: 
Do we have enough information to alert physicians that 
we know of some special problem here ? That in fact was not 
the case. We did not have the data to tell that to a physician. 
As a physician I would have been misled . . . if I had been 
told that. I would have wanted to know what was known.133 
The committee finds that the agency made no attempt to find out 
44what was known" about the nature of the risk of Zomax-associated 
anaphylactoid reaction at the time McNeil proposed to warn physi-
cians that serious and sudden reaction to the drug may be unpredict-
able. Since May 1981, F D A has made no effort to collect data to 
compare the prior allergic histories of individuals experiencing ana-
phylactoid reactions to Zomax and the other NSAIDs. Furthermore, 
F D A never analyzed the May 1981 data which afforded such com-
parisons. As a result, the agency did not recognize that sudden and 
sometimes life-threatening reaction not only appeared to be more 
frequent with Zomax and Tolectin than other NSAIDs, but also 
substantially more difficult to predict and thereby avert. 
Dr. Harter testified that in March 1982, Zomax users who had pre-
viously reacted to aspirin,134 another NSAID, or mildly to Zomax 
were at greatest risk.135 Following the subcommittee hearings, how-
ever, Dr. Harter recalled that the largest number of cases of Zomax-
associated anaphylaxis which he reviewed in March of 198*2 involved 
patients without a prior history of allergy to Zomax, aspirin, or other 
NSAIDs.136 In view of this disclosure, the'cotnmittee finds Dr. Harter ' s 
testimony that such patients were at lower risk surprising. 
Dr. Harter maintained, however, that a warning concerning such 
patients was unnecessary because physicians should know from their 
183
 Hearings, page 113. 134
 Dr. Harter testified that the recent death of an aspirin-sensitive patient was the 
"precipitating factor" for the meetings with McNeil to discuss the proposed Dear Doctor 
letter. Hearings, page 111. Documents in FDA's tiles, however, reveal that it was the 
recent increase in reports of serious hypersensitivity reactions to Zomax, not the death 
of an aspirin-sensitive patient, which led to those meetings. An FDA memorandum of 
the March 22 and 21), 11)82, meetings with McNeil states : "Due to the recent increase In 
anaphylactoid reactions with Zomax, the sponsor is preparing a 'Dear Doctor' Letter." 
Hearings, page 108. In addition, a memorandum from Dr. Marion Finkel, then Associate 
Director for New Drug Evaluation, of a March 15), 1982, telephone conversation with 
Dr. Edward Lemanowicz of McNeil, stated that the firm was considering the dissemina-
tion of a Dear Doctor letter in light of an "increasing number of serious allergic and 
anaphylactic reactions" associated with Zomax. Memorandum in subcommittee files. 
135
 Hearings, page 112. 130
 Transcript of taped interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1083. pages 12-3. 
In subcommittee files. In his testimony before the subcommittee. Dr. Harter recalled that in 
March 1982 he had classified approximately twelve reported Zomax associated hypersen-
sitivity reactions, in addition to one reported death in an aspirin sensitive patient, as 
"anaphylactic" reactions. Hearings, page 111. He informed subcommittee staff that ap-
proximately half of these involved patients without a prior history of allergy to Zomax or 
other drugs in its class, with the other half fairly evenly divided between those who had 
previously reacted to aspirin and those to Zomax or other NSAIDs. Transcript of taped in-
terview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, pages 12 3. In subcommittee files. Un-
fortunately, the subcommittee staff did not have an opportunity to examine these twelve 
cases since, according to Dr. Harter, they were never aggregated as a group and inserted 
into FDA's files. Ibid., page 12. In a November 3, 1983, telephone conversation. Dr. Harter 
emphasized that it was his "gestalt" recollection that half the reported cases involved 
patients without prior allergic histories to Zomax or other NSAIDs. He stated the percen-
tage could have been larger. Staff memorandum of this conversation in subcommittee files. 
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medical training that this type of reaction was the "usual case with 
anaphylaxis/ ' , : 1 ; However, the May i>(>, 1981, data—the only informa-
tion F D A has assembled on the subject—suggest that this type of 
reaction is not the usual case with all nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory 
drugs and that, in fact, it was considerably more common with Zomax 
and Tolectin than with the other NSAIDs. Moreover, Dr. Har ter has 
acknowledged that he had no data in March 1982 comparing the prior 
allergic histories of individuals experiencing anaphylactoid reactions 
to Zomax with those reacting to other NSAII).138 
U p to the drug's withdrawal from the market on March 4, 1983, no 
warning about this type of reaction appeared in the Zomax package 
insert.139 At the same time the contraindications section of the package 
insert has, since the drug's approval, warned that Zomax "should not 
be given to patients in wham aspirin or other nonsteroidal anti-inflam-
matory drugs induce bronchospasm, rhinitis, or urticaria, or other hy-
persensitivity reactions" (emphasis supplied).140 F D A allowed McNeil 
to warn in a manner which, based on the May 1981 data, only protected 
a small fraction of Zomax patients at risk for serious anaphylactoic 
reaction. 
Following the subcommittee hearings, Dr. Har ter maintained thai 
warning physicians about such a risk was futile: 
The problem with uneventful exposure is that you have no 
way to prevent the reaction by being alert. Let's suppose a 
patient had an uneventful exposure, comes into your office 
again and you—what can you do?141 
F D A has the responsibility under law to ensure that drugs ar< 
safe under the conditions of use for which they were approved am 
that drug labeling clearly reflects their risk. FDA's failure to analyze 
the data it had collected prevented it from responsibly assessinj 
whether the benefits of Zomax continued to outweigh the risk tha 
physicians might be unable "to prevent" Zomax-indueed anaphylactoid 
"reaction (s) by being alert." 
Dur ing the subcommittee hearings, Dr. Har ter testified: 
In any case, if I thought we were to the point where we 
needed to add [the warning in the April 9,1982, Dear Doctor 
letter concerning Zomax patients without prior allergic his-
tories to Zomax or other N S A I D s ] , I would have thought 
that we needed to change perhaps the indication portion of 
**"• Transcript of taped interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, pages 14-! 
If physicians need not be warned about what they already should know, the Commlttf 
questions whether the Dear Doctor letter, as Dr. Harter and other FDA witnesses testiflei 
needed to warn physicians not to prescribe Zomax to aspirin-sensitive patients. In thi 
connection, Dr. Daniel Kin. a board certified allergist and an expert consultant to the sul 
committee, described two cases of severe respiratory distress in aspirin-sensitive patienl 
reacting to Zomax as belonging "to a group of patients that might have been expected 1 
f ive adverse reactions to nonsteroidal anti inflammatory drugs such as the zomeplrac learings, page 300. The advisability of not prescribing NSAIDs to aspirin-sensitive patient 
is frequently stated in the medical literature. See, for example, Spector and Parr, "Aspiri 
Idiosvncracy: Asthma and Urticaria," Allergy Principles and Practice, ed. Middletc (C. V. Moseby Co. : St. Louis, 1983), page 1251. 138
 StafT memorandum of his November 3, 1983, phone conversation is in subcommltt* 
Ales. 
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 In subcommittee files. 
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 Transcript of taped interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, page 13. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the label. This suggests that anybody is in danger again, and 
I think it would have required more extensive relabeling.142 
When asked to explain this statement, Dr. Harter later stated: 
Second class drug thing. You know, that was in my mind 
and when we reached the point where I thought we should 
say, this drug has a higher incidence, enough higher that you 
have to worry about the uneventful exposure [problem] any-
more than you usually do, then we ought to think about mak-
ing this a second line drug.143 
Although the agency had data Vhich suggested the possibility that 
ou have to worry about the uneventful exposure [problem]" with 
>max more than "you usually do" with other drugs in its class, it was 
it until shortly before McNeil withdrew Zomax from the market on 
arch 4,1983, that F D A recommended that the Zomax labeling state 
at the drug is "not for initial therapy but for those patients who do 
>t get satisfactory relief from other N S A I D s [i.e., a second-line 
•ugj." M« 
After it removed Zomax from the market, McNeil informed F D A 
at 75 percent of the serious cases of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid 
actions occurred upon restarting the drug after a layoff period.145 
McNeil currently believes that intermittent use of the drug is respon-
ble for the higner frequency of hypersensitivity reactions associated 
ith its use. Although F D A suspects that the increased risk of Zomax-
duced hypersensitivity is related to the drug itself, it also feels it may 
> related to the intermittent manner in which it has been used.14* 
However, not until a February 11,1983, meeting, less than a month 
rfore Zomax came off the market, did F D A recommend that McNeil 
arn about the possibly increased risk associated with intermittent use 
f the drug: "It was recommended that McNeil consider stressing in 
te labeling that there is greater risk for those patients restarting 
omax. This reaction is also seen to some extent in Tolectin." 147 U p to 
le withdrawal of Zomax from the market on March 4,1983, no men-
on of this risk appeared in the drug's labeling.148 
Because of the drug's virtual identity to Tolectin, F D A apparently 
as aware long before February 11, 1983, of a potential problem 
i t h intermittent use of Zomax. Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director, 
'DA's Office of New Drug Evaluation, acknowledged in his testi-
lony before the subcommittee that F D A and the manufacturer were, 
ideed, aware of the risk accompanying intermittent use of Zomax as 
Gtrly as March 1982: 
Mr. WEISS . Are you aware that the McNeil Co. advised 
F D A in March 1982 or perhaps earlier that there was a 
problem with intermittent use of Zomax? 
Dr. TEMPLE. W e had that impression about Tolectin also 
some time around that time. So I don't believe that would 
be a surprise.149 
Mf
 Hearing, page 114. 
"• Transcript of taped Interview with subcommittee staff on June 20, 1983, page 26. 
»* See FDA memorandum ol February 28, 1982 meeting with McNeil, Hearings, 
sge 116. 
"• Hearings, page 175. 
*** Hearings, page 90. 
*•» Hearings, page 126. 
"* The various versions of the Zomax labeling are in subcommittee flies, 
x* Hearings, pages 107-8. 
21 
Since a majority of Tolectin-associated anaphylaxis featured in a 
J u n e 20, 1979 F D A repor t involved in termi t tent use, as earlier dis-
cussed,1 '0 the committee believes t ha t F D A did not require adequate 
warn ing of the risks associated wi th use of Zomax, a d rug which, 
unlike Tolectin, F D A expected to be prescribed pr imar i ly for inter-
mi t tent ra ther than chronic pain. 
V I . F D A IMPROPERLY REFERRED T H E QUESTION OF W H E T H E R ZOMAX 
SHOULD 13E REMARKETED TO ITS A R T H R I T I S ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
F D A referred the question of whether Zomax should be remarketed 
to its Ar th r i t i s Advisory Committee. On Augus t 19,1983, almost four 
months after the subcommittee's hear ings , the advisory committee 
voted to recommend the drug ' s remarket ing. 
D u r i n g its testimony before the subcommittee F D A addressed the 
'"conditions which must be met before Zomax may be remarketed" 151 
(emphasis supp l i ed ) . F o r m e r Commissioner Hayes testified tha t F D A 
"would have to conclude t h a t there is a populat ion of patients in 
whom the risks of [us ing Zomax] would be outweighed by its benefits" 
before the drug ' s remarke t ing would be permitted.1 5 2 Commissioner 
Hayes also testified t ha t because Zomax appeared to be associated wi th 
a h igher risk of serious anaphylactoid reaction,153 F D A would re-
quire, as a pre-condition for remarket ing , tha t studies be performed to 
show tha t it relieved pain bet ter than other d rugs in its class: 
. . . there migh t be a populat ion in which a relatively h igh 
risk migh t be acceptable, e.g., pat ients who cannot tolerate 
narcotics and who do not respond to non-narcotic analgesics. 
In this case, however, studies would be needed to determine 
whether other N S A I D s could function as well as zomepirac 
against narcotics. To date , these have not been done.154 
In weighing the risks against the potential benefits of new drugs , 
F D A has established a policy which tolerates a "somewhat grea ter 
incidence of side effects" in a d r u g as compared to other drugs in i ts 
class "if those side effects are sufficiently offset by greater l)enents." i r 5 
The agency's explanation of the conditions which must be satisfied 
before Zomax may IK1 remarketed was in keeping with this policy. 
A t the Augus t 19, 1983, advisory committee meeting, F D A officials 
rei terated the i r belief tha t Zomax was associated with a higher inci-
dence of anaphylactoid reactions than other d rugs in its class.156 Con-
sistent with the agency's test imony before the subcommittee, Dr . 
Rober t Temple , Ac t ing Director , F D A ' s Office of New D r u g Eva lua-
150
 See discussion in Section IV above. 151
 See subcommittee's April 12, 1983, letter inviting FDA to appear for testimony, in 
subcommittee flies. 
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 Hearings, page 95. 
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 Hearings, page 95. 
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 Hearings, page 90. 
1RR47 Fed. Reg. 22550 (May 25. 1982). 
ir* After Dr. John Scarlett of McNeil presented Medicaid data (from the Computer-
ized On-Iiine Medicaid Pharmaceutical Analysis and Surveillance System [COMPASS]), 
to the advisory committee showing that the risk of Zomax-associated anaphylactoid reac-
tions was 2.55 higher than that for the other NSAIDs, Dr. Robert Temple of the FDA 
stated that , because of the manner in which these data were generated, he believed it was 
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visory Committee meeting, pages 121-2. in subcommittee flies. Dr. Judith Jones, then Di-
rector. FDA's Division of Drug Experience, also expressed the opinion that Zomax was 
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tion, emphasized at the outset of that meeting the need to "identify a 
real patient population . . . in fact, as opposed to in theory" who only 
respond to Zomax.157 McNeil's chief expert at the meeting on the ef-
ficacy of Zomax, Dr. William Beaver of Georgetown University, 
acknowledged that such a population could not he identified: 
The question, can we identify a priori the kinds of patients 
who would do better on this drug than, say, some other non-
steroidal? Well, no. That ' s the problem.158 
I n an October 6, 1983, letter to the subcommittee, F D A could not 
cite any data from adequate and well controlled studies that had 
been provided to the Arthr i t i s Advisory Committee "to enable the 
identification of a patient population for which Zomax was the non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drug of choice." 159 A t the time it re-
ferred the remarketing question to the advisory committee, F D A 
was not in possession of the scientific evidence it had earlier testified 
would be necessary to consider this question. Not surprisingly, in 
voting to recommend remarketing, the advisory committee was unable 
to identify a pat ient population for whom Zomax had proven supe-
rior to other drugs in its class.160 In fact, the advisory committee 
conditioned its recommendation on the sponsor's undertaking studies 
during the drug's remarketing to define and prove the existence of 
such a population.161 F D A had testified, however, tha t this should 
have been a pre-condition for remarketing Zomax. 
Maintaining tha t the increased risk of serious anaphylactoid reac-
tion resulted from the drug's intermittent use, McNeil presented at 
*" Ibid., page 8. 
*» Ibid., page 30. 
*** Hearings, page 531. On September 15, 1983, the subcommittee asked FDA whether 
such data had been provided the advisory committee. Hearings, page 530. The agency's 
October 6, 1983, response indirectly answered in the negative. The agency stated that the 
advisory committee had been provided "data from well-controlled studies . . . showing 
Zomax as effective" as narcotic regimens such as morphine, but did not directly answer 
whether data proving the existence of a patient population for whom Zomax had been 
shown superior to other NSAIDs had been given the advisory committee. Aside from data 
showing Zomax's equivalence to some narcotic regimens, FDA stated that "no additional 
data from adequate and well-controlled studies were provided the [advisory] committee 
regarding patient population identification.'' Hearings, page 531. The committee Interprets 
this to mean that the advisory committee was not presented data identifying a patient 
population for whom Zomax had been shown better than other NSAIDs. 
The committee also notes that at the advisory committee meeting Dr. John Harter, Group 
Leader for FDA's Zomax review, stated that the "pivotal evidence" for Zomax's equivalence 
to narcotics such as morphine was "missing" because of methodological problems in several 
Zomax narcotics comparison studies. Transcript of the Arthritis Advisory Committee meet-
ing, page 149. In subcommittee files. Contrary to the impression conveyed by FDA's Octo-
ber 6, 1983, letter to the subcommittee, the agency's reviewers had not concluded that "data 
from well-controlled studies . . . showing Zomax as effective" as narcotic regimens such 
as morphine had been supplied the advisory committee 190
 Acting advisory committee chairperson Carol Dorsch summarized the advisory com-
mittee's consensus as follows : "Is there a population of patients for whom Zomax should 
be available and, secondly, has that patient population been defined? That is, do we need 
additional data, and I think we have said that we do, in order to define that population. I 
think we have answered affirmatively to both of those questions." Transcript of advisory 
committee meeting, page 195. 
WJ
 Dr. John Harter, Group Leader for FDA's Zomax review, wrote in an August 22, 1983» 
memorandum summarizing the advisory committee meeting: "The committee also recom-
mended that remarketing be contingent on the sponsor's commitment to undertake phase 
IV (post-remarketlng) studies to prove that there is a subset of patients who respond to 
zomeplrac and not to other nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs." In subcommittee files. 
In view of Dr. Dorsch's (see footnote 164) and Dr. Harter's summaries, the committee 
questions the agency's statement in an October 6, 1983, letter to the subcommittee that 
"The [Advisory] Committee felt such a population could be identified, namely, patients 
unresponsive to other agents. The [Advisory] Committee did not believe it was necessary 
to carry out specific trials in a population unresponsive to other agents to conclude that 
such a population exists and would benefit from the drug." Hearings, page 531. 
Moreover, In the absence of scientific evidence that such a class of patients exists, the 
committee does not believe "patients unresponsive to other agents" Identifies a patient 
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the advisory committee meeting its proposal to "reposition" Zoma: 
for the relief of chronic pain, particularly "intractable pain, sue! 
as cancer pain." 1C2 The committee believes that F D A also lacke< 
the scientific evidence needed to request advisory committee consid 
eration of this proposal. 
McNeil first advanced its "repositioning" proposal prior to the sul 
committee's hearings.103 Former Commissioner 11 ayes testified befoi 
the subcommittee that the increased frequency of severe Zomax-assoc 
ated hypersensitivity reactions might be "related to the drug itself 
rather than its intermittent use, and that, as a result, "it would L 
difficult to prove in advance" that "repositioning" Zomax for chroni 
use would appreciably lower the risk of those reactions.104 Dr. Temp 
testified that before permitting Zomax to be remarketed for ehron 
use one 
. . . would have to conclude . . . that the risk of anaphy-
laxis would not be so severe where the drug is given chroni-
cally. As the testimony says, it is not clear how you would . 
reach that conclusion.105 
In her presentation four months later lx»fore the Arthr i t is Advisoi 
Committee, Dr. Jud i th Jones, then the Director of FDA' s Division < 
Drug Experience, stated that the 
. . . question as to whether or not [the increased risk of 
anaphylactic reaction] relates to a chemical difference or . . . 
to a type of use is still unresolved. . . . It is my opinion that 
the critical analysis that needs to be done and has not yet 
been done in either of our studies is whether or not repeated 
intermittent exposure in fact increases the risk consider-
ably. . . ,166 
I t is apparent that F D A did not have the data needed to conclut 
that chronic use would substantially reduce the risk of severe Zoma: 
induced hypersensitivity reactions when it permitted McNeil to pr 
sent its remarketing proposal to the advisory committee. The commi 
tee, therefore, questions FDA's basis for bringing this proposal to i 
Arthri t is Advisory Committee. 
In connection with McNeil's proposal to "reposition" Zomax for tl 
treatment of chronic pain, former Commissioner Hayes testified du 
ing the subcommittee hearings that Zomax "seems to have no advai 
tage in chronic use over aspirin or other NSAIDs ." 167 Elaborat ing c 
this testimony, Dr. Temple informed the subcommittee that such a 
advantage would have to be demonstrated before F D A "would eve 
consider" McNeil's remarketing proposal.108 Dr. William Beaver < 
Georgetown University, McNeil's own expert consultant, acknow 
16a
 See statement of Dr. Patricia Stewart of McNeil, verbatim transcript of advise 
committee meeting, pages 74-5 , in subcommittee files. 
i<* $ee Hearings, page 116. lrt4
 Hearings, page 1)0. FDA cited the high hypersensitivity reaction rate associated wi 
Tolectin, a drug almost chemically identical to Zomax, as evidence for the possihlll 
that Zomax associated hypersensitivity reactions are related to the drug rather than 
Intermittent use. Hearings, page 90. 
1,15
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edged at the advisory committee meeting that "there are no nose to 
nose comparisons of Zomax with the other nonsteroidals in, say, cancer 
pain or other chronic pain problems, as far as I know, that are even 
ongoing or have been done." 1G<J Consequently, Dr. Beaver acknowl-
edged a "lack of data" comparing the efficacy of Zomax to other drugs 
in its class in treating chronic pain.170 The advisory committee recom-
mended studies to provide such data while the drug was being remar-
keted.171 FDA had earlier testified, however, that these studies would 
have to be completed before remarketing of Zomax would be permitted. 
Former Commissioner Hayes also testified that " it would be neces-
sary to reconsider the implications" of the rat tumor findings before 
permitting Zomax to be remarketed for chronic use.172 Prior to approv-
ing such remarketing, Dr. Temple testified, the agency would: 
. . . have to conclude something new and different about the 
risk of tumorigenicity. If all one were able to say is that the 
drug is another nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug with no 
advantage over other similar agents, it is obvious that making 
it available for chronic use would not be consistent with the 
attitude toward the tumorigenicity finding in the first place.173 
Despite such testimony, and FDA's acknowledgement in an Octo-
ber (>, 1983, letter to the subcommittee that it had received no new 
"tumorigenicity information since the subcommittee hearings" to sup-
port the drug's chronic use,174 the agency submitted McNeil's remarket-
ing proposal to the advisory committee. Moreover, the agency had not 
altered its view of the meaning and significance of the drug's tumori-
genicity between the time of the subcommittee's hearings and the 
August 19, 1983, meeting of the Arthrit is Advisory Coniniittee. In this 
connection, Dr. Temple informed the advisory committee: 
Now, on the other hand, I think our position as to what it all 
means is very much what it was at the beginning, that [the 
animal tumorigenicity of Zomax] is certainly something that 
needs to be considered if one is contemplating long-term ex-
posure. . . . We . . . have not changed our view from what the 
initial label stated as their [the rat tumors'] significance.175 
Since F D A had not "conclude[d J something new and different about 
the risk of tumorigenicity" b}' the time the advisory committee met, the 
committee does not believe the agency had sufficient scientific evidenco 
to refer the remarketing issue to the advisory committee. 
Dr. Temple summarized FDA's position on remarketing Zomax 
for chronic use when he testified before the subcommittee: 
. . . there would have to be substantial new information, 
information not now available, before one would reach a 
conclusion that making the drug available for chronic use 
is the right thing to do.176 
i<*> Verbatim t r ansc r ip t of advisory commit tee meeting, page 38, in subcommittee flies. 
i™ Ibid., page 25. 
171
 Transcr ip t of advisory committee meeting, page 173, in subcommittee files. 
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There is simply no evidence that any "substantial new informa 
tion" was available to F D A that justified referring the remarketing 
question to the Arthri t is Advisory Committee. The committee must 
question FDA's motivation for bringing the matter before th< 
advisory committee. 
The committee believes that F D A wastes public funds and impose? 
on the time of busy professional consultants in convening advisor} 
committees to consider alternatives unsupported by the requirec 
scientific evidence. In this connection, the committee stated in its 
1976 report on the Use of Advisory Committees by the Food ana 
Drug Administration: 
Utilization of an advisory committee is not essential if 
the agency itself has the capability to resolve the issue that 
is to be presented to a committee . . . F D A has made and is 
making nonessential use of advisory committees in dealing 
with issues that are well within the competence and expertise 
of its staff.177 
The committee recommended in the report that the "waste [ful] ' 
and "non-essential use of advisory committees" be eliminated anc 
that " F D A place primary reliance on the use of its own staff re 
sources to carry out its responsibilities and use advisory committee: 
only in exceptional circumstances involving difficult medical or scien 
titic issues where outside expertise is clearly required." 178 The Com 
mittee reiterates its recommendation that F D A refrain from th< 
wasteful and unnecessary use of advisory committees. 
A review of the verbatim transcript of the August 19, 1983, Arthr i 
tis Advisory Committee meeting reveals that F D A failed to inforn 
the advisory committee members of its position as presented to tin 
Congress that a patient population in whom the benefits of Zoma^ 
have been shown to outweigh its risk must be identified before Zomaj 
may be remarketed. 17y The committee's 1970 report, in this connection 
observed that "advisory committees were asked [by F D A ] at time: 
to make decisions based on inadequate information." 18° The Committer 
believes F D A again acted improperly in failing to inform the advisor} 
committee of the remarketing conditions which the agency had alread} 
established. In addition to withholding important information fron 
the advisory committee, F D A presented options to the advisory com 
mittee inconsistent with its testimony before the subcommittee. Foi 
example, F D A asked the advisory committee to decide whether "i 
patient population [has] been adequately identified for which Zoma; 
should be available a# either a therapeutic alternative or as the drug o: 
177
 Report by the Commit tee on Government Operat ions, "Use of Advisory Committee 
by the Food and Drug Adminis t ra t ion ," 94th Congress, 2d Sess., H. Rep. No. 94-787, J an 
uary 2(5, 1976, page 5. 
178
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choice for that group?" 181 (emphasis supplied) F D A testified during 
the subcommittee hearings, however, that remarketing would be con-
tingent on identifying a population tor whom Zomax was the "drug of 
choice," not merely a "therapeutic alternative." 
F D A unequivocally testilied be tore the subcommittee that addi-
tional iniorination would be needed before remarketing would be per-
mitted. FDA then asked the advisory committee to consider whether 
"additional studies . . . should be done as a condition for remarket-
ing Zomax" and, if so, "whether they should be done prior to or con-
currently with remarketing?" 1M2 (emphasis supplied) The committee 
believes F D A acted inappropriately m providing the advisory com-
mittee options which were in conflict with determinations which the 
agency had already made. In this connection, the committee repeats 
its 11)70 recommendation that F D A "terminate the practice of seeking 
recommendations from advisory committees on matters that have 
already been decided." 183 
Dr. John Harter , the supervisory medical officer for FDA's Zomax 
review and an agency witness before the subcommittee, in fact, recom-
mended to the advisory committee that it support the drug's remarket-
ing under conditions which were inconsistent with F D A s established 
position. He recommended that all required studies be performed in 
"Phase IV"—that is, after the drug has been allowed to return to the 
market: 
The real question in my mind is whether it should be done 
prior to approval or whether this should be one of the condi-
tions of approval, that these studies be done as a Phase IV 
thing. I think that was really the intent of question four, is 
to try to decide the timing, because if you do it premarketing, 
you have—in the interim, you have to continue to supply the 
drug to those people who think on a compassionate basis that 
you should have it, which is a burdensome thing for both us 
and the sponsor, and you don't know how long that period is 
going to be, because as any of you who have tried to set up 
new methods know, you may think it is going to take you three 
months, and it takes you three years, and it is a very hard 
thing to know how quickly you can do that. 
So my recommendation would be that that would Ix* a Phase 
I V thing.18* 
The committee believes it improper for F D A staff .to urge advisory 
committees to adopt recommendations which do not meet the scien-
tific requirements already established by the agency. 
Tn recommending the remarketing of Zomax before a patient popu-
lation for the drug has been identified. Dr. Harter did acknowledge a 
"problem": 
I think part of the problem . . . is, if you answer . . . no, 
has a patient population been adequately identified, and you 
181
 The quest ions for discussion which were submitted in advance to the advisory com-
mit tee members are in subcommit tee files. 
^ Ibid. 1W
 Keport by the Commit tee on Government Operations, "Use of Advisory Committees 
by the Food and Drug A d m i n i s t r a t i o n / ' page 12. 
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have to do the study to identify it, how are you going to mar-
ket it in the meantime, who are you going to market it for in 
the meantime ? That is one of the problems.185 
Dr. Har ter further stated at the advisory committee meeting that if 
after remarketing, clinical studies are unable to identify a populatioi 
for whom Zomax is superior to all other NSAIDs, then "it would agaii 
be a candidate to be taken off the market." 186 
The law requires that FDA conclude that a drug is safe and effectiv< 
before it approves it for marketing. The committee questions the com 
mitment of agency personnel to meeting their legal responsibilities ii 
urging that market approval of a drug be conditioned on the promisi 
that future studies might identify a population for whom the dru^ 
could be safely and effectively prescribed. 
V I I . RECOMMENDATIONS 
The committee recommends that the Secretary of Health an< 
Human Services take prompt action to correct the deficiencies iden 
tiffed in this report. The committee specifically recommends t ha t : 
1. In order to protect the public from unnecessary exposure to pc 
tentially carcinogenic drugs, F D A should: 
(a) Establish policies and procedures governing the approva 
of new drugs found to be carcinogens in animal studies. The com 
mittee recommends that F D A not approve new drugs which ar 
potentially carcinogenic unless they are shown to have substantia 
advantages over alternative drugs on the market and are intended 
for the treatment of serious conditions. 
(b) Ensure that new drugs that have not yet been adequatel 
evaluated for their carcinogenic potential only be approved i 
exceptional circumstances where they have been demonstrated t 
offer unique and essential benefits. 
2. F D A establish procedures for prompt processing, review, an 
analysis of all adverse drug reaction reports for marketed drugs. Th 
committee recommends that F D A insure that it has the resource 
needed to implement the best available methods for evaluating advers 
drug reaction reports. 
3. F D A use advisory committees only in exceptional circumstance 
involving technical medical or scientific issues where outside expertis 
is clearly required. The committee specifically recommends that ste}] 
be taken t o : 
(a) Assure that F D A only seek advisory committee recou 
mendations on specific issues which have not already been decide 
by agency personnel. 
(b) Assure that advisory committees are fully informed of a 
matters bearing on their deliberations. 
(c) Assure that F D A does not present options to advisory con 
mittees which are not consistent with the requirements of tl 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
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A D D I T I O N A L A N D D I S S E N T I N G V I E W S O F HON. 
B U D D Y M A C K A Y 
The Subcommittee's investigation essentially dealt with two 
questions : 
1. Did the F D A properly monitor adverse reaction reports associated 
with the use of Zomax ? 
2. Did the F D A properly carry out its statutory duties in approving 
Zomax ? 
In my view, the hearings of the Subcommittee established that the 
F D A monitoring of Zomax-associated adverse reaction reports was 
deficient. Thus, I am in accord with Section IV of the Report. I view 
Section V of the Report as cumulative, and believe it should have been 
included with Section IV. I do not believe the testimony established 
that F D A ignored evidence, but that the monitoring of adverse reac-
tion reports was so inadequate that the evidence relating to risks asso-
ciated with Zomax did not come to FDA's attention on a timely basis. 
On the second question, I do not believe the testimony supports the 
conclusion that F D A approved Zomax improperly given the evidence 
that it is a possible carcinogen. This is not intended to in any way 
question the scientific determination that the drug is a tumorigen. 
The evidence suggests that i t is. However, the F D A considered that 
evidence in its approval of Zomax and concluded that the benefits 
of Zomax outweighed the risks. While we personally may have reached 
a different conclusion, I do not believe we can properly report that the 
F D A acted improperly simply because we may disagree with the 
decision. 
Because I believe the Committee and the Congress must be able to 
have complete faith in FDA' s approval procedures, and because I 
believe the hearings were inconclusive on this point, I dissent from 
Section I I I , and respectfully suggest that further hearings should be 
held on those procedures in order that a proper conclusion can be 
reached. 
BUDDY MACKAY. 
(28) 
A D D I T I O N A L V I E W S O F HON. E D O L P H U S T O W N S 
In my view, the testimony does not support the conclusion tha 
the F D A approved Zomax without determining that its benefits out 
weighed its possible carcinogenic risk. The testimony is inconclusive 
on that point. The prepared statements are not directed to tha t issue 
Accordingly, I cannot support Section I I I of the report and wish tx 
have it reconsidered. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that additiona 
hearings be held that would receive evidence from all concerned partie* 
and would be focused on two questions: 
1) was the conflicting evidence of tumorigenicity in one sex of on< 
specie of rats and the related issue of whether it presents a significant 
risk of carcinogenicity in man properly reviewed; and 2) has the FT) A 
properly reviewed the issue of whether Zomax can be re-positioned foi 
use by a very restricted patient population that is characterized bi 
serious, intractable or chronic pain and or whom there is no acceptable 
alternative ? 
EDOLPHUS TOWNS. 
(29) 
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A D D I T I O N A L V I E W S O F HON. BEN E R D R E I C H 
I share the subcommittee's findings relative to the lack of full at-
tention by the F D A to cases involving adverse reactions to Zomax. 
However, I am concerned over the findings on the carcinogenic risk 
of the drug, for I feel that the results of the testimony are inconclu-
sive. This inconclusive testimony, and conflicting reports that have 
been added to this record, present a case for further study, including 
the possibility of additional hearings by this subcommittee. 
B E N ERDREICH 
(90) 
D I S S E N T I N G V I E W S O F HON. R O B E R T S. W A L K E R , H O N . 
J O H N N. E R L E N B O R N , HON. T H O M A S N. K I N D N E S S , 
HON. L Y L E W I L L I A M S , HON. J U D D GREGG, H O N . TOM 
L E W I S , HON. A L F R E D A. (AL) McCANDLESS, A N D H O N . 
L A R R Y E. CRAIG 
The federal Food and Drug Administration ( F D A ) has an awe-
some and vital task in ensuring that safe, efficient drugs are pro-
vided promptly to the American public. The Committee's responsi-
bility in overseeing F D A is equally vital in promoting the health 
and well-being of all Americans. 
Because of the importance of FDA's mission and the Committee's 
oversight function, we are especially sensitive to the conclusion and 
recommendations of our reports. We must strive to be as accurate as 
possible, and we must avoid generalizations that can lead to hasty 
conclusions, harm reputations or unnecessarily cause public alarm. 
I t is our belief that this report is misleading and likely to create 
impressions that are inaccurate. For this reason we offer these dissent 
ing views. 
We cannot agree with the finding that F D A approved Zomax with-
out requiring a showing that its benefits outweighed its carcinogenic 
risk. F D A Commissioner, Dr. Ar thur Hull Hayes, Jr . , offered de 
tailed testimony to the Subcommittee that refutes this finding. In 
his remarks, Dr. Hayes observed that animal studies showing possible 
tumors were not considered ominous, at least in short-term use, but 
the studies were cited in labeling precautions as reasons for caution ir 
long-term use of Zomax. 
I t is important to note that reputable scientists differ as to the 
potential carcinogenesis of tumors discovered in Zomax studies. The 
Committee report does not acknowledge plainly this debate and, in 
fact, treats the issue as if carcinogenesis was a readily accepted con-
clusion. 
Also not appropriately acknowledged is the FDA' s response to the 
Subcommittee testimony of Dr. Adrian Gross. We feel the added per-
spective this response provides would be very valuable in clarifying 
the record. 
At this point, we question the finding that F D A ignored evidence 
relating to other risks associated with Zomax. Evidence to support 
this conclusion is not compelling. We are aware of differences ol 
opinion about the drug's risk but that is far different than a deliberate 
effort to ignore facts. 
We reject the report's finding that "FDA improperly referred the 
question of whether Zomax should be remarketed to its Arthri t is Ad 
visory Committee." This subject was not discussed during the Subcom 
mittee's hearings. F D A officials have not been heard on the subject 
(31) 
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and testimony of other interested parties is non-existent. FDA ' s re-
ferral of Zomax remarketing to its Arthrit is Advisory Committee 
might deserve a hearing on its own merits or it could be included in 
an overall hearing on FDA' s use of its many advisory committees. To 
include this finding and the accompanying recommendation, with the 
declaration of impropriety, is wrong. 
The recommendations offered in the report require some review 
and some clarification. First , the report recommends establishing 
procedures and policies governing approval of new drugs found to 
be carcinogens in animal studies. We believe F D A has had such 
procedures for quite some time and that the agency does not approve 
such drugs unless the benefit of such drugs outweighs the risks to 
the recipient patient population. 
The recommendation that new drugs that have not been adequately 
evaluated for their carcinogenic potential only be approved in ex-
ceptional circumstances is battling. Animal studies are not required 
for every drug prior to approval. While we would agree that such 
studies should be required for drugs to be used chronically, we would 
be concerned that the mandatory animal testing for every drug would 
result in seriously delaying the approval of vitally important new 
drugs. 
ROBERT S. WALKER. 
J O H N N. ERLENBORN. 
THOMAS N. KINDNESS. 
LYIJC WILLIAMS. 
JUDD GREGG. 
T O M LEWIS. 
ALFRED A. ( A L ) MCCANDLKSS. 
LARRY E. CRAIG. 
A D D I T I O N A L V I E W S O F HON. T E D W E I S S 
I t is the subcommittee's function to see that the Food and Drug 
Administration and other Federal agencies subject to its jurisdiction 
properly enforce the laws they administer. In concluding that F D A , 
in its regulation of Zomax, did not meet its statutory responsibility 
for protecting the public's health and safety, this report very carefully 
analyzes and evaluates the subcommittee's extensive hearing record 
and related documents. I believe the report is both reliable and con-
structive. 
The dissenting views of some of my colleagues, which appear to 
defend the F D A even when its actions have deprived the public of the 
health protections intended by the Congress seem, therefore, to be 
misplaced. 
Some of my colleagues believe that the report's emphasis on the car-
cinogenic potential of Zomax is misleading because reputable scientists 
can interpret the results of the Zomax animal carcinogenicity studies 
differently. The report, in their view, did not acknowledge the "de-
bate" over the drug's cancer-causing potential. One of my colleagues 
questions whether F D A "properly reviewed" the rat studies and sug-
gests that they might have been inconclusive. These criticisms overlook 
the central, and, I believe, proper purpose of the report. The report 
does not question the competence of FDA' s reviewing scientists or at 
tempt to determine whether Zomax is a potential human carcinogen. 
Rather, it examines FDA's regulatory performance in light of the 
ageneifs own determination that Zomax is a potential carcinogen. Ir 
determining whether F D A is properly enforcing the law, the reporl 
focuses on how F D A weighed the drug's benefits against a carcino 
genie risk that had already been identified by FDA^s own scientists. 
As documented in the report, F D A believes, on the basis of anima 
studies, that Zomax has the potential to cause malignant tumors ir 
man. Dr. Robert Temple, Acting Director.. FDA's Office of New Dru£ 
Evaluation, testified during the subcommittee's hearings: "So wc 
accepted the idea that the findings in rats could represent some degree 
of carcinogenic risk for man. Tha t is true. I don't think anybody (lis 
agrees with it. Tha t is why it is in the labeling. Tha t is why there is a 
warning against chronic use." (See Hearings, page 159.) Referring t( 
McNeil's proposal to "reposition" Zomax for long-term use, Dr 
Temple recently wrote: " I said [at the subcommittee's hearings] , anc 
believe now, that such a repositioning alone would be unacceptable 
because of the animal tumorigenicity [capacity °f Zomax to cause 
tumors] ." (This statement is contained in an October 26, 1983, letter 
which is in the subcommittee's files.) Dr. Temple even characterized 
the low doses at which Zomax induced tumors in the rat as "scary" 
Tha t Zomax has the potential to cause cancer in humans is clearly the 
conclusion of the Food and Drug Administration. 
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Supporting Dr. Temple's testimony were the following findings and 
conclusions of FDA scientists, all of which were fully documented in 
the subcommittee's hearing record and cited in the report: 
(1) The FDA pharmacologist responsible for evaluating the mean-
ing and significance of the Zomax animal studies identified, in an 
Dctober 25, 1979, review, a significant increase in adrenal medullary 
umors among male rats fed Zomax in a two-year study. 
(2) In a September 19, 1980, review, FDA's statistician character-
ized the evidence for the tumor-inducing potential of Zomax in the rat 
as "statistically significant." In othei words, it is highly unlikely that 
the increased incidence of tumors among rats fed Zomax was a chance 
*vent unrelated to the administration of the drug. 
(3) An FDA pathologist—the only agency expert who examined 
he rat tumor slides—diagnosed the tumors as "malignant". 
(4) On May 20, 1980, FDA's pharmacologist recommended non-
approval of Zoniax pending a determination of whether Zomax can 
be shown to have benefits which outweigh its carcinogenic potential. 
Noting that the potential carcinogenicity of Zomax was not seen with 
^tlier approved NSAIDs, PDA's pharmacologist recommended at a 
minimum "a box warning in the labeling . . . alerting to the car-
cinogenic . . . potential Teased on 2 yr rat study." (Report, 
footnote 40.) 
(5) At a November 23, 1981, meeting with FDA, McNeil was told 
that FDA scientists had concluded "that the incidence of rat lesions 
or tumors was significant enough to consider Zomax a tumorigen 
rtumor-inducerl." FDA officials at the meeting informed the company 
that no scientific evidence had been provided to permit the conclusion 
that the cancer-causing properties of Zomax in the rat had no relevance 
to humans. (Hearings, page 158.) 
The dissenting views of some of my colleagues note that, in defend-
ing the approval of Zomax, despite the adverse findings and conclu-
sions of its scientists, FDA did not consider the rat findings "ominous". 
However, not one pre-approval document written by an FDA re-
viewer attempts to minimize the significance of those findings. In fact, 
some of the features which FDA testified rendered the rat studies in-
conclusive (See Hearings, page 87) are actually contradicted by the 
documented conclusions of FDA's own scientists. (See, for example, 
Report, footnote 35.) 
By questioning the evidence on the potential carcinogenicity of 
Zomax, it is, in fact, some of my dissenting colleagues who challenge 
the scientific findings and conclusions of FDA's experts. The report, 
by contrast, examines whether FDA, prior to approving a new drug 
which its experts have concluded is potentially carcinogenic, has 
weighed its benefits against its possible risks. 
The dissenting views of some of my colleagues state that FDA does 
not approve new drugs unless their benefits outweigh their risks. Based 
on FDA's own scientific conclusions, however, the report documents 
that FDA approved Zomax without evidence that its benefits out-
weighed its carcinogenic risk. 
The requirement that a drug with cancer-causing potential not be 
approved unless it is shown to be superior to marketed alterna-
tives without such a potential is an established FDA policy. The 
35 
report's conclusion that FDA approved Zomax without meet-
ing this standard is also based on the findings of agency experts. The 
committee is neither making its own scientific judgment nor, as one of 
my colleagues suggests, expressing subjective disagreement with FDA. 
As noted in the report, in approving Zomax FDA did not conclude 
that Zomax had been demonstrated superior to other NSAIDs that 
dp not have a known carcinogenic risk. FDA testified in the hearings 
tnat, unlike other drugs in its class, some observers considered Zomax 
as equivalent to modest doses of morphine. However, FDA, not the 
.committee, concluded that Zomax's equivalence to modest doses of 
morphine had not been established by adequate and well-controlled 
studies. Consequently, the agency never approved statements of such 
equivalence in the Zomax package insert. 
j Some of my dissenting colleagues state that FDA did not consider 
khe rat tumors "ominous, at least in short-term use." (emphasis sup-
plied) Although Zomax has been used primarily for short-term pain, 
jits use to treat chronic pain was never contraindicated in the labeling. 
In fact, FDA expected Zomax to be used chronically and large num-
bers of Zomax patients were chronic users. Yet, it was FDA's con-
clusion that Zomax has not been shown to offer advantages over other 
I NSAIDs for the treatment of chronic pain. In short, the report 
merely relies on FDA's own assessment of the scientific evidence 
offered in support of the relative benefits of Zomax. 
I t is an established policy of Federal regulatory agencies, as well 
as of Federal health research agencies such as the National Institutes 
of Health, that substances which induce tumors in animals can cause 
cancer in humans. The Committee on Government Operations has con-
sistently recommended in past reports that FDA protect the public 
from drugs such as Depo Provera and DES that have been shown to be 
carcinogens in appropriate animal studies. At a time when we are 
spending vast amounts of public funds in a national effort to detect 
and control cancer-causing agents, I believe it imperative that FDA 
establish procedures which minimize the public's unnecessary exposure 
to such agents. 
Section V of the report presented statistical analyses and other doc-
umentation showing that FDA disregarded important evidence re-
lating to the dangers of serious hypersensitivity reactions to Zomax. 
Although some of my dissenting colleagues believe this section of the 
report "is not compelling," they have provided no analysis of its 
detailed findings. 
Finally, some dissenters object that the finding that FDA improp-
erly referred the Zomax remarketing question to its Arthritis Advis-
ory Committee was not discussed (luring subcommittee hearings. I t 
was during the subcommittee's hearings, however, that FDA presented 
the conditions which must be met before Zoniax may be remarketed. 
FDA's subsequent failure to adhere to these conditions when it asked 
the advisory committee whether Zomax should be remarketed is in-
tegrally related to the hearings. 
Moreover, even if references to the Arthritis Advisory Committee 
meeting were not directly drawn from hearing testimony, they are 
nonetheless a necessary and proper part of the report. The report is an 
"investigative report" as that term is used in the Rules of the Commit-
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tee on Government Operations. The hearings comprised only a part of 
the subcommittee's "investigation" of FDA's regulation of Zomax. 
I believe it wholly appropriate that the report should cover aspects of 
our investigation which were not specifically discussed during the sub-
mittee's hearings. 
I t should be noted that none of my dissenting colleagues challenges 
the substance of the report's finding that, in its regulation of Zomax, 
FDA made improper use of its xlrthritis Advisory Committee. I believe 
all members of Congress—regardless of party affiliation—should be 
greatly concerned when agency officials take actions which impeach 
their testimony before a Congressional subcommittee. 
TED WEISS. 
o 
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Finally, a New Chief for the FDA 
His Job, Kessler Says, Is to Restore the Agency's Credibility 
By Larry Thompson 
Wnhuvguo Port Sufi Wntw 
A lthough the public awearing-in ceremony won't occur until later this month, a 39-year-old physi-cian and lawyer from New York 
has taken over the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, an agency that has been without a 
leader for nearly a year. 
David Aaron Kessler, the medical direc-
tor of a 431-bed teaching hospital in the 
Bronx, comes to the FDA at a time when its 
credibility with Congress and consumers 
has been badly shaken by scandal in its gen-
eric drug divison. 
Kessler will have to juggle several major 
problems at once—but then juggling has 
been his style. While training to be a pedi-
atrician at the Johns Hopkins School of 
Medicine in Baltimore, he volunteered for 
night duty in the hospital so that he could 
spend the day in Washington as a staffer on 
the Senate's Labor and Human Resources 
Committee. His job was to draft food and 
health legislation. Colleagues remember 
Kessler in the emergency room, with the si-
rens screaming in the background, while he 
was on the phone reviewing the details of a 
bilL That was typical,* said Peter Barton 
Hutt, a former FDA general counsel who 
worked with him drafting legislation. 
He also pussued a law degree at the same 
time that he wis in medial school. For two 
years, he attended Harvard Medical School 
and then spent two years in law school at 
the University of Chicago. For his third 
year, he simultaneously attended law and 
medical schools at Harvard. 
"I got both degrees in medicine and the 
law to run a hospital,"^aid Kessler, the son 
of a jewelry manufacturer and a school psy-
chologist. He also took a management train-
ing course at the New York University 
Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion. Tra very good on organizational 
things," he said. 
In 1984, Kessler became chief medical 
officer at the Jack D. Weiler Hospital in the 
Bronx, a part of the Albert Einstein Cdkge 
of Medicme-Mcctefiore Medical Center 
complex. At Weikr, he managed both'pa-
tients and the medical staff, settin^up a 
new cancer center, kidney program and 
special evaluation clinics for pediatrics and . 
medicine. 
Along the way, he married Paulette 
Steinberg, a lawyer. They have two chil-
dren, Elise, 8, and Benjamin, 5. 
Until his appointment to head the FDA, 
Kessler served on a commission set up by 
Health and Human Services Secretary Louis 
W. SuQrvan to review the operations of the be-
leaguered agency. 
The FDA regulates a vast array of products 
valued at $550 biffion annually, goods ranging 
from cosmetics to canned vegetables to life-
saving drugs. It oversees the nation's blood 
supply, monitors over-the-counter painkillers, 
tests both pocket-size pacemakers and $2-
nulioiHloflar imaging scanners. 
•^vTbe«cocimu6sioAVref»it*.du£. in, May* is. * 
David KtssUf will take over as Food and Drug Administration commissioner this month. 
ized the Reagan administration. Inspections 
of products and food and drug manufactur-
ing plants decreased from 36,258 in 1980 
to 18,592 in 1989. Seizures of contami-
nated foods or adulterated pharmaceuticals 
dropped from 539 in 1980 to 142 in 1989. 
Kessler says one of his first priorities is re-
storing credibility to the generic drug division. 
"We have to be sure that the agency is clean 
and that everyone wlx> deals with it b clean," 
said Kessler. 1 will need a little time." 
• Building bridges to Congress. Kessler 
has gotten off to a good start with congres-
sional leaders, and his nomination sailed 
through in eight days. But it isn't clear bow 
long the honeymoon wiH last Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy CD-Mass.), now chairman of the La-
bor and Human Resources Committee, for 
which Kessler worked, plans bearings on the 
FDA as soon as Congress reconvenes. 
It 's going to be different for him," said 
Jere E. Goyan, pharmacy school dean at the 
University of California at San Francisco 
who served as FDA commissioner from 
1979 to 1981. I n the past, he has been the 
good guy. That will disappear rapidly when 
things go wrong and he has to go down 
' there as commis^ner to explain why." 
likely to call for more resources for the 
FDA, although no major new funds are ex-
pected in an era of tight federal budgets. 
"Kessler faces an enormous undertaking," 
said Charles Edwards, president of the 
Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation in 
La Jolla, Cam*., and former FDA commis-
sioner who heads the HHS panel. 
Among Kessler's most pressing tasks: 
• Restoring public confidence. The agen-
cy's credibility was damaged last year when 
four FDA officials were caught accepting 
bribes to speed up the approval of certain 
generic drugs, which are less costly ver-
sions of brand-name medicines. Several of 
the largest companies were caught sending 
the agency fraudulent information about 
their drugs. Ultimately, it is widely be-
lieved, the scandal cost former commission-
er Frank E. Young his job last December, 
and, said several experts, has raised doubts 
in the minds of physicians and patients alike 
about the effectiveness of many drugs, both 
generics and brand names. 
During the past decade, the FDA's -en-
forcement actions have fallen sharply, in 
part, the agency's critics say, because of the 
,&bik*QpJ}& Pi4fy^n]a^jha^character*/ 
For two years, lie 
attended Harvard 
Medical School and 
then spent two years in 
law school at the 
University of Chicago. 
For his third year, he 
simultaneously 
attended law and 
medical schools at 
Harvard. 
•The question is how much independence 
he will have from the White House. OMB 
[Office of Management and Budget] and 
HHS,- said Sidney M. Wolfe, director of 
Public Citizen Health Research Group, a 
consumer advocacy group founded by Ralph 
Nader. 1 think he would like to get FDA 
back on track and do the. right thing, but the 
leash is too short between the FDA com-
missioner and HHS." 
• Speeding up approval of drugs. The only 
serious questions raised during the Senate 
confirmation process came from AIDS ac-
tivists who expressed concern that Kessler 
might not favor quick release of experimen-
tal AIDS treatments. Kessler says he sup-
ports this. Tra a Bronx pediatrician," Kess-
ler said. "I know what it is like to take care 
of dying children, especially those for whom 
there was no good treatment." Kessler told 
both Congress and AIDS activists that "pa-
tients with life-threatening diseases should 
have new drugs available to them at the 
earliest point at which there is reason to be-
lieve that the drug may be effective." 
• Iaereajiaf resomtet. Sagging morale 
and a crumbling infrastructure may be 
Kessler's biggest obstacle. What is likely to 
determine his success » how well he can 
lobby for more resources—positions and 
money—for his overwhelmed agency. 
"If you add up all the new responsibilities 
placed by Congress on the agency, the re-
sources have not kept up. and everyone rec-
ognize? that," KesslerJfraid. Montefiore's 
$690 million annual budget for its medical 
school and hospitals, for example, is about 
the same size as the FDA's. 
The FDA bureaucracy of 7,750 employees 
is scattered among 23 buildings in seven lo-
cations in the Washington area alone. FDA is 
not yet mOy. computerised: each new drug ap-
proval request involves so much paper that it 
fills a waB of shelves, often exceeding 200 vol-
umes for a single application. 
Kessler knows that he is taking on a 
daunting job and that change is likeljj to 
come slowly. I'm no magician," he 
"But when people see that you can /get 
things done, they line up behind you." 
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February 27, 1991, Wednesday, AM cycle 
SECTION: Business News 
LENGTH: 526 words 
HEADLINE: FDA Pledges to Tighten Enforcement Regulations 
BYLINE: By DEBORAH MESCE, Associated Press Writer 
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
KEYWORD: FDA-Kessler 
BODY: 
The Food and Drug Administration, its reputation tarnished by the generic 
drug scandal, is trying to restore its credibility by strengthening enforcement 
across the range of its authority, the agency's new chief said Wednesday. 
"There has to be a sense out there that there is a will to carry out the 
statute," which tfives the FDA esponsibility for about one-quarter of all 
consumer purchases in the United States, Dr. David Kessler told reporters. "We 
are going to take enforcement up a notch." 
To do that, he said, the agency is broadening its auditing of generic drug 
companies to include other industries with products that require FDA approval 
before they can be marketed, such as other prescription drugs, animal drugs and 
medical devices. 
In addition, Kessler is creating a team of 50 criminal investigators this 
year and wants to double that next year to pursue cases of suspected fraud and 
other such misdeeds. 
He is also considering increasing civil monetary penalties and procedures by 
which companies that deceive the agency through fraud or other serious crimes 
could be barred from further product approvals. 
"Ensuring the accuracy of data presented to this agency is a high priority," 
said Kessler, who was sworn in Monday to head the agency, which regulates 
drugs, foods, medical devices and cosmetics. 
Acknowledging that the FDA's budget of about $$690 million for this fiscal 
year is not enough to do all he wants, he said he is shifting resources to cover 
the highest priorities, including the stepped-up audits. 
After uncovering fraud, bribery and corruption in the generic drug industry 
and the FDA's generic drug division, the agency changed the drug-approval 
process for these products. 
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The Associated Press, February 27, 1991 
"The honor system is out the window," Kessler said, FDA inspectors now 
audit the information in companies' drug-approval applications to verify that 
the data is correct. 
Previously, the agency relied on companies to be truthful. But the scandal 
uncovered numerous instances in which companies cheated on safety and 
effectiveness tests required for FDA approval. Dozens of drugs were taken off 
the market as a result. 
Since July 1988,ve former FDA employees, five generic drug company 
executives, one consultant and three generic drug companies have been convicted 
on criminal charges. 
The scandal reverberated through the industry and some observers say it had 
much to do with the resignation of Frank Young as head of the agency in the fall 
of 1989. 
Kessler said that while expanding the pre-approval inspection audits to 
other prescription drugs, he will be mindful of not lengthening the time it 
takes for products to be approved, which has been a persistent criticism of the 
agency. 
"The goal is to assure quality of what's out there without lengthening review 
time," he said. 
So far, FDA inspectors have found "discrepancies" in some of its audits, 
Kessler said, but no cases of outright fraud. The problems, he said, involve 
such matters as sterilization and potency. 
Kessler, a 3 9-year-old pediatrician and lawyer, left a job teaching food 
and drug law at Columbia University School of Law in New York to head the FDA. 
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THE NEW YORK TIMES NATIONAL WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 
New Chief Vows New Vitality at F.D.A. 
%£•*** 
By PHILIP J. HILTS 
Sf*vi*110 The N'rw York limrv 
WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 - Saying he 
intended to revitalize an overburdened 
agency, the new Commissioner of the 
Food and Drug Administration said to-
day that he would get tough in enforc-
ing its regulations while seeking to ap-
prove new drugs more quickly. 
As a first step, the new Commission-
er, Dr. David Kessler, said he would 
create a team of 100 criminal investi-
gators over the next two years to pur-
sue cases of fraud and other serious 
violations of the food and drug law. 
He was sworn in Monday to head an 
agency that many experts in Congress, 
industry and consumer groups say has 
been in crisis for several years as the 
agency's staff has shr*:.!: while its 
duties have expanded. 
Dr. Kessler's appointment comes at 
a crucial time for the agency. On the 
issue of new drugs, its emphasis is 
changing from holding them off the 
market in order to assure safety to re-
sponding to demands, many from AIDS 
patients, that new drugs be released 
sooner. But its credibility has been 
challenged in scandals ranging from 
favoritism in the approval of generic 
drugs to lapses in regulating health 
claims on foods. 
Trouble With Deadlines 
The agency has been so burdened 
with new responsibilities and so short 
of staff to deal with them that it almost 
routinely fails to meet its own dead-
lines for issuing regulations. In the lost 
decade, the AIDS epidemic has 
dramatically increased the demands 
on the agency, even as Congress has 
passed laws giving it new responsibil-
ities for inspecting drugs, medical de-
vices and foods. And budget cuts have 
left it with a smaller staff than it had as 
the 1980's began. 
But many experts think Dr. Kessler 
has the best credentials of any com-
missioner in many years to save the 
agency from breakdown. 
"If you had to write a fictional 
resume for the perfect person to hold 
this job, it would turn out to be David 
Kessler's resume," said Peter B. Hutt, 
a lawyer who is a consultant to the | 
agency and serves on some of its! 
panels. "If he can't do it, no one can." i 
In taking over the new job, Dr. Kes-
sler said that two of his chief pric. ities 
would be to beef up the agency's power 
of enforcement, and as the same time 
streamline the many-layered proce-
dures that can delay approval for 
drugs and medical devices by months 
or years in some cases. 
Subpoena Power Sought 
He said he would ask Congress for 
new powers for the agency, including 
subpoena power for his 100 new investi-
gators and the authority to levy civil 
penalties against companies if they 
violate the law but the offense is not 
serious enough to warrant criminal ac-
tion. In addition, he said, he will seek 
the power to allow the agency's inspec-
tors — who monitor everything from 
the manufacture of drugs to pesticides 
on tomatoes arriving at the border — to 
inspect recoras. 
Representative Henry A. Waxman, 
Democrat of California, the chairman 
of the House Subcommittee on Health 
and the Environment, said today: "1 
applaud Dr. Kessler's commitment to 
law enforcement, which is essential to 
the F.D.A.'s effectiveness as an agen-
cy. 1 am anxious to work with the 
agency to provide it with the new en-
forcement tools it needs to do it's job." 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Demo-
crat of Massachusetts, the chairman of 
the Senate Labor and Human Re-
sources Committee, which has juris-
diction over the F.D.A., gave Dr. Kes-
sler encouragement today when he 
said through a spokeswoman: "The 
Food and Drug Adminstration is 
caught in a downward spiral of declin-
ing resources, credibility and morale. 
Dr. Kessler has the background to deal 
effectively with the latter two prob-
lems. If he does, he'll find Congress 
ready to provide more resources." 
Dr. Sidney Wolfe, head of the Public 
Citizen Health Research Group, an ad-
A 100-member 
force to pursue 
food and drug 
violations. 
vecacy groups specializing in health 
matters, said that Dr. Kessler's ap-
pointment is very promising. "He 
comes at a key time, after the worst 
leadership in F.D.A. history, which de-
moralized the agency unlike anything 1 
have ever seen," Dr. Wolfe said. "In 
the past, we had to sue them to put 
warning labels on tampons to prevent 
toxic shock and sue them to ban unpas-
teurized milk." 
Scrutiny on Drug Industry 
One example of Dr. Kessler's prom-
ising action cited by Dr. Wolfe was that 
the new Commissioner has doubled the 
size of the staff working on advertising 
and promotional abuses by the drug in-
dustry. 
Althouth the agency's budget has in-
creased in the past two years, it was 
not immediately clear where the 
money to pay the new investigators 
would come from. "Where will they get 
the money for the investigators?" 
asked one staff member of the House 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Inves-
tigations. 
The subcommmittee is headed by 
Representative John D. Dingell. a 
Michigan Democrat who has been a 
persistent critic of the agency and who 
has conducted several inquiries into its 
operation. 
Further, the aide said, the agencies 
recent troubles might make it difficult 
to recruit. "It will be hard for them to 
recruit experienced people," the staff 
member said. i 
But in general. Dr. Kessler's recep-
tion has been so good, and the relief ex-1 
Ipressed so widespread that Mr. Hutt 
said one danger might be expectations 
that rise too high too fast. "This agency 
is still in trouble in many ways," he 
said. 
Resigned Under Pressure 
The former permanent Commission-
er, Dr. Frank E. Young, resigned under 
pressure in the fall of 1989 after several 
agency and industry officials were con-
victed in connection with a scandal in 
which companies faked safety and ef-
fectiveness data for generic drugs that 
went on the market. 
The new Commissioner is 39 years 
old and is both a lawyer and doctor. He 
graduated from the University of Chi-
cago Law School in 1978 and the Har-
vard Medical School in 1979. Dr. Kes-
sler also worked on F.D.A. issues, for 
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of 
Utah, and taught food and drug law at 
the Columbia Law School in New York 
from 1986 until he was named Commis-
sioner in December 1990. A pediatri-
cian, he was also the director of medi-
cine at Albert Einstein College of Medi-
cine in the Bronx from 1984 until he be-
came Commissioner. 
The Food and Drug Administration 
is often said to be the most influential 
regulatory agency on earth, with re-
sponsibility for the safety and effec-
tiveness of one-quarter ot the nation's 
gross national product, and an .xper-
tise that other nations routinely rely on. 
But as Dr. Kessler said in the inter-
view, to cover hundreds of billions of 
dollars of American and imported 
products, the drug agency has a budget 
about the same as the Albert Einstein 
medical school and the Montefiore 
Medical Center. 
The school and medical center 
budget is about $690 million annually, 
and the F.D.A.'s budget is about $690 
million for the fiscal year that began in 
October, he said. 
Bigger Budget Is Vision 
Dr. Kessler hopes to increase the 
agency's budget and was helped by a 
Bush Administration increase for 1991 
and a proposed increase for 1992 that 
would raise financing by 43 percent in 
the two years if Congress agrees to the 
1992 proposal. 
In a speech at a recent meeting of the 
Food, Drug and Law Institute, a trade 
group, Dr. Kessler said his first pri-
ority was restoring the agency's cred-
ibility. 
Of all of his tasks, he said, it was "the 
most difficult one to talk about." He 
went on to express his ideas about the 
agency this way: 
It is the most difficult one because I 
know that F.D.A. employees are deeply 
committed to their mission. But it must 
be said: 'The most important thing we 
can do to rebuild the credibility of the 
agency is to insure the integrity of its i 
processes.' ' 
'Some may argue that by stessing 
integrity, I express a lack of trust in the 
agency. 1 mean nothing of the sort. In 
fact, I think I know how F.D.A. employ-
ees feel: deeply angered that all should 
be tarnished by the gross misconduct 
of a few." 
Hmcr ior inc r\r«r torn liror* 
Dr. David Kessler, new Commis-
sioner of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, plans to add 100 
new criminal investigators. 
John C. Pctricciani, vice president 
for medical and regulatory affairs of 
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association, which represents the 
large pharmaceutical companies, said 
the industry was encouraged by Dr. 
Kessler's appointment. 
'A Gut Feeling' 
"I have a gut feeling that Dr. Kes-
sler's appointment has the potential for 
being one of the most important in the 
agency's history," he said. "It comes 
at a time when the agency is trying to 
decide what it's mission is — tradition-
ally it has been, very heavily, to protect 
j^ealth, but now the availability of new 
drugs is becoming almost equally im-
portant." 
Speeding the approval of new drugs, 
especially those for life-threatening ill-
nesses like AIDS and cancer, is near 
the top cf his list of priorities, Dr. Kes- j 
sler has said. 
But Mr. Petricciar.i suggested that 
the agency should not spend additional 
dollars on criminal mvestigators. 
"What is the mission of the agency?" 
he asked. "Is it law enforcement? 
Some would argue that it is not. It has 
some regulatory responsibility, but to 
the extent it gets into law enforcement, 
that is not the mission of the agency. 
"There arc a finite amount of re-
sources, and the F.D.A. should put its 
money where Congress and the public 
perceive its mission to be," like drug 
approval, he said. 
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a Whipped 
s Testifies 
ping victim takes stand 
:
 vs Deating of slain boy 
liing? oc>.ur-cd in a oack room of 
-. Mandela'-. Sowetu home. He 
she punched Seipei "for a 
-iderable amount JI time." dur 
- which Seipei denieu being a 
ce informant. Kgase said Seipei 
..•oaied LO be 'feeling pain." 
kgase saio Mrs Mauuela went 
m one .via. u, another punching 
':. of them and ,nc-i the others 
ne rouii.jOineti 11.. 
There was pandemonium." 
'.i.t-.?e :>aiu 1 goi myself punched 
.00 many people I was severely 
.ohed tor a long time I can't 
.,ember hov. 11 stopped." 
During the beatings Kgase .said, 
'•-••. s Mandeic. was humming a 
x and dancing to '.he 
W\ of a sudden," Kgase added. 
:
 .saw her having t- sjambok 
• mpj, and she started with me 
-air . . . . Before she saia any-
-,..ig. she struck several blows." 
He said he fell to the ground and 
: led to shield himself as others in 
~.o loom were sitting and watch-
..g Wh-.m she stopped hitting 
- in, Kgase said, she returned to 
•-oipei. 
Then. Kgase saia. three of the 
v.n in the room picked up Seipei 
.;id dropped hiir. twice on his head. 
miners in the room beat Seipei 
-verely with sjamboks until his 
ucc was bloody and his head 
•wollen, Kgase said. As the beat-
i.gs continued, Mrs. Mandela left 
'.he room, he testified. 
Seipei s bods was found a week 
ater in aSowetofieid. 
Dr. Patricia Klepp, who per-formed the autopsy on Seipei, 
•.estified that he had been stabbed 
ihree times in the neck anu oeaten 
-overely on the head and body. She 
said either the stab wounds or the 
head injuries could have caused his 
death. 
Under questioning, Kgase said 
he knew of no homosexual inci-
dents at lhe church house, which is 
run by the Rev Paul Verryn. a 
•videly respected pasto. in Soweto. 
, Verryn still runs the church 
house, ana Mrs. Manaeia has sent 
dozens of young men to his half-
way house for shelter in recent 
months. Ar. internal investigation 
b\ the Methodist Church found no 
evidence of sexual misconduct by 
Verryn. 
Kgase testified that on Dec. 31. 
1988. two days after the beatings, 
Jerry Richardson, the leader of 
Mandela's bodyguard, came to the 
house with another man, whom 
Kgase could not identify. Richard-
son said Kgase, Mono and Mekgwe 
had been pardoned but that Seipei 
had admitted selling out four 
"comrades," who were shot to 
death by police officers. 
Richardson was convicted last 
year and sentenced to death for 
Scipei's murder. 
Kgase escaped from the Mandela 
home on Jan. 7, 1989, and, two 
weeks later, after pressure from 
community leaders, Mono and 
Mekgwe were released. 
Dr. Martin Connell testified 
says. Primt minister cans 
demands unreasonable 
Bv ELTzABFTH SHU.RbN 
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MOSCOW-A spreading soviet 
coal miners siriK*" hai >uetcnes 
from the Ukraine'.C' ^.isic-.i Sibe-
ria will continue utun r>o le. rresi 
aent Miknan S. Gorbachev resigns 
a leader 01 one of the ia. gest strike 
committees said Wednesdav 
"Under Gorbachev s leadership, 
we're living our lives b\ ration 
coupons." said Yuri V Komarev. 
co-chairman of the strike commit-
tee m lhe western Siberian city of 
Novokuznetsk, the centei of the 
count;-} 's second largest coal area. 
Wc wili sta> on strike until Gor-
bachev and his team resign." 
The strike began late iast week 
in the Ukraine and the Central 
Asian republic of Kazakhstan and. 
on Monda> spread to mines in 
western Siberia. 
In the Ukraine rnc '.nines, on 
strike have increased to 2J ac 
cording to Andrei 0 Siivka. ^ 
member of the strike committee-11. 
Donetsk, tne heart of the largest 
Soviet coal field. At l i more mine? 
in the Donetsk Basin, miners are 
still at work but the) ar«. refusing 
tc ship the coal, he added. 
In western Siberian coal fields, four mines are on strike, idling 
70,000 workers, and five others, are 
refusing to ship their coal Workers 
at 28 mines, more than a third of 
those in the coal-rich region, held a 
24-hour warning strike, according 
to Komarev. 
Siivka said many more mines 
would like to participate in the 
strike but that management at 
those enterprises has threa'ened to 
fine sinkers 200 rubles a day. or 
half an average month's pay Local 
officials have warned that "agita 
tors" will be prosecuted and jailed. 
But many minci*, appaiently 
would not be deterred 
"No fewer than 100,000 miners 
are striking right now." Siivka said 
in a telephone interview. "This 
strike shouid show Gorbachev that, 
when his government makes 
pledges, he should be responsible 
for them." 
back on the- joD in tne sumurei w. 
1989. when more than 500.000 
miners across the country struck 
for two weeks. 
Although the current strikes do 
not approach the 1989 crisis in 
scale, they are weakening not only 
the Soviet energy industry but 
other sectors of the economy, in-
jiudmg steel production, that de-
pend on it, and the Kremlin is 
clearly worried about the overall 
impact. 
Prime Minister Valentin S. Pav-
lov, speaking on Soviet television 
Tuesday, appealed to miners to 
return to work and called their 
demands unreasonable at a time 
when industrial production across 
the country is plummeting. 
"I would like to raise everyone's 
pay tomorrow as high as the min-
ers wish.' Pavlov said during an 
interview on "Vremya," the eve-
ning news program. "There's only 
one question: Where will we get 
the money"" 
Pavlov said the country's pro-
duction has dropped 5% since the 
beginning of the year and that the 
miners productivity has declined 
ove; the last three years. 
"I want the miners to understand 
that they have no enemies in the 
government,' the prime minister 
continued. "But we have to look 
objectively and realistically at 
what we can do and when we can 
do it." 
The demands of the strike vary from mine to mine. Although 
some mines had only economic 
demands, the Bolshevik Mine in 
Novokuznetsk demanded that a 
question of no confidence in Gor-
bachev be added to the country-
wide March 17 referendum on 
preserving the Soviet Union as a 
federal state. 
Many miners said they support 
Russian Federation President Bor-
is N. Yeltsin, who has emerged as 
Gorbachevs chief rival. "We sup-
port Yeltsin . . . not because of his 
nice name but because of his con-
crete deeds and his policies," Ko-
marev said. 
The strike has also reached into 
southern Russia, where 18 of the 
101 mines in the Rostov-on-the -
Don region were on strike, the 
labor newspaper Trud said. 
From Associated Press 
India's Prime Minister Quits After 
3 Months; New Elections Probable 
ment. But the president, whose 
post is largely ceremonial, ap-
peared to have no choice since the 
six largest parties in Parliament 
say they do not want to try to form 
another coalition government. 
In the meantime, Shekhar said 
he will continue to serve as prime 
minister "until new arrangements 
are made. 
New elections might again fail to 
determine a clear winner and leave 
the country with another fragile 
minority government like the one 
headed by Shekhar or that of his 
predecessor, Vishwanath Pratap 
Singh. Singh served 11 months 
after dislodging Gandhi in the No-
vember, 1989, elections. 
Shekhar announced his resigna-
tion on the floor of Parliament with 
biting remarks. He had just lis-
tened to two hours of tirades by 
opposition members who accused 
him of running a puppet govern-
ment whose strings were pulled by 
Gandhi and Gandhi's Congress 
Party. 
"I cannot run the government in 
keeping with their [the Congress 
Party's] behavior," Shekhar said. 
NEW DELHI--Prime Minister 
Chandra Shekhar resigned in an-
ger Wednesday, accusing former 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and 
his political party of betrayai and 
making new elections a virtual 
certainty. 
Shekhar, a veteran politician but 
a novice in the top circles of 
government, served three months 
as head of a minority government 
in India, the world's largest democ-
racy. 
Gandhi, 46, who helped to get 
Shekhar elected as prime minister, 
also helped to end his term by 
withholding support needed to puss 
bills in Parliament. 
Six hours after the prime minis-
ter announced his resignation, 
Gandhi's Congress Party declared 
that it wanted new elections, echo-
ing the urgings of Shekhar and 
leaders of the major opposition 
parties. 
It is up to President Ramaswami 
Venkataraman to decide whether 
to call new elections or to ask 
someone else to form a govern-
EggsqpMtbs? 
NEW SHIPMENT! 
Waterford 
FIRST EDmON 
spectacular But he said the trees aeueaie uiuuu» a.<_ .„...*. 
to cold weather, high winds and driving rain. 
An earl> flowering, however can create problems for the 
annual Cherry Blossom Festival, scheduled for March 31 to April 
7. 
Parks service chief scientist William Anderson has examined 
indicator trees—those that consistentls oioom eari> each year — 
and predicted they will be in blossom within a week Kittleman 
said. The rest of the tree? would follow in a few days. 
The 3.000 trees that line the Potomac River near the Jefferson 
Memorial were a gift from the government of Japan during the ', 
administration of William Howard Taft. His wife and the wife of 
the mayor of Tokyo planted the first cherry tree in 1912. 
New Commissioner Vows 
to Restore Integrity to FDA 
ByMARLENECIMONS 
TIME> STAFF WKITEK 
W A S H I N G T O N - T h e new 
commissioner of the Food and 
Drug Administration told members 
of Congress on Wednesday that his 
first priority will be to restore the 
integrity of his beleaguered agen-
cy. 
"The FDA is on the move." said 
Dr. David A. Kessler. outlining his 
agenda during his first public ap-
pearance on Capitol Hill. "We have 
vigorously begun our work. . . 
We are building the momentum 
that will sustain us in the months 
and years ahead." 
Kessler, a pediatrician and an 
attorney, said he intends to protect 
against future abuses by revamp-
ing the ways in which the FDA 
reviews the data upon which it 
bases its approval of various prod-
ucts. 
"The lesson the last several 
years have taught us is that it is 
imperative that we audit the data 
. . .," he told the Senate Labor and 
Human Resources Committee 
"We have found fraud and mis-
leading data, and it is possible that 
these practices are more wide-
spread than we thought likely." 
Kessler said he also plans to 
strengthen the FDA's enforcement 
and surveillance programs to safe-
guard against the type of scandal 
that shook its generic drugs divi-
sion last year. A federal investiga-
tion found that several FDA regu-
lators had taken bribes from 
officials of generic drug companies 
in exchange for hastening the ap-
proval of their products. Five FDA 
employees have been found guilty, 
and four firms and eight drug 
company executives have pleaded 
guilty to making the payoffs. Oth-
ers are still under investigation. 
"I believe the generic drug situ-
ation occurred because people . . . 
thought they could get away with 
it," Kessler said. "We are enhanc-
ing our efforts in this area by 
hiring additional criminal investi-
gators, providing more training for 
all investigators, streamlining out 
enforcement procedures, and hav-
ing FDA headquarters pay more 
attention to field activities." he 
added. 
The new FDA chie-i was >worr 
in last week and was confirmed bv 
the Senate before it adjourned ia?>-
year. but he did not ruvc a confir 
mation hearing. A. the time, 'he 
promised to appear before law-
makers to discuss his objectives for 
the agency 
Before coming .0 the FDA Kes-
sler was directoi of medicine 'at 
Albert Einstein College of Medi-
cine in the Bronx. 
In outlining his objectives 
Wednesday. Kessler said he atso 
hopes to bolster the agency's sur-
veillance activities in such areas as 
medical devices; inspections of im-
ported products, which have tri-
pled since 1970 and which "tend to 
have more violations;" and in food 
products where there can be prob-1 
lems with disease-causing organ-
isms, such as salmonella. 
He added that he wants to find 
ways to manage the growing vol-
ume of applications for such items 
as new drugs, food additives, and 
blood bank licensing. Currently, he 
said, the agency "is not adequately 
prepared to meet the anticipated 
demand of new applications." __ 
He said he was also concerned 
about violations of FDA regula-
tions that govern prescription drug 
advertising, saying "it is clear to 
me that some in the prescription 
drug industry have gone over the 
line." Consumers are being "mis-
led" by some promotions, he said, 
and "unless we act swiftly . . . 
they will almost certainly result in 
the kind of chaos that we saw 
recently with health claims on the 
food label." 
Kessler acknowledged that his 
program was ambitious, saying: 
"We have a lot to do here. It will 
take my entire tenure, and it will 
go beyond one commissioner." 
LAST 5 DAYS! 
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New Chief Makes FDA a Regulatory Tiger 
• Government: He is 
intent on restoring public 
confidence in the agency. 
Businesses are getting the 
word that deception won't 
be tolerated. 
ByMARLENECIMONS 
TIMES STAFF WRITER 
WASHINGTON-After years of restraint—some would 
even say timidity —the federal 
Food and Drug Administration in 
recent weeks has become the reg-
ulatory tiger of the Bush Adminis-
tration, aggressively attacking the 
food industry for deceptive claims 
on a variety of products. 
' With a series of sharply worded 
warnings, court actions and even 
ofie warehouse seizure, the agency 
has jolted food companies long 
accustomed to deferential treat-
ment by the government. The 
change has surprised even some 
KDA officials, who for years had 
been discouraged from taking ac-
tion except in cases of life or death. 
•Most of the impetus for the 
agency's sudden personality 
cfwnge comes from its new com-
missioner. Dr. David A. Kessler, a 
physician and lawyer and an un-
ljjrely activist in an Administration 
that still officially adheres to the 
theme of getting government off 
t$e backs of business. 
-"He has sent a very powerful 
rfiessage," said Jeffrey Nedelman, a 
^okesman for the Grocery Manu-
facturers Assn. "He has our atten-
tion." 
The agency regulates a broad array of consumers products, 
including foods, drugs, cosmetics 
and medical devices. 
i-ln recent weeks, the FDA has 
aimed its enforcement guns at 
s>veral major food companies, 
forcing them, for example, to re-
mpve the word fresh from their 
{ftxluct labels because the foods, in 
fact, are processed. 
•^ A.nd, this week, the agency 
if«ved against manufacturers of 
several vegetable oils and other 
ifems for using the words no cho-
Ujtterol, charging that the designa-
tion was misleading because cho-
lfsterol is a substance found only in 
animal products. 
r"We recommended several 
$mes that we take at least some 
tend of symbolic action, just to 
iow we weren't tolerating this 
timd of thing—and we were turned 
<t>wn from above time and time 
again," said Sanford Miller, who 
was director of the FDA's Center 
for Food Safety and Applied Nutri-
tion from 1978 to 1987. 
"He's going against the big guys 
in the forest—that's what we 
wanted to do, take on a big food 
company or a big drug company 
and say, 'This is the law and you're 
compelled to follow the law just 
like anyone else,'" said Miller, now 
dean of the graduate school of 
biomedical sciences at the Univer-
sity of Texas Health Science Cen-
ter in San Antonio. 
"But the philosophy of the [Ron-
ald] Reagan Administration was: 
the less regulation, the better. 
They never came to grips with the 
idea that someone had to make 
sure that everybody was following 
the rules, that everyone was play-
ing on a level playing field. 
"The interesting thing is that the 
bulk of the industry suffers when 
the FDA doesn't enforce the law. 
Time and time again, companies 
would come to us and say, 'do 
something" about the other com-
panies. 
Kessler said that he was not 
seeking to proliferate regulation or 
to put his bureaucracy in every-
one's business but that he was 
insistent on enforcing the laws and 
restoring public confidence in his 
beleaguered agency. 
For years, "people thought they 
could get away with things," he 
said in an interview. Now, he said, 
that will change—and the impact 
could be broad, because industries 
that fall under the FDA's authority 
touch the daily lives of all Ameri-
cans. 
"The issues go well beyond fresh 
and no cholesterol." Kessler said. 
'They go to the willingness of the 
agency to enforce the statutes. If 
American consumers can't believe 
their government is going to pro-
tect them from dishonest and un-
fair dealings, they won't believe 
their government will protect 
them against unsafe substances 
either. 
"If you let false and misleading 
actions happen, that translates into 
people thinking they can get away 
with things," he said. "And one day 
you will end up with unsafe and 
dangerous things happening." 
In recent years, the agency has 
been laboring under the handicaps 
of limited resources, a shrinking 
staff and serious erosion of public 
respect. 
"Enforcement is only a tool," 
Kessler said. "It's not an end in and 
of itself. It's the incentive to assure 
compliance. In the past, the indus-
try would say, 'Let's fix only what 
we've got to fix.' The incentive to 
comply wasn't out there." 
But now it is, industry execu-
tives acknowledged Wednesday. "I 
can assure you that industry has 
gotten the message," said Peter 
Barton Hutt, a Washington food 
and drug lawyer whose clients 
include many large food compa-
nies. He predicted that companies 
will now begin to police them-
selves. "Any intelligent lawyer 
would advise his clients to do so," 
he said. 
He contended that industry wel-
comes the changes because the 
system will now be made fair for 
everyone. 
SUPER SALE • SAVE UP TO 80% 
HON lATBt ALTOS I MKISYSIM I STORAGE UBNEl HON VDttKU flUS 
;: A K E N N E D Y - W I L S O N , I N C . 
A U C T I O N 
4 ESTATE HOMES IN NORTHRIDGE 
MINIMUM BIDS $570,000 EACH 
UP TO 34% OFF ORIGINAL ASKING PRICES OF $856,000 TO $876,000 
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The Watchdog Wakes Up 
Food companies can forget the days of anything-goes regulators, 
A new FDA commissioner is cracking down on deceptive labels. 
By ANASTASIA TOUFEXIS 
F or a while now, the makers of many vegetable oils have had a nice little 
gimmick going. On their bottles, in big, 
easy-to-read letters, are the words "no cho-
lesterol." sometimes printed with a cute 
drawing of a healthy heart. The implicit 
message: Cook all the French fries you 
want in this oil and don't worry about heart 
disease. 
The only problem with this marketing 
ploy is that it is nonsense. Cholesterol is 
found only in foods from animals, and thus 
putting "no cholesterol" on a vegetable-oil 
label is misleading. More pertinent to the 
consumer is the fact that the oils are a liq-
uid form of fat—pure fat. And high-fat di-
ets have been linked to heart disease, 
breast cancer and a variety of other ail-
ments. So hold the French fries. 
Not so long ago,
 t the food industry 
could pull this kind of shenanigan with im-
punity. But that was before the emergence 
of the new Food and Drug Administration. 
Not the old, demoralized, anything-goes 
agency whose officials accepted bribes for 
approving untested generic drugs, but an 
FDA that seems to be rededicated to pro-
tecting the public. Last week the FDA or-
dered Procter & Gamble, the manufactur-
er of Crisco Corn Oil. along with Best 
Foods, which markets Mazola Corn Oil. 
and Great Foods of America, maker of 
HeartBeat Canola Oil, to cut out the "no 
cholesterol" business. While Best Foods 
and Great Foods stalled by saying they 
would work with the FDA to resolve the dis-
pute, P&G went ahead and announced it 
would drop the offending words from 
Crisco—and also voluntarily remove the 
*"no cholesterol" claim from Duncan Hines 
cake mixes. Fisher Nuts, Puritan Oil and 
Pringle's potato chips. 
It was the second time in three weeks 
that the FDA had dared challenge the big 
food companies. The first target was Citrus 
Hill Fresh Choice orange juice, another 
P&G product. After more than a year of 
wrangling over the word "fresh" (the prod-
uct is made from concentrate and is pas-
teurized), the FDA had U.S. marshals im-
pound 24,000 half-gallon cartons of the 
juice at a suburban Minneapolis ware-
house. P&G gave in within two days. Uni-
lever subsidiary Ragu Foods, which since 
1989 had been skirmishing over the same 
word on labels for its processed pasta 
sauce, soon dropped its right. And earlier 
this month two other companies revealed 
that they were removing "fresh" from pas-
ta sauces: Nestle from the Contadina 
brand and Kraft from DiGiorno sauce. 
The architect of the new FDA is David 
Kessier, 39, who became commissioner last 
December. Kessier is a far crv from the 
WHATS WRONG WITH THESE LABELS? 
It's misleading: the words 
"no cholesterol" stripped 
across a heart imply that this 
vegetable oil is healthy for 
the heart. True, it does not 
contain cholesterol, but, 
more important, vegetable 
oils are pure fat, and too 
much of that hurts the heart. 
In just five months, FDA chief 
Kessier has begun to restore public 
faith in an agency plagued by 
unr lar f i inHino anrj At/oru/nrk 
(ontadina , 
. . mrana 
'LutYiTOMYTO 
MATOSALCfc WITH BASIL 
s&mm&m 
It's false: the pasta sauce 
touts itself as "fresh." That 
may describe the taste, but 
certainly not the 
preparation. In fact, the 
sauce is a precooked 
concoction of processed 
tomatoes and spices. 
Rita Lavelle-style, wine-and-dine-with-
the-industry regulators who reigned during 
the Reagan years. With a degree in medi-
cine from Harvard and one in law from the 
University of Chicago, he understands 
health issues and knows how to devise and 
enforce tough regulations. In the early '80s 
he served as a consultant on FDA matters to 
Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, 
who brought Kessler's talents to the atten-
tion of the Bush Administration. But the 
White House, with its friends in Big Busi-
ness and its fealty to the philosophy of de-
regulation, may not have expected so much 
activism so soon. 'T have no problems 
making decisions.'1 declares Kessier, who is 
investigating several strategies to bolster 
FDA enforcement. Among them: levying 
fines, giving subpoena powers to agency in-
spectors and searching through corporate 
records. 
Food companies contend that the con-
fusion about their labeling stems not from 
deception on their part but from the gov-
ernment's failure to issue clear guidelines 
for making nutritional and health claims. 
The FDA plans to set forth revised labeling 
rules next year. "Once these regulations 
are out," says John Cady, president of the 
National Food Processors Association, 
"industry will know clearly what the FDA 
expects and will certainly comply." Cady 
charges that Kessler's current "hunt-and-
peck approach" of targeting big companies 
is largely an effort to shine up the FDA'S 
tarnished image. 
The agency surely needs better public 
relations—and much more. A report is-
sued last week by an advisory panel to the 
Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices concludes that the FDA is un-
derfunded, understaffed and 
overwhelmed by its mandate, 
which ranges from approving 
drugs and monitoring the nation's 
blood supply to checking food im-
ports and regulating the cosmetics 
industry. From 1979 to 1988. 23 
laws were passed that broadened 
the FDA'S responsibilities: at the 
same time, the agency lost 900 of 
its 8.100 employees. ; 
That slide may finally be over, j 
Congress has boosted the agen- | 
cy's budget by $150 million in the j 
past two years, to $682 million for 
1991, and the number of start" po-
sitions is up again to about 8,400. 
With that backing, Kessier hopes ! 
to strengthen the FDA in all areas, j 
By picking on big food companies j 
sensitive to publicity, he has made j 
an astute start at establishing j 
himself—and re-establishing the I 
FDA—as the nation's top health i 
cop. —Reported by Dick Thompson/ l 
Washington and Linda Williams/New 
York 
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(The Battle of the Bureaucrats 
: Rivals 
witft<<mirastmg| 
£ * y 
ndefTects6n(he 
y\ • 
•Hft& 
itkostirDportantfeder- I 
ftWt: Supply 'ba^f / 
,* and to recent • 
5ejUoiitdr^matf-> 
[gsigpals.' ' r 
Secretary Bdward 
,%ntered office in March, 
£k * innovative nutrition 
ed^atipn program at the request 
^fp&coaimodity groups, thereby 
reinforcing a widely held percep-
tiod that USDA frequently bows to 
IndtisUry wishes. 
Meanwhile, over at the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, 
commissioner David A. Kessler MD 
took up his post in January and 
began waging a high-profile cam-
paign against false health claims on 
food labels. His targets were the 
misuse of the terms fresh and no 
cholesterol; his actions angered ma-
jor manufacturers and industry 
trade groups. 
FDA and USDA, whose respon-
sibilities frequently overlap, are 
long-time rivals for federal fund-
ing and frequently compete over 
turf. There is especially intense 
competition between FDA and the 
USDA's Food Safety and Inspec-
tion Service, which oversees the 
nation's meat and poultry indus-
tries. Both agencies are battling for 
control of what is expected to be a 
; $100-million seafood inspection 
J program. FSIS and FDA are also | wrestling over which agency's nu-
! tritional labeling regulations will 
Lbe adopted for use on all food 
products. 
-— The conflicts, are inevitable be-
cause of the tangled jurisdictions 
between the agencies. USDA, a 
huge department composed of 
more than 40 agencies, is charged 
with promoting agriculture and is 
responsible for all meat and poul-
try products. FDA, a single compo-
AL STEPHENSON / For TheTiriw;. 
USDA'S Edward R. Madigan 
When two new leaders were stirred into this mixture of 
turf battles, elusive funding and 
public criticism, those familiar with 
both agencies were eager to reveal 
their first impressions. Secretary 
Madigan, 55, is a former Republi-
can congressman from Illinois. 
Commissioner Kessler, 39. is a 
physician, lawyer and academician. 
A veteran Washington observer 
remarked that the difference was 
striking. "Kessler hit the ground 
running, while Madigan hit the 
ground and stayed there," he said. 
Predictably, consumer advocates 
laud Kessler's crackdown on mis-
leading food labels and complain 
about Madigan's "cave-in" on the 
Eating Right Pyramid, which em-
phasized consumption of grains and 
produce at the expense of meat and 
dairy products. On the other hand, 
industry representatives have ap-
plauded Madigan's cautiousness 
and attacked Kessler's "grand-
standing." 
"Secretary Madigan shot himself 
in the foot by caving in to the meat 
and dairy industries [over his can-
cellation of the Eating Right Pyra-
mid]," said Michael Jacobson, ex-
ecutive director of the Center for 
Science in the Public Interest in 
Washington. "I think he has un-
dermined his credibility with the 
public . . . USDA [remains] a 
cheerleadpr for rhp inrinstrips it i« 
fthe-Eating Right FyndnfiQ'tfodl 
prior to hi* arrival. 
he nee4& to i f c # W . ~ ^ 
Cacjy said "He is txy^%da) 
is rigjvt and decide-wfct^' * 
"pr^ir^inant^ far 
the four food's 
' exeetftfrre^jjri 
praise 
g#L '">• 
,< Whjfe 
FDA Coi 
iataes~ ibaC V w i p ^ ^ f resotv* 
in Congress by tra^>assa|e <* U*j 
Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act in 1990. She also points out that 
there were significant segments of 
the food md\p^Kf^^^jm 
consumer groups—lha$ wanted Che 
government to crack {ft|>dht'^i 
misleading food labels klHTadvet* 
tisements. - ,i ^ jpr *• \Vj 
"[Kessler) has not changed di-
rection from the passive player 
that the entire (FDA) has been; 
she said. "The real measure of his 
performance wilj be how he en-
sures the safety and wholesome-
ness of food. On this issue, we have 
not seen his colors, his bite or his 
teeth." 
While conceding that Madigan 
made the wrong decision in with-
drawing the Eating Right Pyramid, 
Haas said that he should not be
 f judged on that issue alone.' ; *' * 
"To preemptively withdraw tfe£ 
pyramid when meat interests ccfntV 
plain leaves the action open to ' 
some hasty conclusions, Madigan 
didn't think of the political conse-
quences, and he underestimated 
the concern of the nutritional com-
munity," Haas said. "But Madigan 
needs to make up for thejx>or start 
and he has the opportunity to do 
so." 
The group most frequently m e n ^ 
tioned as having urged Madigan to 
drop the Eating Right Pyramid 
was the National Cattlemen's Assn. 
A representative of the Denver-
based group said the cattlemen's 
role has been exaggerated in press 
reports. 
U A ll we did was tell [USDA) the concerns that we had, Maxwell Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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: iff expected to bo a 
rclfood inspection 
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I W which agency's nu—, 
; regulations will 
r t e use-on ail food 
fct&1fi& inevitable be-
/eausS^ ljQf the tanked jurisdictions 
t l k
 "- ;4heagencies. USDA, a 
.7 tefti composed of 
thMO agencies, is charged 
^fiih pramoting agriculture and is 
responsible for ail meat and poul-
try products. FDA, a single compo-
nent of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, is 
empowered to protect the public's 
heaJJtft iand is responsible for all 
o th |$ foods, including monitoring 
for pesticide residues, combatting 
microbiological contaminants , 
evaftjatjng the safety of additives 
andinspecting imported food. 
According to a recent General Accounting Office report, both 
FDA and USDA have less funding, 
less staff and more work than 10 
years ago. 
"Available data show that the 
resources of the agencies have 
decreased since 1980 while 'their 
work loads related to food safety 
and quality have increased," the 
G AO reported 
Supporting the GAO's finding 
was a study by a federal advisory 
committee on FDA. The 15-mem-
ber group found that the agency's 
current condition posed the "risk of 
impending public health catastro-
phe." The committee also recom-
mended that FDA be given inde-
pendent status similar to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 
but the suggestion was immedi-
ately dismissed bv Bush Adminis-
AL STEPHENSON / For The Tunes 
USDA'S Edward R. Madigan 
w: 
« 
hen two new leaders were 
stirred into this mixture of 
turf battles, elusive funding and 
public criticism, those familiar with 
both agencies were eager to reveal 
their first impressions. Secretary 
Madigan, 55, is a former RepubUr 
can congressman from Illinois. 
Commissioner Kessier, 39, is a' 
physician, lawyer and academician. 
A veteran Washington observer 
remarked that the difference was-
striking, "Kessier hit t&s ground 
running, while Madigan M£H~ 
ground and staged thefe," he sat 
v Pr^^tably, Consume 
Uud Kessler's l&rackjrfywn <m i p i ^ 
feadlrig food labels and complain* 
about Madigan's "cavern" jp$.t&£U 
Right Pyramid, whkh ••«-*;? 
consumption of grains and , 
produce at the expense of meat and/ 
dairy products; On the other hand, 
industry representatives have ap-
pbauded Jladigaifs cautiousness 
fcnd attacked Kessler's "gjandV 
standing."
 r -
"Secretary Madigan shot himself 
in the foot by caving in to the meat 
and dairy industries {over his can-
cellation of the Eating Right Pyra-
mid)," said Michael Jacobson, ex-
ecutive director of the Center for 
Science in the Public Interest in 
Washington. 4 i think he h^s un-
dermined his credibility with the 
public . . . USDA [remains] a 
cheerleader for the industries it is 
supposed to oversee." 
Jacobson, however, had praise 
for Kessier. 
"He [Kessier] is a breath of fresh 
air in an agency where there was 
stale air for so many years. I hope 
this indicates a pattern of strong 
enforcement and an effort to stop 
companies from lying to the public 
[on product labels and advertise-
ments]," Jacobson said. "He is , 
reinvigorating the agency and 
reestablishing credibility with 
Congress, the public and the food 
industry." 
Jacobson's opinions were cer-
tainly not echoed at the National 
Food Processors Assn., a Washing-
ton-based trade group. 
Association president John R. 
Cady was highly critical of Kes-
sler's methods, charging the com-
miss ioner with "regulat ing 
through the press." 
"FDA should focus on the larger 
issues confronting the agency and 
stop this 'hunt and peck' approach 
. . . with [food labels]," Cady said. 
As for USDA, Cady was more 
understanding of Madigans situa-
tion. 
"USDA had ;i npw <;prrpfnrv 
Act in 1990. She also points out that 
there were significant segments of 
the food industry—and .not just 
consumer groups—that wanted the 
government to crack down on 
misleading food labels and adver-
tisements. •« ^v *,; >. .yv •: ^ 
"[Kessier] has not changed di-
rection from the passive player 
that the entire [FDA] has been," 
she said "The real measure of his 
performance will be how he en-
sures the safety and wholesome-
ness of food. On this issue* we haV* 
not seen his Gators," fits bite**-b& 
tee th /" , =/,'-.'-'*-•'..;'-v-.:v"' 
• While conceding thjit 
: made the wrong ^ed^pr; 
^ a w i f i g t l ^ B a d f ^ ^ ^ " 
JHaas^  : s s i j & 4 l | ^ 
pyramid when 
some h p t y jcofteltmooa 
didn't tftnk o r t i $ f K » t f a ^ 
quences, and b < 
the concernof the nu 
munity* Haas'said. " B « 
needs to m a k e u p for 
and he has the opportmity to 
v f6 fe group most freqpfel^ 
tioned as having ufged^Stadlgain to 
drop the Eating Right Pyramid 
was the National CatUernen's As3n. 
A representative of .the Deifrer-
based group said the iattleiften's 
role has been exaggeratedin press 
reports. .. . ,.:,„,,;" ' 
" A U we did wa* tell ftfSQAI 
/ " \ t h e concerns that we had, 
such as the pyramid would g ivethe 
consumer the idea that ret> njfeatj 
was bad/' said,: Alisd fi£fri§pnf\ 
information director of the Nation-; 
ai Cattlemen's Assn/s WashJn$£on 
i t / ; . - .--•.%• " - ;* " • ; 
Others di<| not. believe, the meat 
industry's role in. the cofritrbvdfsy 
was minimal. - •'* 
"Madigan is another ift a long 
line of people who reflect a philos-
»ophy that the Department of Agri-
culture should .belong to t t e people; 
that produce and process food and 
to hell with the people that eat," 
said Carol Tucker Foreman, a 
Washington public policy consul-
tant who was a top USDA official in 
the Carter Administration. "It is 
really just the department of agriX 
business and food processors." 
Foreman applauded Kessler's 
recent decisions on food labeling 
and said that the uncharacteristic 
action is a positive sign for federal 
food regulation. 
"The Bush Administration is 
taking some meaningful steps 
away from the Reagan Adminis-
fratinn nhilncrmhi/ th^t- ill »«""»« 
faterfttksl 
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127TH STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format. 
Proprietary to the United Press International 1991 
April 11, 1991, Thursday, BC cycle 
SECTION: Washington News 
LENGTH: 559 words 
HEADLINE: FDA needs dramatic overhaul, report says 
BYLINE: BY JANET BASS 
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
KEYWORD: FDA 
BODY: 
The Food and Drug Administration is unable to handle its current task of 
safeguarding the nation's food and drug supply, an expert panel concluded in a 
draft report released Thursday. 
A panel convened by Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan to 
review the FDA's mission said it found the agency to be plagued by staff 
shortages, outdated equipment and lack of regulatory authority. 
''It is glaringly apparent t the FDA cannot now execute all of its 
statuatory responsibilities within limitations of existing resources,'' stated 
the committee's draft report. 
''Although the FDA has routinely lived with controversy, the magnitude of 
current pressures is unprecedented in nature and scope,'' it said, noting 
constant demands and scrutiny by consumer organizations and the media. 
''The FDA is not currently prepared to cope with this environment (and) 
... it is imperative that the agency better prepare itself for the future.'' 
The draft was under discussion at the panel's meeting Thursday and Friday in 
Washington. A final version is due to be delivered to Sullivan May 15. 
Some critics have called for removing the FDA from HHS jurisdiction and 
setting it up as a cabinet-level agency like the Environmental Protection 
Agency. 
However, the report only recommends removing FDA from under the Public 
Health Service's bureaucratic umbrella and having it report directly to HHS. The 
report said the change would acknowledge the vital importance of strengthening 
the FDA's law enforcement responsibilities. 
''Moreover, it would demonstrate that the administration recognizes the 
importance of FDA's mission," it said. 
But the panel said if the change is not accomplished promptly, establishing 
FDA as a free-standing agency independent of HHS ''deserves further 
consideration.'' 
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FDA Commissioner David Kessler, who was a member of the advisory 
committee until being named head of the agency in February, said he supports the 
recommendation that the FDA be given the power to issue supoenas, seize 
products and impose civil fines on firms that violate FDA regulations. 
The FDA currently is reeling from a bribery scandal in its generic drug 
division and reports of a grand jury investigation into illegansider trading. 
In addition, AIDS activists have attacked the FDA's slowness in moving drugs 
to market, while consumer advocates charge the agency has done a poor job of 
protecting the public from health hazards like pesticides in foods and 
silicone breast implants. 
The 15-member panel concluded FDA lacks adequate scientific ability to 
evaulate new drugs, let alone keep abreast with ''revolutionary advances 
occuring in biological and medical sciences.'' 
''Many of these ( FDA) facilities are abysmal — overcrowded, poorly 
maintained, hazardous and inefficient. Much of their scientific equipment is 
obsolete and technologically inadequate'' the report said.. 
Staffing shortages are another woe, leading to some food companies being 
inspected only once every seven or eight years and key steps being omitted from 
inspections of drug firms. 
''Inspections have dropped by at least 4 0 percent over the past decade,'' 
the report said, adding that the number of seizures, injunctions and 
prosecutions of food and drug firms has also declined sharply since the 1970s. 
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Copyright (c) 1991 Newsday, Inc.; 
Newsday 
April 12, 1991, Friday, ALL EDITIONS 
SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 17 
LENGTH: 572 words 
HEADLINE: Study: More Money, Power for FDA 
BYLINE: By Michael Unger. STAFF WRITER 
KEYWORD: FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; BUDGET; INCREASE; RESEARCH; 
SAFETY; INVESTIGATION; SURVEY 
BODY: 
The federal Food and Drug Administration should have more financial and 
scientific resources to successfully regulate the growing array of new drugs, 
foods, cosmetics and medical devices, an advisory panel said in a draft report 
released yesterday* 
"It is glaringly apparent that the FDA cannot now execute all of its 
statutory responsibilities within the limitations of existing resources," said 
the report, prepared by 15 experts chosen by the agency. The FDA employs 8,400 
people to regulate the safety and effectiveness of products that account for 25 
cents of every consumer dollar spent in the United States. 
"It is essential that the FDA avoid being repeatedly blindsided by rapid 
advances in biomedical science and technology," the committee warned. "In a 
world undergoing rapid and significant scientific and technological change," 
including bioengineered and software-dominated products, the report said, the 
FDA "must better manage its research operations" and recruit and retain sorely 
needed scientific talent. 
The panel is headed by Dr. Charles Edwards, who was the FDA commissioner fron 
1969 to 1973 and is now president of the Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation 
in La Jolla, Calif. It includes industry officials and representatives of 
consumer groups, scientists and physicians. The FDA's new commissioner, Dr. 
David A. Kessler of New York, was a member of the committee until he took office 
this year. 
The Bush administration had no immediate comment on the report, which called 
for Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan to restore enforcement 
powers blocking the distribution of questionable goods and punishing the 
producers. That power was taken from the FDA commissioner by the Reag&n 
administration in 1981. The commission also urged that the FDA be upgraded and 
given increased independence within the Health and Human Services Department 
from its position of what it called "a third-tier agency" in the U.S. Public 
Health Service. 
Congressional Democrats said they were studying the recommendations. 
The report drew a picture of a demoralized and floundering regulatory agency, 
The "FDA had a difficult time describing to the committee its current research 
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activities, its goals, and the links between research projects and regulatory 
goals, which does not speak well for its management," it said. 
The enforcement picture also was painted as bleak. "The evidence suggests 
the FDA is able to monitor a smaller share of the production, distribution, and 
sale of regulated products than a decade ago," the report said. The number of 
FDA field inspectors returned to 1979 levels only within the past year. 
"The number of formal court enforcement actions brought by the agency -
seizures, injunctions and prosecutions - has declined sharply since the 1970s. 
Inspections have also dropped by at least 40 percent over the past decade," the 
committee said. 
While the number of domestic FDA-regulated products and establishments 
subject to inspection, such as pharmaceutical concerns, has increased, the FDA 
also has become responsible for inspecting a steadily rising number of imported 
foods, cosmetics and medical products. The FDA was strongly criticized for the 
way it handled the investigation of Chilean grapes said to be poisoned. 
Eventually, the agency came up with two poisoned grapes and temporarily 
suspended all shipments. No other poisoned grapes were found. 
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considered in other states ana 
Congress as the nation confronts 
spiraling health costs and widen-
ing gaps in the insurance system. 
The plan's centerpiece — a re-
quirement that * businesses em-
ploying six or more workers offer 
them health insurance or pay the 
state to do it — was originally 
scheduled to take effect next 
January. But it now seems un-
likely to materialize for years, if 
ever. The new Governor, William 
F. Weld, a conservative Republi-
can, has asked the state legisla-
ture to repeal it, calling the re-
quirement "an obstacle rather 
than a vehicle for improved 
health benefits for all." 
Hard to Reach Consensus 
Here as elsewhere, nearly all 
larger companies offer health in-
surance but many small and low-
wage businesses do not, leaving 
many workers and their families 
peal would send to other states," 
said State Representative John E. 
McDonough, a Boston Democrat 
who is a main supporter of the 
plan. "It's being killed not be-
cause of the design of the pro-
gram but for political reasons, 
and because of a recession." 
Opponents say that in the ab-
sence of other measures to con-
trol soaring medical and insur-
ance costs, the plan would place 
crushing burdens on fragile busi-
nesses and a broke state govern-
ment, and put the state's economy 
at a competitive disadvantage. 
"Just mandating something 
doesn't make it work," said 
Charles Baker, the new Under 
Secretary for Health. "I'd rather 
try to get at the root causes of the 
problem through hospital financ-
ing and the insurance system. We 
can try to lower the cost of insur-
Continuedon Page A16, Column 1 
Panel Calls Federal Drug Agency 
Unable to Cope With Rising Task^ 
By ROBERT PEAR 
Special to The New York Times 
WASHINGTON, April 10 — A Fed-! needs additional staff and equipment to 
eral advisory committee appointed to 
study the Food and Drug Administra-
tion says the agency is overwhelmed 
and incapable of coping with vastly in-
creased duties caused by the AIDS epi-
demic, a flood of food imports and ad-
vances in medical science and tech-
nology. 
In a draft of its final report, the panel 
of 15 experts says that F.D.A. laborato-
ries and equipment are in abysmal 
condition, that some food factories are 
inspected only once every eight years 
and that the agency no longer has ade-
quate scientific ability to evaluate new 
drugs, much less to keep up with "revo-
lutionary advances occurring in the 
biological and medical sciences." 
The report says many of the F.D.A.'s 
problems can be traced to its relatively 
lowly status in the Federal hierarchy: 
It is one of many agencies in the Public 
Health Service, all of which report toi 
an assistant secretary at the Depart-; 
ment of Health and Human Services.! 
The commission is urging that thej 
F.D.A. be granted independent status 
within the Department of Health and 
Human Services, a move that would 
allow the F.D.A. Commissioner much 
greater authority to issue regulations 
and enforce them. 
The draft report says the agency 
perform its mission properly, but the 
report does not specify the cost. Nor 
does it say whether the Government 
should levy a fee on food and drug com-
panies to augment the agency's budget, 
as the Bush Administration has pro-
posed. 
The Administration supports efforts 
to increase the agency's law-enforce-
ment powers but opposes removal of 
the agency from the Public Health 
Service, saying that would hinder its 
cooperation with other units of the 
service, like the Centers for Disease 
Control. 
Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human 
Continued on Page Bl I, Column 1 
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forever, she wept 
"That is how they will eradicate us, 
piece by piece," said Ahmad Ali, an en-
gineer from the northern Iraqi city of 
Dohuk. "Yesterday, maybe it was six 
dead, the day before three, tomorrow 
five." 
Thick Mud and Scant Supplies 
"It grows," he said. "Maybe after a 
week or 10 days, we will all be dead." 
Ten days have passed since the 
Kurdish exodus from Iraq began 
reaching Biblical dimensions. Yet res-
cue operations, at least in this stretch 
of mountainous border where 100,000 
or more Kurds have sought sanctuary, 
have yet to be translated into anything 
more concrete than a chaos of prom-
ises and intentions. 
There is a Turkish relief effort, to be 
sure, bolstered by overseas contribu-
tions and aimed at hundreds of thou-
sands of refugees massed at several 
entry points along the 206-mile frontier 
between Turkey and Iraq. American, 
British and French cargo planes havet. 
augmented that aid for the last four 
days by dropping bundles of emer-
gency supplies to Kurds on both sides 
of the border. 
How Many Physicians? None 
But at this remote outpost, up steep 
paths of thick mud inaccessible to most 
trucks, it is hard to see a pattern to the 
haphazard distribution of what thus far 
have been meager food and water sup-
plies. And any internal organization by 
the Kurds seems nonexistent. 
"The snow is our water," a woman 
said. She and other refugees scoop up 
the snow that streaks the mountain's 
upper reaches, and boil it of simply let 
it melt. As for food, sometimes there isj 
bread or potatoes, but far more often j 
not. The more provident among the 
Iraqis hauled flour with them to make 
Continued on Page AW, Column 3 
An Iraqi kurd n 
carried America 
N e w U.S . Warning to Iraq 
Baghdad was told to avoid military 
operations in northern Iraq, where an 
international relief effort for Kurdish 
refugees is under way. Page A10. 
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U.S. Panel Sees Drug Agency as Unable to Cope With Rising Tasks 
"-• Continued From Page At 
Services, has publicly denounced pro-
posals to remove the FDA. from his 
department, and department officials 
said tonight that he was also cool to the 
Idea of removing It from the Public 
Health Service. However, Congress 
could make such changes by legisla-
tion. Democratic lawmakers, including 
Representative John D. Dingell of 
Michigan, chairman of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee, which super-
vises the FDA., have said the agency 
Heeds more independence. 
. ; Regulating Soup to AIDS Drugs 
The agency is charged with regulat-
ing products that account for 25 cents 
of every dollar spent by American con-
sumers — everything from soup to 
hufs, from suntan lotion to tomatoes 
and ice cream, from eyedrops and 
hearing aids to artificial heart valves, 
AIDS drugs and shampoo. In recent 
years, the panel said, the agency has 
had to deal with a "dramatic growth In 
imported foods," often from countries 
with minimal food safety standards. 
But the advisory panel, appointed by 
Dr. Sullivan, said the F.D.A. Commis-
sioner lacks the authority to perform 
important duties, so that Federal laws 
are not fully or properly carried out. 
"It Is glaringly apparent that the 
FDA. cannot now execute all of its! 
statutory responsibilities within the 
limitations of existing resources," the 
Jianel says, and it warns that "nonen orcement invites violations from un 
scrupulous firms." 
For years, the FDA. Commissioner 
had authority to Issue all regulations 
• carrying out the laws for which the 
agency was responsible. But In 1981, 
the Reagan Administration sharply 
.limited this authority. Insisting that the 
Commissioner first get approval from 
the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services and from the Assistant Secre-
tary for health. The advisory panel said 
that Secretary Sullivan should rein-
state the Commissioner's power to 
Issue rules 
-'•This single step would do more than 
any other measure available to the de-
partment to restore the Commission 
ex's prestige" and to Increase the ef 
fectlveness of the F D A . It said. 
Fewer Inspections 
"The number of formal court en 
lb tee men i actions brought by the 
agency — seizures. Injunctions and 
prosecutions — has declined sharply 
since the 1970's," said the panel. "In 
spections have also dropped by at least 
AOpercent over the past decade " 
The panel, the Advisory Committee 
on (he Food and Drug Administration, 
is headed by Dr. Charles C. Edwards, 
Who served as FDA. Commissioner 
from 1969 to 1973 and is now president 
o r the Scripps Clinic and Research 
- Foundation in La Jolla. Calif. The panel 
includes representatives of consumer 
groups, food and drug executives. doc; 
"tors, scientists and five former F.D.A.| 
-officials. 
The FDA has been plagued with 
troubles in recent years, going for 14 
months without a permanent Commls 
' sioner and suffering a scandal involv 
ing payments lo influence approval of 
generic drugs 
* The agency 'cannot adcc.ua e»y «MV {orce all the requirements in in* laws 
BooWsol TheTtmev 
and regulations," the panel concludes. 
Accordingly, it says, "dramatic steps 
must be taken to enlarge F.D.A.*s 
status and independence." 
The committee will meet here on 
Thursday and Friday to review its final 
report, and it expects to present the 
document to Dr. Sullivan on May 15. 
Richard A. Merrill, former chief coun-
sel of the agency and a member of the 
advisory panel, said the draft reflects 
the consensus position of the commit-
tee." Including "conclusions we have 
reached at successive meetings" and 
hearings over the last year. 
The panel's recommendations, which 
also call for more vigorous enforce-
ment of laws and regulations, are nota-
ble because 6 of the 15 committee 
members come from companies or in-
dustries regulated by the F.D.A. Con-
sumer groups have complained for 
years that the agency was a sleepy 
watchdog. 
The advisory committee observed 
that "some food firms are inspected 
only once every seven or eight years." 
Moreover, it said, even though drug 
companies are inspected more fre-
quently, "elements essential to a thor-
ough Inspection have to be omitted" be-
cause of personnel shortages at the 
agency. 
The F.D.A. Commissioner, now re-
ports to the department's assistant 
secretary for health, Dr. James O. 
Mason, who also supervises other 
branches of the Public Health Service, 
Including the National institutes of 
Health, the Centers for Disease Control 
and the Indian Health Service. 
Dr. Mason contends that the F.D.A. 
should keep its current position In the 
Federal bureaucracy so it can coordi-
nate its work closely with other compo-
nents of the Public Health Service. 
The current Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs, Dr. David A. Kessler, was a 
member of the advisory committee 
until he became head of the F.D.A. In 
February. He said he supports the 
panel's recommendations to give the 
agency expanded powers to Issue sub-
poenas, seize products and impose civil 
monetary penalties on companies that 
violate F.D.A. regulations. 
Obsolete Equipment 
In its report, the advisory committee 
expresses alarm at the deterioration of 
laboratories and equipment used to as-
sess the safety of food, drugs and medi-
cal devices. 
"In the Washington, DC, area, the 
F.D.A. occupies more than 32 buildings 
in IT different locations," It says. 
"Many of these facilities are abysmal 
— overcrowded, poorly maintained, 
hazardous and inefficient. Much of 
their scientific equipment Is obsolete 
and technologically Inadequate." 
The panel expresses concern that 
many states, perceiving the F.D.A. as 
sluggish and unresponsive, are adopt-; 
ing food and drug standards beyond | 
B l l 
those enforced by the Federal Govern-
ment, so that national uniformity is 
often compromised. In recent years, 
consumer groups say they have found 
some states, like California, more ag-
gressive than the F.D.A. in trying to 
protect consumers. 
In a recommendation subject to fur-
ther review by panel members, the 
draft report says, "Congress should , 
enact legislation that pre-empts addi- , 
tional and conflicting state require-
ments for products regulated by < 
F.D.A." However, It says that states • 
should be allowed to get an exemption 
from uniform national standards if ; 
they can prove a compelling local need. 
The panel acknowledges that Con-
gress is unlikely to give the agency a ,' 
big budget increase at a time when the , 
Federalbudgat deficit is approaching . 
$300 billion. 
Wre Changing Our\$ays, 
With Nonstop Service 
To Both Sao Paulo And Rio. 
Miami Miami 
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United States 
General Accounting Office 
Washington, D.C. 20548 
Program Evaluation and 
Methodology Division 
B-235944 
April 26, 1990 
The Honorable Ted Weiss 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources 
and Intergovernmental Relations 
Committee on Government Operations 
House of Representatives 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
In response to your request, we are submitting this report describing postapproval risks for 
drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration between 1976 and 1985. The report 
identifies drugs for which serious risks arose after approval for marketing, and it 
investigates the relationship of these risks to some attributes of the drugs and the review 
process. 
As we arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of the report. At that 
time, copies of the report will be sent to the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, and we will 
make copies available to others upon request. 
If you have any questions or would like additional information, please call me at (202) 275-
1854 or Dr. Michael J. Wargo, Director of Program Evaluation in Physical Systems Areas, at 
(202) 275-3092. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. 
Sincerely, 
Eleanor Chelimsky 
Assistant Comptroller General 
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Executive Summary 
urpose Assessing the efficacy and safety of a drug to obtain Food and Drug iVdministration (FDA) approval is a lengthy and complex process. But 
even after approval, many additional risks may surface when the gen-
eral population is exposed to a drug. These risks, which range from rela-
tively minor (such as nausea and headache) to serious (such as 
hospitalization and death) arise from the fact that preapproval drug 
testing is inherently limited. The extent of postapproval risks and the 
reasons they go undetected during preapproval testing, however, have 
not been analyzed. 
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the House Committee on Government Operations 
asked GAO to study the frequency and seriousness of drug risks identi-
fied after FDA approval for marketing and to examine some of the char-
acteristics of these drugs as a first step in understanding why these 
additional risks occur. 
iackground The drug approval process begins with the submission of an "investiga-tional" application, when a drug company applies to FDA for permission 
to test the drug in humans. Then, when the clinical studies involving 
humans provide evidence of a particular drug's beneficial effect at an 
acceptable level of safety, the company submits a new drug application 
(120 were submitted in 1986) to FDA for approval of the drug for wide-
spread use. The agency subsequently reviews all evidence pertaining to 
the drug's efficacy and safety. If it finds the cumulative evidence 
acceptable, FDA approves the drug for marketing (after, on the average, 
29 months of review). 
The preapproval human clinical trials for a drug involve testing with a 
relatively small sample of the potential user population under controlled 
conditions that limit the extent of risk assessments. However, when 
therapeutic benefits appear to outweigh the estimated potential risks, 
the new drug is approved as soon as possible for the benefit of those 
who can use it. After FDA approves the drug for marketing, it is then 
used by patients under conditions much less controlled than those that 
prevailed during testing. 
When a company markets an approved drug, it is required by law to 
include directions for its use—as well as warnings, precautions, and 
adverse reactions—on the drug's label. Postmarketing surveillance then 
identifies potential adverse reactions not included on the original label 
that are discovered after marketing is begun. If an adverse reaction is 
Pane 2 GAO/PEMD-90-15 FDA Drug Review: Postapproval Risks 1976-85 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hapter 4 
>ummary and Recommendation 
Our analyses of almost all new drugs approved by FDA between 1976 and 
1985 provide a broader perspective on the magnitude of postapproval 
drug risks than it is possible to obtain from considering the development 
and approval of an individual drug or from considering the efficiency of 
the drug review process. The information and analyses we contribute 
here have not been previously available. The findings suggest that it 
would be worthwhile for FDA to build upon our results. 
In chapter 2, we showed that 51.5 percent (102) of the 198 drugs we 
analyzed had serious postapproval risks as evidenced by labeling 
changes or withdrawal from the market. Several pharmacologic classes 
had a much higher percentage of drugs with serious postapproval risks, 
while other classes had a much smaller percentage. This finding indi-
cates that the class of a drug is associated with the likelihood of serious 
postapproval risks. 
We found that there was considerable concentration of the serious post-
approval risks for certain disease categories and drug classes (fre-
quently between three and five categories for an individual drug). We 
also showed that serious postapproval risks are frequently more serious 
manifestations of adverse effects known at the time of approval. These 
findings can be useful in predicting postapproval risks during the drug 
review process and in postmarketing surveillance. 
We showed in chapter 3 that examination of several drug characteristics 
provided insights that can inform the drug review process and policy 
issues pertaining to drug approval and postmarketing surveillance. In 
particular, we found that drugs reviewed for use with children wrere 
over twice as likely to have serious postapproval risks and that drugs 
appearing on FDA'S MART list were over 10 times as likely to have serious 
postapproval risks. We showed that drugs with serious postapproval 
risks had a shorter approval time than drugs without such risks. We 
found that there is a greater time lag (perhaps over 5 years) than 
expected (less than 3 years) between a drug's approval, the reporting of 
adverse reactions, and the subsequent changing of labels. Although 
these findings are not conclusive, we believe they raise questions that 
deserve further attention. 
ecommendation We recommend that the Commissioner of FDA establish formal systemic procedures to assure that serious risks identified after a new drug has 
been approved are evaluated and used to enhance premarketing review 
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Chapter 4 
Summary and Recommendation 
of clinical trials and postmarketing surveillance of adverse reactions. We 
believe that the implementation of such procedures would, over the long 
run, contribute to better and more timely labeling, in both the review 
process and postmarketing surveillance. 
We believe that FDA should, in implementing this recommendation, build 
upon the results developed in chapter 2, including 
• identification of drugs with postapproval risks, characterized as serious 
and nonserious; 
• enumeration of the serious postapproval risks by drug class, identifying 
any ''class labeling" changes; 
• enumeration of the serious postapproval risks by drug-induced disease 
category, indicating whether the category is newly identified for the 
drug or is an extension of less severe adverse reactions already identi-
fied for the drug and tabulating the number and type of disease catego-
ries by drug and drug class; and 
• comparison of the serious and nonserious postapproval risks with the 
serious and nonserious risks identified at the time of approval. 
For developing a system for capturing and analyzing postapproval risk 
information, we also suggest that FDA make an effort to introduce more 
quantitative risk analysis methods. To support such methods, the fol-
lowing kinds of information would be needed about a given drug: 
• the number of people exposed to the drug, 
• the proportion likely to be affected by the risk either for the general 
population or for specific subpopulations, 
• indicators reflecting the relative significance of fatalities and morbidity 
(including hospitalization, prolonged hospitalization, and permanent or 
temporary disability), and 
• the time period over which the population is exposed to the risk. 
We believe this additional information would improve the understanding 
of postapproval risks, presenting a more definitive basis for identifying 
trends and informing the need for safety information prior to approval. 
HHS did not concur with our recommendation as stated in the draft 
report. We have clarified it and more fully explained the rationale for 
our position. We have also rearranged the text to make specific imple-
mentation steps clearer. 
Agency Comments and 
Our Response 
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Given the passage of time, are the dangers of falsely inferring an 
original defect from the fact of a subsequent defect—a defect present 
in the product at the time of accident—sufficient to justify a statute of 
repose? How should the law respond when that subsequent defect is 
explainable in terms of the deterioration of the product over time? 
A malfunction in a product at some time after product purchase 
will often properly support a finding of original defect. If a malfunc-
tion theory should therefore be recognized, it should also be delim-
ited. For example, a satisfactory post-malfunction inspection of the 
product may rule out a credible defect finding. The malfunction 
theory is most convincing when the product has been destroyed in the 
accident itself and when the passage of time between product sale and 
product malfunction is meaningfully short. 
The problem of manufacturer liability for product deterioration 
has impressed many observers as a considerable mystery. A solution to 
the mystery may be found in the standard classification of product 
defects, which identifies the circumstances in which deterioration 
should be suggestive of manufacturer liability. Not to be overlooked, 
however, are the significant responsibilities, and hence liabilities, that 
an intelligent law should place on the shoulders of the product owner. 
The question of a statute of repose for product liability claims is 
provocative. Many possible explanations for such statutes—for exam-
ple, that prolonged safe use categorically demonstrates nondefective-
ness—do not survive analysis, though there may be particular theories 
of original defect that prolonged safe use succeeds in eliminating. A 
statute of repose is certain to result in the denial of a significant 
number of valid claims, denials that seem both imperfectly fair and 
disadvantageous in terms of deterrence. Yet repose statutes can be 
supported by tough-minded arguments relating to the overall expense 
of weak old-product claims. Thus far, however, the empirical basis 
for these arguments has not been demonstrated. From all one now can 
tell, an old-fashioned remedy like the directed verdict may be on 
balance as satisfactory as any of the new-fashioned alternatives. 
GENERIC PRODUCT RISKS: THE CASE AGAINST 
COMMENT k AND FOR STRICT TORT LIABILITY 
JOSEPH A. PACK* 
Professor I'tw considers u hetlier strut liabiliti, should he impose,! f„r mfurtes caused hi, prod 
nets that pose arum, risks nsks that do not den, e Irani flat, s in tin munufacturiuu. process hut 
from product design or Iron, the i en, nature of thr pradu, t lie rei uu s tin M.I debate that 
pre, eded adoption of section K>!\ of thr Hestat,m,nt (Sri audi of I art: ami finds th, ambiguous 
meaning of comment k. u huh deals uith "umit nidahh, unstife" prodmts. of little use m 
determmnn: uhether set turn U>2.\ allies to ameru product risks After examining the poll, i, 
justifuations for imposing strut hahditii in < uses im alt mu. design defects and , instruction 
defei Is. i'rofessor I'a^e , uu, ludes that, at least ,n cases im nlftiiu generic product risks that u « re 
uukuoun at the time of sale, strict lialnhti, should he imposed as a modes, imentit e to 
manufaetureis to impra, e product said,, and ,is a means nf satlsf,,,,,- ,usl,f,ahle consumer 
expectations 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent litigation involving asbestos1 and DES2 has attracted 
widespread interest, not only because of the staggering numbers of 
claimants alleging serious harm from these products3 and the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition by the nation's largest asbestos manufacturer,4 
but also because of the complexity of the issues that the cases involve. 
* Professor of L a w , C e o r g e t o w n Universi ty Law Cen te r . A l t . , 1955. L L . B . , 1958. L L A 1 . , 
l!Mi-l. Ha rva rd Univers i ty . 
Tlit' au tho r gratefully acknow ledges the assistance of Peter J. C i n q u e g r a n i , Class of 1981, 
Ceorge town Universi ty L a w C e n t e r . 
' Asbestos lias been imp l i ca t ed as a cause of asbestosis, lung cancer , meso the l ioma (a cance r 
ol the chest or a b d o m i n a l l in ing) , a n d var ious forms of gast rointes t inal cancers . See H a z a r d s of 
Asbestos Exposure: H e a r i n g s Before t he S u b c o m m . on C o m m e r c e , T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , a n d T o u r i s m 
..I the House C o m m . on Knergy a n d C o m m e r c e , 97th C o n g . , 2d Sess. 2-11 (1982) ( tes t imony of 
Di Irving Selikoff, E n v i r o n m e n t a l Science L a b o r a t o r y , Mt . Sinai Medical C e n t e r ) [he re ina f te r 
Asbestos Hear ings] . 
DKS, or d ie thyls t i lbes t rol , is a syn the t ic es t rogen tha t w a s prescr ibed rou t ine ly to preg-
11mt women to prevent miscar r iages . T h e Food a n d D r u g Admin i s t r a t ion a p p r o v e d DKS in 
I' '17. In 1971 the d r u g w a s l inked to a form of vaginal cancer in the d a u g h t e r s of w o m e n to 
s li<uu it was admin i s t e red . For a discussion of this his tory, see general ly Pay ton v. Abbot t L a b s . , 
'*\2 I Supp . 1031, 1032-34 (D . Mass. 1981); C o m m e n t , D E S a n d a Proposed T h e o r y of 
U t e r p r i s e Liabi l i ty , 46 F o r d h a m L. Rev. 9 6 3 , 963-68 (1978). 
' It has been e s t ima ted tha t n ine mill ion A m e r i c a n workers w e r e exposed to asbestos d u r i n g 
' I" I 'UOs a n d 1950 s. See Asbestos Hea r ings , sup ra no te 1, at 3 ( tes t imony of D r . I rv ing Selikoff). 
I tun.ites of the n u m b e r of w o m e n w h o ingested D E S r ange from th ree to four mi l l ion . See 
\ " t e . Market Share Liabi l i ty : An Answer to t h e D E S Causa t i on P rob lem, 94 H a r v . L. Rev. 6 6 8 , 
••••s ii T 11«1S1>. 
' < )n August 26, 1982, Manv i l l e C o r p o r a t i o n , t he largest p roduce r of asbestos in the wes te rn 
•'•'•••ild. liU-d a pet i t ion for r eo rgan i za t i on u n d e r t he federal b a n k r u p t c y code . T h e c o m p a n y c i ted 
•!.. | . ru | ,e ted cost of m o u n t i n g asbestos l i t igat ion as the major reason for its filing a b a n k r u p t c y 
" " » • • See N Y . Times, Aug . 27 , 1982, at A l , col . 6; Wal l St. J . , Aug. 27 , 1982, at 1, col. 6. 
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For example, many DES claimants, daughters of women who took the 
drug during pregnancy, are unable to identify the maker of the partic-
ular pills consumed by their mothers. The courts have had to decide 
whether to depart from traditional causation rules that would require 
directed verdicts for defendants, and if so, what new rules to adopt.5 
In the asbestos cases, courts have had to determine the obligations of 
successive insurers to indemnify asbestos manufacturers against claims 
made by persons who allegedly contracted respiratory diseases from 
continuous exposure to asbestos over many years.*1 In addition to these 
problems, an array of legal theories asserted against an array of 
defendants who do not manufacture asbestos or DES has emerged in 
these cases.7 
The few courts reaching the merits of claims made by asbestos 
and DES victims have, for the most part, refused to venture beyond 
the familiar confines of negligence law. Giving dispositive weight to 
•
s
 Courts have reached opposite conclusions ahout whether plaintiffs who cannot identify 
the specific manufacturer of the drug to which they were exposed may recover. Compare Sindell 
v. Ahhott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 l\2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132. 144-46 
(recovery allowed under theory of market share liability), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); 
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 567-69, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314-16 (Law Div. 
1980) (recovery allowed under •alternative liability" theory); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 
N.Y.2d 571, 584-85, 436 N.E.2d 182, 188-89, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782-83 (1982) (recovery allowed 
under 'concert of action'* theory) with Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 K. Supp. 593, 596-600 
(M.D. Fla. 1982) (recovery denied); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596-97 (D.S.C. 
1981) (same); Puyton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (D. Mass. 1981) (same). Since 
federal courts hear product liability cases only under diversity jurisdiction, each of the above 
district courts applied the appropriate state law. For a state court refusing to relax the traditional 
requirement that a plaintiff identify the defendant who actually caused the harm, see Payton v. 
Abbot Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188-90 (Mass. 1982). 
" Some courts have adopted a theory under which all companies that insured an asbestos 
firm during the period a claimant was exposed would contribute to the defense of the suit and to 
the satisfaction of an adverse judgment. See keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 
1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (adopting "exposure" theory of liability), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 
1007 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir.) (same), cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1081); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 
F.2d 1212. 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1980) (same), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). For a decision 
requiring defen.se and indemnification only from the insurance company that covered tin-
asbestos firm at the time the claimant's disease manifested itself, see Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 115-17 (IX Mass. 1981) (adopting "manifestation" 
theory of liability), modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). 
7
 See, e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.) (action against 
manufacturer of respirator that failed to prevent asbestos-related disease), cert, denied. 454 U.S. 
1109 (1981); Clover \ . Johns-Manvillc Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Va. 1979) (indemnity 
action by asbestos manufacturer against the United States as third-party defendant in suit by 
injured worker), affil in part, vacated and remanded in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981); 
Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. 111. 1978) (battery action against hospital 
for experimental use of DES). 
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section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes 
strict liability for "any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user,"8 and to comment k of section 402A, which 
recognizes an exception to strict liability for products deemed "un-
avoidably unsafe,"9 these courts in effect have required plaintiffs to 
establish that defendants engaged in unreasonable conduct. Under 
this analysis, if the benefits of a product outweigh its known risks, and 
if the manufacturer has provided suitable warnings and directions for 
use, the defendant's product will be deemed reasonably safe, and the 
plaintiff will not recover.10 Similarly, if the manufacturer has placed 
. and 
ubstai 
eb\ 
change 
and sale of hi 
entered into an; 
- Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) provides in full: 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger 
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm ther 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, il 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a produd 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without s 
in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparatioi 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
contractual relation with the seller. 
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965) provides in full: 
I'liavoiilably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state ol 
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made sale lor their intended anil ordinary 
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the 
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious 
and damaging consquenccs when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a 
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwith-
standing the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly 
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonahlu dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, 
many of which for this very reason cannot legally lx- sold except to physicians, or under 
the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental 
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experi-
ence, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but 
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a 
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that 
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given where the situa-
tion calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending 
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently-
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. 
-mphasis in original). 
'" See. e.g., Horel v. Fibreboard l»a|XT Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973) 
even when such a balancing leads to the conclusion that marketing is justified, the seller 
-'ill has a responsibility to inform the user or consumer of the risk. The failure to give adequate 
•^.irnings in such circumstances can render the product unreasonably dangerous." (citing com-
"I'-nt kn. cert, denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 
" t i . 420 A 2d 1305, 1318 (Law Div. 1980) (comment k rules "are not strict liability rules at all. 
I hey are merely rules of negligence embodying the long-standing concepts of a lack of due care 
•uid f.ireseeability of the risk."). 
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the p roduc t into the s t ream of commerce wi thout knowledge of the 
dange r s associated wi th its use or consumpt ion , cour ts typically have 
refused to impose liability unless the exercise of reasonable care would 
have uncovered the hazards . 1 1 O n e notab le exception to this t r end is a 
recent decision by the New Jersey Supreme C o u r t , hold ing that an 
asbestos p roduce r might be strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by 
risks that w e r e u n k n o w n despite reasonable investigation at the t ime 
of sale.1 2 
T h e re luc tance of courts to impose strict liability in toxic-product 
cases cor responds to a t rend , reflected in scholarly m u s i n g s " and 
a d o p t e d in recent congressional reform efforts,14 to limit strict liability 
to p roduc t defects a t t r ibu tab le to the construct ion or manufac tu r ing 
process. W i t h respect to claims alleging inadequa te p roduc t design, 
w a r n i n g s , or instruct ions for use, the proponents of this l imitat ion 
wou ld app ly a negligence test, e i ther expressly or in a disguised form. 
Al though the desirabili ty of imposing strict l iabili ty upon the 
p h a r m a c e u t i c a l industry for adverse d r u g react ions has been de-
ba ted , 1 5 the larger issue of whe the r all manufac tu re r s should be held 
l iable w i t h o u t fault for o ther types of toxic adverse effects of their 
p roduc t s largely has escaped scrut iny. Since courts in a n u m b e r of 
jurisdict ions m a y soon be addressing the merits of asbestos and D E S 
cases, a fresh look at the subject seems in order . 
T h e cen t ra l focus of this Article is whe the r all "gener ic p roduc t 
risks" should be t rea ted alike. T h e Article first will discuss the various 
types of generic r isks—avoidable and unavoidab le , k n o w n and un-
k n o w n — inc lud ing those risks associated with toxic p roduc t s like as-
11
 Sec. e .g . , liort-l v. F ib r eboa rd T a p i r Prods. C o r p . , 493 F.2d H)7(i, 1090 (5(1) Ci r . 1**73) 
("A p roduc t must nol he m a d e ava i lab le to tin- publ ic wi thout disclosure of those dange r s that the 
app l i ca t ion of reasonab le foresight u o u l d reveal ." ) , cert , denied, 419 U.S . 8<i9 (1974); I lci idcr-
son. C o p i n g W i t h the T i m e Dimens ion in Products Liabi l i ty , (if) Calif. L. Hcv. 1)1!), 924 (15)81). 
, :
 See Kcshada v. Johns Manvi l lc Prods. C o r p . , !M) N.J . 191, 209, 147 A.2d 539, 54(> (1982). 
" Sec l l i r u b a u n i . U n m a s k i n g the lest for Design Defect: F r o m Negl igence to W a r r a n t y to 
Strict Liabi l i ty to Negl igence . 33 V a n d . L. Hcv. 593 (1980); Powers , T h e Persistence of Faul t in 
Produc t s L i a b i l i t y (,l Tex. L. Hcv. 777 (I9S3). 
" See S 4 1, 9Slli C o n g . . 1st Scss. §§ 5 . (i. 12!) Cong . Hec. S285 (daily ed . J a n . 2(>, 1983) 
(strict l iabil i t \ lor un rea sonab ly dange rous construct ion or m a n u f a c t u r e ; faul t -based liabili ty for 
un rca sonah l ) daugc io i i s design or failure to provide a d e q u a t e warn ings or ins t ruct ions) ; S. 2(i31. 
!)7th C o n g . . 2d Scss.. 128 C o n g Pec . S(iS4<> (daily cd. June Mi, 1982) (vir tual ly identical 
predecessor \e is ioi i ol S. 44) . 
'• See gencia lK MeCle l l an . Tate & F a t o n . Strict Liabili ty for Prescr ipt ion D r u g Injuries: 
T h e lu ip rope i Nbuke t ing T h e o r y . 2<> St. Louis l . L J 1 (1981); Merr i l l . C o m p e n s a t i o n for 
Prescr ipt ion D r u g Injuries . 59 \ ' a . L. Hcv. I (1973); Prat t 6: P a r r o n . Diagnosis of a Legal 
H e a d a c h e . Liahil iK lor I ' n lo rcsccah lc Defects m Drugs . 53 St. J o h n s L. Hcv. 517 (1979); Note . 
T h e Liabilitv ol P h a r m a c e u t i c a l Manufac tu re r s tor Unforeseen Adverse D r u g l tcac t ions , 48 
I ' o r d h a m L. |»e\ . 735 (1980). 
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bestos and DES. 1 " It will then a rgue that section 402A of the Restate-
ment and its c o m m e n t s provide little gu idance in dec id ing cases that 
involve generic risks, and should not be accorded dispositive weight in 
product l iabili ty suits. T h e Article will then examine and eva lua te the 
policy justifications for adop t ing a rule of strict tort liability in cases 
involving generic risks. Ul t imate ly , the Article will conc lude tha t a 
persuasive case can be m a d e for imposing strict liability on manufac-
turers .whose produc ts conta in u n k n o w n generic risks. 
I 
Tin : N A U H F . OF PKODUCT RISKS 
Risks a t t r i b u t a b l e to flaws or impur i t ies caused by the manufac -
turing process usually are present only in a small percen tage of the 
units of a pa r t i cu la r p roduc t and do not endange r every consumer of 
the p roduc t . Such product risks are nongener ic in n a t u r e . T h e pres-
ence of a foreign subs tance in a jar of mayonna i se and a malfunct ion 
in a television set due to po t t w o r k m a n s h i p exemplify this category of 
hazards. In cont ras t , asbestos and D E S share a c o m m o n charac ter i s -
tic: the capac i ty to c rea te risks that e n d a n g e r , but do not necessarily 
harm, every user or consumer of the p roduc t . Such p roduc t risks are 
generic in n a t u r e . 
This Article will focus on generic p roduc t risks, of wh ich there 
are two ma in types. O n e includes design risks, or risks tha t can be 
el iminated or at least reduced by chang ing the design of the p roduc t . 
Eor instance, the inter ior of an au tomob i l e can be m a d e more 
crashwor thy so that the occupan t is more likely to survive a collision. 
Some design risks, however , may be impossible to e l imina te or to 
reduce wi thou t f rus t ra t ing the purpose for wh ich the p roduc t is mar -
keted. The sharpness of a knife, the heat of a stove, and the physical 
loree genera ted by an au tomobi l e a re examples of this type of risk. 
These hazards e n a b l e the p roduc t s to d o w h a t they w e r e m e a n t to do ; 
they are essential to the function of the produc t and canno t be de-
signed a w a y . 
T h e haza rds associated wi th toxic p roduc ts like asbestos and D E S 
represent the second ma in type of generic risk. T h e manufac tu re r s of 
asbestos p roduc ts and D E S have no desire to c rea te the haza rds associ-
ated with their p roduc t s because these haza rds serve no useful pur-
pose. Unlike the capac i ty of a knife to cu t , wh ich is essential to its 
intended use, the capac i ty of D E S to cause cancer in the daugh te r s of 
' Al though generic- risks associated wi th toxic p roduc t s like asbestos a n d D F S are but one 
!•<• ol iicneric risk, these p roduc t s represent a pa r t i cu la r ly i m p o r t a n t type of gener ic risk. 
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mothers who used the drug is irrelevant to the effectiveness of the 
drug; while the cutler consciously designs the cutting edge of a knife, 
the pharmaceutical company does not intentionally create the risk of 
cervical cancer. Toxic product risks are inherent in the nature of the 
product,17 regardless of its design, and cannot be eliminated, at least 
given the current state of scientific knowledge, by any means short of 
withdrawing the product from the market.1" 
Other examples of generic, nondesign risks abound: adverse reac-
tions to drugs and exposure to harmful chemicals;10 the risk of cancer 
from smoking cigarettes;20 the risk of "toxic shock" from using tam-
pons;21 and the possibly deleterious effects of consuming food and 
beverages containing saccharin22 and caffeine,23 if these substances 
were someday linked conclusively to diseases in humans. 
As the saccharin and caffeine examples suggest, different types of 
generic risks, whether designed into a product or inherent in its na-
ture, may also be distinguished by the degree of existing knowledge 
about them. Some generic risks, such as the risk of cancer from 
smoking cigarettes, are well known to manufacturers and consumers 
alike. Other generic risks, such as the carcinogenic effects of DP]S, 
were unknown when the consumer was exposed to them. Still others, 
such as the possible side effects of caffeine, remain unknown today. 
17
 Nonyeneric risks may also be inherent in a component part of a product. Indeed, it w as a 
flawed wooden spoke on the wheel of a 1910 Buick that ^ave birth to modern product liability 
law. See MacPhcrson v. Buick Motor Co.. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.K. 1060 (1016) (Cardozo, J.). 
"* In some instances, manufacturers can minimize the generic risks associated with their toxic 
products by providing consumers and users with warnings and instructions. For example, drujj 
producers can warn users who mi^ht suffer allergic reactions, and asbestos producers can 
instruct users to use protective masks when installing asbestos insulation. Warnings and instruc-
tions can be used effectively, of course, only with respect to hazards that are known to exist. 
1H
 Representative recent cases involving these risks include Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp., 
520 F. Supp. 865 (S.I). Tex. 10S1) (vinyl chloride); Cutowski v. M & K Plastics & Coatings, 
Inc., 60 Mich. App. 100. 231 N.\V.2d 156 (1075) (tolylenede-isoc\ analcs); Peterson v. Bendix 
Home Sys.. Inc., 318 N.\V.2d 50 (Minn. 1982) (formaldehyde). 
'-" Representative ciuarette cancer cases include Creen v. American Tobacco Co., 301 F.2d 
07 (5th Cir lO(iS), cert, denied, 307 U.S. 01 1 (1070) (prior appeals reported in 325 F.2d 673 (5th 
Cir. 1063); 301 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1062)): Pritchard v. Lif^ctt & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 
170 (3d Cir. 10<>5). cert, denied. 3S2 U.S. 087 (1066) (prior appeal reported in 205 F.2d 202 (3d 
Cir. 1061)); l.artiqiic v. B.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. 317 F.2d 10 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 375 
U.S. S65 (1063). 
•-•' See Lampshirc v. Proctor & Camble Co.. 01 F.B.I). 58 (N.I). Ca. 1082). For a descrip-
tion of toxic-shock syndrome, see Bobertson, To\ic Shock, N.Y. Times. Sept. 10, 1082. § 6 
(Ma.ua/iiie). at 30. 
--' For a discussion of the danm-rs of saccharin use. sec, ctf.. The Banning of Saccharin. 1077: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific- Beseari -h of the Senate Conini. on 
Human lb-sources. 05th Cony., 1st Sess. 01-07 (1077) (testimom of Donald S. Fredrickson. 
Director. National Institutes of Health). 
••' For a discussion ol the possible dangers of caffeine use. see N.Y. Times. Apr. 21. 1082. at 
CI . col. I 
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This Article discusses whether or not these various generic prod-
uct risks—designed-in and inherent, known and unknown — should be 
treated alike for purposes of applying strict liability. Should the rights 
of a plaintiff whose hand is burned by a hot stove or whose eye is 
injured because a machine tool lacks a safety device be determined by 
the same theory of liability that determines the rights of a plaintiff 
disabled by exposure to toxic asbestos fibres or DES? Should the claim 
of a patient harmed by an adverse side effect known to be associated 
with a drug be governed by the same theory of liability as is the claim 
of a patient injured by an adverse side effect that was unknown at the 
time the drug was administered? The light shed on these questions by 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has greatly influenced the 
development of product liability doctrine, is an appropriate starting 
point. 
II 
GKNF.HK: PRODUCT RISKS AND THK RKSTATFMKNT 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts24 gave impetus 
to a profound and far-reaching change in the law of product liability. 
It subjected sellers, including manufacturers, of all products to strict 
liability and grounded the cause of action in tort rather than war-
ranty.2S This change was important because a warranty cause of 
action was contractual in nature and was being preempted by the 
Uniform Commercial Code.2'4 More importantly, this change relieved 
plaintiffs of the need to establish a privity-of-contract relationship 
with defendants. This so-called "citadel of privity," preventing plain-
tiffs from asserting breach of warranty against defendants with whom 
they were not in privity, already had almost totally collapsed in 
warranty cases involving products for internal human consumption, 
and was crumbling under the onslaught of plaintiffs injured by manu-
factured goods.27 The widespread judicial adoption of section 402A 
:
' See note 8 supra. 
" See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment m (1065). 
" The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes an implied warranty of merchantability run 
ninu with the sale of #>ods, under which the goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes for 
\0iich they are sold. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1078). By 1965, the Uniform Commercial Code had 
been adopted in over 10 jurisdictions. See J. White & K. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 5 
'The classic articles on the demise of the privity requirement were both written by Dean 
TIMSM'I'. Hi. first wrote Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer). 
«•'• ^ale I..J. 1000 (UMiO). Several years later, he finished the story. See Prosser, The Fall of the 
< itadcl (Strict Liability to the Consumer). 50 Minn. L. Rev. 701 (1066) [hereinafter Prosser IIJ. 
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completed the demolition28 and seemed at the time to be the most 
dramatic aspect of the new rule. 
This doctrinal revolution was remarkably swift. What began in 
1958 as a modest proposal for strict tort liability for the sale of food "in 
a condition dangerous to the consumer,"2" was extended three years 
later to cover "other products for intimate bodily use" in a "defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer."'0 By 1964, the 
final form of section 402A applied to "any product." " This expansion 
of the strict liability rule, however, was not accompanied by a thor-
ough analysis of the implications of bringing new classes of products 
within the sweep of section 402A. As a result, the Restatement does 
not adequately address the issues raised by generic risks. 
A. The Restatement Generally 
When the drafters of the Restatement broadened the scope of 
section 402A to cover all manufactured goods, they apparently as-
sumed that the doctrine and explanatory comments, which had been 
developed for food and other products "for intimate bodily use," 
would apply equally well to all manufactured goods. The final version 
of the section and its comments, therefore, remained virtually in-
tact.32 
In retrospect, the most significant impact of this rush to strict 
liability was the confusion and uncertainty that subsequently plagued 
product-design litigation. Although the concept of design defective-
ness was not unknown in 1964,J:} the proponents of section 402A saw 
no need to adjust the rules to determine explicitly when the new 
doctrine would impose strict liability for design defects. They retained 
the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous"14 and added the 
requirement that the product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond 
*" For ty- four s tates have adop ted sonic form of strict liability based upon § -402A. Sec J. 
Heaslcy, P roduc t s Liabi l i ty and the Unreasonably Dangerous Hecjuiremcnt xii xiii, 97-KM) 
(1981)'. 
2,1
 Hestateincnt (Second) of Tor t s § 402A (Tent . Draft No. ri. 10(>1). 
1,1
 Hestateincnt (Second) of Tor ts § 402A ( ' lent . Draft No. 7, 19<>2). 
" ^ s t a t e m e n t (Second) of Tor t s § 402A (Tent Draft No. 10, 19b4). This version was finally 
e n a c t e d . For o the r reviews of this evolut ion, see J. Bcasley, supra no te 28, at 21-23: W a d e , O n 
the N a t u r e of Strict Tort Liabi l i ty for Produc ts , 44 Miss. L.J. S25. 830-31 (1073). 
•*- C o m p a r e Hesta tenient (Second) of Tor ts § 402A comment s a in (Tent . Draft No. 7, 10(>2) 
(coverage l imited to food a n d produc ts for in t ima te bodily use) wi th Hestatenient (Second) of 
Tor t s § 402A c o m m e n t s a in (Tent . Draft No. 10, 1«M»4) (coverage ex tended to all p roduc t s , wi th 
vir tual ly no c h a n g e in w o r d i n g of commen t s ) . 
" For an early recogni t ion of this concep t , see Noel, Manufac ture r ' s Negl igence of Design or 
Direct ions (or Use of a P roduc t , 71 Vale L.J. Nib (19(>2). 
u
 Res ta tement (Second) of Torts § 402A (19(>5). 
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that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer."'" In 
subsequent years, courts and commentators alike have found this 
formulation inadequate and have struggled in vain to fashion an 
acceptable test for strict liability in product-design cases.1" 
Although the issue of design defectiveness was not recognized as a 
problem during the evolutionary stages of section 402A, certain other 
generic risks did occupy the attention of Dean William E. Prosser (the 
Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), his advisers (the 
American Law Institute Council), and the American Law Institute 
("ALL) membership. In working out the new rule of strict liability, 
they were cognizant of the controversy over the causal relationship 
between cigarette smoking and cancer, as well as of the incidence of 
serious harm attributed to certain drugs and vaccines,17 and consid-
ered whether the tobacco and pharmaceutical industries should be 
subject to strict liability/18 In their floor debates. Dean Prosser and 
members of the ALI also considered how whiskey would fit into their 
scheme of liability/"' 
With respect to cigarette-cancer litigation, the Restatement came 
out unequivocally on the side of the tobacco companies. During a 
1961 floor debate on section 402A, a motion was made to delete the 
word "defective" on the ground that the "unreasonably dangerous" 
requirement was an adequate test for determining when strict liability 
should apply and that therefore the term "defective condition" consti-
tuted excess baggage.4" In response to this motion, Dean Prosser 
pointed out that the ALI Council wanted to retain the element of 
defectiveness in order to insulate from liability the sellers of dangerous 
products, such as whiskey, cigarettes, and certain drugs, which are 
Hestateincnt (Second) ol Tor t s § 402A c o m m e n t i (1905). 
"' (Citations to the extensive l i t e ra tu re a n d to a s a m p l i n g of judicial decisions dea l ing wi th the 
!<-st lor liability in design-defect cases m a y be found in Twersk i . Seizing the Midd le C r o u n d 
H. twecn Hules a n d S t a n d a r d s in Design Defect Li t iga t ion: Advanc ing Di rec ted Verdict Prac t ice 
in Hi. Law of Tor t s , 57 N . Y . U . L. Hev. 5 2 1 , 521 n . l (1082). 
' These p roduc ts a re m e n t i o n e d specifically in the Hestatenient (Second) of To r t s § 402A 
inients i, k (19(i5). See also text a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 40-44, 54-bl infra. Indeed , appe l l a t e 
"pinions involving these p roduc t s a l ready b a d a p p e a r e d . See, e .g . , P r i t cha rd v. Liggett 6c Myers 
l.-baeco C o . . 205 F.2d 202 (3d Ci r . 10<il) (cigaret tes): C o t t s d a n k c r v. C u t t e r L a b s . , 1.N2 C a l . 
\;<P 2d (»i,2. <> C a l . Hptr . 320 (1900) (polio vaccine) . 
Sec tc\t a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 40-43 infra. W h e n the ALI was m a k i n g this decis ion, earls 
-ir.ilK
 ( ) | $ i()2A appl ied only to food a n d to p roduc t s for i n t ima te bodily use. Sec Hestate incnt 
• ^ • ' " i ,< | . . i fTo r t s§4 t )2A (Tent . Draft No. 7, 10(i2). Al though it is impossible to know for ce r t a in , 
' ' " I act that m a n u l a c t u r c d goods w e r e excluded from the sweep of § 402A may have affected the 
• !:-ilieis th inking about gener ic h a z a r d s . 
•\mericaii L a w Ins t i tu te , 38th Annua l Meet ing: Proceedings 87-88 (19(>2) [here inaf ter ALI 
l — . l m g s l 
' I'l at 87. T h e mot ion was m a d e by Professor Heed Dickerson. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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inherently dangerous even though there is nothing "wrong" with 
them.41 The specter of alcoholics bringing a barrage of suits against 
distillers apparently haunted the drafters of section 402A.42 After a 
very brief discussion, the motion was defeated by a voice vote, and the 
"defective condition" standard remained a part of section 4()2A.4:J 
The notion that section 402A would apply only to defective 
products—products that have something wrong with them other than 
their inherent danger—would seem to exclude most generic risks. It is 
not clear, however, that this interpretation is what the majority of the 
ALI had in mind. During the 1961 debate, Dean Prosser agreed with 
other members that the "unreasonably dangerous" standard was suffi-
cient to protect sellers of products such as cigarettes and whiskey.44 In 
11
 Id. at 87-88. 
42
 As Dean Prosser noted during the I9til floor debate, " Defective' was put in to head off 
liability on the part of the seller of whiskey, on the part of the man who consumes it and yets 
delirium tremens, even though the jury might find that all whiskey is unreasonably dangerous to 
the consumer." Id. at 88. What the drafters never realized, however, was that the cure, 
retaining the requirement of a delect, ultimately would prove worse than the disease. 
Judge (Goodrich, in his concurring opinion in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 
295 F.2d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 19bl), was the first to link cigarettes and whiskey. This linkage is 
more lyric than logical. This imagery suggests a no-liability conclusion in search of a rationale 
rather than a result dictated either by doctrine or principle. An apparent zeal to exonerate the 
tobacco industry from strict liability produced the following giddy pronouncement: "Good 
tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; 
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.'' Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1905). 
In arguing that the manufacturer of cigarettes that cause cancer should not be liable for 
breach of implied warranty (absent some representation that the product is harmless). Judge 
Goodrich invoked the whiskey analogy and noted that "lejverybody knows that the consumption 
of intoxicating beverages may cause several different types of physical harm." 295 F.2d at 302. 
He went on to assert that there would be no liability for over-consumption of whiskey •unless (1) 
the manufacturer tells the customer the whiskey will not hurt him or (2) the whiskey is 
adulterated whiskey." Id. The analog) does not really apply. Plaintiffs in cigarette-cancer cases 
do not seek damages for harm resulting from excessive or abusive smoking but rather from 
ordinary smoking over a prolonged period of time. This is the very type of consumption sought 
by the tobacco companies. Sellers of whiskey, on the other hand, do not overtly encourage the 
type of over-consumption that causes the harm to which Judge Goodrich adverted. 
In addition. Judge Goodrich stated that "|i]f the defendant here takes the position that 
nobody knows whether cigarettes cause cancer or not but at the same time asserts to buyers that 
. cigarettes do not cause cancer, it is in difficulty if a customer shows that the use of these 
cigarettes caused cancer in him." Id. The problem he never addresses is whether liability should 
attach when the seller of cigarettes says nothing to the buyer about the risk of cancer, which is 
unknown to both buyer and seller, and the risk later materializes. Reference to the over-
consumption of whiskey obscures rather than informs his analysis. 
In IWil Judge Goodrich was the Kxecutive Director of the ALI and had participated in the 
Council discussion to which Dean I'rosser referred. See text accompanying note 41 supra; Wade, 
supra note 31. at S30 n.23. 
" Nee Al.l Proceedings, supra note 39, at 89. 
" Id. ("I thought 'unrcasonabR dangerous' . . carried every meaning that was neces-
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drafting comment i to section 402A, he pointed out that many prod-
ucts, including food and drugs, involve "some risk of harm, if only 
from over-consumption," but this risk did not render such products 
"unreasonably dangerous." Dean Prosser concluded that the proper 
test was whether the product was "dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who pur-
chases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as 
to its characteristics."4r' Thus defined, the requirement of unreasona-
ble danger would not be met in cases involving whiskey, the hazards 
of which are known universally, but might be met in cigarette cases, 
depending upon the court's determination of what the ordinary con-
sumer knew about the risks of smoking at the time of marketing.4" 
Toxic risks are not necessarily excluded, therefore, from section 402A. 
Another way to approach the scope of section 402A is to ask 
whether a product with any kind of generic risk, which was found to 
be unreasonably dangerous, would meet the separate requirement of 
defectiveness. The comments to section 402A do not answer this ques-
tion. Comment i presents examples that shed little light upon the 
problem. The examples contrast generic risks that are not considered 
unreasonable ("good" whiskey that makes some people drunk, "good" 
tobacco that causes harm, "good" butter that deposits cholesterol in 
the blood and leads eventually to heart attacks) with those that do 
present unreasonable dangers attributable to defects in the same prod-
ucts (whiskey contaminated with a dangerous amount of fusel oil, 
tobacco with marijuana, butter with poisonous fish oil).47 The former 
pose dangers widely known to the ordinary consumer;48 the latter 
present clear instances of something "wrong" with the product. Nei-
ther group of examples presents a product, not otherwise defective, 
with such unreasonable risks that strict liability ought to apply. 
Comment g, elaborating upon the concept of "defective condi-
tion," is similarly unhelpful. It limits strict liability to situations where 
"the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition 
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreason-
ably dangerous to him."4u The word "condition," like the contami-
' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (19b5). 
" Studies linking smoking and cancer began emerging in the 1940s. See Pritchard v. Liggett 
v\ Mvers Tobacco Co., 295 K.2d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 19(ih. Modern consumers, therefore, know a 
v.:rat deal more about the risks of smoking than did previous generations. The hazards might 
".II i„.u be considered •universally known." 
' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (l«Mi5). 
' This conclusion is based, of course, on a factual finding that cigarettes and butter are 
h.muiul. 
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (I9b5) (emphasis added). 
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nated product examples, seems to suggest that there must be some-
thing "wrong" with the product beyond any inherent capacity to 
cause harm. 
Yet Dean Prosser and the ALI did not intend to exclude from 
section 402A all products creating generic risks. Comment j states that 
warnings may be required for "poisonous drugs or those undulv dan-
gerous for other reasons"50 (categories broad enough to embrace medi-
cines triggering deleterious reactions), a proposition compelling the 
conclusion that the failure to include such warnings might subject the 
manufacturer to strict liability. While the comment specifies that the 
absence of directions or warnings may render the product unreason-
ably dangerous, it does not explain whether unreasonably dangerous 
also means that the drug is in a "defective condition."51 Does com-
ment k shed any light on the meaning of "defective"? 
B. The Meaning of Comment k 
Comment k, dealing with so-called "unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts," is more expansive than these other comments. It declares that a 
drug with proper directions and warnings would be neither defective 
nor unreasonably dangerous,52 thus suggesting that the same charac-
teristic (mislabeling) that made the drug unreasonably dangerous 
might also make it defective. This wording blurs the distinction be-
tween the two elements, and the requirement of a defect thus becomes 
superfluous.53 
The genesis of comment k may help explain this blurring and 
comment k's other mysteries. Dean Prosser drafted the comment in 
response to a proposal at the 1961 ALI meeting that prescription drugs 
""" 111. comment j . 
M
 Id. In an article- written after lie drafted this comment. Dean Prosser indicated that a drug 
marketed without warnings of dangers, which consumers would not already know about, would 
he regarded as -defective.-' See Prosser II. supra note 27, at HOI. 
'•- See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 102A comment k (1005). Tin- text of comment L 
which emphasizes the word "unreasonably," is reprinted in note 0 supra. 
•' See Nader & Page. Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 Calif. L. Uev. 015. 
010-50 (1007). For judicial recognition of this point, see Hoss v. Up Uight. Inc.. 102 F.2d 013. 
017 (5th Cii I00.S) ("When . . . the product is | manufactured | exactb as intended by the 
manufacturer, to speak in terms of a defect" onlv causes confusion. . . . The key . . . is whethe-
the product is unreasonably dangerous." ""); Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., 500 S.\V.2d 571. 
577 (Tex. Civ. App. 107K) (•'one who sells a nondefective unreasonabh dangerous product 
w ithout conmmnk ating the dangciousness of the product . . . is liable for the injuries inflicted 
hv the unreasonably danuerous item"); Little v. PPC Indus.. 02 Wash. 2d 1 IS. 121, 501 P.2d 
Oil. 01.5 (1070) ( |l)t is inaccurate to speak of a properly manulactured but necessarily danger 
ous product as being in a •defective' condition. . . . | ! ]t is more appropriate to describe an article 
bearing an inadequate warning as "unreasonably dangerous' than as "defective." "). 
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be specifically excluded from section 402A.54 The arguments and the 
discussion that followed were notably unfocused. The motion under 
consideration failed to distinguish between harm from adverse reac-
tions and other kinds of drug-induced harm, such as that caused by 
improper formulation or toxic ingredients.55 Since no one could argue 
seriouslv that the latter risks should escape strict liability, the failure 
to separate the two categories muddled the debate. Moreover, neither 
Dean Prosser nor the AIT member who made the proposal indicated 
how he thought section 402A would apply to prescription drugs in the 
absence of an explicit exemption. A solution was being offered for a 
problem that never had been clearly defined. Nor were adverse reac-
tions about which warnings had been issued at the time of marketing 
distinguished from other harmful effects not discovered until later. 
There was also disagreement over the scope of the proposed 
exemption. The motion proposed to insulate all prescription drugs 
from strict tort liability.5" Dean Prosser suggested that a better case 
could be made for excluding "relatively new, experimental, and un-
certain drugs, of which there are a great many on the market, and 
justifiably so."57 He defined the term "experimental drug" to include 
virtually all prescription drugs and even some over-the-counter medi-
cines.58 Dean Prosser's use of the adjective "experimental" went far 
beyond clinical testing, an initial stage of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA") approval process, and covered drugs that had com-
pleted the entire approval process and had been marketed to con-
sumers.59 Thus, he was suggesting an exemption even broader than 
that proposed by the motion.'*0 The motion to include an exemption 
'•• See API Proceedings, supra note 30, at 00-02. Harold B. Cross of New York City made the 
motion. 
•' Dean Prosser. criticizing the motion, observed that a pharmacist who supplies poisoned 
.•psom salts clearly should be liable to the injured consumer. Id. at 02. 
'•'" Id. at 00, 07. 
Id. at 03. Dean Prosser's assertion that a great main experimental and uncertain drills 
were justifiably on the market, offered ex cathedra and witho.it documentation, was a debatable 
••lie ..I best. See generally M. Mint/.. The Therapeutic Nightmare (10ti5); M. Sliapo. A Nation of 
Cuiuca Pigs: The Unknown Hisks of Chemical Technology (1070) II the assertion stands as a 
I'.isis lor comment k. it demonstrates strikingly the weakness of the Hestatement drafting process 
i i m< i. haiiism for resolving policy issues. 
M l Proceedings, supra note 30. at 00. Dean Prosser also saw a need to treat experimental 
i--ids" in a similar fashion. Id. at 04. For an argument against exempting new and experimental 
:-»«ls hom strict liability, see Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforeseeable Hisks in Maim 
!...tmers" Liability Under Implied Warranty, 03 Colum L. Hev. 515. 533 (1003). 
< :linical testing is a prerequisite for FDA approval of a new drug. For a description of the 
•:'io,,-v, b> which the FDA approves new drugs, see generalK 1 J. OUeillv. Food and Drug 
Vlimnislralion ch. 13 (1082). This approval process helps to insure that information about some 
•i-k- .e.soriated with the approved drugs becomes known after widespread and long term use. 
' The nub other member to speak on the issue besides Dean Prosser, Donald J. Parage of 
I'inl.idelphia. opposed any exemption. See ALI Proceedings, supra note 30, at 07. 
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tor prescription drugs in section 402A ultimately was defeated,"1 as 
was a subsequent motion to insert such an exception in the com-
ments."2 On its face, this defeat did not seem to reflect a desire by the 
membership to exclude more than prescription drugs from section 
402A, but Dean Prosser apparently saw things differently. 
Reflecting the murkiness of its origins, the version of comment k 
that emerged from the Reporter's hand failed to delineate in any 
meaningful way either the breadth of its coverage or its purpose. The 
comment first addresses "unavoidably unsafe products," which it de-
fines as "products which, in the present state of human know ledge, 
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary 
use."03 The comment then appears to focus on "the field of drugs," 
where such products are "especially common," and presents three 
overlapping categories of unavoidably unsafe products: high-benefit, 
high-risk drugs, such as the vaccine used for the treatment of rabies; 
"many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which [because of 
high risks involved] cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or 
under the prescription of a physician;" and "many new or experimen-
tal drugs.""4 
The comment furnishes no criteria for determining how risky and 
how beneficial a drug must be in order to qualify under the first 
category as "unavoidably unsafe." In any event, such a determination 
would appear to be unnecessary for drugs. The second category may 
reasonably be read to include all prescription drugs, since federal law 
mandates that any medicine with toxic effects that render it unsafe as 
self-medication be sold under prescription05—and a high-risk, high-
benefit drug surely would be limited to sale by prescription. The 
sweeping requirement of prescription status also makes the third cate-
gory superfluous, a fortunate occurrence since the term "new or ex-
perimental drugs" is highly ambiguous.bH 
•" id. 
n
* Id. at 08 . 
"' Res ta t ement (Second) of Torts § 402A c o m m e n t k (10(>5). For a de ta i l ed analysis of 
c o m m e n t k, sec Wil l ig , Tin- C o m m e n t k C h a r a c t e r . A Concep tua l Harr ier to Strict L iab i l i ty . 2!) 
Mercer I.. I lev. 545 (1078). 
"
4
 Res ta t ement (Second) of Torts § 402A c o m m e n t k (1005). 
"'• See 21 l l . S C . § :}53(l>)(l)(li) (1070) ("A d r u g in tended for use by m a n w h i c h . . . because 
ol its toxicity or o t h e r po ten t ia l i ty for harmful eflect, or the me thod of its use, or the col la tera l 
measures necessary to its use, is not sale for use except unde r the supervis ion of a p rac t i t ione r 
licensed by law to admin i s t e r such d r u g . . shall IM- dispensed o n h [upon prescr ip t ion) . . . . " ) • 
The adject ive • ' exper imenta l " seems to refer to the cl inical- test ing phase of the n e w - d r u g 
app rova l process. For descr ip t ions of this phase of the process, see 1 J. O 'Rei l ly , sup ra no te 59 , at 
13 -30 to 13 40; C a m p b e l l . Civil Liabili ty for Invest igat ional Dr i l l s : Far t I. 42 T e m p l e L . O . 09 . 
100 07 (1009). W h i l e t h e subsequent reference to the "market ing" of such d rugs suggests tha t 
thev a re geiicrallv ava i l ab l e , the dis t r ibut ion of d rugs used in clinical t r ials ac tua l ly is highlv 
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Thus, if its examples are taken seriously, comment k reasonably 
could be read as excluding from section 402A onh' unavoidably unsafe 
prescription drugs. The comment, however, fails to explain what 
might render an unavoidably unsafe product "defective" and thus 
subject to section 402A in the first instance. Instead, it states that if the 
known benefits of one of these products outweigh its known risks, it 
would not be considered "unreasonably dangerous," provided that it 
was prepared properly and bore adequate warnings and directions for 
use.(i7 The negative implication of this statement radically expands the 
scope of the exemption. Since injury caused by any product whose 
risks outweigh its benefits presumably would be actionable under 
traditional negligence principles,08 comment k may be read to remove 
from the reach of section 402A any product that is unavoidably unsafe 
as long as the manufacturer will not be subject to liability under a 
negligence rule for injury caused by the product. Such an exemption 
includes but is not limited to prescription drugs, an ironic turn in light 
of the ALI vote rejecting the proposed exemption for prescription 
drugs alone."" 
To appreciate the effect of this interpretation of comment k, it is 
necessary to consider how sellers of unavoidably unsafe products 
might be held strictly liable in the absence of comment k. The COn-
supervised. Coinc iden ta l w i th the evolut ion of § 402A a n d its c o m m e n t s was the passage ol t he 
Drug A m e n d m e n t s of 1002. which t igh tened u p new d r u g c l ea rance p rocedures . Sec D r u g 
Industry Act of 1002, Tub . L. No. 8 7 - 7 8 1 , § 104, 70 Sta t . 780, 784 ( a m e n d i n g 21 F . S . C §§ 3 3 1 . 
.'MS. 355 (1070)). 
Moreover, it is not at all c lear w h a t t he draf te rs of § 402A mean t In a new but nonexper i -
hicutal d rug The Food , D r u g , a n d ( ' o smet i c Act defines "new d r u g " as any d r u g "not general ly 
n-eiigui/ed . . . as safe a n d effective for use u n d e r t he cond i t ions p resc r ibed , r e c o m m e n d e d , or 
suggested in the labe l ing t h e r e o f . . . ." 21 U . S . C . § 321(p ) ( l ) (107b). D e a n Prosser's d r u g 
d-limnology, by d r a w i n g this d is t inct ion be tween new a n d expe r imen ta l d rugs , did not seem to 
f i i l o r i n to the s ta tu tory def ini t ion. 
' Restatement (Second) of Tor t s § 402A c o m m e n t k (1005). 
, s
 See W . Prosser, T h e Law of 'Tor t s 140 (4th cd. 1071) ("It is f u n d a m e n t a l tha t t he s t a n d a r d 
i 'induct which is the basis of t he l aw of negl igence is d e t e r m i n e d by ba l anc ing the risk, in light 
••: the social value of the interest t h r e a t e n e d , a n d the probabi l i tv and extent of the h a r m , against 
•I-- ^.i!ue of the interest wh ich the ac tor is seeking to p ro tec t , a n d the expedience of the course 
i- . i-ucd."». 
Mthough cour ts m igh t theore t ica l ly find t h e m e r e m a r k e t i n g of a d a n g e r o u s p roduc t 
'•• J igcnt because the risks o u t w e i g h e d the benefi ts , they have not yet d o n e so. At least one recent 
;
 "•'• has asserted this c la im against h a n d g u n m a n u f a c t u r e r s . See First A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t for 
• '..mages at 10-11. Brady v. Hinckley , No . 82-0549 ( D . D . C . Sept . 8, 1982). See general ly No te . 
M..i..ilacluicrs' Liabil i ty to Vict ims of H a n d g u n C r i m e : A C o m m o n L a w A p p r o a c h . 51 Ford-
1
 'i'i i. Hev. 771 (1083); Note , M a n u f a c t u r e r s ' Strict Liabi l i ty for Injuries from a W e l l - M a d e 
l l - i .dcuu . 21 W i n . & Mary L. Rev. 407 (1083). For the a r g u m e n t against using produc t liabilitv 
•• i 'iieans to achieve gun con t ro l , see D . Santare l l i & N. C a l i o , T u r n i n g the C u i i on Tort L a w : 
v
. inu ai Cour t s to 'Take Produc ts Liabi l i tv to t he Limi t (1082) ( W a s h i n g t o n Legal F o u n d a t i o n 
M - . g . a p l n . 
s e e text a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 01-02 sup ra . 
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sumer-contemplation test of comment i70 seems to preclude liability in 
cases where the risks generally were known and therefore within the 
contemplation of the ordinary consumer. Under this test, if a patient 
suffers harm from a high-risk, high-benefit drug and the harm falls 
within the scope of the contemplated risk, the drug would not be 
unreasonably dangerous. Similarly, a warning about an adverse reac-
tion listed on the label of a prescription drug would be considered part 
of the contemplated risk,71 as would be true of known risks posed by 
experimental drugs. Given the broad sweep of comment i, one can 
salvage independent meaning for comment k only by surmising that, 
without comment k, harm from unknown risks, or harm from known 
risks which turns out to be much graver than expected, generally 
would be actionable under theories of strict tort liability. With com-
ment k, therefore, one must surmise that a manufacturer of a product 
posing such risks would escape liability under section 402A if the 
product were "unavoidably unsafe." 
This analysis suggests that the function served by comment k is to 
exempt unknown risks created by unavoidably unsafe products, since 
comment i already excludes known risks. Yet this interpretation 
presents difficulties. The text of comment k is not at all specific on the 
point, and a matter as important as the treatment of unknown haz-
ards merits direct mention.72 Moreover, the comment focuses on 
known risks. Two of the three categories listed in the comment involve 
products unavoidably unsafe because of known risks,73 such as a rabies 
7,1
 See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
71
 In the case of prescription drugs, the manufacturer discloses risks to the prescribing 
physician. The physician is then under a legal duty to inform patients of material risks associated 
with drug therapy. See Merrill, supra note 15, at 65-67. In rare instances, courts have imposed a 
duty upon the manufacturer to insure that the patient is aware of these risks. See, e.g., Heyes v. 
Wveth Labs., -198 I\2d 1264. 1270-78 (5th Cir.) (polio vaccine), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1096 
(1974); Davis v. Wveth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1968) (same). Thus, as a 
general proposition, contemplation of risk by the prescribing physician usually would satisfy the 
requirement of comment i. 
7
- Shortly after § 402A was published in final form. Dean Prosser wrote a law review article 
in which he noted that "[tjhc conclusion would be clearly indicated that, provided that the 
product, so far as is known at the time of the sale, is reasonably safe for its intended use, there is 
no liability for unavoidable dangers-- if it were not for the state of confusion surrounding flu 
question of lung cancer from smoking cigarettes." Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in 
California. IS Hastings I. J. 9, 2(i (1966). He apparently was convinced that strict liabilit> 
should not extend to unknowable hazards. Wh\ the comments to § 402A did not take a forthright 
position on the issue is pu/./.ling. 
1
 See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra. This emphasis is especially apparent in the case 
ol a high-risk, high benefit product, such as a cancer cure known to have fatal consequences for a 
small percentage of users. Dean Prosser mentioned such a hypothetical drug during the Aid floor 
debate on § I02A. See Al l Proceedings, supra note 39. at 54, 93. In referring to comment k. 
Dean Prosser stressed that it was designed to protect "the person who is selling a drug which is 
October 19.K3| i'RODCCT LIARILIT) TASSACE OE TIME Mill 
vaccine. According to the comment, the manufacturers of these drugs 
should not be strictly liable for harm from the known risk, a proposi-
tion seemingly rendered superfluous by comment i. The third cate-
gory, "new or experimental drugs," however, does cover products that 
are unavoidably unsafe because of unknown risks. Indeed, one impor-
tant purpose of the clinical testing of experimental drugs is to learn 
more about adverse reactions they might cause. On the other hand, 
since a patient participating in clinical trials must give an informed 
consent, which includes an understanding that the harmful effects of 
the drug are not yet fully known,74 any adverse reaction the patient 
suffers may be said to fall within the range of consumer contempla-
tion.75 
Comment j , unlike comment k, speaks specifically to product 
risks unknown at the time of marketing; but comment j raises more 
questions than it answers and sheds little light on the meaning ol 
comment k. In discussing the duty to give warnings and directions for 
use, Dean Prosser indicated that the sellers of food need not provide 
warnings about common allergic reactions to their products, since 
they might reasonably assume that consumers who suffer from the 
allergy are aware of it.70 This conclusion is consistent with the con-
sumer-contemplation of unreasonable danger test in comment i: to the 
ordinary consumer with a common allergy, an allergic reaction would 
be an expected hazard, and hence not unreasonable. The Reporter 
went on to state, however, that 
[wjhere . . . the product contains an ingredient to which a substan-
tial number ol the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one 
whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which the 
consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the 
seller is required to give a warning against it, if he has knowledge, 
or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and 
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient 
and the danger. Likewise in the ease of poisonous drugs, or those 
:.--icssarilv unsafe, although its utility outweighs the risk." American Law Institute, 41st Annual 
Meeting. Proceedings 360 (1965). Once again the implication is clear that the risk making the 
lisuv; uecessarilv unsafe was known at the time the product was marketed. 
' See 21 C.F.H. § 50.25(b)(1) (19K3) (human subject ol clinical trials must be told that "the 
i'-'i'ieular treatment or procedure mav involve risks to the subject . . which are currently 
l.-.eseeahle"). 
See < iainphell. Civil Liability for Investigational Drugs: Part II, 42 Temple L.O. 2K9, 335-
••• I ' M , ' ) , 
'The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for example to 
•-'-' "i strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn against them." 
''••••.iiemeiit (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j (1965). 
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unduly dangerous for other reasons, warnings as to use may be 
required.77 
This language is unclear on a number of points. Why should the 
duty to warn unwary allergy victims be limited to cases in which a 
"substantial" segment of the populace is affected? Under ordinary 
negligence principles, one might find the risk of serious harm or death 
to a miniscule percentage of individuals, or even a single individual, 
to be sufficient justification for requiring a warning.78 Also, if the risk 
is undiscoverable in the exercise of due care and hence need not be 
mentioned in the warnings or instructions for use, does it follow that 
the manufacturer will not be strictly liable for harm resulting from 
the risk? This seems to be a fair reading of the text. If so, strict liability 
will not attach even though the product was dangerous beyond the 
contemplation of the ordinary consumer. 
But what are the reasons for this departure from the comment i 
test? Does the last sentence of the paragraph indicate merely that 
drugs fall within the scope of the general duty to give warnings or 
directions in every case? Or does it mean that allergic reactions to 
drugs should be governed by the same principles applicable to reac-
tions to food, i.e., that users need not be warned about common risks 
that are known by both the manufacturer and the consumer? Should 
it be read even more expansively to preclude liability for harm from 
all unknowable adverse drug reactions, and, by extension, from all 
unknowable generic risks? If this gloss on the language of comment j is 
correct, comment k again would serve no purpose. 
Another noteworthy aspect of comment k is its suggestion that 
strict liability not be imposed on the manufacturers of "new or experi-
mental" drugs containing harmful or impure ingredients that could 
not be eliminated "because of lack of time and opportunity for suffi-
cient medical experience."79 The scope of the "unavoidable product 
danger" exception would be extended beyond generic risks and would 
apply to garden variety defects, where something is actually "wrong" 
•
7
 id. 
7rt
 Sec Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 L.2d 53, 5(i (2d Cir. 195T) (allergic reaction to 
deodorant; duty to warn even though "only a miniscule percentage of potential customers could 
he endangered"); Bruiui v. Koux Distrib. Co.. 312 S \V.2d T5S, 768 (Mo. 1958) (duty to discover 
and warn of risks oi serious allergic reaction; plaintiff was apparently first to sutler reaction from 
defendant's hair dye): sec also Keeton, Products Liability Liability Without Fault and the 
Requirement of a Defect, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 85(i. 806 (1963). Hut see Cudmorc v. Richardson 
Merrell, Inc., 398 S.\\.2d 640, 044 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (adverse reaction to MF.R/29; 
manufacturer liable only if an "appreciable number" of people experience the adverse reaction), 
cert, denied. 385 U.S. KM):) (1967). 
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965). 
(), tuber 1983| l'l« >D( (I I IMUI II) I'ASSM'.I OI IIMI ST I 
with some units of the product. Such a view reads into comment k an 
"impure ingredient" exception."" 
If the risk of an impure or otherwise deleterious ingredient is 
known when a drug is marketed, but the manufacturer could not 
discover which doses contained the substance (as is the case of blood 
contaminated with serum hepatitis), an adequate warning on the 
label of the drug would place the defect within the scope of consumer 
expectations. The product thus would not be unreasonably dangerous 
under the comment i test.81 Impure ingredients whose presence is not 
known when the drug is sold (such as the offending agents in the polio 
vaccine case) pose a more difficult problem because of their similarity 
to impurities in food and manufacturing defects in mass-produced 
goods. The seller may be unaware of these defects and may be unable 
to discover them by economically feasible methods. But these in-
stances are plainly covered by the strict liability rule of section 402A.h-
The comment k "impure ingredient" exemption should not apply 
to either of these cases. The exception should be narrowly limited to 
emergencies in which the usual precautions for assuring the purity of 
ingredients have not been taken, yet there is medical justification for 
using the drug. s t The appropriate scope of the exception is thus so 
narrow that the exception would make more sense as an interpretation 
of the consumer contemplation test of comment i than as an exception 
to the strict liability rule of section 402A: in this particular context, 
assuming an adequate warning has been given, the risk of harmful 
ingredients is within the ambit of consumer contemplation. 
In conclusion, the Restatements treatment of generic risks falls 
short on several counts. The requirement of a "defect" as a distinct 
clement of strict liability was inserted to serve a function already 
"•" A California decision might well have inspired this "impure-ingredient" exception. Set 
Cnttsdanker \ . Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 607-08. 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (Hist. Ct 
\pp. I9(i0). In C.ottsdunkcr, live polio virus constituted the "impure ingredient"' in a polio 
vaccine. The court applied strict liability under a theory of implied warranty from the producer 
<.l the vaccine, since the specifications of the vaccine called for only inactive polio virus 
'" In at least two blood-contamination cases, the labels on the products bore warnings, but 
the courts chose to ignore comment i, and instead used comment k as a basis for finding for the 
defendants. See Hrodv v. Overlook Hosp.. 127 N.J. Super. 331. 339-40, 317 A.2d 392. 397 (App. 
Div 1974) ul'i'd per curiam, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975); Hines v. St. Josephs Hosp., 86 
\ M 763, 764-65, 527 P.2d 1075, 1076-77 (Ct. App. 1974). 
s
 The rule of strict liability applies even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in 
'he preparation and sale of his product." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1905); see 
also \ \ ade. Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers. 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965) ( I f the article left 
'he defendant's control in a dangerously unsafe condition . . . the defendant is liable whether or 
not he uas at fault in creating that condition or in failing to discover and eliminate i t " ) . 
One h\ pothetical example would be the emergency production of a new vaccine to combat 
• i Miious and rapidly spreading epidemic. 
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adequately addressed by the "unreasonably dangerous" test. The Re-
statement fails to make a clear distinction between known and un-
known hazards, and never takes a forthright position on which of 
these two types of hazards strict liability should cover: either, neither, 
or both. This omission is surprising given the evident concern, re-
flected both in the ALI floor debates and the comments, over the 
effect of section 402A upon the manufacturers of drugs, vaccines, and 
cigarettes. Comment k also is vague in that it fails to make clear what 
kind of special rule it puts in place, what purposes it meets, and to 
what classes of products it applies. Finally, the ALI's position on 
generic product risks, uncertain though it may be, reflects policy 
judgments. While the ALI is a distinguished body, it is a private, 
nongovernmental entity.84 The courts have ultimate responsibility for 
translating policy into common-law rules, and the matter of liability 
for generic risks, and for toxic products in particular, requires more 
comprehensive scrutiny than has been afforded by the Restatement. 
Ill 
GLNLHIC PHODUC:T RISKS RECONSIDEKKD 
When the Restatements commentary on adverse reactions to 
drugs, food, and tobacco was drafted, the proposed rule of strict 
liability did not cover all products placed in the stream of com-
merce.65 Thus, there was no need to consider how the full range of 
generic risks should be integrated into the framework of a strict liabil-
ity system. Even had the drafters reflected on this issue, their efforts 
may not have produced an internally consistent doctrine to cover 
harm from the ill effects of products for human consumption and 
intimate bodily use, and harm from the designed-in dangers of mass-
produced goods, for the problem is not an easy one. 
There are two basic approaches to the issue of liability for the 
deleterious effects of generic risks. One approach is to focus on strict 
liability as it has evolved in design-defect and warning cases, and to 
ask whether the manufacturer's duty to eliminate8'1 or warn of prod-
uct dangers extends to the particular generic hazard in question. The 
other approach is to ask whether the policy justifications for imposing 
M
 For a descr ip t ion of tin- process bv which tin- Restatements a r c d ra f t ed , sec G o o d r i c h . The 
S t u n of the Amer i can Law Ins t i tu te . 1951 Wash . F L O . 283, 287. 
"'' See Res ta tement (Second) ol Tor t s § 402A (Tent . Draft No. 7. 19<i2); text a c c o m p a n y i n g 
notes 21) 31 supra . D e a n l 'rosser did not h ide his belief, however , tha t t he case law was m o v i n g in 
that d i rec t ion . See A l l Proe. vd ings , supra note 30. at 52-55. 
s
" The m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s du ty i l l ic i t also extend to re t ra in ing from des igning in p roduc t 
dange r s . 
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strict tort liability in cases involving nongeneric risks, i.e., construc-
tion defects, where there is general agreement that it should be im-
posed, support the extension of strict liability to cases involving ge-
neric risks. Each of these approaches will be considered in the 
remainder of this section. 
A. Justifying Strict Liability for Generic Risks: Is tlie Duty in 
Design-Defect and Warning Cases Adequate? 
Under well settled principles of negligence law, a manufacturer 
has a duty to use reasonable care in the design of a product.87 This 
obligation requires the manufacturer to use precautionary measures 
which are economically and technologically feasible,88 and which will 
eliminate unreasonable risks of harm. The duty extends to risks of 
which the manufacturer is aware and, in the exercise of due care, 
should be aware.89 If a hazard may be reduced by providing informa-
tion to the user of a product, the duty of reasonable care may be 
discharged by providing instructions and warnings.90 
To have meaning in design cases, the concept of strict liability 
must make the manufacturer answerable for product-related harm for 
which negligence theories would provide no remedy. Strict liability 
potentially might extend to all generic risks, to risks that are designed 
into a product as well as to those naturally and unavoidably present.91 
The failure to design out or to warn against these risks would render 
the manufacturer liable, even though the design change or warning 
might be economically or technologically infeasible, and even though 
the risk may have been unknown or unknowable at the time of 
production. 
See 1 L. F n u n c r 6c M. L r i e d m a n . P roduc t s Liabi l i ty § 7 (1982). 
''" The duty of r easonab le c a r e has been in t e rp re t ed , w i th in an economica l ly ra t iona l ( i . e . . 
prolit maximizing) f r a m e w o r k , as r equ i r ing an ac tor to expend on acc ident p reven t ion an 
amount up to the projec ted cost of acc idents that might occur in the absence of such an ou t l ay . 
See I'osncr. A T h e o r y of Negl igence , 1 J. Legal S tud . 29 . 32 33 (1972). T h e d u t y also obliges 
tM.iimiacturers to keep reasonab ly "abreas t ol t echn iques used by pract ica l men in t he i n d u s t r y . " 
\ o e l . Heeeiit Trends in Manufac turers" Negl igence As to Design, Ins t ruc t ions or W a r n i n g s . 19 
Vv I .J 13. 51-52 (19(>5) (ci t ing eases). 
'" I or a discussion of t he m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s du ty to test, sec 1 L. 1-miner 6c M. F r i e d m a n , sup ra 
:i"U S7. 5j (). 
See ill. § 8. 
A rule of abso lu te l iabil i ty w o u l d hold m a n u f a c t u r e r s responsible for all h a r m causal ly 
<< i-Hed to a product w h e t h e r or not t he p r o d u c t w a s defect ive. A rule of l iabil i ty for h a r m from 
• 'il ueucric risks associated w i t h a p roduc t w o u l d he s o m e w h a t less t h a n abso lu te , bu t nonetheless 
ultra strict " I'or a discussion of abso lu te l iabil i ty in the p roduc t s contex t , see S c h w a r t z , 
» " i - A o r d : I ndc r s t and ing P roduc t s L iab i l i ty , 07 Calif. L. Rev. 435 , 4-11-48 (1979) (referred to as 
•.•'•inline strict l iabi l i ty") . For use of t he t e r m " u l t ra-s t r ic t ' l i ab i l i ty ," see O w e n , Re th ink ing the 
I ' l u i . s .,f Strict P roduc t s L iab i l i ty , 33 V a m i . L. Rev. H81, 714 (1980). 
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A theory of "ultra-strict" liability for harm from all generic 
hazards has found neither judicial nor scholarly acceptance. As Pro-
fessor Gary Schwartz has argued in a similar context, if loss spreading 
is our goal, we ought not to adopt a rule that discriminates against the 
victims of nonproduct-related accidents."2 Courts adopting "ultra-
strict" product liability would find themselves on the fabled slippery 
slope and would be unable to offer any logical reason for not extend-
ing the doctrine to other contexts in which the public is routinely 
exposed to the risk of injury, such as the operation of premises held 
open for business or public purposes"1' or leased to tenants."4 Such 
radical changes in the common law surely and properly would en-
counter judicial hesitation, grounded upon the conviction that it 
would be more appropriate to leave the difficult policy judgments 
involved in adopting such an expansive rule to the legislature."5 
The rejection of "ultra-strict" liability leaves open, however, the 
theoretical possibility of imposing strict liability for some harm caused 
by generic risks. For example, suppose an automobile manufacturer is 
deemed not liable for all harm to occupants who collide with the 
interior of a vehicle. Is there any way to assign responsibility for some 
but not all injuries attributable to the generic risks of the so-called 
"seeond collision"—to assign responsibility in fewer than all cases, as 
would be done under a rule of ultra-strict liability, yet in more cases 
than would be done under a rule of negligence? In other words, are 
there second collisions that the manufacturer could not have avoided 
by exercising reasonable care but for which the manufacturer should 
be held liable? This question has provoked considerable academic 
debate, much of it sharply critical of courts that have answered "yes" 
and imposed liability for injuries that were not reasonably avoidable 
"- S c h w a r t z , s u p r a no te 9 1 . at 115. Professor Schwar tz also points out that the rule migh t not 
de t e r cer ta in kinds of acc iden t s , such as those caused In plaintiff's themselves or by o the r 
pa r t i c ipan t s in t h c e \ e n t , a n d that it might he difficult to d e t e r m i n e wh ich of several m a n u f a c -
turers whose p r o d u c t s w e r e involved in the accident outfi t to be held l iable . Id . at 441-45. It is 
<|iiestionahle w h e t h e r his analysis , focusing on absolute liability, wou ld app ly equal ly in the 
context of "u l t r a - s t r i c t " l iabil i ty for h a r m from generic risks. 
" Sec I ' r s iu . Strict Liabi l i ty for Defective Business Premises: O n e Step Beyond Hon land and 
( . ' r . n i m i / n . 22 I . C . I . A. I. Rev. 820 (1975) (case for applying strict l iabil i ty for h a r m from 
dangerous ly defec t ive business premises). 
" See l .ove. L a n d l o r d s Liabil i ty lor Delect ivc Premises: Cavea t Lessee, Negl igence, or Strict 
L i a b i l i t y . 1975 Wis . L. Bev. 19, 134-44 (case- for a p p K i n g strict l iabil i ty for h a r m from 
delect ivc leased premises) . 
" Sec L p s t c m . P roduc t s Liabil i ty: The- Search for the Middle C r o u n d . 5ti N . C . L . Hcv. 6 4 3 . 
<>fiO Id (197.S) deu i s la tu res a r c bet ter suited than courts to consider a n d resolve issues raisetl by 
abso lu te or ul t ra-s t r ic t p roduc t l iabili ty); O w e n , supra note 9 1 . at 705-0b ( legislature is m o r e 
a p p r o p r i a t e bod\ to ef fec tua te clistiihutixe justice*' via product l iabil i ty rules). 
October 1983) I'lii )I)IC1 LIMil III) I'ASS.U'.l. (>/ll\ll. S75 
without articulating a clear, workable standard for deciding when an 
alleged design flaw is defective or unreasonably dangerous."" The 
emerging consensus seems to be that design defects are best dealt with 
under a balancing test,"7 which is indistinguishable from the negli-
gence standard. Thus, the failure to develop judicially adminis trate 
criteria for strict liability has led to the conclusion that product manu-
facturers, absent negligence, should not be liable for failing to design 
out functional dangers. Commentators have concluded, in short, that 
there is no middle ground between negligence and "ultra strict" liabil-
ity, at least in cases involving design defects. 
The one exception to this proposition, originally articulated by 
Deans Page KeetonHS and John Wade,"" and since adopted in several 
"" Design liabihtx ta i l ing be tween the poles of ultra-strict l iabil i ty a n d negl igence max be 
imposed under the consumer expecta t ion test, wh ich asks xvhat type of design features g u a r d i n g 
against the risk ol injury an o r d i n a r y consumer would have expec ted . Another c o m p r o m i s e 
approach wou ld use a faul t -based s t a n d a r d which lessens the- b u r d e n s t rad i t iona l ly assigned to 
plaintiffs in ni'gligene•<• cases. Lor a decision permitt ing! both a p p r o a c h e s , sec Barker v Lull 
L n g g C o . , 20 C a l . 3d 4 1 3 . 132. 573 P 2d 443 . 455 5(>. 143 C a l . Bpt r . 225 . 237 38 .1978) 
(plaintiff may use e i ther c o n s u m e r - c o n t e m p l a t i o n test or negl igence- type ba l anc ing test, in 
which the b u r d e n is on defendan t to establish tha t the- design fea ture in ques t ion was not 
delect ivc). 
For cri t icisms ol 'Marker, see. e .g . . B i r n b a u m . supra note- 13. at 002-18; Kpstein. supra note 
95. at 050-54; H e n d e r s o n . Renewed Judicia l Cont roversy Oxer Defective Produc t Design: 
Toward the Preservat ion of an F ine rg ing Consensus . (i3 Minn . L. Hcv. 7 7 3 . 782-97 (1979, . l o r 
an exhaustive and pa ins takingly fa i r -minded discussion of Barker, sec S c h w a r t z , supra note 9 1 , 
at 404-82. 
"
7
 Lor a classic ba l anc ing test, sec W a d e , supra note 3 1 , at 8.37-38 (discussing factors used to 
weigh the risk of a p roduc t against its ut i l i tx) . Such an analysis has been a d o p t e d b \ several 
courts. See, e .g . . H a s a n s x . Ol iver Mach . C o . , 57b F.2d 97, 99-100 (5th Cir . 1978| ; B o w m a n v. 
Ccneral Motors C o r p , 427 L. Supp . 234 , 244 ( F . D . Pa . 1974). O t h e r scholars have also urged 
the adopt ion of b a l a n c i n g tests. See k e e t o n . Product Liabil i ty a n d the M e a n i n g of Defect , 5 St. 
Marvs L.J. 30 , 37-38 (1973). 
For the e m e r g i n g consensus, see B i r n b a u m , supra note 13. at 049 (conc lud ing tha t design 
deh-ct cases should be dec ided under a negl igence s t a n d a r d ) ; S c h w a r t z , T h e Uniform Produc t 
Liability Act A Brief O v e r v i e w , 33 V a n d . L. Rev. 579 , 584-87 (1980) (discussing a d o p t i o n of a 
negligence test for design a n d xvarning cases in t he Uniform Produc t Liabi l i ty Act) . 
"
s
 See Keeton , P roduc t s L i a b i l i t y — A d e q u a c y of I n f o r m a t i o n . 48 Tex. L. Bev. 3 9 8 . 407 08 
11970) r [ T ] h e fact tha t the make r was excusably unaxvare of t he extent of t h e d a n g e r a n d h a d 
not commi t t ed any negl igent act or omission tha t caused the d a n g e r xvould be ent i re ly irrele-
vant ." ) ; Keeton, Some Obse rva t ions About the Strict Liabi l i ty of the Maker of Prescr ip t ion 
Dings: T h e Af te rmath of M L R / 2 9 , 56 Calif. L. Rev. 14!), 158 (1908) ("A d r u g or any o the r 
product is un rea sonab ly d a n g e r o u s , I suggest , if. a n d only if, a r easonab le m a n , w i t h knoxs ledge 
"I the condi t ion of t he p roduc t a n d an app rec i a t i on of all the risks as found to exist at t h e t i m e ol 
tin trial , xvould not now marke t the p roduc t at all or wou ld do so p u r s u a n t to a different set of 
warnings and ins t ruct ions as to use ." ) . For the earliest men t ion of this excep t ion , sec Kee ton , 
I 'Moucts L i a b i l i t y - C u r r e n t D e v e l o p m e n t . 40 Tex . L. Rev. 193. 210 (1901) ( conc lud ing tha t 
'•xe usable- ignorance of a defect or t he proper t ies of a p roduc t is i m m a t e r i a l as r egards w a r r a n t y 
liability"). 
"' See- W a d e , supra note 3 1 , at 8.34 ("assume that the de fendan t knew of the d a n g e r o u s 
< ••ii.htiein of the p roduc t a n d ask w h e t h e r he w a s negligent in p u t t i n g it on t he m a r k e t " ) ; W a d e , 
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jurisdictions,100 is that knowledge of risks should be imputed to the 
manufacturer as of the time of production or sale. Thus, in determin-
ing whether to impose liability for failure to design out or warn of a 
danger, a jury might take into account hazards that were unknown, 
or even unknowable, to the manufacturer when the product was 
marketed. That the manufacturer could not have discovered these 
risks in the exercise of reasonable care would be irrelevant; if a hypo-
thetical reasonable manufacturer, aware of these risks, would not 
have marketed the product or would have warned of the dangers, an 
injured plaintiff may recover.101 
This exception uses hindsight to achieve a genuine strict liability 
in certain cases of generic risks, such as adverse reactions to drugs, 
dusts, and chemicals. This hindsight approach, however, has not 
supra note 82, at 15 ("lAJssuniing that the defendant had knowledge of the condition of the 
product, would he then have been acting unreasonably in placing it upon the market?"). Dean 
Wade has recently stated that he never intended this broad language to apply to unknowable 
hazards, but only to manufacturing flaws in the condition of the product. See Wade, On the 
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N Y U . L Hex. 
734. 705 (1983). His position has heretofore widely been interpreted as being identical to that of 
Dean Keeton. See Birnbaum, supra note 13, at 019; Powers, supra note 13, at 791; Veltri, 
Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 Or. L. Rev. 293, 299 (1975). 
But see Phillips v. Kimwood Much. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492 n.6, 525 P.2d 1033. 1030 n.6 (1974) 
(en banc). 
100
 See, e.g., Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis 
Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); 
Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (K.D. Pa. 1971), affd men.., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d 
Cir. 1973); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191. 200, 447 A.2d 539, 544 (1982); 
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (en banc). 
"" If knowledge or risk as of the time of marketing is to be imputed to the manufacturer, it 
would seem logical also to impute subsequently acquired knowledge of inefficaey. Hence, factors 
to be weighed in a strict liability action would include newly discovered information about risks 
and benefits. A New Jersey intermediate appellate court has refused to apply the hindsight 
approach to either risks or benefits in a DFS decision. See Ferrigno v. Kli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. 
Super. 551, 576, 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (Law Div. 1980). The court felt itself bound by comment k 
in product liability cases and interpreted the comment as mandating a foresight test. 
It would also seem logical that, if the product might reasonably have been marketed with 
knowledge of the risk and with adequate warnings, plaintiffs should have to establish that such 
warnings would have led them not to use the product. See Henderson, supra note I 1, at 946-48. 
In most cases, however, this requirement would hinge resolution of the causation issue upon 
plaintiffs' credibility. Alternative approaches have been adopted. See Reyes v. W'veth Labs., 498 
F.2d 1264. 1281 (5th Cir.) (presumption, rebuttable by the manufacturer, that warning would 
have IM'IMI heeded), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Canterbury v. Spence. 464 F.2d 772. 791 
( D C . Cir. 1972) (causation to be determined by asking what a reasonable person in plaintiffs 
position would have decided if informed of all risks), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1974); Model 
Uniform Product Liability Act § 104(C)(3) (Dep't of Commerce 1979), 44 1\L\. Reg. 62.714. 
02.721 (1979) (•claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that if adequate 
warnings or instuctions had been provided, they would have been effective because a reasonably 
prudent product user would have either declined to use the product or would have used the 
product in a manner so as to have avoided the harm"). 
October 1983] riiODLCT LIABILITY I'ASSACE (>t 77A/J-." 
received much policy-oriented justification either by courts or com-
mentators.102 The mere fact that it created a well-delineated area of 
strict liability in design and warning cases seemed to suffice. It was 
inevitable that a need for a firmer rationale would arise. 
The recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada 
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp."" attempted to provide such a ra-
tionale. The court held that asbestos manufacturers might be liable 
for lung diseases caused by exposure to asbestos dust at a time when 
the risks were unknown and undiscoverable, offering three reasons to 
support this extension of strict tort liability: the allocation of the costs 
of injuries to the parties best able to bear them; the reduction of risks 
bv increasing incentives for safety research; and the elimination of the 
need for plaintiffs to prove scientific know-ability, a factual determi-
nation that is too complex and speculative for jury resolution.104 The 
potential problems with each of these reasons will be considered in 
turn. 
The first rationale offered, the notion that manufacturers of 
defective or unreasonably dangerous products are in a superior posi-
"'- The applicubililN of the hindsight approach to drugs and cigarettes has been criticized. See, 
e.g., Connolh. The LiabiliU of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His 
Product, 32 Ins. Conns. J. 303. 306 (1965): Comment, supra note 58. at 530-35. For an effort to 
meet some of these criticisms, see James, The Untoward Kffects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some 
Reflections on Fnterprise Liability, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1550, 1555-58 (1966). 
"" 90 N.J. 191. 447 A.2d 539 (1982). 
»•« See id. at 205-08, 447 A.2d at 547-48 The precise issue in Beshada was whether the trial 
judge erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' assertion that the danger of 
which they failed to warn was undiscoverable when the products were marketed. The court 
referred to this assertion as a "state-of-the-art" defense. See id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542. The term 
would seem to apply more properly and precisely to considerations of practical feasibility, 
relating to technology that might have been used to reduce a known risk. See \\. Keeton. D. 
Owen & J. Montgomery, Products Liability and Safety: Cases and Materials 465 (1980); Model 
Uniform Product Liability Act § 107(D) and commentary (Dep't of Commerce 1979). 44 Fed 
Reg 62 714 62,728-30 (1979). The term, however, has also been used to encompass both 
te< lu.ological feasibility and state of scientific knowledge. See Murray, The State of the Art 
Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57 Mar.,. L. Rev. 649, 651-52 (1974); Spradley, Defensive 
Use of State of the Art Fvidencc in Strict Products Liability, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 343, 344-47 
(I9N2|. 
Beshada is the first case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has applied the hindsight 
approach to the unknowable adverse effects of a toxic product. Prior decisions had approved the 
test when- plaintiffs sought recover} for harm from machinery which allegedly had been 
designed defectively or from a flammable liquid chemical. See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, 
Ine 87 N J 229 239-41, 432 A.2d 925, 930-31 (1981) (flammable chemical); Suter v. San 
\ngelo Foundry & Mach Co.. 81 N.J. 150. 171-72, 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (1979) (same); Cepcda 
v Cumberland Fngg Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163-75, 386 A.2d 816, 821-27 (1978) (defectively 
drsigMcd machine), overruled in part, 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979). An intermedi-
ate appellate court in New Jersey has refused to apply the Beshada rule in a drug case. See 
I . Id.uan v. Lederle Labs.. 189 N.J. Super. 424, 432-33, 460 A.2d 203, 207-08 (App. Div. 1983). 
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tion to allocate the costs of product-related injuries, does not really 
help to answer the question of what makes a product defective or 
unreasonably dangerous. Nor does it answer the question of which 
costs should be shifted.105 Compared with plaintiffs who are injured 
by products, manufacturers are almost always better able to bear risks 
by spreading losses through price adjustments and insurance. This 
rationale would therefore justify imposing liability for harm from 
risks known as well as unknown, reasonable as well as unreasonable, 
and ultimately would lead to "ultra-strict" liability. Because it proves 
too much, this rationale provides only weak justification for a nar-
rower rule of strict liability. 
Professor James Henderson has also criticized the risk-spreading 
rationale on the ground that a hindsight approach would misallocate 
the costs of liability from products creating risks that were unknown 
and unknowable at the time of sale. Manufacturers would add this 
cost to the prices of different, reasonably safe products or to the same 
products put to different, safe uses. Since the offending products 
would already have been priced and sold, their liability costs could 
not be assigned to them. Moreover, once manufacturers discover the 
danger, the product is removed from the market or redesigned, or 
appropriate warnings are given, and thus there is no longer any need 
to assign costs of liability.10*1 
Such a result—product prices reflecting costs other than those 
caused by the product itself—would lead to market distortions and 
destroy the optimality properties that flow from cost-based pricing in 
a perfectly competitive market.107 In a perfectly competitive market, 
cost minimization and profit maximization for a particular product, 
and not costs from earlier versions of a particular product, or different 
products altogether, will determine the price of the product. A manu-
facturer who tries to pass on these costs will be driven from the market 
by manufacturers who do not. Professor Henderson's argument thus 
squarely poses a paradox: the market distorting effects of misalloca-
tion can occur only in a noncompetitive market, where the effects of 
misallocation are ambiguous.10" Because of competitive market pres-
,,,s
 Sec Owen. su|ira note 1)1, at 703-07. 
'"•' See Henderson, supra note I I, at 042-44. 
"
,7
 A perfectly competitive economy is "efficient-* (i.e., scarce resources are allocated opti-
mally) and "Pareto optimal" (i.e., no one can he made "better off" without making someone 
"worse of!"). For a serious yet nomnatheinatical discussion of these concepts, see J. Quirk. 
Intermediate Microeconomics 220-45 (1076). 
'"" The distortions that make a market noncompetitive also destroy the optimality properties 
of perlecth competitive equilibrium. Adding additional distortions to the market may improve 
the situation, or it may make the situation worse. Kconomists have labelled this ambiguity the 
theor\ of the "second best." For a general discussion of this theors. see id. at 243-44. 
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sures,10" unanticipated liability costs are more likely to be paid out of 
profits, loans, or sources other than price increases.11" 
It is important to distinguish between the allocation that would 
result from the retroactive application of a hindsight rule and that 
from the prospective application.111 The court in Beshatla pointed out 
that application of the rule of strict liability for unknowable risks "will 
force the price of any particular product to reflect the cost of insuring 
against the possibility that the product will turn out to be defec-
tive."112 Thus, the threat of prospective liability would force a proper 
allocation of product prices.111 When a court initially adopts a hind-
sight rule and imposes it retroactively, however, the prices of products 
marketed years, or, in the case of asbestos, decades, earlier will not 
bear their own liability costs."4 In the case of asbestos, this "first shot" 
problem is enormous. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not ask 
whether considerations of fairness deriving from justifiable reliance by 
asbestos manufacturers,115 or the enormous potential liability to which 
the industry might be exposed, supported the recognition of a hind-
sight rule that would operate prospectively only.11" 
For all of these reasons—because it proves too much, because it 
may or may not apply depending on market conditions, and because 
its effectiveness depends on whether the application is prospective or 
retroactive—the risk-spreading rationale raises more questions than it 
answers and provides only weak support for a rule of strict liability. 
"'" Whether a particular market is competitive, of course, is an empirical question, and the 
answer can vary from market to market. 
"" II the market is competitive, manufacturers are earning what economists call "normal 
prolits.'* the profits necessary to continue functioning as an ongoing business. II profits drop, the 
manufacturer will encounter problems raising new capital (a result of insufficient returns on the 
capital already invested in the firm) and may ha\e to withdraw from the market. Recovering 
lial.ilitx costs from profits, therefore, may drive firms from the market. In noncompetitive 
markets, however, where firms earn "super profits," the result may be entirely different 
11
 The problem is discussed in Schwartz, New Products, Old Products. Fvolving Law. 
Hd.oactive Law. 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 706, 825 (1083). 
1
 00 N.J. at 206, 447 A.2d at 547. 
'•' This conclusion assumes that a manufacturer will be able to obtain adequate protection 
against the unknown and the unknowable, risks that would have to be translated somehow into 
monetary terms and factored into the cost of liability insurance premiums, which product prices 
would then reflect. 
•" Ol course, the same is true whenever liability is expanded at common law -parties who 
lia\c already avoided liability in the past continue to do so under the new rule as well. See R. 
Kreton. Venturing to Do Justice: Reforming Private Law 25-26 (10(30). 
Since the hindsight approach was first suggested in 1061, see note 08 supra, manufacturers 
w ric arguably on notice that liability for harm from unknowable risks might one day be imposed 
'i|""> 'hem In livshada, however, the exposures to asbestos dust dated back to the 1030s. 
;
' It would be difficult to apply the hindsight rule prospectively only. If it were limited to 
r\ sustained in the future, or after 1061, problems of proof would greatly complicate cases 
iiA.-Uuig prolonged harmful exposures. 
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The second policy justification offered in Beshada was that a rule 
of strict liability would spur safety research that might reveal hidden 
dangers.117 Put another way, a contrary rule would benefit producers 
who were unaware of risks and thus would tend to perpetuate igno-
rance, especially if plaintiffs could not easily establish that a hazard 
might have been detected in the exercise of due care. Admittedly, if 
the existence of a hazard were completely unknown at the time of 
marketing, a manufacturer would be unable to determine how much 
to spend in order to make the discovery, and there may be no increase 
in safety research.118 On the other hand, if a hazard were suspected or 
were known to exist but its full extent were not known, the incentive 
for additional investigation could produce some incremental level of 
safety. In either instance, though, this incentive for safety research 
would justify a rule of strict liability because the manufacturer can 
always uncover the known risks better and more cheaply than the 
potential victim.119 
It is worth noting that Beshada involved asbestos rather than a 
drug. Federal regulation prescribes the nature and amount of safety 
testing that must be done before the marketing of a new medica-
tion.120 In using stimulation of safety research as a rationale for a rule 
of strict liability for unknown risks, a court would be explicitly or 
implicitly recognizing a general need for more extensive premarket 
investigation than presently required by the FDA. This recognition, 
however, goes far beyond judicial determinations in individual cases 
that FDA approval of a particular new drug does not preclude a 
finding of negligence or strict liability.121 While the safety-incentive 
appropriate warnings. 
"" Sec notes 132 33 infra. 
'-" See 21 C.F R $$.310,312,314 (198.3) (FDA regulations governing the approval proces 
new drugs). 
'-' Tor eases finding that KIM approval of a warning is not conclusive on the issue of th. 
adequacy of the warning, see, e.g.. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 042 F.2d 052. 05s 
(1st Cir. |!)K1); Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co.. 0 (Jul. 3(1 51, 05-60, 507 P.2d 053, 001-02, 107 
Cal. Hptr. 15. 53-54 (1973); McK.uen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 390-400 52s 
m 
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rationale is not indefensible,1- some courts might give it less weight 
than they would otherwise because of its far-reaching implications 
Another problem \\ ith the accident-avoidance rationale is that it 
leaves open the following question: why should courts impose strict 
liability upon manufacturers for harm from hazards of unknown 
scope as an incentive to discover the true scope of the risks, but not 
apply strict liability as a spur to technological development where at 
the time of production it was technologically infeasible to eliminate or 
to reduce risks? There is widespread agreement that in the latter eases, 
involving the so-called "state of the art" issue,121 manufacturers will 
not be liable, absent negligence, for having failed to use today's safety 
technology yesterday.'24 It is difficult to distinguish between technol-
ogy that can detect the gravity of risk and technology that can elimi-
nate or reduce risk, or to conclude that strict liability would act as a 
spur to the advancement of the former but not of the latter.1-"' 
The third justification for strict liability offered by the Beshada 
court is that the litigation process cannot adequately determine scien-
tific knowability.12" But although the same might be said of the need 
to decide whether a manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care in 
designing a product,127 courts have not stopped resolving these is-
' " Proposed FDA regulations would .streamline the drug-appio\al process and hence reduce 
the time required to bring neu medications into unrestricted commercial use. See New Drug anil 
Antibiotic Regulation, 17 l\-d. Reg. 10.022 (to be codified at 21 C.I R pts 310. 312. 31 1, 130. 
131, -133) (proposed June 23. 1982). The recent removal ol the antiurthritie drug Oraflex from 
the market because of its association with the deaths of a number ot users, see Newsweek. Aim. 
10. 1982, at 50, col. 1, however, lias provoked criticism about the adverse implications for safetv 
ol drug deregulation. See NY. Times, Aug. 15, 1082, at 7F, col. 2. That the new proposal would 
permit the FDA to rely more heavily upon foreign clinical studies also has been seiiouslv 
questioned. See The New Drug Rev iew Process: Hearings on the Herniation of New Drugs fn the 
Food and Drug Administration Before tin- Subcoinin. on Intergovernmental Relations and 
Human Resources of the House Conun. on Covernment Operations, 97th Cong.. 2d Sess. 312-52 
(19N2). 
' ' ' The term is used here to mean technological lea.sibility. Sec note 101 supra 
'•'• See. e.g.. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 01, 07-00, 577 P 2d 1322. 1320 27 
i PITS,; Roatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 009 S.\V.2d 7-13. 7 10. 718 (Tex. 10M)) 
'-"• Piofessor Henderson, who disapproves of the hindsight rule, argues that strict liahihtv 
would not provide increased incentives for manufacturers to develop technology, that eliminates 
or lessens risks; the incentive already exists in the market. Kven Henderson recogni/i s however, 
that although information about product risks does not general, profits, the subsequent!) 
developed risk-reduction technology might well provide competitive advantages to its creator, 
•HI.I .i strut liability rule might well stimulate this typo of technology. Sec Hendeison supra note 
I I. at 952-53. Moreover, risk information may have considerable value in discrediting a eompeli 
tor's pioduet. See Page. Not So Sure: The Underarm Menace, The New Republic. Apr. 12. 1975. 
• it S u-onipetitor discovered hazards associated with a rival's antiperspirant and submitted the 
data to the FDA). 
' 99 N J at 200-07. 117 A.2d at 548-49. 
See Henderson. Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits 
t ^indication. 73 Coliuu. L. Rev. 1531 (1973) (developing the idea ol "polwenti icitC that 
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sues.128 The scientific speculation inherent in deciding whether a par-
ticular hazard was knowable may produce more uncertainty than a 
dispute about whether designing out a known danger was feasible; 
this greater degree of uncertainty might tip the balance in favor of 
giving at least some weight to this particular rationale for strict liabil-
ity. The elimination of the need to establish knowability would cer-
tainly reduce trial costs, but so would dispensing with the burden of 
proving lack of due care in design cases. 
Since design and warning cases generally are decided by balanc-
ing factors that are virtually identical to those used to determine 
negligence, it is difficult to justify treating unknown or unknowable 
generic risks as falling within the duty to design or warn but outside 
the balancing approach. Ultimately, however, a de facto negligence 
test for all generic risks is unsatisfactory because this standard does not 
take into account the compelling policy reasons for adopting a strict 
liability theory. I now turn to those policy reasons, which have been 
recognized in the context of nongeneric risks.129 
B. Justifying Strict Liability for Generic Risks: Are the Policies 
Underlying Strict Liability in Construction Defect Cases Adequate? 
The conceptual treatment of liability for harm from unknowable 
generic risks as deriving from the manufacturer's duty to design or to 
warn creates a discomforting impression: that liability is being im-
posed for a failure to do the impossible. An alternative approach is to 
view generic risk through the same lens that, when focused upon the 
risk of harm from construction defects, has produced a rule of strict 
liability even when it might have been economically infeasible or 
technologically impossible to eliminate the hazard. Here the theory 
design der i s ions an- mul t i f ace led a n d a l te r ing one- aspect of a design might cause a "defec t" in 
a n o t h e r par t of tin- des ign) ; K. h'pstein. Modern Product Liability I ,a\v 84-90 (1980) (agreeing 
wi th Professor Hende r son) . J'or judicial concur rence wi th this v iew, see- D a w s o n v. Chrys ler 
C o r p . . <i30 1.2d 950 , 9<i2-(i3 (3d Ci r . 1980) (revogni/.ing in d ic tum that design decisions arc 
po lvccn t r i c i . cert , d en i ed , 450 U.S. 05!) (1981). 
' '" I'or explicit rejections of this crit icism in the product -des ign context , see H o u m a n v. 
C e n e r a l Motors C o r p . , 427 V. Supp . 23-1,212, 245 40 (K .D. I V 1077); O w e n s v. Al l i s -Chalmers 
C o r p . . B i N . W 2 d 3 7 2 . 377 78 (Mich. 1982): MeMul len v. Volkswagen o( An . . . 271 O r . 8 3 . 8 0 -
90 . 515 p .2d I 17. 11!) 21 (1970); S c h w a r t z , supra note !J1. at 4451-51. 
' ' " Th»- critic ism that these s ame policy reasons might support extensions of t he strict l iabili ty 
d o e l n n e lH'\oiid produc t l iabil i ty does not necessarily preclude modest steps in tha t d i rec t ion . 
C o u r t s t r ad i t iona l ly h a \ e p e r m i t t e d the c o m m o n law to develop g radua l ly a n d inc remen ta l ly : 
indeed, . a s . h\ case l a w m a k i n g permi ts no o ther me thod . The cen t ra l role of consumer i sm in 
contempora iA Western society makes especially a p p r o p r i a t e the use of p roduc t l iabil i ty as a 
testiuu m o u n d lor dev ia t ions Irom t radi t ional fault principles and t o w a r d risk sp read ing . 
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does not rest so much on any real or presumed inadequacy in the 
manufacturing process as on a policy decision to impose liability 
without fault. Thus, it may be appropriate to inquire whether the 
bases of strict liability for construction defects support a similar rule 
for generic risks. 
Manufacturers are strictly liable for harm from construction de-
fects even if they could not have eliminated, or discovered, such 
defects by exercising reasonable care.130 Held to the standard of their 
own plans and specifications, manufacturers must answer for imper-
fections that arise from their production processes.111 Of the various 
reasons that have been advanced to justify this rule of strict liability in 
construction defect cases,112 three seem worthy of discussion in the 
context of generic risks: accident avoidance, loss spreading, and the 
satisfaction of justifiable consumer expectations.113 
"" See He.statement (Second) of T o r t s § 4()2A(2)(a) (1!)(>5). 
1,1
 Sec H. Kpstein, suj ra no te 127. at OS. As Kpstein notes , this obl iga t ion is well settled 
"
:
 Professors John K. M o n t g o m e r y a n d Dav id C . O w e n have identif ied seven policy justifica-
tions lor imposing strict tort liabilitx on m a n u f a c t u r e r s of defect ive p roduc ts : 
(1) Manufac tu re r s c o m e y to t he publ ic a general sense of p roduc t qual i ty t h r o u g h the use 
of mass adver t i s ing a n d m e r c h a n d i s i n g pract ices , caus ing consumers to re-ly tor their 
protect ion upon the1 skill a n d expert ise of the- m a n u f a c t u r i n g conunun.it>-. 
(2) C o n s u m e r s no longer l i a \ c the abil i ty to protect themselves adequa te ly from defect ive 
products d u e to the vast n u m b e r a n d complexi ty of p roduc t s which must be- "consumed' in 
order to function in m o d e r n society. 
(3) Sellers a re often in a be t te r posi t ion t h a n consumers to identify the po ten t ia l p roduc t 
risks, to de-termine the a c c e p t a b l e l e w i s of such risks, a n d to confine the risks wi th in those-
levels. 
(4) A major i ty of p r o d u c t acc iden ts not caused by p roduc t abuse- a re p r o b a b l y a t t r i b u t a b l e 
to the negligent acts or omissions of m a n u f a c t u r e r s at some stage of the m a n u f a c t u r i n g or 
marke t ing process, yet t he difficulties of d iscover ing a n d prov ing this negligence- a re often 
pract icably i n s u r m o u n t a b l e . 
(5) Negligence l iabil i ty is genera l ly insufficient to induce- m a n u f a c t u r e r s to marke t ade-
quately safe p roduc t s . 
i(i) Sellers a lmost i nva r i ab ly a r e in a be-tter position t h a n consumers to a b s o r b or sp read 
tin- costs of p roduc t acc iden t s . 
(7) The- costs of injuries f lowing from typical risks inheren t in p roduc ts c a n fairly IK- put 
upon the enterpr ises m a r k e t i n g t h e p roduc t s as a cost of thei r do ing business, thus assur ing 
that the-se- enterpr ises will fully " p a y their w a y " in t h e society from which they der ive the i r 
profits. 
M-'iilgnnie-ry 6c O w e n , He-flections on the T h e o r y a n d Admin i s t r a t ion of Strict Tort Liabi l i ty lor 
I >• t.-eti\e Products . 27 S . C . L . Rev. 8 0 3 , 809-10 (1970). Al though these policy just i f icat ions app ly 
•'-:i<-rally to p roduc t l iabi l i ty l a w , they a r e pa r t i cu la r ly re levant to cons t ruc t ion-defec t cases, 
•AII.-I,- there is general a g r e e m e n t t ha t strict l iabili ty should app ly . 
judge T r a y n o r a d v a n c e d these a r g u m e n t s in his semina l c o n c u r r i n g op in ion in lvscola v. 
«' '..i Cola bo t t l ing C o . , 24 C a l . 2d 4 5 3 , 4(> 1-63, 150 P.2d 43b . 440-41 (1944), to suppor t a rule of 
il'-'lule- l iabil i ty" for p r o d u c t defects . 
1 In need to protect c o n s u m e r s from the complexi t ies of m o d e r n p roduc t t e c h n o l o g y the 
• iiiil.u-tiirer's super ior capac i ty to cont ro l risks, a n d the desirabi l i ty of forcing m a n u f a c t u r e r s to 
'•in.ih/e- costs associated w i t h p roduc t risks all justify t he public- policy objec t ive of acc ident 
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Whether strict liability will actually foster accident avoidance 
has been seriously questioned. It has been argued that producers will 
avoid only those accidents worth avoiding—if it is cheaper to let an 
accident happen and to pay the resulting liability costs, the profit-
maximizing manufacturer will follow that course. Thus, if testing and 
quality-control procedures would cost more than projected liability 
costs, a rule of strict liability would not encourage manufacturers to 
adopt procedures to prevent accidents."4 
This argument, however, is not entirely persuasive. A manufac-
turer bound by negligence principles might foresee escaping some 
liability costs that should attach when it does not exercise due care. 
The difficulties of proving fault might be too great for injured plain-
tiffs in certain kinds of cases,135 or economic constraints might force 
plaintiffs to accept unfavorable settlements.1'" Anticipating these 
lower liability costs, manufacturers might spend less on accident pre-
vention. By reducing plaintiffs' burdens, a strict liability rule might 
well encourage manufacturers to increase safety expenditures to the 
level they might reach under a negligence system that functioned 
optimally137 
The adoption of a rule of strict liability in cases where a manu-
facturer knew a risk existed but did not know its full extent also might 
increase safety by providing an incentive to perform additional inves-
tigations.138 Indeed, assuming that manufacturers foresee that, under 
negligence principles, not every injured plaintiff will recover full 
damages for harm from a particular design feature or warning, the 
application of strict liability to all generic hazards, known and un-
known, will increase the prospect of full recovery, encouraging safety 
a v o i d a n c e . L ibera l ized discovery procedures and doctr ines such as res ipsa loqu i tu r appear 
sufficient to o v e r c o m e har r i e r s that might once have heen i n s u r m o u n t a b l e to m a n y p la in t i lb 
suffering p r o d u c t re la ted h a r m . 
"< See Po.sner. Strict Liabi l i ty : A C o m m e n t . 2 J. Legal Stud. 2 0 5 . 20!) (1073); Sachs . Negh 
gence or Strict P roduc t Liabi l i ty : Is T h e r e Really a Difference in L a w or Lcono.n ics : . 8 C a . J 
Ini ' l c\ C o m p . L. 250 . 27-1-70 (107N). 
1
' ' I n d e e d . J u d g e T r a y n o r relied in part on this ra t ionale in his c o n c u r r e n c e in Escola. See 2 I 
C a i . 2d at Hi.}. 150 I ' .2d at 4-11. 
' " Product liability suits usually are f inanced th rough cont ingent fees. T o the extent a t to rne \ -
perceive " t o u g h e r odds" u n d e r a negligence regime, they will he less wi l l ing to t ake on cases than 
thev wou ld be u n d e r a ru le of strict l iabili ty. Plaintiffs will thus be u n a b l e to "finance" ' then 
l i t igat ion. Moreover , .some plaintiffs may need the money now. even if it is less t h a n they nugh ' 
1
 ' This cri t icism uses economic theory to respond to an economic a r g u m e n t . In t h e p r e so ld 
ol market imperfec t ions like p rob lems of proof (imperfect in format ion) a n d costs of litigation 
(capi ta l marke t imperfec t ions) , then- may well be a role for in tervent ion (a rule of strict liability 
in the market 
' '" See text a c c o m p a n y i n g note 1 IS supra . 
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expenditures and accident avoidance. This increase in safety enhance-
ment standing alone, however, is probably insufficient to justify lia-
bility without fault in these cases. 
The "loss-spreading" rationale rests on the manufacturers' ability 
to use insurance to spread the costs130 of harm caused by construction 
defects more efficiently and more easily than product victims can."" 
Construction defects are easily insurable for two reasons: the number 
of claims likely to arise from such defects is fairly predictable, and this 
number is likely to be relatively small in comparison with the total 
number of products placed into the market.141 Insurance against these 
risks, therefore, is readily available because the costs are predictable 
and the harm to be insured against normally will remain within 
modest bounds.142 The number of known generic risks likely to oc-
cur—ranging from adverse drug reactions for which warnings have 
been given143 to automobile accidents144 — can also be predicted with 
some certainty. Hough estimates can even be made about risks whose 
presence is known but whose extent cannot be calculated. The only 
type of hazard that would not permit even a guess would be the 
unknown and undiscoverable danger. 
In the case of generic risks, however, the other aspect of insur-
ability—a comparatively small number of risks—is absent. Unlike 
construction defects that affect only a small percentage of users, every 
m-neric risk will endanger every user of the product. Thus, the 
amount of damage attributable to generic product risks could be 
mormons, even if recoveries are reduced to take into account the 
\s noted earl ier , this r a t i ona l e leaves open the ques t ion of which costs ought to be shi t ted. 
-< t«-xt accompany ing note 105 s u p r a . 
' When deal ing wi th bo th t he m a n u f a c t u r e r s ' a n d consumers ' abil i t ies to insure . I assume 
"i ' i UNII-IHC ol vvell- lunctioning insurance marke t s to which the respect ive par t ies have access. 
1 »i pending mi the type of loss o n e seeks insurance aga ins t , this max or may not be an empiric ally 
.-tillable assumpt ion . 
' S-e O w e n , supra note 0 1 . at 0 0 1 0 2 ; S c h w a r t z , supra note 07 , at 5X5. Professor O w e n . 
ii< ... know ledging the pred ic tab i l i ty of cons t ruc t ion defects ("product f laws") , does not view 
piedictahilitx as a valid basis for d is t inguishing cons t ruc t ion d e b i t s l rom design delects . 
s<'me const ruct ion defects , h o w e v e r , have significant costs. For e x a m p l e , cons t ruc t ion 
'• ' ii. ant . .mobiles may affect l a rge n u m b e r s of vehicles. See. e .g . . B r o w n , Hear W h e e l Loss 
'• -:<d m Millions of CM'.s Sedans , W a s h . Post, Apr . 2, 10S3. at C 7 . col . 5 ( improperly 
1
 •Haeiurcd componen t associated wi th par t ia l or total separa t ion ol rear axle shaft a n d wheel 
' 'blv A delect affecting every a u t o m o b i l e could h a v e even m o r e d isas t rous consequences . 
• U • iber . Automobi le Recall C a m p a i g n s : Proposals for Legislat ive a n d Judic ia l Responses, 50 
i , i ? J l i b . L. 10X3, 1085 (1070). 
I he I D A approves new d rugs on the basis of cost benefit j u d g m e n t s that t ake into account 
:i-k- ..| adverse react ions . See I J. O 'Rei l ly , supra no te 50 , § 14.05. 
s
" O w e n , supra no te 0 1 , at 002 (discussing cost-benefi t assessments of fuel tanks m the 
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comparative responsibilities of plaintiffs, third persons, and other 
enterprises that might appropriately share the losses. One might ar-
gue, then, that loss spreading makes sense only in the context of 
construction defects, where the relativeK' modest costs can be more 
easily absorbed by the manufacturer. 
An intermediate position might hold manufacturers strictly liable 
for unavoidable hazards, such as adverse reactions to toxic products, 
but not for designed-in, functional dangers, such as the speed of an 
automobile. This compromise position, however, has several prob-
lems. As a practical matter, it is difficult to base a rule of strict 
liability on degrees of potential damage: the notion that the more 
harm a defendant may cause the less likely it is that liability will 
attach strikes a somewhat perverse chord. Moreover, the focus on the 
quantity of loss may well be misguided. If the purpose of loss spread-
ing is to deflect the economic impact of product-related harm away 
from those who may not be able to absorb it, perhaps the focus should 
be on the victims' capacity to pay for their own injuries, and not on 
the aggregate cost of all such injuries. 
Consumers' ability to foresee product risks is relevant to a deter-
mination of their ability to insure themselves against those risks, and 
thus to a determination of their capacity to absorb the cost of their 
own injuries. The policy of satisfying justifiable consumer expecta-
tions145 may shed light on this issue of cost absorption in particular 
and on the appropriateness of strict liability for generic product risks 
in general. 
The notion that manufacturers should be strictly liable for harm 
from product frustration is rooted in the doctrine of implied warranty 
of merchantability, which holds goods to the standard of reasonable 
fitness for their intended use.14" Products placed into the stream of 
commerce carry with them a representation of safety, the scope of 
which is determined by what the ordinary consumer would expect of 
those products.147 This representation of safety underlies the consumer 
contemplation test set out in comment i of the Restatement. 
"•'• For a r t i cu la t ions of tlu- consumer - con t emp la t i on approach to strict p roduc t l iabi l i ty , see 
genera l ly H u b b a r d . Heasonab le H u m a n Kxpeetat ions: A Normat ive Model for Impos ing Strict 
F iabi l iU lor Delec t ive P roduc t s . 29 Mercer F . Hev. 405 (197K); S h a p o , A Ik-presentat ional 
T h e o r \ o f C o n s u m e r Pro tec t ion : Dot t r ine . Func t ion and Fcgal Liabil i ty for Product Disappoin t -
m e n t , (id Va. F . Hev. 1 10** <1!I7-I>. 
141
 F C C ^ 2 314 (197K). 
" S.-,- Fis. her . P roduc t s Fiabi l i tv T h e Mean ing of Defect. 39 Mo. F . Hev. 33!). 348-52 
( F ) T l i . 
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It is important to distinguish between two uses of consumer 
expectations: the goal of meeting justifiable consumer expectations as 
a policy behind strict tort liability, and the use of consumer expecta-
tions as a criterion for deciding whether strict liability should apply in 
a particular instance. The former derives from the conviction that, as 
a matter of fairness, consumers should be entitled to rely on the 
representation of safety made by the seller of a product and by any 
information accompanying the product. Consumers depend on the 
manufacturer to provide goods that will meet these implied represen-
tations so that they can make rational judgments affecting their own 
well-being. The imposition of strict liability will encourage producers 
to satisfy these consumer expectations, will permit consumers to act on 
the assumption that expectations will be met, and will enable con-
sumers to survive the economic hardship of unexpected losses.1,s 
When using consumer expectations as a criterion for applying 
strict liability, the critical task is to determine which consumer expec-
tations are justifiable. The rule in construction defect cases suggests 
that courts have found such defects to lie outside the ambit of con-
sumer contemplation; consumers, therefore, may justifiably expect 
products to be free of construction flaws, and manufacturers will be 
held strictly liable for all such flaws: known, unknown, and unknow-
able.149 In design defect cases, however, courts apply what amounts to 
a negligence test150 and say in effect that consumers justifiably max 
expect only that due care, measured as of the time of manufacture, 
will be exercised with regard to design and warning decisions. 
Is this distinction tenable? Given what the average person un-
doubtedly knows about product quality (especially in light of the 
publicity given to recalls of automobiles and other household pro-
ducts), all types of risk-creating flaws, both in construction and de-
sign, are arguably within the contemplation of ordinary consumers.151 
In some cases, awareness of a vague possibility that some defect might 
" See S h a p o . supra no te 145, at 1124-31. W h e n consumers expect a loss. the> can insure 
.gainst the loss themselves . It is only w h e n the loss is unexpec ted that c o m p e n s a t i o n , u n d e r a rule 
ol strict l iabil i ty, is needed . 
"" See text a c c o m p a n y i n g notes 130-33 supra . 
' " S»t- note 97 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g text supra . 
'''' As Professor O w e n has a r g u e d , 
| l ' | r o m a m o r e abs t rac t perspect ive of social psychology, it may well be that the typical 
consumer knows full well tha t of the t housands of cars spewed out by Detroi t on a dai ly 
basis m a n y h u n d r e d at least will house p roduc t ion er rors of var ious typos a n d levels of 
d a n g e r . . . . It t hus may be tha t consumer expecta t ions a re no m o r e violated in cases ol 
p roduc t ion flaws t h a n in those involving design adequac ies . 
O w e n , supra note i l l . at 0 9 3 . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
«SSK \ 7 U YOHK I XI\ I HSU) LAW HE\U\\ [Vol. 5 S S 5 3 
lurk soiiie\\ here within a product ought not to establish the risk as 
within the consumers' contemplation. The wide range of potential 
Haws, especially in complex items such as automobiles and workplace 
machinery, and the varying degrees of potential risk associated with 
such flaws, renders a general awareness practically useless to the 
consumer. 1V~ Moreover, the marketing image of a product may dim an 
already faint awareness of the risk. A rule of strict liability for con-
struction defects, then, reflects a justifiable judicial determination 
that consumers merit protection under a standard requiring goods to 
be completely free of such defects. 
A practical reason for limiting justifiable consumer expectations 
to the exercise of reasonable care in the design of products is that there 
is no other workable standard by which courts may determine 
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. Consumers usually are 
unable to form an expectation about the extent to which design defects 
will be eliminated: it is not a matter of expecting one unit of a 
particular product to be as good as the next.1™ Therefore, the best that 
consumers can justifiably expect in the design defect context is that 
manufacturers will use technologically and economically feasible 
methods to reduce or eliminate foreseeable risks. 
The policy of satisfying justifiable consumer expectations also 
dictates the refusal to impose strict liability for harm from known 
generic risks. The ordinary consumer appreciates the dangers posed by 
a speeding automobile or a sharp knife, and would therefore have no 
cause to believe that a manufacturer would do more than use due care 
to reduce these hazards. Contemporary smokers know of the risk of 
cancer Irom cigarettes. The presence of warnings on the label of 
prescription drugs makes physicians, acting on their patients' be-
halves, aware of the relevant risks. In each of these cases, consumers 
can make a rational judgment about the scope of the hazard and act 
accordingly.' ' ' 
' ' N.c Die kelson. P roduc t s Liabil i ty: l low ( iood Does a Product H a w to Ber\ 12 h id . L.J. 
SOI. 315 Hi (1007). 
1
 •' l o i cr i t ic isms ol the c o n s u m e r con templa t ion test in the design delect context , see k e c t o u . 
P roduc t s I.i.ibililv Design H a z a r d s and the Mean ing ol Defect, 10 C u m . L. bev . 203 , 300-05 
( | 0 7 0 i ; MoiitiMMuen c\ O w e n , supra note 1.32. at S23: Schwar tz , supra no te 0 1 , at 471-SI . 
1
 •' Dean k c e t o n has a rgued that the consumer con templa t ion a p p r o a c h to strict l iabili ty 
w o u l d di -n\ I C O N c iv to p la in t i l l s injured by an open a n d obvious design de lec t . See Kceton . 
Mipia note |.->3. at 302. T h e so called patent d a n g e r " rule , developed u n d e r negligence- l a w . has 
been S C V . H K , n t i c ized . Sec g c u c r a l b Marsehal l , An Obvious W r o n g Does Not Make a Night: 
\ l a m i l a . • t u r n s - I iabilitv lor Patently Dangerous Produc ts . IS N Y U . L. I\ev. 10(>5 (1073). The-
ir , n i l l i r n d has b . c n to reject the rule and to permit ob \ iousness of risk to be we ighed as merely 
-me I . , . lor in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a product is un reasonab ly dangerous . Se-e Pike' v. F rank C . 
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But if the danger or its full dimensions do not become evident 
until after the plaintiff has been exposed to the product, the con-
sumer-contemplation policy supports the imposition of strict liability. 
The product has inflicted an unpleasant surprise. Although the manu-
facturer could not have discovered the danger or its extent, the mar-
keting of the product misled the consumer with an implied representa-
tion of safety that was not met and thus deprived the consumer of the 
opportunity to evaluate the risk and to decide whether to accept it.155 
Under this new view of consumer expectations, a product posing an 
unknown or unknowable generic hazard would stand on the same 
footing as a product with a construction flaw: each product would be 
considered unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict liability be-
cause it frustrated justifiable consumer expectations recognized by the 
law . 
The need to integrate liability for product-related harm to non-
consumers into a scheme structured around consumer expectations 
raises a conceptual problem. Professor Gary Schwartz has noted that a 
third-party beneficiary theory can preserve the viability of the con-
sumer-expectations test in instances where the consumer could reason-
ably be deemed to have contemplated the conferral of accident-avoid-
ance benefits upon others.15" The extension of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, which under the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
tects anvone "who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be 
affected by the goods,"157 lends support to this argument by analogy. 
But it would be stretching things beyond the breaking point to assume 
that a consumer intends to protect bystanders, especially those who 
are total strangers. As a practical matter, this problem will be limited 
to construction defect cases: the de facto negligence test used to deter-
mine liability in design defect cases applies equally well to consumers 
and bystanders;1™ and unknown generic risks will rarely endanger 
Hough C o . . 2 Ca l . 3d 405. 173-74. 4<>7 P.2d 220. 23-1-35. 85 Ca l . Hpt r . <>20. <>34-35 (1070); 
Muallcl v. Miehle C o . , 30 N Y . 2 d 37b\ 3H4-85, 34S N . K . 2 d 5 7 1 , 576-77 . 384 \ . Y . S . 2 d 115, 120-
21 il07(i). Se-e generally Phil l ips, Products Liabi l i ty : Obviousness ol D a n g e r Hevisited. 15 h i d . L. 
Kev 707 (1082). Hence , w h e r e p roduc t risks a rc open a n d obvious , p la in t i l l s may still be able to 
establish negligent de-sign. 
1
 Note thai this consumer -expec ta t ions r a t i ona l e , unl ike the safety e n h a n c e m e n t a n d loss-
preading ra t ionales discussed above , appl ies to risks u n k n o w n or even u n k n o w a b l e ; the focus is 
"ii the c o n s u m e r s slate of knowledge , a n d not on the m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s s ta te of t echnology . 
' ' ' See Schwar t z , supra note 0 1 . at 474-75. 
I C C . § 2-318 (I07S) (a l te rna t ives B a n d C ) . 
" Inc le r a negligence test, the m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s d u t y w o u l d be to avoid c r ea t ing un rea sonab l e 
n ks <,| h a r m to foreseeable vic t ims, a class tha t w o u l d inc lude bys tanders as well as users. See 1 
I I . i n n e r & M. F r i e d m a n , supra note <S7, § 5 .03 ( l ) ( c ) . 
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anyone other than a product user.159 These limitations, however, do 
not eliminate the theoretical hurdle. 
One answer is simply to recognize that the policy of satisfying 
justifiable expectations supports the imposition of strict liability only 
on behalf of consumers and their intended beneficiaries. To hold 
manufacturers liable without fault for harm to bystanders would then 
require a separate, independent rationale. A second, and perhaps 
preferable, solution lies in a reassessment of the consumer-contempla-
tion policy. Its roots, as has been noted,1WI go back to the doctrine of 
implied warranty of merchantability, the primary concern of which 
was the adjustment of the rights of parties to commercial transactions. 
Although courts fashioning tort doctrine may legitimately borrow 
from sales law, they need not feel fettered by sales law constraints. 
Where the same policy goals would be applicable to nonconsumers, it 
might be logical to extend strict liability protection beyond the pur-
chaser. Thus, the user of a product personally relies upon the implied 
representations of safety inherent in the product. Certain bystanders 
may also entertain similar expectations that a product will not injure 
them. This approach would require courts to differentiate between 
two classes of bystanders: the first is exemplified by a pedestrian 
injured when an automobile goes out of control because of a construc-
tion defect; the second by the person harmed while asleep at home by 
an airplane that crashed because of a flaw in its assembly. In the latter 
case, the victim had no expectation generated or frustrated by the 
product.101 The falling airplane was like a falling meteorite—com-
pletely unexpected—an event for which there is no tort remedy. 
Hence the consumer-contemplation rationale, expanded to take into 
account the actual expectations of users and bystanders, would not 
support recovery by such victims under strict liability. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has proposed a conceptual framework for determin-
ing when to apply strict liability to generic product risks. On the 
twentieth anniversary of the first decision to hold product manufac-
turers strictly liable in tort,'"2 the parameters of the doctrine remain in 
October 1983 J riiODlCTllMill.lT) l'.\SS.\i:i: 1)1 TIMI. s«»l 
flux. Federal legislation threatens to restrict the doctrine to harm from 
nongeneric risks.1"' Conflicts and uncertainties in the common law of 
product liability as it has evolved in the states have been cited as a 
major justification for federal action.1"4 
Tin* case for salvaging some remnant of strict liability within the 
area of generic product risks is not an easy one. The use of a policy-
based analysis, however, makes it possible to link the accepted view 
that the rule should apply to construction defects to the admittedly 
controversial proposition that harm from unknown or unknowable 
generic risks should be compensated in the same fashion. The advan-
tage of this approach is that it provides a coherent, principled basis for 
excluding other kinds of generic product risks from a rule of strict tort 
liability. Both the satisfaction of justifiable expectations on the part of 
product victims and the achievement of modest advances in safety 
justify the application of strict liability to harm from unknowable 
generic hazards. 
Neither section 402A and comment k, interpreted as denying 
strict liability for unknowable generic risks, nor Bcshada. forthrightly 
permitting recovery in such cases, presents a satisfactory resolution to 
the problem. The proposed federal Product Liability Act uncritically 
accepts comment k,,B,r> while Bcshada has provoked an outpouring of 
criticism.1"" The tide at the moment apparently is running against 
strict liability in generic-risk cases. But the last words have not yet 
been spoken. 
"" Sec note 14 supra . 
"•' S i v S . Rep. No. <>70. 07th C o n n . , 2cl Sess. 3-10 (1982). 
"•'• S t r S . 4 1. 98th C o n y . , 1st Sess. $ 5(c) , 12!) Com; . Rec. S285 (tluih ed. J an . 2d, U K J): 
A product is not u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s in design or formula t ion if the h a r m was caused 
by an unavo idab ly d a n g e r o u s aspect of a p r o d u c t . As used in this p a r a g r a p h , an " u n a v o i d -
ably dange rous aspec t" m e a n s t ha t aspect of a p roduc t wh ich could not , in light of 
know ledge wh ich w a s reasonab ly accep ted in the .scientific, t echnica l , or medica l c o m m u -
nity at the t ime ol m a n u f a c t u r e , have been e l imina ted wi thou t seriously i m p a i r i n g the 
effectiveness w i th w h i c h the p r o d u c t pe r fo rms its i n t ended funct ion or the des i rab i l i tv . 
economic a n d o the rwi se , of t he p roduc t to the person w h o uses or consumes it. 
^ • - a l s o S . Hep. No. 070 . 97»h C o n g . . 2d Sess. 3 0 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ( a c c o m p a n y i n g S. 2 0 3 1 . 97 th C o n g . , 2d 
Vss . I2S Cony . Hec. S0846 (daily ed . J u n e 10, 1982), a bill wi th a section v i r tua l ly ident ical to 
*l'is section of S. 4-1). 
' See S c h w a r t z , sup ra note 111. at 824-25; S c h w a r t z , T h e Post-Sale D u t y to W a r n : T w o 
1
 " lu ih i i ia te Korks in tin- Hoad to a Reasonab le D o c t r i n e . 58 N Y . U. I.. Hex . 892 , 901 -05 (1983): 
u
 .i<lf. supra note 99 , at 738-39 , 744; C o m m e n t . Requ i r ing Omnisc ience : T h e D u t y to W a r n of 
s
* lentilieally Uiidiscoverable P roduc t Defects . 71 C e o . 1..J. 1035 (1983); B i r n b a u m tx W r u b c l . 
\ I H i d . Cour t Blazes N e w P a t h in Ho ld ing a M a n u f a c t u r e r Liable , N a t l I . J . . J an . 24. 1983, 
l!
 - I eol. 1; P b t t & P ia t t . Mov ing from S t r u t to "Abso lu te" I . iabil i tv. Nat I I . J . . J a n 17. 1983. 
'• ^ col. 3 . 
I'W a defense of Bcshada by the a t to rneys for the plaintiffs in the case, see Phu itella & 
I ' l i i i i ' l l . licsfuula i . Johm-Manvillc Products Cor}).: Involution or Hevolut ion in Strict P r o d u c t s 
1
 ' a b i l i t y . 51 Kordham I.. Rev. 801 (1983). 
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by Bill Wagner 
Strict Liability Isn't a 
Problem—It's a 
Solution 
<
^T\ S"? obody likes to be sued. I ts 
| \ \ J one of life's few absolute 
truths. For a manufacturer, 
litigation can be an expen-
sive diversion of time and energy, and 
insuring against liability represents a 
significant cost of doing business. An-
other absolute truth, however, is that 
defective products injure and kill peo-
ple. Product liability lawsuits have be-
come a primary means by which 
injured victims seek redress from those 
who make and market defective prod-
ucts. It is fair to ask whether this sys-
tem of dealing with defective products 
has helped or hurt society as a whole. 
A recent report issued by the Con-
ference Board asserts that strict liabil-
ity has inhibited the development of 
new products, imposed heavy costs on 
corporate manufacturers and execu-
tives, and placed obstacles in the path 
to competitiveness.1 The most inter-
esting aspect of this report is its an-
cestry. In 1987, the board issued 
Product Liability: The Corporate Re-
sponse.1 That report, based on re-
sponses by the risk managers of major 
U.S. corporations, concluded that 
product liability had had "relatively 
little impact" on product prices, but has 
motivated improvements in product 
quality and safety. Understandably, 
lobbyists for tort reform were highly 
critical of the report. In response to 
their political concerns, the Confer-
ence Board undertook a new survev, 
this time of chief executive officers.3 
The result, predictably, hews much 
closer to the tort reformers' party line. 
Not surprisingly, most of the CEOs 
polled would like to eliminate strict li-
ability. An objective look at this doc-
trine, however, reveals that strict 
liability has served the American peo-
ple well. Moreover, it is a doctrine that 
operates within the free enterprise sys-
tem by providing economic incentives 
for safety, rather than by imposing 
massive governmental regulation or 
subsidized compensation programs. 
The fact is that manufacturers, like 
many businesses, government entities 
and health care providers, are not vic-
tims of the tort system. They are ex-
periencing serious problems because 
they have been mistreated by their own 
liability insurers. Through misman-
agement and, perhaps, deliberate mis-
conduct, the insurance industry has 
created a crisis in the cost and availa-Digitized by the Howar  W. Hunt r Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
M ost CEOs would like to eliminate strict liability 
bility of insurance. Changing the civil 
justice system will deprive injured vic-
tims of their rights, and it will reduce 
the incentive for safety that benefits 
us all. But it will not make liability in-
surance more affordable or available. 
As a legal doctrine, strict liability 
does not represent a problem for 
American society; it is a solution. 
What Strict Liability Is and Isn't 
The starting point for any discussion 
of the merits of strict liability must be 
a clear understanding of what the doc-
trine means. Indeed, much of the hos-
tility to the doctrine stems from 
confusing strict liability with absolute 
liability. Consider the following defi-
nition of strict liability in the Confer-
ence Board's CEO report: 
Strict Liability: A broad principle 
of product liability law which 
holds that a manufacturer is re-
sponsible for the torts (wrongful 
acts for which suits may be 
brought) that its product pro-
duces, regardless of whether the 
product was made properly when 
entered into the stream of com-
merce. In other words, this prin-
ciple establishes liability without 
the showing of fault. 
That sounds as if strict liability de-
mands that a manufacturer pay for any 
harm caused by his or her product. 
Small wonder that the heads of 500 
manufacturing firms strongly con-
demned such a doctrine. The problem 
is that the above statement is not the 
law in any American jurisdiction. 
The most authoritative statement of 
the doctrine of strict liability is set forth 
in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 
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402A, promulgated by the American 
Law Institute in 1965. Thirty-seven 
states have expressly adopted 402A; 
most of the remaining states apply rules 
that are substantially similar to it. The 
exact text of section 402A is worth ex-
amining: 
(1) One who sells any product in 
a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or con-
sumer or to his property is subject 
to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user 
or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the 
business of selling such a product, 
and 
(b) it is expected to and does 
reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the con-
dition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection 
(1) applies although (a) the seller 
has exercised all possible care in 
the preparation and sale of his 
product, and (b) the user or con-
sumer has not bought the product 
from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller. 
The comments issued by the insti-
tute are generally deemed authorita-
tive in defining the scope of the rule. 
They make it clear that strict liability 
does not make manufacturers abso-
lutely liable for any harm their prod-
ucts might cause. Only defective 
products result in liability: 
The rule stated in this Section ap-
plies only where the product is, at 
the time it leaves the seller's 
hands, in a condition not contem-
plated by the ultimate consumer, 
which will be unreasonably dan-
gerous to him. The seller is not 
liable when he delivers the prod-
uct in a safe condition, and sub-
sequent mishandling or other 
causes make it harmful by the time 
it is consumed. The burden of 
proof that the product was in a 
defective condition at the time it 
left the hands of the particular 
seller is upon the injured plaintiff. 
... (comment g). 
A product is not in a defective 
condition when it is safe for nor-
mal handling and consumptig^4f 
the injury results frorfTabnormal 
handling ... the seller is not liable, 
(comment h). 
The rule stated in this Section ap-
plies only where the defective 
condition of the product makes it 
unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer. ... The article 
sold must be dangerous to an ex-
tent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with 
the ordinary knowledge common 
to the community as to its char-
acteristics." (comment i). 
There are some products which, 
in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of 
being made safe for their intended 
and ordinary use. [For example, 
many drugs and vaccines] ... The 
seller of such products, again with 
the qualification that they are 
properly prepared and marketed, 
and proper warning is given, 
where the situation calls for it, is 
not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attend-
ing their use, merely because he 
has undertaken to supply the 
public with an apparently useful 
and desirable product, attended 
with a known but apparently rea-
sonable risk, (comment k) 
Clearly, it is only the manufacturer 
of a defective product who will be 
strictly liable for the harm caused. In 
the controversial area of design de-
fects, juries may impose liability only 
where the danger is unreasonable, 
either because it exceeds consumer ex-
pectation under comment i, or where 
the likelihood of serious harm out-
-I A 
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weighs the usefulness of the particular 
design.4 Though the precise definition 
of product defect has been the subject 
of a great deal of scholarly debate over 
the years, no American court has held 
a manufacturer liable for a non-defec-
tive product merely because it has 
caused injury. 
Those who advocate replacing strict 
liability with a fault-based system sim-
ply misconceive the nature of strict li-
ability as a legal doctrine.5 Strict liability 
is based on fault.6 Under negligence 
principles, the injured plaintiff bears 
the very difficult burden of proving 
that the actions of the manufacturer 
fell below the relevant standard of 
care.7 Strict liability merely shifts the 
focus from the unreasonable conduct 
of the manufacturer to the unreason-
able condition of the product.8 It is the 
marketing of an unreasonably danger-
ous product which constitutes fault 
under strict liability. As a practical 
matter, it is difficult to conceive of an 
unreasonably dangerous product that 
could not also be linked to lack of due 
care, provided that the manufacturer 
recorded the process and the plaintiff 
had full access to the company's in-
formation.9 
Another fact that should not be 
overlooked is that strict liability was 
not invented with the promulgation of 
the Restatement in 1965. Under the 
common law of sales, and then under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, sellers 
have historically been held strictly li-
abii^iof breach of warranty. Injured 
purchasers have always been entitled 
to sue the seller of a product that was 
not reasonably safe. The difficulty was 
that contract law required privity be-
tween the plaintiff and the defend-
ant.10 One who was injured by a 
defective automobile could bring an 
action against the dealer, but not the 
manufacturer of the car. Food and drug 
products were generally exempt from 
the privity rule.11 It is worth remem-
bering that, prior to strict tort liability, 
the makers of vaccines were held 
strictly liable for breach of warranty 
without privity.12 
Generally speaking, the adoption of 
strict liability in tort did not impose 
higher standards on U.S. manufactur-
ers than existed in theory, at least, un-
der negligence or warranty.13 Strict 
liability simply removed the artificial 
barriers that allowed manufacturers to 
evade liability for unsafe products. 
Toward a Safer Society 
The purposes of strict liability, which 
it shares with tort law in general, are 
to deter the marketing of unsafe prod-
ucts and to compensate victims who 
are injured by unsafe products.14 It ac-
complishes these goals by imposing on 
those who have greatest control over 
the safety of products, and who reap 
the profits from their sale, the cost of 
injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts.15 This system of introducing safety 
incentives into the marketplace not 
only benefits the injured plaintiff, but 
fosters a safer society for all consumers 
through the mechanism of the mar-
ketplace itself. 
The fundamental genius of tort law 
is that it uses the natural economic 
forces of the free market system to fur-
ther the goals of safety. Suppose, for 
example, that Company A equips its 
industrial machine with an interlock 
device to prevent injury to operators 
of the machine, at an added cost of 
$50 per unit. Rival Company B sells a 
similar machine without such protec-
tion. In the absence of tort liability, B 
enjoys an unfair competitive advan-
tage due to its lack of investment in 
safety. By forcing B to compensate 
workers who are injured due to the 
(continued on page 47) 
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(continued from page 15) 
lack of, for example, a guard, strict li-
ability adds to the cost of B's machine. 
The greater the hazard, the greater the 
reward for the safety conscious man-
ufacturer. Products liability does not 
force any manufacturer to take its 
product off the market; it demands 
only that the product pay for the harm 
its defects cause. In a competitive mar-
ket, strict liability enables the safest 
products to drive out the most dan-
gerous.16 
It should be recognized that "pri-
vate" safety enforcement through tort 
actions is a conservative means for 
dealing with product injuries. The al-
ternative to liability is not necessarily 
less restriction. Accountability of some 
kind is the rule in our society; immu-
nity the rare exception. If this private 
remedy were withdrawn, there would 
undoubtedly be great public pressure 
for massive governmental regulation 
and civil and criminal penalties against 
the makers of unsafe products. 
Secondly, immunity from tort lia-
bility would not "save" the money that 
would otherwise go to plaintiffs. It 
would simply shift the costs of injury 
to other compensation mechanisms 
which do not provide the same incen-
tive for safety. Consider, for example, 
the fact that more than half of product 
liability claimants are workers injured 
on<jhe-job.-What is often overlooked 
is that manufacturers are also employ-
ers and consumers of the products of 
many other companies, from manu-
facturing machines to office equip-
ment to delivery trucks. Any reduction 
in product liability insurance premi-
ums would be offset by immediate 
increases in costs for workers compen-
sation and other insurance benefits as 
the right of subrogation disappeared. 
If such benefits were to become the 
sole source of compensation for injured 
workers and their families, there would 
inevitably be enormous, maybe irre-
sistible political pressure to dramati-
cally increase the benefits and cover-
age of these programs.17 
For manufacturers, elimination of 
the tort remedy would result in shift-
ing money from one expense (e.g., lia-
bility insurance premiums) to another 
expense (workers compensation, med-
ical insurance, disability and other 
insurance premiums). For society as a 
whole, the consequences are more dis-
turbing because it shifts the burden of 
paying for the harm caused by defec-
tive products away from the entity 
which is most able to eliminate the 
danger in the first place. 
Manufacturers may rail against the 
imposition of strict liability in tort, but 
few would favor the most likely alter-
native to the tort system: deterrence 
through government regulation, and 
compensation through a genuinely no-
fault insurance scheme. Moreover, 
society as a whole would lose a doc-
trine that has advanced safety. 
Is America a safer place than it would 
have been without strict liability? There 
can be no doubt of it. 
There are many examples of dan-
gerous products that were only made 
safer after the manufacturer was held 
liable to a victim injured by the prod-
uct. A classic example, among literally 
hundreds, is the hot water vaporizer 
that tended to tip over, pouring scald-
ing water near sleeping children. Only 
after being held liable did the maker 
install the simple device of a secure 
lid.18 Similarly, it was liability that 
motivated the maker of drain cleaner 
to use a safe container.19 Professor Tom 
Lambert has collected many other 
instances of product liability resulting 
in product safety.20 
But by far the greatest progress 
toward a safe society is due to the pre-
ventive impact of products liability. 
Manufacturers have learned that it is 
better to build a fence at the top of the 
cliff than provide an ambulance below. 
The Conference Board survey of risk 
managers indicates a dramatic increase 
in the number of companies that have 
instituted product safety programs.21 
Even the survey of CEOs reveals that 
more than half the companies have 
improved the safety of their products 
due to the pressure of potential liabil-
ity.22 The Consumer Federation of 
America has concluded that improved 
product safety has saved billions by 
preventing injury and death.23 It is no 
exaggeration to state that strict liability 
lawsuits are primarily responsible for 
that progress. 
Chilling Development? 
In the debate over whether strict lia-
bility has been good for America, the 
question of whether it "chills techno-
logical innovation" is not particularly 
helpful. First, the question assumes that 
every decision not to develop or pro-
duce a product is a loss to society. 
Surely the decision not to produce a 
toy that fires sharp projectiles or a 
mascara that can cause blindness is not 
to be regretted. The very purpose of 
strict liability is to deter the marketing 
of unsafe products. One might as well 
ask whether laws against negligent 
operation of automobiles have a chill-
ing effect on driving. Second, the 
question overlooks the fact that 
improvements in product safety are 
themselves technological innovations. 
It is the liability incentive that leads 
companies to apply technology to 
safety. 
As noted above, strict liability does 
not demand that manufacturers pro-
duce absolutely injury-proof products. 
It only asks that, while the company 
is spending considerable sums to 
determine whether its product will sell, 
it also investigate whether the product 
could kill; that in designing a product 
that does its job well, engineers also 
focus their expertise on whether the. 
product does its job safely; that a cor-
poration investing in advertising to 
persuade consumers to buy their prod-
uct also invest a small amount in 
warning them of the dangers associ-
ated with it. Is that too much for the 
law to ask? There is absolutely no indi-
cation that manufacturers are unable 
to make reasonably safe products. 
Instead, the primary complaint made Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by the CEOs polled by the Conference 
Board is that product liability insur-
ance, even for companies with few 
claims against them, is often too 
expensive or not available at all. In 
other words, it is not product reliability 
but insurance reliability that is hind-
ering progress. 
"Competitiveness" has become a 
buzzword in these days of high trade 
deficits. So it is not surprising to find 
that term creeping into the rhetoric of 
the tort reformers. But the charge that 
strict liability hampers competitive-
ness has no basis in fact or reason. 
Trade is, of course, a two-way street. 
Half of the equation concerns imports. 
American auto, makers, for example, 
have lost a considerable share of the 
domestic market. But any loss in com-
petitiveness is not due to strict liability. 
Japanese, German and other foreign 
car makers are subject to the same strict 
liability rules as the American Big 
Three. The courtroom is a level playing 
field. 
On the other side of the equation, 
the reasons why American manufac-
turers find it difficult to export more 
goods are varied and complex. The 
notion that American products are too 
safe to be competitive borders on non-
sense. It is true that the steps manu-
facturers have taken to improve prod-
uct safety as a result of strict liability 
do add to the cost of products. How-
ever, quality and safety, like price, are 
competitive factors. It is worth noting 
that many of the auto imports sold in 
the United States are more expensive 
than American models. In addition, 
other countries, particularly the devel-
oped countries where most American 
manufactured goods are exported, also 
impose safety standards. Finally, it 
should be recognized that the types of 
products in which American manufac-
turers have become less competitive, 
such as electronics, clothing and tex-
tiles, are those which have fairly low 
product liability exposure. 
Again, the Conference Board's CEO 
survey reveals that the manufacturers' 
chief complaint is not that strict liabil-
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ity requires American goods to be 
excessively-safe. It is that their liability 
insurance premiums are excessively 
high. 
Amazingly, few manufacturers appear 
to question the justification for huge 
premium hikes or policy cancellations. 
They have adopted the mythology pro-
moted by their insurers: that the tort sys-
tem is running out of control, forcing 
insurers to charge higher premiums to 
cover their costs or cancel policies 
because the risks are unpredictable. In 
short, they have accepted as fact one of 
the most successfully promoted myths 
in public relations history: The Lawsuit 
Crisis. 
The Lawsuit Crisis Myth 
There is little doubt that product 
manufacturers have been suffering 
through an insurance crisis. Particu-
larly in the mid-1980s, premiums 
increased several hundred percent. All 
too often, insurance was not available 
at any price, even for companies that 
experienced few claims. What was the 
true cause of this crisis? 
The insurance industry has claimed 
that too many plaintiffs are suing for 
injuries, that runaway juries are 
awarding inordinately high verdicts, 
and that insurers are simply passing 
along the high cost of the tort system. 
In other words, "Blame the victims, 
blame the juries, and most especially, 
blame the lawyers." 
It is worth remembering that a sim-
ilar crisis gripped the industry in the 
mid-1970s. A presidential task force 
studied the facts and concluded that 
rate increases were far in excess of 
genuine liability. The legal study com-
missioned by the task force deter-
mined that "the volume and size of 
damage awards in all probability can-
not be considered the direct cause of 
the alleged insurance problems."24 
Moreover, "no inequitable doctrine or 
group of doctrines could produce a 
greater availability of or a lower cost 
of insurance."25 The facts demonstrate 
that the latest crisis is also not due to 
the tort system. 
The insurance industry has claimed 
so often and so loudly that Americans 
are becoming litigation-happy and that 
juries give away huge sums to any 
claimant, that there is a danger that the 
"litigation explosion" may have achieved 
the status of conventional wisdom by 
sheer repetition. Industry spokesmen 
have reinforced this percepaprvtip the 
media by distorting the facts of a few 
unusually large verdicts. The Reagan 
administration added a measure of false 
credibility to the myth by adopting it 
unquestioningly in a report prepared 
under the direction of then Attorney 
General Edwin Meese.26 The Working 
Group made no independent investi-
gation of the facts. Its conclusion that 
the number of suits is growing was based 
entirely on the increase in the federal 
court caseload. The conclusion that ver-
dicts are skyrocketing was based on sta-
tistics concerning "average" verdicts 
published by Jury Verdict Research. 
The fact is that the number of law-
suits has not been increasing, much 
faster than population growth. A report 
by the General Accounting Office con-
cluded that the statistics relied upon 
by the Working Group revealed that 
most of the growth in the caseload was 
attributable to the atypical surge of 
asbestos, bendectin and Dalkon Shield 
cases, situations in which many years 
of exposure and injury have resulted 
in a sudden wave of cases. Apart from 
those unusual cases, the products lia-
bility caseload has been increasing at 
about 4 percent annually since 1981, 
about the same rate of increase as the 
gross national product and slightly 
above the rate of population increase. 
The GAO concluded that the growth 
in products liability suits in general 
"appears to be neither accelerating nor 
explosive."27 More important, approx-
imately 95 percent of products liability 
actions are in state court where the 
National Center for State Courts has 
found that "careful examination of 
current trial data ... provides no evi-
dence to support the existence of a 
national 'litigation explosion' in the 
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state trial courts/'28 There is simply no 
reliable evidence that products liablity 
lawsuits are increasing to an extent that 
would justify increases of several 
hundred percent in liability premiums. 
The myth of runaway jury verdicts 
is equally false. The Working Group 
relied on the average verdict in a rel-
atively small number of newsmaking 
cases. In testimony before Congress, 
the chairman of Jury Verdict Research 
himself repudiated the abuse of these 
statistics. "JVR has neither asserted nor 
published any conclusions that the 
average size of jury verdicts has 
recently skyrocketed/' he testified. 
"Although verdicts, as well as many 
other items, have increased substan-
tially over the years, our studies do not 
support any claim of recently escalat-
ing jury awards/'29 
Equally significant is a closed-claim 
study by the insurance industry that 
refutes the unsupported claim that the 
largest awards are increasing the fast-
est. In a study of claims over $100,000 
(about 1 percent to 2 percent of total 
claims) including verdicts and settle-
ments, payments for bodily injury 
increased about 15 percent per year, 
compared to the average cost of living 
increase of 10 percent.30 What is cru-
cial to keep in mind is that bodily injury 
payments are primarily influenced by 
the cost of medical care, which has 
increased faster than inflation. During 
the same period, hospital costs rose an 
average of 18 percent annually, and 
gene>ftl medical costs rose 12.5 percent 
per year. Again, these increases cannot 
justify the huge hikes in premiums. Nor 
could they explain the sudden una-
vailability of insurance for many cus-
tomers. The real cause of the insurance 
crisis lies with the insurance industry 
itself. 
Cash-Flow Underwriting 
The notion that large premium 
increases necessarily reflect large 
increases in payments to plaintiffs has 
a superficial appeal to those who are 
accustomed to thinking of insurance as 
essentially an underwriting operation: 
estimating risk and collecting enough 
in premiums to cover payouts plus 
overhead and reasonable profits. 
In reality, insurers receive a substan-
tial amount of income by investing 
premium dollars. This is especially true 
in products liability, where claims may 
not be paid until many years after the 
premium has been collected. Since the 
actual demand for this type of insur-
ance is relatively static, it is often the 
investment side which drives the 
industry. As a result, liability insurers 
experience business cycles which 
reflect the investment environment in 
the economy. 
Insurers tend to magnify the effect of 
investment cycles by letting short-term 
investment opportunity, rather than risk 
assessment, set premium rates. In the 
early 1980s, for example, with the prime 
rate exceeding 20 percent, insurers 
engaged in a price war, slashing pre-
mium rates in an effort to attract more 
premium dollars to invest. Companies 
expected investment income to offset the 
fact that the premiums were potentially 
insufficient to cover anticipated liability. 
This so-called "cash flow underwriting" 
reached absurd dimensions with the 
advent of retroactive insurance. For 
example, a group of insurers wrote lia-
bility coverage for the fire at the MGM 
Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, after the hotel 
had burned down.31 As the Insurance 
Services Office reported: 
For the better part of seven years, 
the insurance industry has been 
engaged in a brutal price war. 
During the early 1980s the price 
for commercial insurance was 
decreasing, sometimes sharply, as 
insurers vied for premium dollars 
to invest at the high interest rates 
then in effect. At the time, com-
mercial customers did not com-
plain. Indeed many realized that 
commercial insurance in the 
United States was being sold at 
below cost, even when invest-
ment income was considered.32 
In 1984, interest rates plunged to 
around 9 percent. Insurers suddenly 
believed that their reserves were inad-
equate to meet anticipated liabilities 
and that investment income would no 
longer bridge the gap. What followed 
was a panic of cancellations and price 
hikes in an effort to balance the books. 
This latest cycle was made particularly 
severe by reinsurers. 
In the 1980s, an American insurer 
might sell products liability coverage 
of up to $50 million, but pay a rein-
surer to assume the liability above $10 
million. In this way, the primary 
insurer could write a greater volume 
of primary insurance and still remain 
within the 3-to-l premium to surplus 
ratio imposed by statute or sound 
accounting practice. These reinsurers 
were primarily foreign entities wholly 
outside the regulatory powers of the 
states. At one point Lloyds of London 
was writing 25 percent of the Ameri-
can reinsurance market. 
When interest rates plunged, it was 
the reinsurers, with their long-tail cov-
erage, who were affected first and 
hardest. Many defaulted on their obli-
gations. Lloyds substantially pulled out 
of the American market. The effect was 
to dramatically strain the capacity of 
the American companies, who were 
already beginning to feel the effects of 
investment shortfalls. Again, the com-
panies resorted to cancelling or reduc-
ing coverage and jacking up premiums 
to bring capacity into line with the 3-
to-1 ratio.33 
It is clear that abusive cash flow 
underwriting, especially when com-
bined with dependence on foreign 
reinsurers, turned a cyclical downturn 
into a crisis. 
There are two lessons to be learned 
from this experience. The first is that 
premium increases are strongly influ-
enced by investment returns, or, more 
precisely, anticipated return on invest-
ment of premiums. The operation oi 
the tort system has had relatively little 
impact. 
The second lesson is that the indus-
try's resoonsp tn fhp marUf ri/MAr«**t«** 
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was to protect its profits, not its policy 
holders. Businesses were hit with huge 
premium increases, reduced coverage, 
and even cancellation, so that the 
industry would not fail to increase 
profits for even a single year. In 1985, 
the property casualty industry took in 
$2.1 billion in net profits; in 1986, it 
earned $13.1 billion.34 As the General 
Accounting Office reported to Con-
gress, the industry managed to earn 
almost $75 billion between 1976 and 
1985, on which it paid virtually no 
income tax, and expected to gain $90 
billion between 1989 and 1990.35 In 
effect, the policyholders have been 
insuring the profits of the insurance 
industry. 
Not only did the property-casualty 
insurance industry manage to turn a 
crunch into a crisis with its abusive 
practices, the industry may have been 
guilty of-deliberately fomenting the 
crisis from the start. 
The Insurance Information Institute 
embarked on a $6.5 million media 
campaign to sell to the public the idea 
that the insurance crisis was really a 
lawsuit crisis.36 In this fashion, the 
industry not only deflected criticism of 
its own role in the crisis, but also cre-
ated a panic atmosphere in the state 
legislatures. Under the guise of "tort 
reform/' legislatures were enticed into 
showering special benefits on the 
healthy insurance industry that far 
surpass any bailout given to failing 
companies. 
Soon after the insurance crisis 
became part of the national conscious-
ness, there were indications that ele-
ments in the insurance industry were 
deliberately worsening the crisis in 
order to panic legislatures into adopt-
ing tort reform statutes. In June 1985, 
John J. Byrne, now Chief Executive 
Officer of Fireman's Fund, told a meet-
ing of the Casualty Actuaries of New 
York, "It is right for the industry to 
withdraw and let the pressures for 
reform build in the courts and in the 
legislatures."37 He also noted that 
"withdrawing from certain lines such 
as product liability ... will eventually 
rn 
bring home the message to state and 
federal lawmakers."38 
Tort Reform Won't Work 
A set of proposals has been pressed 
upon the legislatures and the public 
under the guise of "reforming" the tort 
system. The proposals favored by the 
CEOs in the Conference Board poll 
closely match the most commonly 
urged measures outlined in the Work-
ing Group Report. Limit non-eco-
nomic and punitive damages, abolish 
joint and several liability, abolish the 
collateral source rule, mandate peri-
odic payment of future damages, and 
limit attorney's fees. 
The most objectionable characteris-
tic of these proposals is that they limit 
the rights of victims to obtain compen-
sation for their injuries. Even if these 
provisions would alleviate the high cost 
of liability insurance, it is unconscion-
able to require the most severely 
injured persons to subsidize a benefit 
for American business. 
The fact is, however, that none of 
these proposals has any chance of 
relieving manufacturers of the burden 
of the insurance crisis. The underlying 
premise of the various proposals is that, 
by reducing the amounts that liability 
insurers must pay to injured victims, 
the insurers will save substantial sums 
that they will pass along to policy-
holders in the form of lower premi-
ums. 
Manufacturers should ask them-
selves whether the insurance industry, 
which milked huge profits from poli-
cyholders during the crisis, would be 
likely to pass along any savings 
achieved through tort reform. If past 
performance teaches anything, it is that 
this money will go directly to the 
insurance companys' coffers and stay 
there. 
Moreover, most of the proposals, 
while devastating to some injured vic-
tims, will not result in a substantial 
savings to insurers. The industry itself 
has admitted that this package of 
reforms will have little or no impact 
on claims payments.39 
More fundamentally, as demon-
strated above, there is no relation 
between the civil justice system and 
the unavailability and unaffordability 
crisis in insurance. Premiums rose in 
the mid-1970s, fell in the early 1980s, 
and rose again in the mid-1980s, a 
mirror image of the investment mar-
ket. The tort system did not causeUtese 
cycles, and changing the rules of tort 
liability will not stop them. 
Time and again, in state after state 
where tort reform was considered by the 
legislature, insurers were unwilling to 
couple their support for restrictive leg-
islation with a promise to reduce pre-
miums if the measures were enacted. In 
testimony before Congress, insurers have 
stated that enactment of restrictive tort 
bills will not result in lower rates or a 
greater availability of coverage. On this 
matter, at least, manufacturers should 
take their insurers at their word. 
Conclusion 
Strict liability for unreasonably dan-
gerous defective products has given us 
a safer society. It has done so by pro-
viding market incentives for safety, free 
from the heavy hand of government 
regulation and massive compensation 
programs. Some manufacturers are 
facing problems in developing new 
products or competing in world mar-
kets, not because the law requires 
American products to be reasonably 
safe, but because liability insurance is 
costly or unavailable. 
There is an anecdote about a drunk 
who one night dropped his keys in his 
dark doorway, but went looking for 
them under the street lamp, "because 
the light's better out here." The tort sys-
tem may be an easy target, but it is the 
wrong target. What we need to solve the 
liability insurance crisis is more light on 
the insurance industry and a willingness 
to hold that immensely important 
industry accountable for its conduct. 
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Strict Liability 
(continued from page 11} 
case was Thomas t>. Winchester,19 in 
which a druggist mislabeled a bottle of 
extract of belladonna (a deadly poison 
used in quite small quantities for heart 
trouble) as extract of dandelion, a 
harmless medicine that could be used 
in larger quantities. The plaintiff took 
a large dose and became quite ill. The 
court allowed recovery on the ground 
that the poison was imminently dan-
gerous, so that the druggist owed a 
duty to the public in general and not 
just to a person in privity with him. 
This case produced other breakaway 
decisions,11 baaed on differing ration-
ales, which were collected, analyzed 
and organized by Judge Walter R 
Sanborn in Huset v. J.L Case Threshing 
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Machine Co.12 into a set of three excep-
tions to the privity requirement: 
[(1) an] act of negligence which is 
ururdnently dangerous to the life 
or health of mankind and which 
is committed in the preparation or 
sale of an article intended to pre-
serve, destroy or affect human life, 
. . . [2] an obvious act of negli-
gence which causes injury to one 
who is invited by him to use his 
defective appliance upon the 
owner's premises, and . . . [3] an 
act of selling an article which he 
knows to be imminently danger-
ous to life or limb to another with-
out notice of its qualities. 
Huset became a new point of depar-
ture and many later decisions were 
based on the exact language of Judge 
Sanborn. 
In 1916, there came the famous case 
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.n The 
facts were similar to Wmterbottom in 
that a defective wheel of the vehicle 
(a Buick Model 10 Runabout) col-
lapsed, injuring the driver. Declaring 
that "[pjrecedents drawn from the days 
of travel by stage coach do not fit the 
conditions of travel today/' Judge Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo analyzed the earlier 
negligence cases, particularly those 
from New York,14 and concluded that 
the many exceptions to the privity rule 
had eroded it to the point that the 
exceptions had become the general 
rule. MacPherson is the classic illustra-
tion of the method by which the law 
evolves gradually until a perceptive 
judge or commentator is able to dem-
onstrate conclusively that the change 
has taken place and the exceptions are 
reversed. 
Those of us who first read the opin-
ion many years ago remember it as the 
beginning of the modern negligence 
law of products liability. In this we are 
correct, but we have been inclined to 
forget how cautious Cardozo was and 
how carefully he limited the extent of 
the change. Let me quote a few sen-
tences from his decision: 
If the nature of a thing is such that 
it is reasonably certain to place life 
and limb in peril when negligently 
made, it is then a thing of danger. 
. . . If to the element of danger 
there is added knowledge that the 
thing will be used by persons oth-
er than the purchaser, and used 
without new tests, then irrespec-
tive of contract, the manufacturer 
of the thing of danger is under a 
duty to make it carefully... .There 
must be knowledge of danger, not 
merely possible, but probable.... 
There must also be knowledge that 
in the usual course of events the 
clanger will be shared by others 
than the buyer, (italics added) 
Most of the potential limitations 
suggested by Cardozo's cautious lan-
guage have now been sloughed off. 
Thus, the requirement that "life and 
limb" be put in peril was soon regard-
ed as being met by danger of any bod-
ily injury, and eventually of any 
physical injury, even to property. The 
requirement that it be "reasonably cer-
tain" that the injured party's personal 
safety be put in peril came to be sat-
isfied by a showing that the defendant 
had created an unreasonable risk. The 
requirement that die defendant have 
"knowledge that the thing will be used 
by persons other than the purchaser" 
came to be met by a finding of mere 
f oreseeability that others might use the 
product The requirement of "knowl-
edge of danger not merely possible but 
fwobable" came to be met by simple 
oreseeability of the risk of narm. In 
other words, the potential limitations 
of MacPherson were rejected in favor 
of the general principles of negligence, 
with their customary attributes. 
Henceforth, in a negligence action for 
physical injury, lack oF privity of con-
tract, either vertical or horizontal, was 
no barrier to recovery. 
The general principles of negligence 
law were soon expanded to new situ-
ations. The maker of a component part 
of a finished product was held to the 
same duty of care as the assembler of 
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